{"created":"2023-07-27T12:34:08.850732+00:00","id":37931,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"0754f305-6ef7-4f67-8b6f-adc27f505bdc"},"_deposit":{"created_by":19,"id":"37931","owners":[19],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"37931"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:ir.ide.go.jp:00037931","sets":["3552:4093:4101"]},"author_link":["44850"],"item_14_biblio_info_6":{"attribute_name":"収録情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2010-06","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicVolumeNumber":"240","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"IDE Discussion Paper"},{"bibliographic_title":"IDE Discussion Paper","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_14_description_21":{"attribute_name":"フォーマット","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"application/pdf","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_14_description_23":{"attribute_name":"DIG_NO","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"IDP000240_001","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_14_description_3":{"attribute_name":"抄録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"The article examines how the power distribution between the executive and the legislature under the Presidential system affects policy outcomes. We focus in particular on the presidential veto, both package and partial. Using a simple game theory model, we show that the presidential partial veto generally yields a result in favor of the President, but that such effects vary depending on the reversion points of the package veto and the Congress's possible use of sanctions against the President. The effects of the Presidential partial veto diminish if the reversion point meets certain conditions, or if the Congress has no power to impose sufficient sanctions on the President when the President revises the outcome\nex-post. To clarify and explain the model, we present the case of budget making in the Philippines between 1994 and 2008. In the Philippines, the presidential partial veto has been bringing expenditure programs closer to the President's ideal point within what may be called the Congress's indifference curve. The Congress, however, has not always passed budget bills and from time to time has carried over the previous year's budget, in years when the budget deficit increased. This is the situation that the policy makers cannot retrieve from the reversion point.","subitem_description_type":"Abstract"}]},"item_14_geolocation_18":{"attribute_name":"地域/国名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_geolocation_place":[{"subitem_geolocation_place_text":"フィリピン"}]}]},"item_14_identifier_registration":{"attribute_name":"ID登録","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_identifier_reg_text":"10.20561/00037926","subitem_identifier_reg_type":"JaLC"}]},"item_14_publisher_7":{"attribute_name":"出版者","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_publisher":"Institute of Developing Economies　(IDE-JETRO)　"}]},"item_14_rights_5":{"attribute_name":"権利","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_rights":"Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア経済研究所 / Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp"}]},"item_14_subject_16":{"attribute_name":"日本十進分類法","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"312.248","subitem_subject_scheme":"NDC"}]},"item_14_subject_19":{"attribute_name":"主題(図書館用)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_subject":"Philippines","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Internal politics","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Budget and accounts","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Institutions","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Democracy","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Policy","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"},{"subitem_subject":"Budget","subitem_subject_scheme":"Other"}]},"item_14_text_32":{"attribute_name":"著者別名","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"川中, 豪"}]},"item_14_version_type_15":{"attribute_name":"著者版フラグ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_version_resource":"http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85","subitem_version_type":"VoR"}]},"item_creator":{"attribute_name":"著者","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Kawanaka, Takeshi"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{"nameIdentifier":"44850","nameIdentifierScheme":"WEKO"}]}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2017-04-10"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"IDP000240_001.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"361.3 kB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_note","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"本文","url":"https://ir.ide.go.jp/record/37931/files/IDP000240_001.pdf"},"version_id":"c8fe4753-5af5-4117-b3b7-cd0799f84567"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"eng"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"technical report","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh"}]},"item_title":"Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making"}]},"item_type_id":"14","owner":"19","path":["4101"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"公開日","attribute_value":"2010-09-09"},"publish_date":"2010-09-09","publish_status":"0","recid":"37931","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["Political institutions and policy outcomes : effects of presidential vetoes on budget making"],"weko_creator_id":"19","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-07-27T15:43:01.879500+00:00"}