WEKO3
アイテム
Political conditions for fair elections
https://doi.org/10.20561/00037981
https://doi.org/10.20561/0003798166ca9935-3f37-4aaa-872f-175cd5bba114
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
本文 (408.3 kB)
|
|
| Item type | アジ研テクニカルレポート / IDE Technical Report(1) | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2008-12-15 | |||||
| タイトル | ||||||
| タイトル | Political conditions for fair elections | |||||
| 言語 | ||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||
| ID登録 | ||||||
| ID登録 | 10.20561/00037981 | |||||
| ID登録タイプ | JaLC | |||||
| 著者 |
Kawanaka, Takeshi
× Kawanaka, Takeshi |
|||||
| 著者別名 | ||||||
| 値 | 川中, 豪 | |||||
| 抄録 | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||
| 内容記述 | Democracy is not necessarily consolidated simply by the introduction of formal democratic institutions. It is often observed in new democracies that democratic institutions are neglected and eroded in actual practice. Particularly, electoral fraud committed by a ruler is one of the main problems in this regard. This paper deals with two questions, (1) under what conditions does a ruler have an incentive to hold fair elections (or to rig elections), and (2) what makes a ruler prefer to establish an independent election governing institution? Assuming that a ruler prefers to maintain her power, basically she has an incentive to rig elections in order to be victorious in the political competition. A ruler, however, faces the risk of losing power if the opposition stages successful protests on a sufficiently large scale. If opponents are able to pose a credible threat to a ruler, she will have an incentive to hold fair elections. The problem is that information on electoral fraud is not shared by every player in the game. For the opposition, imperfect information deepens their coordination problems. Imperfect information, on the other hand, in some cases causes a problem for a ruler. If the opposition is sufficiently cohesive and have little tolerance of cheating, even unverified suspicions of fraud may trigger menacing protests. In such a case, a ruler has an incentive to establish an independent election commission to avoid unnecessary collisions by revealing the nature of the elections. | |||||
| 権利 | ||||||
| 権利情報 | Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア経済研究所 / Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp | |||||
| 収録情報 |
IDE Discussion Paper en : IDE Discussion Paper 巻 181, 発行日 2008-11-01 |
|||||
| 出版者 | ||||||
| 出版者 | Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO) | |||||
| 著者版フラグ | ||||||
| 出版タイプ | VoR | |||||
| 出版タイプResource | http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 | |||||
| 日本十進分類法 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | NDC | |||||
| 主題 | 314.8 | |||||
| JEL分類 | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | JEL: | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Democracy | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Election | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Governance | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Democratic consolidation | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | Institution | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 民主主義 | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 選挙 | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 統治 | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 民主主義の定着 | |||||
| キーワード(LSH) | ||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||
| 主題 | 制度 | |||||
| フォーマット | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | application/pdf | |||||
| DIG_NO | ||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||
| 内容記述 | IDP000181_001 | |||||
