

IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated
to stimulate discussions and critical comments

IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 850

Measuring the Influence of Executive Heads in International Organizations –Illustrative Analysis on the Effects of Democratic Density–

Tomoko TAKAHASHI, Sanae SUZUKI and Taku
YUKAWA *

March, 2022

Abstract

This paper focuses on the influence of Executive Heads (EHs) of international organizations (IOs) and introduces a newly created dataset that calibrates two groups of factors that can alter the extent of their influence: (i) institutional factors and (ii) personal traits. All factors are measured for across eighteen multi-issue IOs for the years 1980–2015. Secondly, this paper conducts a descriptive analysis to show that the dataset can speak to a wide range of topics on IOs. Thirdly, an illustrative analysis demonstrates the dataset's ability to support deep, fine grained studies and also yields interesting findings in its own right. Specifically, we show that democratic IOs confer more authority to EHs, while autocratic ones show a preference for intergovernmentalism. This is in line with outcomes related to personal traits, where EHs in democratic IOs possess expertise on institutional policy-making, and those in autocratic IOs have domestic authority to some extent, which dovetails with the average age of the EHs. The paper thus offers a significant contribution to scholarly research on IOs; despite the increasing attention paid to the autonomous capabilities of IO secretariats, there have only been sporadic case studies on EHs, and our dataset enables systematic research on these important actors.

Keywords: international organizations, executive heads, dataset, institutional factors, personal traits, Personal Biography Approach, democratic density

JEL classification: [F53](#), [F55](#), [F59](#)

* Tomoko Takahashi: PhD Candidate, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo /Research Fellowship for Young Scientists (DC2), Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Email: tomoko-takahashi7@g.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp.

Sanae Suzuki: Associate Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, Email: suzuki@global.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp.

Taku Yukawa: Associate Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo, Email: yukawa@waka.cu-tokyo.ac.jp.

The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998. The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views expressed within.

INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN

©2022 by author(s)

No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the author(s).

Introduction

The field of International Relations had traditionally imagined bureaucrats in international organizations to be marginal actors unworthy of sustained scholarly attention. However, recent scholars who pursued the topic discovered that, to some extent, bureaucrats possess unique preferences, autonomy and influence (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hawkins et al. 2006; Reinalda and Verbeek 2003). Much of this theorization is pursued under the frameworks of social constructivism and principal-agent theory, and quantitative empirical analyses are conducted with newly constructed datasets (Haftel and Thompson 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2015; Novasad and Werker 2019).

While international organizations (hereinafter IOs) themselves have come to be recognized as actors, and theoretical and empirical research on secretariats is seeing progress, research on the executive heads (hereinafter EHs) lags behind. Although their significance was pointed out in the earlier studies on institutions (Cox 1969), research on EHs has been sporadic at best. Furthermore, most such research focuses on specific individuals (Chesterman 2007; Chorev 2012), rather than on EHs as an analytic category. It is only very recently that scholars have attempted to theorize about when and how EHs exert influence (Hall and Woods 2018; Schroeder 2014). As mentioned above, although there are thick case studies on particular IOs and specific EHs, the reality is that there is a paucity of comparative analyses. The main backdrop of this is that we lack datasets on EHs. While there are datasets on IO secretariats (Haftel and Thompson 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2015; Novasad and Werker 2019), the first dataset tailored specifically to EHs is presented in this paper.

The dataset introduced here bifurcates the conditions in which EHs exercise leadership. The conditions include institutional variables that constrain leadership, and personal ones that relate to individual capacities and value systems. The dataset is populated with indices derived from EHs in eighteen multi-issue IOs during the period 1980–2015. This dataset can contribute to research on a wide array of questions, and is expected to function as a certain kind of

infrastructure for future research on international institutions.

This paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, it reviews the literature related to the issue of agency of IO constituents, such as secretariats and EHs, and highlights the new dataset's potential contributions to theoretical and empirical research. Secondly, it formally introduces the new dataset and elaborates twenty-nine specific indices, of which sixteen describe institutional characteristics and thirteen are associated with personal traits. Thirdly, a first-cut analysis aggregates the annual data of all indices, which enables some thumbnail theorizing about their tendencies. This is followed by a first-cut analysis that focuses on two specific indices, one institutional and one personal, that shows our dataset's ability to support analyses over both time and IOs. Fourthly, it presents an illustrative analysis that examines how an IO's democratic density affects the extent to which its EHs can exert influence. Finally, The general arguments and findings are summarized in the conclusion.

1. Literature Review

While exciting new research supports the idea that IOs or their secretariats have their own agency (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Hawkins et al. 2006; Reinalda and Verbeek 2003), the amount of research on EHs remains small (Hall and Woods 2018: 866). Although Cox (1969: 205) pointed out the significance of EHs as early as 1969 explaining that “[t]he quality of executive leadership may prove to be the most critical single determinant of the growth in scope and authority of international organization”, subsequent generations of scholars have not chosen to pursue this line of research.

Instead, secretariats have persistently been seen as monolithic actors, and no attention was paid specifically to EHs (Schroeder 2014; Graham 2014; Yi-Chong and Weller 2008). In reality, secretariats are collective and not monolithic agents. Furthermore, like domestic governance structures, secretariats are organized hierarchically. When one begins with this premise, the corollary that EH leadership matters seems to follow naturally (Yi-Chong and Weller

2008: 39).

However, does EH leadership actually matter, and how have the earlier studies evaluated this? Moravcsik (1999) finds that EHs cannot exert independent influence. They face idiosyncratic difficulties in that they have to coordinate the stakes not only within the secretariat but also among the member countries (Reinalda and Verbeek 2003). Furthermore, states exert control over IOs by monitoring them and forcing them to submit periodic reports for surveillance by mechanisms called “police patrol oversight” and “fire alarm oversight” (Nielson and Tierney 2003: 242; Pollack 2003: 42). Regarding EHs as individuals, Hall and Woods (2018) point out three constraints on their agency: legal-political constraints regarding formal rules on decision-making processes or EH authority; budgetary or human resources constraints; and bureaucratic constraints such as organizational culture. Moreover, an IO’s member states may choose EHs without “bold ideas” in the first place (Schroeder 2014).

Rather than study EHs as a group, scholars have explored the experiences of ‘exceptional’ individuals who exerted tremendous influence on and through their respective IOs. The list includes Dag Hammarskjöld and Kofi Annan of the United Nations (UN) (Chesterman 2007), Robert McNamara of the World Bank (Kraske et al. 1996), Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Betts 2012), James P. Grant of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (Beigbeder 2001), Raul Prebisch of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Finger and Magarinos-Ruchat 2003), Maurice Strong of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (Ivanova 2007), and Halfdan Mahler and Harlem Gro Brundtland of the World Health Organization (WHO) (Chorev 2012). They have been depicted as a handful of great EHs, despite the restrictions imposed by their institutional environments.

As episodes accumulate, it is becoming clear that EHs as a group are not just puppets of member countries or great powers, and we are finally seeing attempts to theorize about their behavior (Hall and Woods 2018; Schroeder 2014). EHs may in fact not have much influence so

long as they only manage the secretariat, or limit their efforts to carrying out administrative tasks, but EHs sometimes play political or norm entrepreneurial roles (Chesterman 2016). Specifically, EHs can realize their policy preferences by creating recommendations or strategic plans controlling the flow of information (Gordenker 1993), holding formal or informal meetings with its member countries, and proactively framing the discourse for the secretariat staff (Schroeder 2014: 348).

Meanwhile, it is understandable that not all EHs can always exert influence. This is exactly why it is necessary to understand the conditions under which they can, which is the research question that drives the illustrative analysis presented below. Two points have been made regarding this issue. The first emphasizes structural or environmental factors that align with the various kinds of constraints mentioned above. Most importantly, the kinds of authority that are formally conferred on the EH matter. For example, rights to set the agenda, sponsor drafts in the budgetary process, and recruit and dismiss their staff can have a great impact on an EH's ability to pursue his or her own goals (Hooghe and Marks 2015; Bauer and Ege 2016; Graham 2014: 370).

EHs also might exert influence by taking advantage of agency slack (Tamm and Snidal 2014; Hawkins et al. 2006; Graham 2014). Specifically, EHs can act more autonomously during moments of uncertainty and disagreement, either regarding what policies an IO should pursue, or how agreed policies should be implemented (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chorev 2012).

In sum, EH theorization is showing signs of progress, but empirical analysis is proceeding slowly. In particular, datasets are underdeveloped and there is a lack of comparative analysis. Like the studies on EHs, most work on secretariats takes the form of case studies. These can reveal the ability of individual secretariats to exert influence in certain ways, but cannot identify the mechanism or conditions under which such influence is exercised. (Ege et al. 2020: 558–559; Bauer and Ege 2016: 2016). While studies on secretariats still have the datasets as mentioned above (Haftel and Thompson 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2015; Novasad and Werker

2019), and comparative analyses are conducted, the same quality of analysis cannot be expected from EH studies.

Furthermore, existing studies have unduly emphasized constraints on EH influence, but the question of which conditions *facilitate* EH influence is rarely addressed. While Schechter (1987: 197) pointed out in 1987 that effective executive leadership requires both favorable organizational characteristics and favorable personal factors, subsequent research has been biased towards the wide range of constraints to such leadership, and has played down the relevance of personal factors. As an exception, Kille and Scully (2003) measure personal characteristics with content analysis regarding the EHs of IOs, but their targets are limited to the United Nations and the European Union.

In response to these shortcomings, this study has created a dataset that includes both personal traits of EHs and institutional constraints on them. Through descriptive and illustrative analyses, we demonstrate that this dataset can be understood to be a kind of infrastructure for future studies on EHs.

2. Introduction to the New Dataset

This paper introduces a newly created dataset that consists of two types of information on EHs in IOs: information on institutional factors and that on personal traits. Data on eighteen multi-issue-area IOs has been assembled.¹

¹ We define IOs as “formal intergovernmental, multilateral, and bureaucratic organizations established to further cooperation among states” as defined by Tallberg et al. (2020: 628, footnote 2), and take up the eighteen IOs selected by the authors. Their data on democratic density are used in Section 4 of this paper. The eighteen IOs are as follows and the years next to their abbreviations represent the year when their secretariats were established (and not when the organization was established); Arab Maghreb Union (AMU, 1989), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC, 1993), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1976), African Union (AU, 1963), Andean Community (CAN, 1997), Caribbean Community (CARICOM, 1973), Council of Europe (COE, 1949), The Commonwealth (COMW. 1965), European Commission (EU, 1958), the Nordic Council (NC, 1971), Organization of American States (OAS, 1970), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1961), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC, 1969), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, 1990), Pacific Islands Forum (PIF, 1973), Southern African Development Community (SADC, 1981), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO, 2002),

An existing study has pointed out that IOs in the field of technical issue areas are more likely to concede authority to secretariats or EHs, while conversely, those in the field of security that incurs high sovereignty costs do not (Pollack 2003: 27). Therefore, in order to eliminate issue-specific factors and effects, and to focus on factors related to EHs, this paper takes up multi-issue IOs. Another reason for the choice of the eighteen IOs is that they are not biased towards specific regions, but cover the globe rather uniformly.

Needless to say, the eighteen IOs do not represent an exhaustive list of all multi-issue area IOs on earth. However, we are following the choice by Tallberg et al. (2020), whose dataset compiles the liberal norm commitment specifically by multi-issue IOs for the first time. This allows future research to combine our dataset on EHs with their data on norms to test a variety of hypotheses. This section elaborates the respective indices.

The dataset covers the years 1980 to 2015². The unit of analysis of the institutional factors is IO-year, meaning that institutional factors were calibrated every year that the IO secretariat was existent; years when it did not exist are denoted with an 'NA'. The unit of analysis of the personal traits is IO-EH-year, although all individual characteristics except age only differ by IO-EH. This dataset captures 128 EHs in total³.

(1) Index: Institutional Factors

This section explains the institutional indices, which indicate the authority or constraints that the IO member states officially or virtually confer on the EHs. They serve as proxies for the extent of

and the United Nations (UN, 1945). With regard to IOs that experienced reforms including the change of names, we made sure that there was continuity, and this paper will call the IOs with their latest names for the sake of convenience.

² We chose to cover the years 1980 to 2015, because it is only after the 1980s that more than half of the eighteen IOs possessed secretariats. Before the 1960s, only 7 IOs had secretariats, but 5 created secretariats in the 1970s. In other words, our dataset tries to avoid creating too many NAs for fear the descriptive data become distorted.

³ This is the cumulative total number of people. However, the dataset captures Rasli Noor's experience as the EH of APEC and ASEAN separately, as well as how Mahe Tupounina of PIF had become its EH for two different times.

autonomy of the EH from the IO's member states. As institutional factors often affect an EH's ability to exert influence, we provide information on the three aspects of such factor.

To begin with, we focused on sources of authority that enable EHs to exert influence on the substance of IO policies (1-1, 1-2). Secondly, there is authority regarding the institutional resources that the EHs can make use of in exerting their authority regarding the first aspect (Brown 2010). Specifically, we gathered data on the EH representational roles, their ability to appoint staff, and their ability to control the IO's budget (1-3, 1-4, 1-5, 1-6). We expect that when these institutional resources are more available, EHs are more likely to exert influence over the policies of their IOs. Finally, we created indices regarding IO rules on appointing their EHs (1-7). They do not explain EH authority itself, but are factors that affect EHs' exercise of authority. The respective indices were compiled in a binary format to indicate whether such authority or rules exist in the IOs or not, and the information derived from a close textual analysis of each IO's treaty of establishment (if any), constitution, by-laws and other relevant documents. Phraseology of the texts varied from document to document, which necessitated hand coding that took contextual issues into careful consideration.

1-1. Agenda-Setting

Agenda-setting functions are always taken up in studies on the delegation of authority (Hooghe and Marks 2015: 309, 315). Furthermore, it is often one of the elements that adds to the authority of the EHs (Haftel and Hofmann 2017: 486, 491; Hooghe et al. 2017: 110-112), together with their role on implementation as described below. As alluded to above, most earlier studies understood both agenda-setting and implementation authority as being conferred (or not) upon the "organization" such as the secretariat or other internal organizations of the IO. By contrast, this paper focuses on whether these types of authority are conferred upon EHs (Bauer and Ege 2016: 1028; Hall and Woods 2018: 874).

Here, authority on agenda-setting was categorized into two indices: proposition and

coordination. Firstly, (i) the authority to propose refers not only to the everyday proposal of concrete drafts in the decision-making of policies, but also to the right to convene meetings in urgent situations. As to (ii) the authority on coordination, although it is concomitant with the authority to propose, it was captured separately by focusing on whether EHs can reflect their own opinions in the agreements by reconciling the stakes of discordant member states and/ or respective organizations.

As to coding, we created a binary variable that represents authority conferment with a “1” and its absence with a “0” regarding (i) proposition and (ii) coordination. In assessing the documents, wording that indicated the initiation of policies, proposition of the agenda and submission of proposals by the EHs was interpreted as suggesting the existence of the authority of proposition, and texts that identified an EH role in decision-making coordination was seen as a sign of the authority of coordination.

1-2. Monitoring and Dispute Settlement

Authority related to the policy implementation is often taken up together with the authority on agenda-setting as an index regarding the conferment of authority. This refers to the functions (i) to monitor whether the member states actually implement the policies agreed upon by them; and (ii) to participate in dispute settlement procedures when they are not complied with in some cases (Hooghe et al. 2017: 112–113). Since compliance/ non-compliance outcomes of agreements and dispute settlements often become reference points for future policies, EH influence on these outcomes projects also into the contents of future policies. This study subdivides implementation authority into the rights (i) to monitor, including the right to gain comprehension of the extent to which the agreements are being implemented, and (ii) to settle disputes, which points to the ability to participate in such procedures when conflicts arise out of (perceived) noncompliance.

As to coding, we created a binary variable for the respective types of authority, where “1” indicates the conferment of such functions and “0” shows the opposite. When text related to

the implementation of monitoring or reviewing processes was found in the documents, it was seen that the monitoring functions were conferred on the EH, and terms on the mediation of conflicts and involvement in dispute settlements were interpreted as the fact that the authority to participate in dispute settlements was conferred on the EH.

1-3. Budgetary Control

One of the most important policies and agreements of IOs concerns budgetary issues. Budgetary designs on the amount of resources devoted to different types of collective activities constitute one of the important policy formulations. The authority (or not) of an EH to propose concrete plans on budgetary allocation is significant (Hooghe and Marks 2015: 309, 315; Bayerlein et al. 2020: 6). Therefore, we created indices that indicate whether the EH possesses the authority to propose the drafts for (i) the budget of the IO as a whole, or (ii) that of the IO secretariat. While many IOs confer authority for (ii), EHs who possess the authority for (i) have a much greater ability to exert influence on their IO's activities.

We coded the indices with a binary variable, where "1" indicates the existence of the authority to plan the budgetary draft of the IO as a whole or that of the secretariat, and "0" signifies its absence. Text that explains how EHs present an annual budget for approval or prepare an annual budget of the secretariat were referred to in assessing the existence of such authority.

1-4. Appointment of the Secretariat Staff

When the secretariat is taken as a stand-alone actor, it may be intuitive to presume that the authority to appoint secretariat staff is conferred on the EH as the chief of the organization. However, in reality, because the secretariats are internal organizations and EHs are appointed by the member states of the IOs, EH authority to appoint or dismiss the secretariat staff is not self-evident (Hall and Woods 2018: 869, 877-878; Brown 2010: 148-149). This study assessed not only the ability of an EH to appoint the secretariat staff, but also their ability to employ part-time

staff such as consultants. As to coding, organizations whose documents and websites indicate that their EHs possess such appointment authority were noted with a “1”; otherwise, with a “0”.

1-5. Representation

This section refers to the authority of an EH to represent and express the opinions of the IO vis-à-vis third parties. Little attention has been paid to the authority of representation due to its distant relation to policy legislation. However, the ability to enhance his or her presence outside of the IO by exerting such authority may augment an EH’s influence on decision-making within the IO. Furthermore, by representing the organization personally, an EH may be better able to regulate the assessment of the IO by external actors. This index enables research on these indirect effects. Referring to descriptions regarding the representation of the organizations, this index was coded with a “1” when the authority to represent was conferred upon the EH, and “0” otherwise.

1-6. Research Function

EHs can make use of institutions that allow for research on policy-input as another type of institutional resource. Earlier studies have pointed out that the ability to utilize outcomes of research supports the extent of autonomy of the secretariat, and earlier studies often use the existence of research units or equivalent departments within the secretariat as a proxy for this ability (Bauer and Ege 2016: 1027; Haftel and Hofmann 2017: 491). We expect that the same is true of EHs; an EH with direct access to research resources is better able to exert influence over a wide range of institutional activities. For example, it is likely that the extent to which EHs can propose substantial drafts upon policy legislation and validate the monitoring of agreement implementation correlates closely with the EH’s ability to utilize outcomes of research, including research related to the monitoring of agreement implementation. Referring to the organization charts or other relevant descriptions of the secretariat, this index was coded with a “1” if it could be taken that a department for research exists, and with a “0” otherwise.

1-7. Appointment Rules

EHS are basically appointed by inter-governmental meetings such as summits of state leaders or conferences of foreign ministers that consist of all member states of the IO in question. Their terms of office vary, and one IO (the NC) does not stipulate the term (Hooghe et al. 2017: 54–56). Rules on appointment can affect the opportunities for EHS to exert all types of authority. For example, EHS whose length of tenure is short and reappointment is not allowed have less opportunity to exert influence, even if many types of authority are conferred on them. Conversely, if terms can be prolonged or reappointment is possible, such constraints are relaxed. Six database indices capture the traits of EH selection rules.

To begin with, we captured the rules of EH selection. It shows whether EHS are selected (i) by open recruitment and/or (ii) by rotation among the member states. We only found one case with (i) open recruitment rules. When the IO did not even fit into the rotation category, we noted down whether the EHS are selected (iii) with sensitivity to nationality, or with (iv) deference to specific member states, and particularly the countries that are seen as regional hegemon or regional powers within the IO. The selection process as recorded in official documents was triangulated with “trend” data on the countries of origin of selected EHS; “trends” can reveal unwritten rules or shared understandings among member states.

With regard to coding, (i) open recruitment was coded with a “1” if there was a clear description about such appointment rules, and with a “0” otherwise. On (ii) the adoption of rotation rules, it was coded with a “1” either when the official documents include terms such as “based on rotation” and “based on principle of equitable geographical distribution”, or when the list of the EHS’ countries of origin demonstrate that rotation is the unwritten rule; IOs that did not follow these conditions were coded with a “0”.

Regarding whether nationalities were taken into account during EH selection (iii), all IOs that follow the (ii) rotational rule explained were denoted with a “1”. In addition, IOs that had

other kinds of nationality stipulations, such as those that say EHs and deputy EHs must be of different nationalities, were denoted with a “1”. IOs with no such stipulations or customs were coded with a “0”.

Appointment index (iv) captures whether specific member states, and particularly the countries that are seen as regional hegemon or regional powers within the IO in question, produce EHs. This decision rule is never specified in official documents, but certain trends revealed themselves during an analysis of the origin of successive EHs. If we saw a bias towards specific member states as producers of an IO’s EH, the index was coded with a “1”, and “0” otherwise.

A fifth appointment-related index, (v) Stipulated Term, refers to the length of the term of the EH stipulated by the IO. (As a caveat, this can be different from the number of years an EH actually served for.) This variable simply codes the stipulated number of years. Finally, appointment index (vi) captures whether EH reappointment is allowed (“1”) or not (“0”).

Table 1: Summary of the Indices for Institutional Factors

1. Institutional Factors	Indices	Variable
1-1 Agenda-Setting	(i) Proposition of the Agenda	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Coordinating Act that Reconciles Conflicting Stakes	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
1-2 Monitoring and Dispute Settlement	(i) Monitoring IO Policy Implementation by Member States	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Participation in Dispute Settlement Procedures When Non-Compliance Occurs	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
1-3 Budgetary Control	(i) Proposition of the Budget of the IO as a Whole	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Proposition of the Budget of the IO secretariat	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
1-4 Appointment of the Secretariat Staff	(i) Appointment of the Secretariat Staff	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
1-5 Representation	(i) Representation of the IO	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
1-6 Research Function	(i) Research Function	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
1-7 Appointment Rules	(i) Open Recruitment	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Rotation Rules	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(iii) Consideration of Nationality	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(iv) Selection from Regional Hegemon/Powers	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(v) Stipulated Term	Number of Years
	(vi) Reappointment	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
EH Authority	(i) EH Authority as the Sum of the Blue Indices	Numerical

Finally, Table 1 above summarizes the institutional factors, their indices, and their measurements. In order to have a better overview of the extent to which the different IOs confer authority on the EHs, a single “authority” variable was defined and calculated. This variable represents the sum, for each IO, every year, of the eight highlighted indices that refer directly to the extent of EH authority. The authority of budgetary proposition with regard to the budget of the IO secretariat (1-3, (ii)) is eliminated from the “authority” variable, because its scope condition is slightly different from calibrating the influence of EHs on the IOs as a whole.

(2) Index: Personal Traits

The next set of indices are unique: they address personal traits of EHs. Our work is premised on Krčmaric et al.’s (2020) Personal Biography Approach (PBA). Moving beyond the so-called “great man approach”, PBA begins with a general expectation that “the personal attributes and life experiences of individual leaders affect important political outcomes in systematic, predictable ways The characteristics and prior experiences of political elites have meaningful effects on their behavior” (Krčmaric et al. 2020:134-35). Most PBA studies have focused on individual national leaders; our innovation is to apply this approach to a new analytic category: the EHs of IOs.

With regards to coding, we searched for any information available about the EH of interest, and noted down all the resources as well as why such interpretation was consolidated when necessary. Information was more easily obtained for the EHs of later years than those of the early 80s, and in case it was impossible to discern the index, the indices were noted with NAs.

2-1. Past Job Experiences in the Same IO

A variety of career paths can lead to the position of EH of an IO. The careers of some EHs were of no apparent relevance to the IOs they came to head, while others had gained potentially valuable experience by working in one or more positions in an IO before they undertook their

leadership role.

Prior experience in an IO can be important for two reasons, each of which is captured by our index. Firstly, such experience molds the policy preferences of the EH, and it is contended that having worked in the same IO creates a compatible preference of the EH with that of the IO secretariat (Bauer and Ege 2016: 1027). Secondly, EHs that have personal ties with the bureaucrats of the secretariat, or those that are familiar with the organizational culture of the secretariat should be able to smoothly mobilize them upon promoting their own policy within the secretariat.

With regard to coding, the first index on (i) whether the EH has job experiences in the past at the same IO, is noted with a “1” if the leader has worked in the IO at any point before becoming its leader, and with a “0” otherwise. The second index on (ii) whether the EH was elevated from the deputy EH of the same IO, limits the temporal range and is noted with a “1” only when the EH was a deputy EH right before it became the EH, and with a “0” otherwise.

2-2. Job Experiences Abroad/ Job Experiences in Other IOs

In parallel with the above-mentioned indices, (i) if the EHs have worked in locations outside their countries of origin, and/or (ii) if they have experienced working in IOs other than the one that they serve as the EH, such factors may help broaden the international network of the EH.

If the EH in question had worked overseas for at least once, (i) the first index on overseas job experience was coded with a “1”, and with a “0” otherwise. So long as the job happened geographically abroad, the case was coded with a “1”. Secondly, (ii) the index on past job experiences in other IOs is also binary, and is noted with a “1” if the EH has such experience, and with a “0” otherwise. The “past” can refer to any point in time as long as it happened before the EH undertook its role.

2-3. Minister Experience/ State Head Experience

If the EHs have experienced the role of a (i) cabinet-level minister (including (ii) foreign minister) and/or the (iii) head of state, such as the prime minister or the president in their domestic context, they can be expected to exert a certain amount of influence as EH.

The IO decision-making process is driven by head-of-state summits and the foreign minister meetings where summit agendas are prepared. Therefore, an EH with experience as a minister, and as a foreign minister in particular, is much more likely to get his or her voice heard in the moment of decision-making. For example, Surin Pitsuwan, who served as the ASEAN's EH from 2008 to 2012, was a former foreign minister of Thailand, and was the very first EH with such experience. It is often pointed out that this fact has influenced the consensus building of ASEAN. For example, although no public authority was attached to the ASEAN Secretary General regarding the 2008 cyclone damages in Myanmar, as well as on disaster management, Surin was able to lead ASEAN's humanitarian aid and liaise with the international community (Suzuki 2021). Although Surin's statements at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting were democratic ones that were hard to swallow for some foreign ministers, it was still difficult for them to ignore his remarks.

The three indices under this banner are coded with a "1" if the EHs have experience as (i) ministers, (ii) foreign ministers and (iii) state heads, and with a "0" otherwise. By definition, all EHs who had been (ii) foreign ministers also had been (i) ministers in general, and are coded with a "1" in both categories. Finally, (iii) head of state is counted regardless of the title associated with this position, which is usually "prime minister" or "president".

2-4. Expertise

Expertise is regarded as another source of influence (Cox 1969: 210). For example, Robert McNamara's success at the World Bank has been attributed partly to his professional background in finance (Schechter 1987: 202).

Index (i) measures whether the EH in question has an experience as a lawyer, and (ii) captures experience as a scholar; these were coded with a “1” if true, and with a “0” otherwise.

As to the meaning of expertise, it matters because leaders with stronger expertise are more likely to realize their goals in the IO. Therefore, by (i) “lawyer”, this paper refers not only to those that practice law as a profession (judge, prosecutor, attorney), but also to scholars who specialize in law. Legal scholars are coded with a “1” in both indices. The reason for taking up legal profession rather than those in other disciplines is that IOs work primarily with norms and rules, regardless of the issue areas they focus on, and therefore possessing expertise in law is of great advantage. By (ii) “scholar”, our dataset considers those with experiences of having worked in the academia as a researcher and/or an instructor, regardless of what academic credentials they have received themselves.

2-5. Gender

Many PBA-based studies have pointed out that gender differences can influence the policies of the actors. For example, Paxton et al. (2016) claim that female politicians are more likely to prioritize policy areas like healthcare, education, family and housing. This was taken as a binary variable, where “1” indicates that the EH was a male, and “0” indicates that the leader was a female.

2-6. Age

Although age itself does not reveal much, it may be associated with relevant EH characteristics when combined with career-related indicators. For example, a relatively old EH with a career as a minister in domestic politics may indicate the IO’s preference for someone with political authority even if outside the context of multilateralism.

As noted above, the unit of analysis of personal traits is IO-EH-year, and therefore the database allows for derivation of EH ages throughout the entire period 1980–2015. This capability

is used in the illustrative analysis of this paper, where the average age of the respective EHs over their terms in office were calculated to suit the mapping scheme.

2-7. Education in the West

Virtually all EHs have graduate and even postgraduate degrees, so a general “education” variable on whether they have received higher education is not expected to yield many insights compared to the national leaders. However, education in the West, meaning education in Western countries or regions in the geographical sense, does vary and is expected to be interesting.

Education in the West can influence EHs in two ways. Firstly, it can happen by the change of value systems, or by socialization of the EHs. In other words, EHs with study-abroad experiences in the West may internalize the importance of values promoted by the West, such as those on democracy or human rights (Gift and Krmaric 2017). Since it is not necessarily the case that the preferences of the member states and the priorities of the EHs do not match (Cox 1969: 225), the preference formation of the EHs matters to a high extent.

Secondly, this factor may influence EHs through the social networks that they develop in the Western local areas during their time of education. Bureaucrats in the IOs, which include the EHs, are said to possess respective networks (Fleischer and Reiners 2021), and interpersonal relationships and access to the diplomats or governments of other countries (Cox 1969:210) are essential sources for influence. Studying abroad matters to a high extent in building such cross-border networks.

With regards to coding, we created two indices. The first index calibrates (i) whether the EH has the experience of receiving higher education in the West. By “higher education”, this paper does not include education at and below the upper secondary school level, but refers to education at and beyond the university level (which includes the college level).

Furthermore, so long as the school in question was located in a Western country, the case was seen to fulfill the conditions of this index, and was coded with a “1”, and with a “0”

otherwise. By the geographical “West”, this dataset refers to the states in North America and Western Europe, following the careful definition by Gift and Krcmaric (2017: 680).

Different from the second index, the first index did not consider whether degrees and the like were conferred on the EH; education could include visiting researcher statuses or short-term study-abroad programs. Meanwhile, the second index captured (ii) whether a degree in higher education was conferred on the EH in the West, which was also coded with a “1” if yes, and with a “0” otherwise. Table 2 summarizes the indices presented in this section.

Table 2: Summary of the Indices for Personal Traits

Personal Traits	Indices	Variable
2-1	(i) Past Job Experience in the Same IO	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Former Deputy EH of the Same IO	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
2-2	(i) Overseas Job Experience	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Past Job Experience in Other IOs	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
2-3	(i) Minister Experience	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Foreign Minister Experience	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(iii) State Head Experience	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
2-4	(i) Expertise as a Lawyer	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Expertise as a Scholar	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
2-5	(i) Gender	Binary (1=male/0=female)
2-6	(i) age	Number of Age
2-7	(i) Western Higher Education Experience	Binary (1=yes/0=no)
	(ii) Western Higher Education Degree	Binary (1=yes/0=no)

3. Descriptive Analysis

This section introduces some of the actual data contained in the indices introduced above. It first presents the average number of all the indices related to institutional factors and offers one example to understand the data. It then does the same for indices on personal traits, and offers another example of a first-cut analysis. Finally, to illustrate our new dataset’s ability to assess changes over time, and not only by IOs, we take up one index from the institutional factors and another from the personal traits, and plot the trend of the average of those indices that represent all IOs.

(1) Institutional Factors

Table 3 presents the data of the institutional factors for each IO. The rows present the indices, which are listed in the order in which they were introduced in Section 1. The columns present the eighteen IOs in alphabetical order.

Regarding indices calibrated in the form of binary variables, the numbers in Table 3 are the average of the extent to which the IO in question conferred the designated function on the EH during the time period 1980–2015, excluding years (if any) the IO secretariat did not exist. The average number is rounded off to the first decimal point. As shown in Table 1 above, indices related to institutional factors are binary variables except “1-7(v) Stipulated Term” and “EH Authority”.

For example, the ASEAN secretariat has operated continuously since 1967, and all annual data can be assessed for the entire period under study. The function to propose agenda items (Index 1-1(i)) was first conferred in 2008, when the ASEAN Charter went into force. Annual data thus show twenty-eight “zeros” (for the years 1980–2007) and eight “ones” (for the years 2008–2015), and the average of these thirty-six data points is 0.2222.... Table 3 reports this number rounded to one decimal point, which is 0.2.

The first non-binary variable, “1-7(v) Stipulated Term”, shows the average length of an EH term, in years, during the time period from 1980 to 2015, disregarding the years before the IO secretariat was founded. Again, the numbers are rounded off to the first decimal point.

Let us look again at ASEAN. During 1980–1984, ASEAN documents stipulate a three-year term for the EH. This changed to two years in 1985, and to five years in 1992, where it has remained. The average becomes the sum 149 divided by 36, which is rounded to 4.1 in Table 3.

Regarding the second non-binary variable, “EH Authority”, the respective numbers

Table 3: Average Aggregates of IO Institutional Factors, 1980–2015

Institutional Factors	Indices	AMU	APEC	ASEAN	AU	CAN	CARICOM	COE	COMW	EU	NC	OAS	OECD	OIC	OSCE	PIF	SADC	SCO	UN
1-1	(i) Proposition of the Agenda	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	1.0	0.3	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0
	(ii) Coordinating Act that Reconciles Conflicting Stakes	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	1.0
1-2	(i) Monitoring the Implementation of Member States	0.0	1.0	0.7	0.4	1.0	0.3	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.0
	(ii) Participation in Dispute Settlement Procedures When Non-Compliance Occurs	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	1.0	0.3	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
1-3	(i) Proposition of the Budget of the IO as a Whole	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
	(ii) Proposition of the Budget of the IO Secretariat	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.3	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.2	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
1-4	(i) Appointment of the Secretariat Staff	1.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.2	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.0	1.0
1-5	(i) Representation of the IO	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.0
1-6	(i) Research Function	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
1-7	(i) Open Recruitment	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	(ii) Rotation Rules	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0
	(iii) Consideration of Nationality	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0
	(iv) Selection from Regional Hegemon/Regional Powers	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0
	(v) Stipulated Term	3.0	1.5	4.1	4.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.6	4.6	NA	5.0	5.0	2.7	3.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	5.0
	(vi) Reappointment	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.7	0.0	1.0
	EH Authority	0.8	0.9	1.8	1.7	2.2	1.4	2.0	5.0	6.0	3.0	2.8	4.0	2.7	2.9	1.6	1.9	0.0	8.0

calculated by IO-year indicate the sum of the binary variables designated in the section on the index. This sum is divided by the number of years when the IO secretariat was existent during our time of interest. ASEAN's EH Authority changed from being zero (1980-1991) to one (1992-2008) and then to six (2008–2015), and this sum is divided by 36, which becomes 1.8 when rounded to its first decimal point.

One of the most interesting takeaways from these averages is that, IOs whose binary variables are noted as either 0.0 or 1.0 did not change the level of conferment of the function on their EHs throughout the observed years with high likelihood⁴. By contrast, all other numbers indicate that there was a change in the conferment of the function on the EH during the observed years, such as the number “0.2” in ASEAN's “1-1(i) Proposition of the Agenda”. It can be implied that the IOs with more “0.0s” and/ or “1.0s” are more rigid in changing their policies on the conferment of functions on EHs compared to those with more “non-0.0s” and/ or “non-1.0s”.

Quite a few of the eighteen IOs see rigidity in this regard. For ten IOs, namely, AMU, CAN, COE, COMW, EU, NC, OECD, OSCE, SCO and the UN, all binary indices fall on one of the two extreme ends: 0.0 or 1.0. Among the rigid IOs, the UN enjoys the largest number of 1.0s when compared to the occurrences of 0.0s by ratio within its binary indices. This may indicate their strong and constant resolution to stipulate EH functions, as alluded to by Ravndal (2017). In contrast to this, the SCO presents the largest number of 0.0s, which implies a consistent preference of SCO member states not to stipulate the independent authority of EHs, which in turn allows them to retain their own power. This dovetails with the claim that the organization is a tool for states to expand their sphere of influence (Debre 2021; Öniş and Gençer 2018).

The other eight IOs, APEC, ASEAN, AU, CARICOM, OAS, OIC, PIF and SADC saw changes in their conferment levels, and ASEAN and CARICOM have the largest number of

⁴ Only two NAs appear in the index “1-7 (v) Stipulated Term”, which means that this calculation and inference were not affected by the NAs. The only exception is when the numbers turned into 0.0 or 1.0 after rounding off the original results, but this is unlikely due to how consistent many of the binary variables were for each function and IO.

indices that should have changed at least once during the observed time period. The quantification of institutional rigidity regarding EHs may add to existing calibration methods on the rigidity of treaties (Koremenos 2016), and contribute to broad debates regarding the “flexibility” of international institutions (Koremenos et al. 2001), which is said to be a major factor for rising powers in deciding whether to stay inside the IO and reform the organization from within or to exit and build a new one (Lipsky 2017).

Aside from the question of rigidity, a simple comparison of the numbers coded in indices 1-1 to 1-6 imply the extent to which these IOs confer authority. Regarding EH Authority, the UN again enjoys a full score of 8.0, which is in stark contrast to the SCO, which has the lowest possible score of 0.0.

(2) Personal Traits

Table 4⁵ presents the data of the personal traits of EHs by IOs. The rows present the indices in the order they were introduced in Section 2. The columns present the eighteen IOs in alphabetical order.

As to the indices originally calibrated in the form of binary variables, the numbers represent the ratio of EHs among all the past EHs of the IO in question that has a score of one, given that the binary index does not fluctuate by year so long as the EH remains the same person. The ratios are rounded off to the first decimal point.

The index “2-6 (i) Age”, which is the only non-binary variable, is calculated according to the following steps. Firstly, the average age of each EH during their tenure was calculated with regards to respective IOs. Secondly, the mean values of such averages were taken for all the EHs that belong to the same IO, and were noted in Table 4. The averages are rounded off to the first

⁵ Since the virtual unit of analysis of the data on EH personal traits is IO-EH, most of the indices except for that on age can be summarized per IO, rather than by temporal change. This is because there were no cases where their past experiences or other statuses changed during their term of tenure.

Table 4: Personal Traits of IO Executive Heads (Ratio of EHs with Ones for Binary Variables, Average Aggregates for Age), 1980–2015

Personal Traits	Indices	AMU	APEC	ASEAN	AU	CAN	CARICOM	COE	COMW	EU	NC	OAS	OECD	OIC	OSCE	PIF	SADC	SCO	UN
2-1	(i) Past Job Experience in the Same IO	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.8	0.1	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6
	(ii) Former Deputy EH of the Same IO	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
2-2	(i) Overseas Job Experience	1.0	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.4	0.8	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	0.8	0.5	1.0	1.0
	(ii) Past Job Experience in Other IOs	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.2	0.8	0.1	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
2-3	(i) Minister Experience	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.9	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.0	0.4	0.7	0.3	0.6
	(ii) Foreign Minister Experience	0.7	0.0	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.3	0.6
	(iii) State Head Experience	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
2-4	(i) Expertise as a Lawyer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4
	(ii) Expertise as a Scholar	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.5	0.2
2-5	(i) Gender	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0
2-6	(i) age	68.0	56.8	60.9	56.0	56.0	54.6	58.6	63.3	58.3	52.1	56.9	62.0	63.2	56.8	57.9	47.3	56.8	66.1
2-7	(i) Western Higher Education Experience	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.7	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.4	1.0	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.0	0.8
	(ii) Western Higher Education Degree	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.8	0.6	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.0	1.0	0.3	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.7	0.0	0.8

decimal point.

To take up another example from ASEAN, “0.9” is reported for index “2-2(i) Overseas Job Experience”, which indicates that 90% of ASEAN’s EHs had worked overseas before becoming an EH at the institution, although NAs are eliminated from the calculation. Index “2-5(i) Gender”, is slightly different from the other binary variables on experiences in that one and zero, respectively, indicate male and female. In other words, “1.0” shows that all ASEAN EHs have been male. Index “2-6(i) Age”, shows that the average of the ASEAN EH’s mean age at the time of their tenure is 60.9 years old.

The richness of the dataset is that it is amenable to a variety of possible and testable interpretations. High ratios close to or at “1.0” may indicate strong expectations that EHs possess the indicated traits, either informally or formally. Three indices enjoy 100% experience coverage by several IOs; “2-2 (i) Overseas Job Experience”, “2-7 (i) Western Higher Education Experience” and “2-7 (ii) Western Higher Education Degree”. Given how IO postings require their EHs to work in international environments, and how IOs originate in the Western ideas of multilateralism (Kumm et al. 2017; Zürn and Stephen 2010), these are not surprising results.

This also aligns with the fact that only 40% of COE’s EHs worked overseas before becoming the EH; as an IO of the West, many of its EHs might have gained multilateral experience while staying in their countries of origin, as opposed to non-Western EHs that have to travel overseas to become familiar with IOs.


Furthermore, the SCO’s “0.0s” for both “2-7 (i) Western Higher Education Experience” and “2-7 (ii) Western Higher Education Degree” are notable, but this may be natural given that they only place secondary importance on democracy as a Western value (Öniş and Gençer 2018).

(3) Trends of the Average EH Authority Level and the Ratio of EHs with Past Job Experiences in the Same IO

This section introduces temporal change by focusing on the composite institutional factor (“EH

Authority”) and one personal trait (“2-1 (i) Past Job Experience in the Same IO”). Figure 1 represents the average of “EH Authority” over all IOs in each year. In other words, the means of the EH Authority of eighteen IOs by year show fluctuations in the extent to which IOs in general conferred authority on their EHs.

Figure 1



Interestingly, the overall EH authority level increased steadily from 1980 until about 2007, when it seems to have reached a plateau. While the average EH Authority can theoretically rise up to 8 when all the IOs reach the full score of 8, the latest maximum value is around 3.8.


Although there is a need to further investigate the context, the increase in the level of EH authority seems to dovetail with the fact that there is an increasing importance placed on the role of actors external to governments under the push of anti-globalization movements that go against neo-liberal policies created by governmental cooperation (Zürn and Stephen 2019). Conferring a higher extent of authority on EHs as opposed to governments may constitute a partial picture of the trend.

Furthermore, IOs have become increasingly entangled in so-called “regime complex” situations, which is said to have been a murky concept that connotes the often-unintended overlaps of institutions that change the consequences of jurisdictions and rules (Alter and

Raustiala 2018: 331). Alter and Raustiala (2018: 335-336) disentangle the concept by referring to the argument on “transnational legal orders”, where “informal and nonstate actors as well as formal institutions jointly construct systems of normative ordering”. In order to coordinate with other IOs and actually make the regimes work, EHs might be expected to function as the dots that connect the IOs within a regime. This may be especially true for EHs of the IOs that handle multi-issue areas, which is the case for the eighteen IOs under study.

In stark contrast to the tendency of average EH Authority to increase over time, the index on personal trait “2-1 (i) Past Job Experience in the Same IO” shows a steady decrease at least until 2010, as shown in Figure 2. To clarify, Figure 2 shows the ratio of all EHs under study who had worked in the same IO that they came to lead at any point before they undertook the role, according to index “2-1 (i) Past Job Experience in the Same IO”. As this is different from “2-1 (ii) Former Deputy EH of the Same IO”, the indicated experiences can include the specific experience of serving as the former Deputy EH of the same IO, but do not limit themselves to such cases.

Figure 2



In a nutshell, Figure 2 shows that organizational inbreeding became less popular in many

IOs, falling from more than 55% with prior experience in the same IO between 1982 to 1983 to only slightly above 10% in 2010. The sharp increase after 2010 requires further analysis, but two factors might have contributed to the decrease until 2010.

To begin with, regime complex situations might have played a role here. As global governance became common with the end of the Cold War, there was a surge in the number of IOs, which allowed IO bureaucrats and EH candidates to gain experience across many arenas. Therefore, even if the EH does not have any experience with the exact same IO, he or she might have worked and gained virtual experience in a different IO within the same regime complex.

Another factor is that, organizational inbreeding can be criticized for its ineffectiveness and lack of transparency in its procedures, and these two factors are said to be strongly acknowledged by the global governance elites (Scholte et al. 2021). This might have encouraged the election of EHs without any experience with IOs, and those from completely different sectors.

In sum, this section presented the overview of the statistics, and elaborated the trend of two indices. Needless to say, these are only first-cut analyses, and new interpretations, whose topics are not necessarily limited to the points raised above, may be discovered with the data.

4. Illustrative Analysis: Democratic Density Matters

This section presents one among the manifold types of research that our new dataset can contribute to. It asks how the domestic regime type of member states affects the design of an IO.

It has already been pointed out that the preferences of the member states over IO designs depend on whether their domestic political regime type is democratic or autocratic (Tallberg et al. 2016: 755). In particular, it is contended that democratic countries are more tolerant to conferring authority on IOs, or that they are more proactively delegating or pooling authority to IOs (Debre 2021; Hooghe and Marks 2015; Hooghe et al. 2017; Acharya and Johnston 2007). In other words, autocratic states should prefer institutional designs with emphasis on the preservation of their sovereignty.

Two mechanisms can be referred to in this regard. Firstly, democratic states place emphasis on democratic values in designing institutions, such as the rule of law, and this can be also observed with regards to international institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2015: 316). Secondly, authoritarian countries are extremely vigilant in order to prevent the external intervention regarding domestic repressions or human rights violations, and worry that giving authority to the IOs will lead to IO interventions in unexpected ways (Debre 2021). For example, if authority over agenda-setting is delegated to the IOs, member states may run the risk of having their human rights violations taken up for discussion.

In sum, it has been said that the more democratic the member states are, the higher the extent of conferment of authority and delegation becomes vis-à-vis the IO. However, by “IO”, the earlier studies have referred to IOs in general or to their secretariats, and no analyses have been conducted with regard to the EHS. Therefore, this paper uses our new dataset to analyze whether the above-mentioned theory applies to the cases of EHS.

In doing so, this paper categorizes the type of IOs into three types, depending on the ratio of the number of domestic regimes within the member states. This is based on a well-known concept named “democratic density”, which is defined as the “percentage of permanent members in the organization that are democratic” (Pevehouse 2005: 46). As Tallberg et al. (2020; 2021) compiles data on the “democratic density” of the eighteen IOs that we are interested in, we matched each IO with its unique ratio by year between 1980 and 2015, and teased out the statistics. After calculating the mean values of such ratios for respective IOs over the years, we ended up with eighteen numbers. The mean of the democratic density by IO was 45%, and the median was 41%. With regards to categorization, the IOs below the first interquartile range (where less than or equal to 24% of their member states are democratic) were seen as “autocratic IOs”, namely SCO, AMU, OIC and ASEAN from low to high. The nine “intermediate IOs” fall between the first interquartile range and the third (and has more than 24% but less than or equal to 60% of their member states being democratic), which were AU, SADC, UN, CAN, COMW, OAS, APEC,


CARICOM and PIF in order. Finally, the five “democratic IOs” were those above the third interquartile range (with more than 60% of their members being democratic), and were OSCE, COE, OECD, EU and NC in order.

In the following, we present data for all three organization types, but focus our analysis on its revelation of clear distinctions between authoritarian and democratic IOs. IO design traits are directly related to the IO categories mentioned above. Indices on EHs were also categorized according to the IOs they served for, which in turn connect to the tripartite categories by democratic density.

(1) Institutional Factors

This section explores the data regarding the extent to which the IOs confer authority on their EHs, as well as constrain their opportunities to exert such influence. To begin with, the composite index on EH Authority is aggregated by different IO types in Figure 3.

Figure 3



This was done in two steps. Firstly, we calculated the average EH Authority level of respective IOs using their data by year. Secondly, the average of such measurements were

calculated by grouping IOs by their types, as in the legend⁶. It is obvious that the extent of authority conferred on EHs are higher with democratic IOs, and lower with autocratic IOs.

From the eight indices used to calculate the authority index, figures 4 and 5 tease out the two types of authority that are emphasized in earlier studies; “1-1 (i) Proposition of the Agenda” and “1-3 (i) Proposition of the Budget of the IO as a Whole”. The results show the same tendency: higher democratic density correlates with a higher level of EH authority. None of the autocratic IOs allowed for any EH authority on budgetary issues (Figure 5).

Figure 4





Figure 5



Overall, we have observed the authority conferred on the EHs by their IOs with regard to selected institutional factors, and what has been said about the IO secretariats also applies to the case of EHs: just as more extensive authority has been conferred on the secretariats of democratic than autocratic IOs, democratic IOs conferred stronger authority on their EHs, compared to their autocratic counterparts. Conversely, autocratic IOs demonstrate their strong characteristics of intergovernmentalism, and do not pursue an independent role of the EHs.

A similar tendency is observed with EH selection processes. Figures 6 and 7

⁶ This is the same for figures 4, 5, 6 and 7.

demonstrate that autocratic IOs have been more proactive in establishing rotation rules or considering the nationalities of EH candidates, so that member states have equal opportunities to have someone from their country selected as the EH. These results can be interpreted, firstly, as evidence that, to some extent, autocratic IOs value “equality” for their member states when it comes to exerting influence via the EHs selected from their country. Secondly, the results imply that member states of autocratic IOs do not expect the EH to possess much capacity, such as that on policy legislation, policy implementation or reconciliation among the member states. In a nutshell, these tendencies represent their intergovernmentalism.

Figure 6





Figure 7



(2) Personal Factors

This section explores the PBA-inspired indices on EH personal traits by showing the ratio of the EHs that fit into the categories provided in the legends by the three IO types they belong to⁷. To begin with, figures 8 and 9 show whether EHs had prior work experience in the same IO. Particularly interesting is that remarkably few autocratic IO EHs had such experience, not to

⁷ This is the same for figures 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15.

mention experience as a deputy EH of the same IO. This implies a trend with regard to personal factors that parallels the trend, demonstrated above, with regard to institutional factors. Since autocratic IOs only have low expectations that their EHs possess practical capabilities in policy legislation or implementation, such IOs do not expect the EHs to be familiar with their organizations or to have close personal ties related to the IO. This can be highlighted as a significant contribution of this paper: what has been said about institutional traits actually corresponds to specific personal traits.

Figure 8⁸





Figure 9



Other indices offer the same idea, that EHs of autocratic IOs are not expected to possess expertise. Few such EHs have prior work experience in IOs other than the ones they served as EHs for (Figure 10), which indicates how they are not expected to possess international networks. Furthermore, EHs of autocratic IOs rarely possess legal expertise (Figure 11).

⁸ As to the numbers of EHs that were categorized into autocratic, intermediate and democratic IOs, they were 24, 71, and 33, in order. This applies to all the figures of the indices on personal traits (figures 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15).

Figure 10





Figure 11



In sum, taking advantage of the PBA-inspired variables, data presented in this section indicates that autocratic IOs do not expect their EHs to behave as an entity independent from the member states, and therefore do not require the EHs to possess expertise. If this is the case, what kinds of attributes are the EHs in autocratic IOs expected to hold?

Put simply, people with domestic authority are selected as EHs in such IOs. The ratio of EHs that had served as minister is highest in autocratic IOs, compared to intermediate and democratic IOs (Figure 12), and most notable is the high ratio of those that have experienced the role of the foreign minister (Figure 13).

Figure 12





Figure 13



One caveat is that, when it comes to the ratio of EHs that had been a head of state (Figure 14), the democratic IOs have the highest score. This is because IOs with a strong tendency of intergovernmentalism, such as autocratic IOs, place utmost importance on the meeting of foreign ministers in the decision-making process. Within intergovernmental IOs, important policies are formulated in summits that constitute the highest decision-making body, and it is the meetings of foreign ministers, and not the internal organizations of the IOs such as the secretariat that play an essential role in setting the agenda and formulating policies at the summit. If there are EHs with experiences of having been the state head, which is a higher ranked position than the foreign ministers, such decision-making processes will fall into confusion and lack smooth operations. This is why the past domestic positions of the autocratic IOs' EHs do not go beyond that of foreign ministers, and former/past state heads are avoided.

Finally, the average age of EHs while in office was calculated and they are mapped according to the category of the IO they belong to (Figure 15). The ages of the EHs of autocratic IOs are conspicuously high. In other words, even young candidates can become EHs in the democratic IOs so long as they possess the expertise, while candidates for autocratic IOs need to wait in order to first enhance their authority within their countries.

Figure 14





Figure 15



In sum, EHs of democratic IOs are those on whom institutional authority is conferred, who only have weak institutional constraints, who are familiar with the IO in question, and who possess one or another form of expertise. On the other hand, EHs of autocratic IOs are those on whom institutional authority is not conferred, who are not required to possess expertise, but are expected to have high authority within their home countries.

The above-mentioned summary indicates the difference that, while democratic countries seek relatively autonomous IOs, and are tolerant about compromising the sovereignty of the member states, autocratic countries assume that it is the member states that steer the wheel of IOs and insist on sovereignty.

Conclusion

This paper pointed out that, although the existing literature on international organizations has datasets on secretariats, none exist for EHs. In response to this, we created an original dataset that compiles data on institutional factors and personal traits relevant to EHs. The use of PBA to identify relevant EH traits should be highlighted as a particularly new perspective.

In the third section of the paper, the average values of the indices were descriptively presented both by IOs as well as over time. A first-cut analysis suggested that the dataset can speak to those interested in multiple aspects of international institutions: (i) the fluidity of international institutions by offering a calibration method on the rigidity of stipulations related to the EHs; (ii) the issue of the West/non-West divide in multilateralism by coding the Western experiences and original countries of the EHs; (iii) the regime complex situations by suggesting how EHs build their career over time and engage in global governance, and (iv) the issue of effectiveness and democracy of IOs by providing data on the selection process and the traits of elected EHs.

Furthermore, as an example of the usage of this dataset, this paper showed the different traits of EHs between those of democratic and autocratic IOs. We concluded that the former

expects the EH to undertake the role of a political and autonomous leader compared to the latter IOs, and this was empirically shown from both the institutional and personal aspects. This finding extends what has been said with regard to secretariats in the earlier studies to the EHs.

Needless to say, it only shows one example of research enabled with this dataset. It is highly expected that the dataset introduced in this paper will serve as the infrastructure for future IO research, and provoke new ideas. Some of the frameworks to think about its usage in combination with other datasets are as follows; (i) we can operationalize the EH dataset as the dependent variable vis-à-vis data on other factors that explain either or both of the institutional and personal traits of EHs, just like how we combined the data on democratic density. For example, we can test how the asymmetric influence of states in the context of IO design results in EHs from particularly influential countries. Secondly, (ii) we can use the indices in the EH dataset as independent variables that explain other phenomena. For example, it is possible to assess whether and how EH factors alter the performance of IOs, which may feed into the debate on whether it is the states as principals or IO actors and bureaucrats as agents that fall into the moral hazard problem (Lall 2017). Another example is to assess whether and how EH factors alter the adoption of liberal norms in those IOs, which speaks to the heated debate on whether liberal international order persists (Tallberg et al. 2020).

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank our three research assistants; Kyoungwan Jang (Doctoral Student, University of Tokyo), Taichi Sato (Master's Student, University of Tokyo) and Taihei Atarashi (Master's Student, University of Tokyo) for collecting the data on personal traits. We are also grateful to Dr. Jonas Tallberg (Professor, Stockholm University) and Dr. Magnus Lundgren (Senior Lecturer/ Associate Professor, University of Gothenburg) for providing us with further information on their data from their 2020 article, as we cited in the Data section of the Reference List.

Funding

This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science ([grant number 20K01518] and [grant number JP21J13964]).

References

Acharya, Amitav, and Alastair Iain Johnston. 2007. "Comparing Regional Institutions: An

- Introduction.” In *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston, 1–31 (Chapter 1). Cambridge University Press.
- Alter, Karen J., and Kal Raustiala. 2018. “The Rise of International Regime Complexity.” *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 14 (1): 329–49.
- Barnett, Michael, and Martha Finnemore. 2004. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Bauer, Michael W., and Jörn Ege. 2016. “Bureaucratic Autonomy of International Organizations’ Secretariats.” *Journal of European Public Policy* 23 (7): 1019–37.
- Bayerlein, Louisa, Constantin Kaplaner, Christoph Knill, and Yves Steinebach. 2020. “Singing Together or Apart? Comparing Policy Agenda Dynamics within International Organizations.” *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 1–20.
- Beigbeder, Yves. 2001. *New Challenges for UNICEF: Children, Women and Human Rights*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Betts, Alexander. 2012. “UNHCR, Autonomy, and Mandate Change: Alexander Betts.” In *International Organizations as Self-Directed Actors: A Framework for Analysis*, edited by Joel E. Oestreich, 118–140 (Chapter 4). London and New York: Routledge.
- Brown, Robert L. 2010. “Measuring Delegation.” *The Review of International Organizations* 5 (2): 141–75.
- Chesterman, Simon. 2007. “Introduction.” In *Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*, edited by Simon Chesterman, 1–12 (Introduction). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chesterman, Simon. 2016. “Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past, Present and Futures.” *European Journal of International Law* 27 (4): 945–78.
- Chorev, Nitsan. 2012. *The World Health Organization between North and South*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Cox, Robert W. 1969. “The Executive Head: An Essay on Leadership in International Organization.” *International Organization* 23 (2): 205–30.
- Debre, Maria J. 2021. “The Dark Side of Regionalism: How Regional Organizations Help Authoritarian Regimes to Boost Survival.” *Democratization* 28 (2): 394–413.
- Debre, Maria J. 2021. “Clubs of Autocrats: Regional Organizations and Authoritarian Survival.” *The Review of International Organizations*, 1–27.
- Dingwerth, Klaus, Henning Schmidtke, and Tobias Weise. 2020. “The Rise of Democratic Legitimation: Why International Organizations Speak the Language of Democracy.” *European Journal of International Relations* 26 (3): 714–41.
- Ege, Jörn, Michael W. Bauer, and Nora Wagner. 2020. “Improving Generalizability in Transnational Bureaucratic Influence Research: A (Modest) Proposal.” *International Studies Review* 22 (3): 551–75.
- Finger, Matthias, and Bérangère. 2003. “The Transformation of International Public Organizations: The Case of UNCTAD.” In *Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and Promise*, edited by Dennis Dijkzeul and Yves Beigbeder, 140–165 (Chapter 5). Oxford and New York: Berghahn Books.
- Fleischer, Julia, and Nina Reiners. 2021. “Connecting International Relations and Public Administration: Toward a Joint Research Agenda for the Study of International Bureaucracy.” *International Studies Review* 23 (4): 1230–47.
- Graham, Erin R. 2014. “International Organizations as Collective Agents: Fragmentation and the Limits of Principal Control at the World Health Organization.” *European Journal of International Relations* 20 (2): 366–90.
- Gift, Thomas, and Daniel Krmaric. 2017. “Who Democratizes? Western-Educated Leaders and Regime Transitions.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (3): 671–701.
- Gordenker, Leon. 1993. “The UN Secretary-Generalship: Limits, Potentials and Leadership.” In

- The Challenging Role of the UN Secretary-General: Making “the Most Impossible Job in the World” Possible*, edited by Benjamin Rivlin and Leon Gordenker, 261–82 (Chapter 15). New York: Praeger.
- Haftel, Yoram Z., and Stephanie C. Hofmann. 2017. “Institutional Authority and Security Cooperation within Regional Economic Organizations.” *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (4): 484–98.
- Haftel, Yoram Z., and Alexander Thompson. 2006. “The Independence of International Organizations: Concept and Applications.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (2): 253–75.
- Hall, Nina, and Ngaire Woods. 2018. “Theorizing the Role of Executive Heads in International Organizations.” *European Journal of International Relations* 24 (4): 865–86.
- Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, and Michael J. Tierney, eds. 2006. *Delegation and Agency in International Organizations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2015. “Delegation and Pooling in International Organizations.” *The Review of International Organizations* 10: 305–328.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Gary Marks, Tobias Lenz, Jeanine Bezuijen, Besir Ceka, and Svet Derderyan. 2017. *Measuring International Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Volume III*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Ivanova, Maria. 2007. “Moving Forward by Looking Back: Learning from UNEP’s History.” In *Global Environmental Governance: Perspectives on the Current Debate*, edited by Lydia Swart and Estelle Perry, 26–47. New York: Center for UN Reform Education.
- Kille, Kent J., and Roger M. Scully. 2003. “Executive Heads and the Role of Intergovernmental Organizations: Expansionist Leadership in the United Nations and the European Union.” *Political Psychology* 24(1): 175–198.
- Koremenos, Barbara. 2016. *The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” *International Organization* 55 (4): 761–99.
- Kraske, Jochen, William H. Becker, William Diamond, and Louis Galambos. 1996. *Bankers with a Mission: The Presidents of the World Bank, 1946–91*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Krcmaric, Daniel, Stephen C. Nelson, and Andrew Roberts. 2020. “Studying Leaders and Elites: The Personal Biography Approach.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 23: 133–151.
- Kumm, Mattias, Jonathan Havercroft, Jeffrey Dunoff, and Antje Wiener. 2017. “Editorial: The End of ‘the West’ and the Future of Global Constitutionalism.” *Global Constitutionalism* 6 (1): 1–11.
- Lipsky, Phillip. 2017. *Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1999. “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation.” *International Organization* 53 (2): 267–306.
- Nielson, Daniel L., and Michael J. Tierney. 2003. “Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform.” *International Organization* 57 (2): 241–76.
- Novosad, Paul, and Eric Werker. 2019. “Who Runs the International System? Nationality and Leadership in the United Nations Secretariat.” *The Review of International Organizations* 14 (1): 1–33.
- Öniş, Ziya, and Alper Şükrü Gençer. 2018. “Democratic BRICS as Role Models in a Shifting Global Order: Inherent Dilemmas and the Challenges Ahead.” *Third World Quarterly* 39 (9): 1791–1811.
- Paxton, Pamela Marie, Melanie M. Hughes, and Tiffany D. Barnes. 2016. *Women, Politics, and*

- Power: A Global Perspective*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Pevehouse, Jon C. 2005. *Democracy from above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pollack, Mark A. 2003. *The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ravndal, Ellen Jenny. 2017. “‘A Force for Peace’: Expanding the Role of the UN Secretary-General under Trygve Lie, 1946–1953.” *Global Governance* 23 (3): 443–59.
- Reinalda, Bob, and Bertjan Verbeek. 2003. *Autonomous Policy Making by International Organisations*. London: Routledge.
- Schechter, Michael G. 1987. “Leadership in International Organizations: Systemic, Organizational and Personality Factors.” *Review of International Studies* 13(3): 197–220.
- Scholte, Jan Aart, Soetkin Verhaegen, and Jonas Tallberg. 2021. “Elite Attitudes and the Future of Global Governance.” *International Affairs* 97 (3): 861–86.
- Schroeder, Michael Bluman. 2014. “Executive Leadership in the Study of International Organization: A Framework for Analysis.” *International Studies Review* 16 (3): 339–61.
- Stephen, Matthew D., and Michael Zürn. 2019. “Rising Powers, NGOs, and Demands for New World Orders: An Introduction.” In *Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-State*, 1–36 (Chapter 1). London: Oxford University Press.
- Suzuki, Sanae. 2021. “Interfering via ASEAN? In the Case of Disaster Management.” *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 40 (3): 400–417.
- Tallberg, Jonas, Thomas Sommerer, and Theresa Squatrito. 2016. “Democratic Memberships in International Organizations: Sources of Institutional Design.” *The Review of International Organizations* 11 (1): 59–87.
- Tallberg, Jonas, Magnus Lundgren, Thomas Sommerer, and Theresa Squatrito. 2020. “Why International Organizations Commit to Liberal Norms.” *International Studies Quarterly* 64 (3): 626–40.
- Tamm, Henning, and Duncan Snidal. 2013. “Rational Choice and Principal-Agent Theory.” In *International Organization and Global Governance*, edited by Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, 132–143 (Chapter 9). London: Routledge.
- Yi-Chong, Xu, and Patrick Weller. 2008. “‘To Be, but Not to Be Seen’: Exploring the Impact of International Civil Servants.” *Public Administration* 86 (1): 35–51.
- Zürn, Michael, and Matthew Stephen. 2010. “The View of Old and New Powers on the Legitimacy of International Institutions.” *Politics* 30 (1_suppl): 91–101.

Data

- Tallberg, Jonas; Lundgren, Magnus; Sommerer, Thomas; Squatrito, Theresa, 2021, "Replication Data for: Why International Organizations Commit to Liberal Norms", <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OZPJNK>, Harvard Dataverse, V1.
 (Tallberg, Jonas, Magnus Lundgren, Thomas Sommerer, and Theresa Squatrito. 2020. “Why International Organizations Commit to Liberal Norms.” *International Studies Quarterly* 64 (3): 626–40.)