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  1. 報告書・レポート
  2. IDE Discussion Paper
  3. 2006

Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam

https://doi.org/10.20561/00038100
https://doi.org/10.20561/00038100
56ffd344-df64-4bb4-8268-8f3a24ec10e0
名前 / ファイル ライセンス アクション
IDP000061_001.pdf 本文 (253.0 kB)
Item type アジ研テクニカルレポート / IDE Technical Report(1)
公開日 2006-07-25
タイトル
タイトル Is Group Lending A Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving High Repayment Rates?: Evidence from Field Experiments in Vietnam
言語
言語 eng
資源タイプ
資源タイプ識別子 http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh
資源タイプ technical report
ID登録
ID登録 10.20561/00038100
ID登録タイプ JaLC
著者 Kono, Hisaki

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WEKO 45079

Kono, Hisaki

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著者別名
値 高野, 久紀
抄録
内容記述タイプ Abstract
内容記述 Microfinance institutions employ various kinds of incentive schemes but estimating the effect of each scheme is not easy due to endogeneity bias. We conducted field experiments in Vietnam to capture the role of joint liability, monitoring, cross-reporting, social sanctions, communication and group formation in borrowers’ repayment behavior. We find that joint liability contracts cause serious free-riding problems, inducing strategic default and lowering repayment rates. When group members observe each others’ investment returns, participants are more likely to choose strategic default. Even after introducing a cross-reporting system and/or penalties among borrowers, the default rates and the ratios of participants who chose strategic default under joint liability are still higher than those under individual lending. We also find that joint liability lending often failed to induce mutual insurance among borrowers. Those who had been helped or who had repaid a little in the previous round were more likely to default strategically and repay a little again in the current round and those who paid large amounts were always the same individuals.
権利
権利情報 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構(ジェトロ)アジア経済研究所 / Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
収録情報 IDE Discussion Paper
en : IDE Discussion Paper

巻 61, 発行日 2006-05-01
出版者
出版者 Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO)
著者版フラグ
出版タイプ VoR
出版タイプResource http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
日本十進分類法
主題Scheme NDC
主題 338
JEL分類
主題Scheme Other
主題 JEL:F15 - Economic Integration
JEL分類
主題Scheme Other
主題 JEL:O14 - Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
JEL分類
主題Scheme Other
主題 JEL:O30 - General
地域/国名
位置情報(自由記述) ベトナム
キーワード(LSH)
主題Scheme Other
主題 Microfinance
キーワード(LSH)
主題Scheme Other
主題 Joint liability
キーワード(LSH)
主題Scheme Other
主題 Free-riding
キーワード(LSH)
主題Scheme Other
主題 Vietnam
キーワード(LSH)
主題Scheme Other
主題 マイクロファイナンス
キーワード(LSH)
主題Scheme Other
主題 ベトナム
フォーマット
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 application/pdf
DIG_NO
内容記述タイプ Other
内容記述 IDP000061_001
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