THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSITY UNIVERSITÉ DES NATIONS UNIES

Project on Technology Transfer, Transformation, and Development: The Japanese Experience

Projet sur l'expérience japonaise en matière de transfert, transformation et développement de la technologie

---

Distribution: Limited

HSDP-JE Series

This working paper was prepared within the framework and as part of the Project on Technology Transfer, Transformation, and Development: The Japanese Experience (JE) of the United Nations University's Human and Social Development Programme. The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the United Nations University.

The JE project is co-ordinated by UNU Project Co-ordinator Dr. Takeshi Hayashi, with the support of the Institute of Developing Economies, Address: UNU Project on Technology Transfer, Transformation, and Development: The Japanese Experience, c/o Institute of Developing Economies, 42 Ichigaya-Honmuracho, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 162, Japan. Tel: (03) 353-7501. Cable: AJIKEN TOKYO.

The United Nations University: 29th Floor, Toho Seimei Building, 15-1, Shibuya 2-chome, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo 150, Japan. Tel.: (03) 499-2811; Telex: J25442; Cable: UNATUNIV TOKYO

© The United Nations University, 1981
Printed in Japan

ISBN 92-808-0256-9
ISSN 0379-5780

HSDRJE-32/UNUP-256

THE LOWER SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASSES AND MASS RIOTS IN A PROVINCIAL CITY

Tetsuya Hashimoto

Associate Professor
Faculty of Law and Letters
Kanazawa University
Kanazawa, Japan



This paper is being circulated in a pre-publication form to elicit comments from readers and generate dialogue on the subject at this stage of the research.

CONTENTS

Introduction 1

I. The Significance of Studies Concerning the Lower Strata of Urban Society

1. The Study of the Urban Poor 2
2. Questions Pertaining to Provincial Cities and the Lower Social Strata 6

II. Kanazawa, a Traditional Provincial City, and the Leaf Industry

1. Kanazawa as a Provincial City with Traditional Industry 10
2. The Development of the Leaf Industry 12
3. Labour, Life, and Consciousness of the Leaf Workers 16

III. The Rice Riot in Kanazawa

1. The Rice Riots and Provincial Cities 21
2. Movements of the Kanazawa Rice Riot 24
3. Group Formation and Communication of Rice Riots 27

Notes 31

Tables 33

INTRODUCTION

This paper is the outcome of research work done in order to analyse concretely the correlation between urbanization in pre-war Japan and mass riots. The goal is to clarify the characteristics of the lower strata and the mode of behaviour exhibited by the masses in provincial cities during the Meiji and Taishō periods. Kanazawa, a provincial city, is studied to obtain corroborative evidence, and the writer's opinions regarding the rice riot in Kanazawa are explained.

The significance of investigating the correlation between urbanization and the lower social strata, especially between the urbanization of provincial areas and their lower strata, is discussed. As a specific example, the development of the leaf industry as a traditional industry in Kanazawa, its production process and technology, the life and labour of leaf workers, and their consciousness as a people of the lower social strata are examined. Lastly, several points concerning the behaviour of and collective action on the part of the people of the lower strata, especially of the leaf workers in the Kanazawa rice riot, will be examined.

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDIES CONCERNING THE LOWER STRATA OF URBAN SOCIETY

1. The Study of the Urban Poor

This writer presently has three objectives with regard to the study of the lower social strata in pre-war urban society. The first objective is to ascertain the role played by the lower strata in relation to capitalism during the Meiji and Taishō periods. The objective examination, in this case, centres on such cities as Tokyo and Osaka. The second objective is to point out various patterns in the lower social strata of provincial urban society, and to study problems concerning the urbanization of provincial cities. Particularly, the writer is interested in an examination of mass riots in relation to the characteristics of the lower social strata of each city. In this regard, the absence of rioting in certain cities is a subject of study. Although space may not permit it, this paper nevertheless attempts to present some of the facts concerning the second and the third objectives. The writer's views on the first theme are summarized below.

With regard to studies on the lower strata of urban society in the periods cited above, the writer considers the following to be the most significant sources: Gennosuke Yokoyama's Nippon no Kasō Shakai [Japanese lower social strata] written in the Meiji period, and Toyohiko Kagawa's Hinmin Shinri no Kenkyū [Studies on the psychology of the poor] written in the Taishō period. Due to limited space, both works cannot be examined here, and only the former will be explored.

A complete bibliography of publications by Gennosuke Yokoyama has been compiled by Chōju Nishida.[1] For each of his books there are commentaries which accompanied their publication, as well as many evaluations which

appeared in the form of individual thesis. His work, particularly in recent years, is frequently examined from the perspective of urban and labour problems in the formative period of Japanese capitalism. The writer's study, however, pertains to Yokoyama's studies on the urban poor. The core of Yokoyama's studies of the poor was naturally Nippon no Kasō Shakai, which was written mainly on the basis of observational surveys.

Regarding an outline of his studies, no detailed introduction which included the full content of his studies was written except for "Hinmin Jōtai no Kenkyū" [A study of the conditions of the poor]. This was a paper published in Chūō Kōron in 1903, a little after the publication of Nippon no Kasō Shakai. At the beginning of the paper Yokoyama vigorously presents an outline of his studies of the poor as follows:

> I became intent on the studies of the lower social strata ten years ago and I still pay much attention to this now. My thoughts thus have constantly been with this subject... Here I enumerate the survey items which I have been constantly using for my studies requesting the intelligent public to rectify them.[2]

Yokoyama categorized the studies of the poor into general studies and special studies. The former are divided into seven items: (1) the percentage of immigrants from other prefectures; (2) the ratio of increase between mental workers and physical workers; (3) primary occupation of indigent Tokyo residents; (4) the degree of effectiveness of the policy of Tokyo city concerning the poor and the labouring population; (5) determination of the extent of social problems; (6) determination of the area which has the greatest number of poor in Tokyo; and (7) slums.[3] The special studies concern: occupations, wages, housing, banking facilities, relief systems, popular morality, hygiene, religions, education, laws, and regulations concerning the poor, charity activities, and social ranking. Although no further sub-categories concerning the items in general studies are mentioned in this paper, each of the latter is provided with further sub-headings. Under wages, for example, Yokoyama's explanation is not only concrete in its approach but also detailed. He shows the ratio of wages to rice prices during the Tokugawa period; wage

fluctuation from the Meiji Restoration; wage changes before and after the Sino-Japanese war; the kind of influence exerted by the rise of the machine industry upon the wages of general workers — those whose wages increased and those whose wages decreased; wage differences between tradesmen and factory workers; a comparison between general workers and technical workers.

Yokoyama comprehends the poor and their society in a very broad framework. This is clearly shown in his definition of the poor. His definition, accordingly, begins: "Who are the poor in the first place? Interpretations of the poor diverge from one scholar to another. Should the poor be categorized on the basis of existing case studies?"[4] It includes the following five groups: (1) all those who are destitute fall into the category of the poor; (2) those who reside in specific areas and those who hold specific occupations; (3) those who are the subjects of the Poor Relief Act; (4) factory workers after the industrial revolution; and (5) inhabitants of a certain social level (denoting communities which are discriminated against). Moreover, Yokoyama states that

> I, nevertheless, accept the broadest interpretation and intend to include all the populace who are below the middle class into the category of the poor.

He continues to say that

> I intend to place not only such general workers as daily wagers and rickshaw-pullers, but also tradesmen with skills and factory operatives in the category of the poor. Furthermore, those who are not physical labourers but petty merchants such as street-stall keepers, vendors, and pedlars are put into this category.[6]

Yokoyama considered the poor and the indigent to be identical, and thus insisted that "the studies of the poor are the studies of the lower social strata which comprehensively contain all the strata below the middle class."[7]

When viewed as a general theory, Yokoyama's opinion appears to be very unreasonable. However, as clarified by Shinchō Tsuda regarding the case of Tokyo, with the use of massive data, there were instances in the post-Sino-Japanese war period where factory workers resided in the "slums" together with the urban poor. The living standard of those two differed

very little even after the Russo-Japanese war. The proximity of the workers to the urban poor was also discussed in the early Taishō period.[8] Prior to the Russo-Japanese war at least, the workers and the urban poor co-existed as a community. It was this aspect that Yokoyama objectively clarified. This writer considers this point to be significant in the examination of the conditions of the urban poor in the Meiji period. It is necessary to consider the living and working conditions of the Meiji period, especially of the metropolitan lower social strata, in analysing Yokoyama's survey. Yokoyama was not the only one engaged in studies of the urban lower social strata in this period. Chōju Nishida's Meiji Zenki no Toshi Kasō Shakai [The urban lower social strata in the first half of the Meiji period] should be referred to in this regard.[9] Among works produced at about the same period as Yokoyama's which have been virtually ignored, I would like to cite two: "Yoga Hinminron no Ippen" [A piece of my theory on the poor] (Hansei Zasshi, vol. 4, 1897: the predecessor of the present Chūō Kōron) by Kentarō Suzuki and Nippon Hinmin Ron [A study of the Japanese poor] by Iwanosuke Yamashita (published in 1897). Their content and evaluation, however, will have to be presented in another paper.[10] Emphasis is placed upon a strict re-evaluation of Yokoyama's and other works of the same period from the perspective of the relationship between the urban lower social strata and capitalism, and the life style of the urban poor in the pre-war period.

The main argument of the former centres on labour mobility. On the basis of the correlation between the development of Japanese capitalism and the formation of a labour market, there are the following theories: a theory concerning the pooling of the rural surplus population ("Migrant labour theory" by Kazuo Ōkōchi); in opposition to this, a theory concerning the fixed rate of rural population drain (by Shōkichi Namiki); and a theory which rearranged the above two into a theory concerning the pooling of the class of urban odd-jobbers (by Mikio Sumiya). Each theory presents its own argument. According to a powerful argument presented by Sumiya,[11] however, the class of urban odd-jobbers who were pooled for the cities consisted of the urban social strata who resided in metropolitan low-class areas. Such items as the characteristics of the populace residing

in low-class areas, their life style and activities, the relationship between the urban lower strata and the poor, and their native places become important subjects of research.

Studies on the life style of the urban poor include the above-mentioned items. The contemporary research standard in this area is revealed by Tsuda's Nippon no Toshi Kasō Shakai [Japanese urban lower social strata].

In examining studies on the urban lower social strata in the pre-war and the post-war periods, it can be noticed that these studies and analyses all centre on metropolitan cities. The necessity for studies on the urban lower social strata in provincial cities, therefore, is presented in the following.

2. Questions Pertaining to Provincial Cities and the Lower Social Strata

The following two points are mentioned here among several other subjects which need to be covered in an examination of questions pertaining to the lower social strata in provincial cities before the war. The first concerns the classification of provincial cities in the pre-war period. I have certain opinions in this regard;[12] for the Meiji and Taishō periods, medium-sized provincial cities with a population of over 50,000 will be considered. Refer to Table 1 for the number of cities and the size of their populations.

Although the population percentage of six metropolitan cities to the total population reveals a general decline, the percentage for those cities with a population of over 50,000 remained in the vicinity of 60 per cent throughout the period shown in the table.

An increase and decrease trend of the urban population in accordance with the size of the population (Table 2) reveals that there was a marked increase in the population of cities with populations of 50,000 to 200,000; while the population increase in six metropolitan cities slowed down. This

aspect seems to provide the key to the necessity of examining provincial cities with a population of over 50,000 people.

Table 3 shows the populations of cities in 1918. All the cities that can be called medium-sized provincial cities are included in Table 3.

At any rate, however, serious examinations regarding the question of the lower social strata in provincial cities have hardly been made. One of the very few studies was made by Gennosuke Yokoyama in Nippon no Kasō Shakai [Japanese lower social strata], but he did not seem to be particularly interested in provincial cities. As quoted below, there is a very interesting survey report contained in a thesis which was written in the same period. This section, however, was not cited in Nippon no Kasō Shakai.

Yokoyama was most productive when he was with the Mainichi Shimbun (under the editorship of Saburō Shimada, 1894-98). Nippon no Kasō Shakai was produced as the fruit of his activities in this period. He became ill in the interim and returned to his home town (Uozu, Toyama prefecture). He wrote his observation record entitled "Chihō no Kasō Shakai" [Lower social strata in the province] there, which was serialized in the Mainichi Shimbun (18 articles starting from 25 October 1896 of which the 7th to the 17th articles are included in Nippon no Kasō Shakai). The significant sections of these articles are as follows.

The most important section in his series discussing the provincial lower social strata seems to be contained in the 5th article, in which he made a comparison between the urban indigent and the provincial indigent. Yokoyama first stated that

> there are essentially fewer destitutes in the province in comparison to the metropolis. However, when the reality of their living conditions is taken into consideration, the provincial indigents are as piteous as the urban indigents, if not more.[13]

He subsequently gave four concrete points which showed provincial and urban differences. They are as follows: (1) While few urban indigents are married, the majority of those in provincial towns are married with

children, and have relatives in the vicinity; (2) Although there is little daily socializing and obligation [giri ninjō] involved in the life of the urban indigent, the life of the provincial indigent is full of personal relationships; (3) While the wives of urban indigents are engaged in side jobs for themselves, the provincial wives do the same in order to supplement the family finances; (4) Due to a higher living standard in the cities, it is easy for the urban indigent to purchase goods. In the provinces, however, it is difficult to obtain the necessities of food, clothing and shelter. Although Yokoyama gave several other points, the above can be regarded as the important ones.

What do Yokoyama's findings tell us? Firstly, as stated in the first and the second points, the urban indigent were divorced from the local community, partially because many of them were not married. They were the ones who were engaged in urban odd jobs. However, it is difficult to say that they comprised a stratum which was so destitute that they could only survive in a given locality. It can be said that they comprised a sector which had the ability of moving elsewhere if they could not sustain themselves in the locality. In this sense, the urban indigent had the prospect of evolving into a proletariat. In contrast to the urban indigent, the provincial indigent were rooted in a specific community where they followed a set life cycle. They, therefore, possessed a kind of "native wisdom" which enabled them to be sociable to some extent in their communities. The provincial indigent as they were, however, had no prospect of evolving into a proletariat. Although they could secure subsistence living as long as they adapted themselves to the local community, there was no guarantee that any higher hopes could be actualized. Should they be expelled from the local community for one reason or another, they might not have had any choice but to move into the urban lower social strata. As pointed out in (4), however, a set of conditions which enabled those who suddenly moved into the urban lower strata to maintain their subsistence living existed in the cities.

When Yokoyama's findings are interpreted as above, it can be noticed that Yokoyama did not simply compare the living of the urban indigent with that of their provincial counterparts in his paper. Despite the fact that

he mentioned the differences and similarities of the two, it can also be assumed that to some extent he was also interested in the relationship of the two. To put it simply, while the provincial indigent moved to the cities, the reverse was not possible. This was illustrated by the prospect of the urban indigent becoming a proletariat. Theoretically speaking, this point overlaps such tendencies as the migration of the rural population to the cities, and problems involving the process of farmers becoming wage-earners. In terms of historical research, although many opinions were expressed with regard to the process of the birth of the proletariat, there has not been a decisive theory. As far as the evaluation of Yokoyama's work is concerned, his definition and papers pertaining to the provinces tend to be regarded as by-products. What is needed is not only an examination of the urban lower social strata in relation to the urbanization of the metropolitan cities, but also a comparison of the provincial cities with the metropolitan cities, as well as a description of the actual conditions of urbanization of the provincial cities. In relation to these points, the following will present the case of Kanazawa as a medium-sized provincial city.

II. KANAZAWA, A TRADITIONAL PROVINCIAL CITY, AND THE LEAF INDUSTRY

1. Kanazawa as a Provincial City with Traditional Industry

The significance of studies pertaining to provincial cities and the lower social strata in the Meiji and Taishō periods has just been discussed. As one example, Kanazawa and the conditions of a mass riot there are examined in order to substantiate the study. Let us first examine the nature of Kanazawa as a city. As shown in Table 3(1918), Kanazawa ranked as one of the largest of the medium-sized provincial cities throughout Japan. It was also, however, a castle town of one million *koku* which ranked next to the three metropolises during the Tokugawa period. During the course of time from the restoration to the post-war period, therefore, there was very little population growth in Kanazawa. In comparison to the speed of urbanization in other cities, that of Kanazawa was slow and thus its rank according to population size gradually declined. This point should be kept in mind when the transition of Kanazawa's population shown in Table 4 is studied. Nevertheless, other factors, such as natural conditions, which made it difficult for Kanazawa to develop as a city should be taken into account.

The characteristics of the main industries in medium-sized provincial cities are arranged in accordance with the ranking of industrial percentile(Table 5).

Because the figures for cities with populations of 50,000 or more are based upon the 1920 "National Census Survey Report," several of the figures are different from those cited in Table 3. The following points regarding Kanazawa's characteristics, compared to other provincial cities throughout the country, stand out. The proportion of manufacturing

industry to all industries is relatively high, and textile and related industries are the most prevalent. Nevertheless, the textile industry accounts for slightly more than 20 per cent of all industrial activity; such industries as metal, wood, and bamboo processing also play a big role. These two industries can be regarded as traditional industries (refer to Table 6). Although the ratio of the tertiary industries is not contained in the table, it is quite high in terms of the industrial ratio. Table 6 was formulated to illustrate the above points in more detail.

The characteristics of industrial development in Kanazawa can be grasped roughly; the table shows the development for every ten years starting from 1898. On the basis of Table 6 the following can be determined: (1) Silk fabrics(major item being habutae silk for export) were important from the Meiji period; (2) Following silk fabrics, the production value of such traditional products of Kanazawa as sake, dyed goods(Kaga printed silk), leaf, Kutani ware and other ceramics, confectionery(Japanese sweets), and lacquer ware is significant; (3) Although leaf production was subject to economic booms and depressions, it constantly accounted for 2 to 4 per cent of the total value of production in Kanazawa; (4) The ratio of the production value of the top ten items to the total production value increased from less than 40 per cent to atmost 80 per cent in the early Shōwa period, and there was a clear tendency for Kanazawa's indigenous products to occupy a greater ratio.

Another characteristic which was not revealed in Table 6 can be seen in Table 7. In 1921, all the industries except for the textile industry were managed on the basis of small-sized factories with less than 30 workers. Moreover, these factories were on the level of handicraft manufacturing as less than two-thirds of them relied upon motor power even in the Taishō period. It can be clearly seen that many of these factories were traditional industries.

Taking these industrial conditions of Kanazawa in the Meiji and Taishō periods into consideration, it can be understood that it is not meaningless to select the leaf industry as a typical example, and to approach the characteristics of a medium-sized provincial city such as Kanazawa

through an analysis of this industry.

2. The Development of the Leaf Industry

> Such precious metals as gold and silver have captured the hearts of people since olden times and have been been used not only for coins but also for art and craft objects. In the case of the latter, it is not difficult to imagine that people welcomed the method of beating gold which is highly adhesive into leaf and applying it as ornament. It is assumed that gold leaf and silver leaf came to be produced because the finished object differed very little from the genuine gold or silver object.[15]

Sekiya Shimoide, who studied the history of Kanazawa leaf, thus started writing on the origin of leaf. The primary characteristic of gold leaf is that the lustre never discolours. Because it is extremely thin and soft, intricate processing is possible. Thus it is the most valuable of the various types of leaf. It can be used for a variety of purposes, such as "Buddhist altars, Buddhist altar fittings, folding screens, mounting, sliding doors, picture frames, bookbinding, marking, gold letters, sign boards, weaving, gold thread, commercial medicine, ceramics, lacquer ware, fans, and gold plated paper."[16] In recent years, however, in addition to silver leaf, the so-called western leaf(brass leaf and copper leaf) and aluminium leaf are manufactured in quantity. These were developed as substitutes for gold leaf, because they are inexpensive. Only gold leaf will be considered in this paper. The following is a brief account of the development of the leaf industry from the Tokugawa period to the Taishō period.

The history of gold leaf in the Kaga fief goes as far back as the time of the founder of the fief, Toshiie Maeda.[17] Gold-beaters appeared in Kanazawa when gold-beating was transferred from Kyoto. In the middle of the seventeenth century, however, Kanazawa gold-beating was stopped temporarily due to the shōgunate's policy which banned mintage, as a means of controlling gold and silver. The revival was accidentally triggered at the beginning of the nineteenth century when the outer works of Kanazawa castle burnt down. Upon receiving the shōgunate's permission,

the fief government appointed Isuke, a merchant of Yasue Honchō in Kanazawa, to procure a massive amount of gold leaf, necessary for the reconstruction of the castle. At the beginning of this task Isuke had to rely upon the strength of Kyoto workers. After ten years of hardship, however, the previous technology was revived. Small independent workshops under the protection of the fief government were set up. Each workshop flourished, and it is considered that they reached the manufacture level by the middle of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, it was not possible to achieve development further than the manufacture level, due to the dominance of a handful of wholesalers who controlled the purchase of the raw material (gold) as well as the sales of the finished products. Furthermore, it was due to the fact that the market itself was extremely small. In an evaluation of such control by the wholesalers the following opinion was expressed. As a result of the dominant wholesale system, leaf production was specialized into the process of "rolling the ground metal, skimming, setting, transferring, and wrapping." Therefore,

> the development of specialized production indicates that the labour of these workers had already resulted in a division of labour for the production of finished products. ... The co-operative work relationship which produced a finished product was very characteristic of manufacturing.[18]

When social stability was regained after the Meiji Restoration, demand for leaf increased rapidly. Coupled with the removal of a nation-wide ban on the production of leaf which had lasted for 300 years, new groups of workers rushed to the leaf industry in Kanazawa. It is said that the number of leaf-beaters reached as many as 1,500 around about 1880. Kanazawa leaf was highly valued because:

> Beating is so exquisitely done that the texture is extremely thin. In view of the fact that less gold is required, the cost is naturally less than for that produced elsewhere. This was a special endogenous method made possible by local artisans who possessed the technology to beat the leaf to the maximum thinness allowed by the adhesive power of the raw material.[19]

The monopolistics position of Kanazawa leaf was enhanced through this technological superiority over the leaf produced in other areas.

However, sales competition among Kanazawa producers themselves became severe, which led to slipshod manufacturing. These factors were compounded by the coming of the Matsukata deflation and the recession, leading to a sudden decline in the industry. The situation was such that "many artisans moved on to other industries, and those engaged in gold-beating were heard lamenting all over."[20]

In 1888, during this period of hardship, the Leaf Trade Association was formed, in order to take measures for quality control and cost stabilization. The details of this association, however, are unknown. Due to the upsurge of modernization which came about in the post-war period of the Sino-Japanese war, the industry flourished again. After the Russo-Japanese war "the number of leaf wholesalers came up to 26, and following the habutae silk industry, the leaf industry became established as a speciality of Kanazawa.[21]

In the latter half of the Meiji period, the demand for Kanazawa leaf increased tremendously and it achieved a good reputation throughout Japan. As will be described below, the production was primarily by manual work of the cottage industry. Consequently, those who tried to invent machinery came from the section of leaf-beating which was ripe for the introduction of a mechanical process.

Hikotarō Miura, a leaf dealer of Kanazawa, began to devise a leaf-beating machine in the period after the Sino-Japanese war. After making repeated attempts, he succeeded in manufacturing a leaf-beating machine in 1911. At first, neither the quality nor the quantity of machine-produced leaf could surpass that of manually produced leaf. After World War I, however, due to the recession of German leaf, which had until then monopolized the world market, an extensive market was opened for Kanazawa leaf. A superior beating machine was completed at this time, almost in response to the increased demand.

Table 8 shows the trend of Kanazawa leaf production from the end of the Meiji period to the Taishō period. The production of leaf definitely occupied 5 per cent of the total production value of Kanazawa by this

period. Three-quarters of leaf production in the Meiji and Taishō periods was made up of gold leaf. However, when machine beating was started at the end of the Taishō period, it can be seen that the ratio of western leaf increased, and thus the ratio of gold leaf fell to two-thirds.

A glance at Table 8 reveals that the influence exerted by the introduction of the leaf-beating machine in the post-World War I period is directly related to the increased production of gold leaf. A comparison of the periods before and after World War I shows that the value of gold leaf production increased more than sixfold and the number of leaf sheets produced increased nearly threefold. Although the increase in the number of leaf workers, a result of the boom, naturally contributed to this increase in production, a greater significance should be attached to the emergence of leaf factories with motor power. However, the leaf-beating machine was not necessarily the dominant factor. In the latter half of the Taishō period, a superior manual worker produced 3,000 sheets monthly, while a leaf-beating machine produced 5,000 sheets. Nevertheless, while a long period of time was required for the training of a superior worker, there was the benefit that machine beating skills could be acquired in a relatively short period. The manufacture of high-quality products was still dependent on the skills and intuition of workers with many years of experience. The leaf-beating machine, therefore, had its limits. In addition, leaf beating only comprised a section of the leaf production, and other sections maintained manual production methods. Herein lies one of the reasons why leaf production could not develop into a factory industry. At any rate, the highest production value in the Taishō period was seen in 1919. Leaf producers, however, continued to encounter such major hardships as a depression after World War I, and the instability of the Japanese economy which fluctuated from one depression to another. In relation to the next chapter, what were the conditions in the previous year of 1918? It was another year of recession for the leaf industry and leaf workers were faced with extreme difficulties due to a marked commodity price increase and the concurrent soaring of rice prices.

Such was the development of the leaf industry in the Meiji and Taishō

periods. In sum, what should be emphasized here is the fact that the leaf industry was not suited to modernization. The reasons will be briefly explained in lieu of a summary.[22]

In the first place, in view of the fact that leaf production was a traditional industry, by its historical nature it was prevented from developing beyond a certain level. It was originally controlled by a system of wholesalers. It can be pointed out that the subordinate relationship of leaf workers to commercial capital continued to exist after the Meiji period and that the management scale remained small. Secondly, due to the fact that gold leaf was an ornamental material for luxury goods or exclusive art and craft objects, the independent development of a new market was not possible. Thus another reason that hindered the progress of this industry derived from the fact that most of the production was done on the basis of orders. Since the leaf itself was a finished consumer item, there was also no movement in the market stimulating the modernization of the leaf industry. As stated previously, they were confronted with an upsurge of repeated recessions. The fact that there was constant difficulty in the usage of the raw material, gold, should be remembered. The last point pertains to the fact that the production technology was manually oriented, and that many sections in the production process remained non-mechanized. In the next section these will be examined in more detail from the perspective of labour.

3. Labour, Life, and Consciousness of the Leaf Workers

The leaf industry in Kanazawa City during the Meiji and Taishō periods was primarily located in two areas. The large area was located on the west side of Mt. Utatsu, along the right bank of the Asano River. The other, relatively small area was located along the right bank of the Sai River, between the Kamikiku Bridge and the Shimokiku Bridge. It was said that the leaf-production area created its own atomosphere, obvious to anyone coming into the area because of the unique tap-tap sound which was the result of beating.

First, the process of leaf production will be explained briefly. Regarding this, the aforementioned book by Shimoide provides the most detail. Because the production of gold leaf involves the beating of the gold thinly into leaf, it appears to be simple work from the amateur's perspective. Broadly speaking, however, production is divided into the three processes of skim-making, leaf-beating and leaf-transferring. In addition, the support of special Japanese paper is absolutely indispensable for leaf-beating. Thus there are four processes if the process of this paper is included, but this process is eliminated here.

Let us examine the processes from the beginning to the end. Although gold is the raw material of gold leaf, to be more exact it is an alloy containing some silver and copper. The skimmer's work begins with making an alloy of precise proportions. This then is beaten with a rolling hammer to the thinness of about 3/100 mm (currently a roll machine is used). Then each layer is cut into small pieces (about two sun square) which are inserted between skimming paper; about two hundred layers are laid on top of each other. These are beaten into pieces of about five sun square, which are again cut into small pieces and inserted in between skimming paper. This process is repeated five times. The finished pieces in this process are called the skim, and they are made to the approximate thickness of 3/1000 mm.

The second process is the real leaf-beating process whereby the skim is finished into gold leaf with the approximate thickness of 2/10,000 to 3/10,000 mm. Basically the process involves inserting small pieces (called koma) between beating paper, beating, cutting them into small pieces and inserting each piece between beating paper, then repeated beating. During this process, such skills as transferring the pieces to beating paper, which easily expands, and then cooling the paper and small pieces largely depend upon intuition nurtured over long years of experience.

The beating process is accomplished by two beaters who usually face each other and take turns in beating about 500 layers of the small pieces inserted between beating paper. A skilled artisan holds the main hammer (omozuchi) and beats (producing a "tap-tap" sound) upon the layers, which

are moved about on the stone base. In between the beating by the skilled artisan, an apprentice or a trainee in front beats with two subordinate hammers(mukōzuchi), making the tap-tap sound. When the beating on the front is finished, they beat on the back again. It was in this process that the leaf-beating machine came to be used. How many times, or to what extent, this process of beating and transferring to different beating paper should be repeated is not necessarily standardized. When the leaf is beautifully expanded, filling the beating paper of 5 sun 5 bu square with the even thickness of 2/10,000 to 3/10,000 mm, the work is complete.

The third process is the finishing of the gold leaf. When beating is over, each piece is taken out and transferred to a broad book. Because the leaf is very thin and light, any wind must be avoided; the leaf is carefully and quietly transferred with the use of the so-called "long-nosed goblin's claws" as well as workers' chopsticks. Each piece is then taken out and cut into appropriate sizes with a bamboo cutter(aitake). The standard sizes which still exist now are the 3 sun 6 bu square, the 5 sun 2 bu square and the 7 sun 2 bu square. One hundred pieces of the same size are bound into a bundle. The work is complete when five bundles or ten bundles are put into the leaf box.

What was the position of the leaf workers in the production process? Their work and life and their consciousness will be discussed here. A survey based upon interviews with leaf workers in Kanazawa(five in their 60s and 70s and one iron mill worker) was conducted in November 1973. The objective of the survey was not only to investigate the actual conditions of the leaf industry and their workers in the Meiji and Taishō periods but also to hear about the circumstances of the Kanazawa rice riot which developed around the leaf workers.[23] The tape containing the three-hour interviews has been neither publicized nor used elsewhere. A part of the data is disclosed here, as this writer took part in the survey(any subsequent quote without a footnote is taken from the tape).

The work and life of the leaf workers were so severe and poor that they were classified with the populace of the lower social strata, having

labour conditions of the lowest kind. Table 9 shows list of wages. However, it can be seen that the segment of leaf workers who were not especially skilled received much lower wages than the minimum wages paid to any other worker. Several skilled workers, apprentices and junior apprentices primarily, lived at their employer's house. "The maximum wage was 25 sen per month. This was paid on the two holidays in the month, 15 sen on the first day of the month and 10 sen on the 15th. I remember that a movie used to cost 5 sen in those days." As mentioned already, the leaf-beating was done by a pair of workers. Should an unskilled apprentice miss the beating, he was "hit on the head by the main hammer, which hurt so much." The working hours were "on the surface from 7 in the morning to 6 in the evening, but night work lasted until about 10 o'clock." Thus the work lasted for many hours. Those who participated in the interview were all so aged and pitiful that they did not appear in their 60s and 70s. Their health must have deteriorated because of many hours of labour, and the poorly ventilated work places which were sheltered from draughts. Junior apprentices began their work at the age of eight or nine. Thus it was said that in the Taishō period they commuted to a night elementary school which existed in the vicinity of the leaf-producing area. Children were engaged in the same kind of work. The food was extremely poor. It was

> hot watered rice which was simply hot water poured onto rice. It was special if potatoes were added. There were also a few pickles. Miso soup was offered once in a while in the evening. I found a mud snail in the soup. I was so happy that I tried to pick it up only to discover that there was nothing in it as it was the reflection of my eyeball.

Lastly, the consciousness of the leaf workers will be touched upon here as it relates to the next chapter. It is so complex as a whole that it is itemized as follows: First of all, a conservative aspect which may be called the artisan spirit must be pointed out. There was the attitude of the traditional artisan which was well expressed in the expression of "the leaf-beaters being gamblers," meaning that they spent all they earned. Moreover, there was a strong sense of solidarity. On the other hand, coupled with their own circumstances, they also "sympathized with the downtrodden." There was the licensed quarter of Higashi adjoining the

leaf production area. It is said that some leaf workers who felt sympathetic toward the geisha and prostitutes helped them run away or redeemed them. There was one who spoke reminiscently that "it is not easy to admit that my work was that of a leaf-beater even now. This is because in the past the leaf-beaters were notorious for gambling, fighting, and bilking restaurants, which came up in the newspapers every day."

On the other hand, they also had a liberal and cultured aspect. "A pair of workers facing each other had a lot to talk about. Some workers found spare minutes to read the newspapers out loud for others to listen." Their attention was directed toward society through such conversations and topics. "Socialism was a popular word among the workers back then. We also knew the word democracy. One fellow-worker raised the issue of socialism so often that he was summoned to the police." This kind of statement was made in rapid succession by the former leaf workers. Such an ideological standard certainly existed among the leaf workers as a whole. In the Meiji and Taishō periods, however, it is appropriate to remark that "the main bearers of the labour movement in Kanazawa were the leaf production workers who could not be called modern wage-earners in the strict sense of the word."

Furthermore, the cultural aspect was nurtured in a similar way. "There were many fellow-workers who thought up satirical poems. We all learned them from our seniors." "When I was twelve or thirteen years old (author's note: around 1920), I sent in a poem to the newspaper. It went: 'Eight hours' work/Working women began to insist,' and it was printed."

The above shows only a fragment, but the correlation between the work and life and the consciousness of the leaf workers who made up the populace of the lower social strata and the rice riot will be considered in the next chapter.

III. THE RICE RIOT IN KANAZAWA

1. The Rice Riots and Provincial Cities

The rice riots which first broke out in Toyama prefecture in late July 1918 were the largest of all mass uprisings in Japan. Kome Sōdō no Kenkyū [Studies on the rice riots] (eds. Kiyoshi Inoue and Tetsu Watanabe, 5 vols., Yūhikaku, 1959-62) provide us with "comprehensive studies on the entity of this nationwide incident" (Ibid., vol. 1, Preface). It is unnecessary to discuss the significance of this work. However, the rice riots will be examined somewhat as they relate to problems regarding provincial cities and as they correlate to the present theme.

The rice riots were triggered by unrest which first broke out in Toyama prefecture in late July. They spread throughout the nation in the week following the unrest in the big cities such as Nagoya and Kyoto on 10 August. Unrest occurred in the big cities and towns, and violent uprisings at coal mines and metal mines in Kyūshū broke out. By about the middle of September, the rice riots had by and large come to an end. More than one million joined the riots and the military was mobilized at 120 spots with a force 92,000 strong (Takachika Matsuo, Minpon-shugi no Ryūchō [The trend of democracy] p. 130). Table 10, formulated on the basis of the previously cited Kome Sōdō no Kenkyū, shows the number of rice riots by city and by the scale of activity.

The fact that unrest of every scale broke out extensively throughout the cities, towns and villages of Japan can be demonstrated. The following provides a brief explanation on the basis of the categorization of cities, based upon this table. First of all, although "it was considered that there were extremely few rice riots in rural villages, the number is

unexpectedly high."[25] In the places where the towns and villages were small, the movements were naturally weak, involving a small group of people.(They were mostly of categories (B) and (C).) The purposes of their movement were to prevent rice shipments, to demand essential, subsistence relief(in Toyama and Okayama prefectures), to be united with tenants in their disputes(Hōryūji Village, Nara prefecture and others), and to attack capitalists, such as land owners. Of the above, the opposition to rice shipments, which triggered the riots, was based more on their so-called "instinct." It can thus be said that the opposition was "so subject to the conditions of the locality that it is hard to ascribe nationwide universality and exigency."[26] In the case of Toyama, however, the aspect of tradition, i.e., that it was their "custom since Meiji," should not be viewed lightly.

The greater the size of the population of cities and towns, the more extensive their movements became(increase in (A)). Moreover, their riots developed more in accordance with the particular characteristics of each city. In the case of cities with populations of 10,000 to 50,000, nearly 20 suffered rioting. Of nearly 30 cases in the category of (A), all the rioters attacked rice merchants and other capitalists as their primary targets, except in Nagano and Kōchi, where the rioters threw stones at police stations. Furthermore, all these cases are also common in the sense that they occurred in the peak period between 10 August and 17 August. Those in a newly developing city such as Amagasaki, "occurred centring on the labourers' town." It was, however, a situation where "daily labourers rose in revolt under the leadership of bosses to whom labourers were tied on the basis of a pre-modern labour relationship,"[27] rather a revolt of factory workers. Moreover, in the case of a city such as Aizu-Wakamatsu where "the capital of commercial usury tied the land and where the system of apprenticeship was dominant,"[28] the strata of workers subjugated by such operations formed the core of rioting. They thus directed their attack toward "the rice merchants who represented commercial usury.[29]

What were the circumstances in the medium-sized cities of 50,000 to 200,000? Approximately 30 cases of large-scale rioting occurred in nearly

20 cities of this size. Excluding Toyama and Sasebo, the vast majority of them were concentrated around 14 and 15 August. The targets, as well as the character of the movements, were diversified because they were closely linked with the characteristics of urbanization in each city. There was a tendency toward a metropolitan type of movement in Toyohashi, Wakayama, Matsuyama, and Fukui, where the police and the military police were attacked. This tendency was even clearer in Kure, where rioting was so violent that it looked like a "scene of city warfare in darkness when there was a confrontation with a troop of naval soldiers"[30] (Mitsusada Yoshikawa, Iwayuru Kome Sōdō Jiken no Kenkyū[A study on the so-called rice riot incident],(Shakai Mondai Shiryō Sōsho, Fukkoku-ban, p. 169). This incident was characterized by the fact that of 372 who were arrested, "158, nearly half, were modern workers of the navy arsenal as well as workers of Yoshiura Shipyard"[31] (Shigeru Yamamoto, Hiroshima-ken Shakai Undō-shi[A history of the social movement in Hiroshima prefecture], p. 191). Even soldiers participated in the uprising, and 14 were subsequently court-marshalled. There was henceforth an upsurge in the labour movement (the formation of the Kure Labour Union, October 1919) and the development of the people's movement. Nevertheless, it is said that there was neither an organized movement nor leaders among the workers who took part in the rice riots.

On the other hand, despite having a large population, as was the case with Kanazawa(150,000) (as will be explained below), artisans of the traditional industries continued to live widely in some cities, due to slow urbanization. In such cities, daily wagers and artisans (leaf workers in Kanazawa) became the core of the rioters and their wreckage of rice shops resembled the riots which occurred in small cities.

As can be seen, there were several types of rice riots which evolved in a complex manner, depending upon the circumstances of each urbanization process. A further analysis, which is the theme of this paper, will be made regarding the correlation between the lower social strata and the behaviour of the populace, using Kanazawa City as an example.

2. Movements of the Kanazawa Rice Riot

In addition to a brief summary of the Kanazawa rice riot which has just been explained, I give here (Table 11) a list of all those who were indicted as a result of the rice riot.

On the 11th of September, exactly a month after the Kanazawa rice riot, seven people were brought to trial at the Kanazawa District Court. Five of the indicted were leaf workers. The fact that many leaf workers participated in the riot was one of the reasons for the research shown in this paper. In addition, over one hundred people engaged in the leaf industry jointly signed a petition submitted at the time of the trial. The chairman of the leaf industry association and 21 board of directors also signed the petition. Ultimately the sentence was given at the end of October.[32]

The following is an account of the Kanazawa rice riot including some newly clarified facts. As quoted in the third section of the previous chapter, data obtained through interviews with leaf workers regarding the rice riot and the labour conditions existing in this industry will be used here, so that whatever was lacking in the previous record can be supplemented. (All the quotations in this section and the next section without a specific notation are quoted from the interviews.)

A mass movement in Kanazawa started from about the 10th of August, when people demanded to the Prefectural Governor and others that measures be taken concerning the soaring rice prices and commodity prices. Then, about 8 o'clock in the evening on the 12th, masses somehow began to gather in the Bishamon Shrine ground located on Mt. Utatsu in the east of the city. Kanazawa-shi Shi [Kanazawa City history] states as follows regarding this:

> When it seemed that there were over one hundred people, Nawakichi Kamei (of Tanamichi, Shin-machi), despite his senior age, stood in the middle of the steps and appealed to the masses. "Because of the unlimited soaring of rice prices recently, we, the indigent, are so destitute that we futilely await starvation. We thus wish to make a petition that the rice merchants sell us rice inexpensively. I will head the

group and thus I would like those who share the same thoughts to come with me. However, I wish you to refrain from committing rash acts which were seen in Nagoya and Kyoto." Thus the people at Mt. Utatsu rose and moved toward the centre of the city. People joined in as they moved on, and the group developed into a large crowd with about 2,000 people. At a time when there were hardly any mass movements, it was truly astounding to see a crowd of 2,000 people demonstrate in the city.33

This description was based upon an article in Hokuriku Mainichi newspaper. Two points, the fact that people somehow began to gather, and Nawakichi Kamei himself, will be touched upon later. The people who headed toward the city broke up into several groups and beseiged rice shops, other shops, the prefectural governor's residence and other residences in succession. (For the following, refer to "Kanazawa Shigai Chiku"[Kanazawa City area], 1919 edition p. 26.)

The first crowd went down through Bishamon Shrine to the north and raided the Okabe Clinic. ("We taught him a lesson because he snatched Nanching rice.") The crowd subsequently moved toward Kasuga-cho and raided the sake brewery run by Okabe's parents as well as a rice shop farther ahead. The second crowd headed toward the west from Mt. Utatsu and first raided Yamamoto Rice Shop at the corner of Higashi Baba and Nakano Bridge (a bridge over the Asano River) and then Asahi Rice Shop in Yasue-cho, Ito Rice Shop in Tamaru-cho, and Komori Rice Shop, which was across from Ito's. This crowd managed to get a promise to have rice sold cheaply by these shops that it raided. At Yamamoto Rice Shop, it went as follows: "Shop people threw out several bags of rice saying, 'This should be enough. Now forgive us.' Because spectators also joined in the crowd, the number of people thus kept increasing." It is said that the people "grew excited and were shouting 'heave-ho, heave-ho.'" Their action, however, did not become very violent and "no sooner had the people charged into the rice shop noisily than they came out; just a matter of three or five minutes."

One of the eyewitnesses of the second crowd stated that, when the crowd headed for Ito Rice Shop in Tamaru-cho, it was "chased by four or five

horses occupying the entire width of the road. It seemed like a group of military policemen or soldiers." There is no record of the military being mobilized to quieten the riot in Kanazawa. Thus it might have been the mobilized mounted policemen.

The second crowd was split into two groups in the interim, and the large crowd went back the same route to the east and raided Suzuki's Shop in Shimozutsumi-cho and Kōgawa's Shop in Bakuro-cho. It marched by the castle to the prefectural governor's residence in Mori-cho to the south of Mt. Utatsu. As might be expected, the crowd was stopped by dozens of policemen, and the crowd seemed to have dispersed after glaring at the police for a while. The dispersed crowd, which will be called the third crowd, went southward along the main road from Shimosutsumi-cho. This crowd marched on, repeatedly shouting "Hurray! Hurray!," and raided the residence of Kyūtarō Sano in Furudera-cho, which was located just before Saikawa Grand Bridge. Sano's residence was attacked because it was said that "he was doing business extensively and had a warehouse full of rice as he was a large-scale landowner." Being again encountered by the police, however, they crossed the bridge and dispersed in the vicinity of No-machi. Although the above was roughly reported by Hokuriku Mainichi newspaper, it appears that there was another group.

This fourth crowd "gathered at Kamikiku Bridge and, after raiding Matsumoto Rice Shop in Kawakami, Mori Rice Shop, and Sumiya Pawn Shop, it reached Shimokiku Bridge," which was on the upper stream of the Sai River. The Kawakami area on the right bank of the Sai River is also one of the leaf industry areas.

Including the crowd which was newly ascertained by this writer, it is assumed that there were altogether four crowds that rioted in four different areas, surrounding the castle which is in the centre of Kanazawa City. Excluding the activity in the vicinity of the governor's residence, all the actions occurred in the residential areas of artisans and the middle and lower strata. Consequently, the number of participants from such areas increased in due course, and the groups developed spontaneously into large crowds. It may be an underestimation to state that "the

number of people who participated in the movements was over two thousand at their height."[34] Although there is no basis for this estimate, one informant said that he remembers the total number to be "about three thousand." Nevertheless, the figure simply indicates the total number of four crowds, and their actions were not organized joint actions. The following statement needs further examination: "There was no atmosphere of joint action. We had a competitive feeling and thus started rioting on our own when the others did."

According to newspapers, it was reported that although crowds gathered again on the following day(13th), they were dispersed without starting any action. On the other hand, the court record reveals that Segawa Rice Shop in Zaimoku-cho and others were wrecked. Thus, although it is difficult to ascertain the truth, it is at least considered that there was not as much action as during the previous day.

Let us again refer to the Kanazawa City History, which was quoted at the beginning of this section.

> It was surprising that a large number of citizens went against the will of the authorities and resorted to direct action in order to plead their destitute living conditions, and that they attempted to find a means to overcome their hardships relying solely upon their own strength. Although they retreated peacefully, there is no way of knowing how they may change drastically should they be allowed to get away with it. When the sense of surprise subsided, the authorities were seized with fear.[35]

Having stated this, the book goes on to explain the measures to be taken by the authorities. In view of the fact that our interest lies in other issues, we will move on to them.

3. Group Formation and Communication of Mass Riots

The previous section showed the development of the rice riot in Kanazawa. When the rice riot is viewed on the basis of the behaviour and consciousness of the leaf workers and of the lower strata in a provincial city, there seem to be several points which deserve attention.

Though insufficient, clarification of these points will follow, in lieu of a summary of this paper.

The first point pertains to the uniqueness of the leaf industry workers and their role. Prior to the Kanazawa rice riot of 12 August, "the bosses of the leaf workers seemed to have gone around the town discussing something." "There was an intense atmosphere in the neighbourhood as if something was about to happen." This was said by those who were in their teens and early 20s back then. Although such a recollection lacks specific evidence, it implies that there was some "organized" movement for the riot in the leaf-beating areas. It was not as if people somehow gathered. Thus the reason that "the bosses could not have let the workers starve" becomes plausible, and the petition which was submitted to the court subsequently is significant in this light. Moreover, average working conditions, life style, and consciousness of the leaf workers were such that it was not surprising for them to initiate a rice riot at any time. In this regard, it is questionable whether one should place too much emphasis upon progressive people who "knew socialism." Isn't it more plausible to assume that the leaf workers rose to action out of their sense of righteous indignation, when their consciousness is taken into consideration? It was for this reason that this writer laid more stress than did the newspaper account on the fact that a part of the leaf workers raided the Okabe Clinic.

It is concluded that the core of the rioters consisted of leaf workers and other people of the lower strata. In this regard, the system of the joint district which existed in Kanazawa City is taken up as the second point. It was a system which is slightly different from the guild relationship existent in the leaf industry. This ordinary local unit played a significant role in many aspects, such as group formation, organization of group action, and the exchange of information. As pointed out by Yokoyama, friendly living or solidarity was particularly indispensable for the people of the provincial lower strata. This is a rather bold conjecture, but was it not the case that the four crowds of the rice riot by and large formed groups and rioted on the basis of their respective joint district? It is possible to determine this by tracing the

area and the route of action undertaken by each crowd. Although it is necessary to explain the arrangements of towns into joint districts,[36] to put it simply, the rioting crowds were in the following joint districts: The first crowd was in the seventh joint district(Baba, Moriyama and by the Asano School); the second crowd was also in the seventh district as well as in the fourth joint district(Miso Storage and by the Zaimoku School) and the fifth joint district(Hōsai, Matsugae and by the Nagadobei School); the third crowd was in a different part of the fifth district; the fourth crowd was in a part of the second joint district(Niigashi and by the Kikukawa School). It has already been mentioned that these crowds in different joint districts were more competitive than if they had been united together for greater joint action. It was not as if three thousand people as one group carried out a demonstration, and there was little possibility for them to be that way.

The third point pertains to the leadership of the rice riot. Newspaper articles as well as other accounts of the Kanazawa rice riot which were solely based upon newspaper accounts all regard Nawakichi Kamei as a hero. All the respondents of the interviews, however, unanimously disagreed with such a view. According to them, Kamei had a very bad reputation; "nobody spoke well of Kamei back then," "he was more of a so-called ruffian," and "he had a personality much to be criticized." This writer, therefore, does not attribute much to Kamei's leadership. When the behaviour of four crowds is seen on the basis of the leaf workers' organization and the joint district system, it must have been the case that central figures in each group spontaneously assumed the role of leadership. It is somehow unnatural to conclude that Kamei, who was considered untrustworthy, suddenly assumed the role of leadership to pull everyone together. This writer feels that the people of the lower strata behaved otherwise.

Fourthly, it is imagined that communication and the exchange of information among the people of the lower strata was pursued in multifarious forms. This point was already explained in the section pertaining to the work of the leaf workers. "I have heard all about what happened at Namerikawa(the earliest rice riot) from the fishmonger women." Thus such news must have stread in an instant through gossiping. In those days,

newspapers were not necessarily the main source of information. It is necessary to accumulate concrete data and to study these aspects further.

Lastly, the element of traditionalism in the mass riot will be touched upon. This involves two points. One is the fact that there is ordinarily a certain rule and experience which was nurtured by tradition as to when and where to gather when a large number of people rose to action. The manner in which they raided the rice shops and won their demands in a short period of time(prior to any conflict with the police) revealed that they were quite experienced. Furthermore, it was known to everyone at that time to gather at Bishamon. Incidentally, at the time of the Kanazawa riot of 1858("rice riot"), Bishamon was one of the base points. The other is the fact that in the broader sense of the meaning of tradition, the Hokuriku region had the tradition of resorting to rice riots. The people of Kanazawa were well aware of the fact that rice riots were habitual in the Toyama region, which went through a number of them from the time of the Meiji period. Under these circumstances, the people of the lower strata in Kanazawa must have perceived their action at the time of the riot to have arisen out of necessity due to their destitution. They, thus, would not have felt that they had made a tragic decision — committing an outrage and doing something beyond their knowledge. As a result of this, in due course sympathizers grew in number spontaneously.

NOTES

1. Chōju Nishida, "Yokoyama Gennosuke Nippon no Kasō Shakai no Seiritsu," (Rekishigaku Kenkyū, no. 161, 1953). A recent work of research is Yūichi Tachibana's Hyoden Yokoyama Gennosuke (Sōju-sha, 1979).

2. Gennosuke Yokoyama, "Hinmin Jōtai no Kenkyu," vol. 1(Chūō Kōron, vol. 18, no. 6), p. 24.

3. Ibid., p. 26.

4. Ibid., p. 24.

5. Ibid., p. 25.

6. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

7. Ibid., p. 26.

8. Refer to Shinchō Tsuda, Nippon no Toshi Kasō Shakai(Minerva Shobō, 1972).

9. In addition, Nippon Shakai Fukushi no Kisoteki Kenkyū by Kunijirō Tashiro, author and editor(Doshin-sha, 1965), can be cited.

10. Tetsuya Hashimoto, "Nisshin Sengo no Jidai to Hinmin Ron," Kanazawa University Keizai Gakkai, Keizai Ron Shū, no. 17, 1980.

11. See "Nippon Shihonshugi to Rōdō Shijō" contained in Mikio Sumiya, Nippon no Rōdō Mondai(Tōdai Shuppan Kai, 1967).

12. Refer to Tetsuya Hashimoto, "Toshi-ka to Minshū Undō" in Nippon Rekishi, vol. 17, Modern 4(Iwanami Kōza, 1976); "Taishō Democracy-ki ni Okeru Toshi no Keisei ni Tsuite," Kanazawa University Hō Bungaku-bu Ronshū, vol. 22 on economics, 1975; "Nichiro Sensō-go no Toshika to Rōdōryoku no Idō," Nippon-shi Kenkyū, no. 2000, 1979, etc.

13. The entire article on "Chihō no Kasō Shakai" is contained in Yokoyama Gennosuke Zenshū, vol. 1(Meiji Bunken, 1972). Quoted from p. 465.

14. Ibid., p. 467.

15. Sekiya Shimoide, Kaga Kanazawa no Kinpaku(Hokkoku Shuppan-sha, 1972), p. 2.

16. Seiji Nakamura, Chihō Tokushu Sangyō no Kōzō(Ishikawa Newspaper Co., 1951), p. 210.

17. The history of gold leaf under the fief government of Kaga is well described in the aforementioned book by Shimoide.

18. Nobujirō Kōno, Kanazawa Haku no Enkaku to Genjō, 1966, p. 41.

19. Kanazawa City Office, Kanazawa Kōgyō Enkaku Shiryō, 1905, p. 110.

20. Ibid., p. 111.

21. Kōno, op. cit., p. 43.

22. Nakamura, op. cit., pp. 236-40.

23. The survey was planned and carried out by a study group on the rice riot in the Publication Committee of the History of Social Movements in Ishikawa Prefecture. The findings will eventually be used as descriptive data in Ishikawa Ken Shakai Undō-shi[The history of social movements in Ishikawa Prefecture].

24. Kanazawa-shi Shi, contemporary(2nd vol.), 1969, p. 120.

25. Kiyoshi Inoue and Tooru Watabe, Kome Sōdō no Kenkyū, 5 vols. (Yūhikaku, 1959-1962), vol. 1, p. 107.

26. Ibid., vol. 5, pp. 18 and 20.

27. Amagasaki-shi Shi, vol. 3, p. 483.

28. Kichinosuke Shōji, Kome Sōdō no Kenkyū(Mirai-sha, 1957), p. 152.

29. Ibid., p. 154.

30. Mitsusada Yoshikawa, Iwayuru Kome Sōdō Jiken no Kenkyū, p. 169.

31. Shigeru Yamamoto, Hiroshima-ken Shakai Undō-shi, p. 191.

32. Inoue and Watanabe, vol. 3, p. 474. Volume 3 features the rice riots in Ishikawa prefecture and gives newspaper accounts of that time to illustrate the event.

33. Kanazawa-shi Shi (contemporary edition 1969), vol. 1, p. 145.

34. Inoue and Watanabe, vol. 3, p. 469.

35. Kanazawa-shi Shi, (vol. 1), p. 147.

36. Ibid., (vol. 2), p. 40.

TABLE 1. The Percentage of the City Population According to Size

City size	1903		1908		1913		1918		1925	
	No. of cities	Population* (%)	No. of cities	Population* (%)	No. of cities	Population* (%)	No. of cities	Population* (%)	No. of cities	Population* (%)
Metropolitan cities	6	4,094 (45.7)	6	5,005 (44.8)	6	5,247 (40.1)	6	6,136 (38.8)	6	6,608 (34.2)
100,000 - 200,000	3	374 (4.2)	4	530 (4.7)	5	690 (5.3)	8	1,156 (7.3)	15	2,132 (11.0)
50,000 - 100,000	16	1,077 (12.0)	19	1,353 (12.1)	26	1,630 (12.5)	31	2,199 (13.9)	41	3,445 (17.8)
10,000 - 50,000	168	3,417 (38.1)	221	4,289 (38.4)	278	5,514 (42.1)	324	6,341 (40.0)	363	7,165 (37.0)
Total	193	8,964 [18.5]	250	11,178 [21.6]	315	13,081 [23.7]	369	15,832 [27.3]	425	19,351 [32.4]
Nationwide total population		48,542		51,736		55,131		55,087		59,736

* In thousands

Source: The above is formulated with figures from a section on the present population for towns and cities in Nippon Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan[Imperial Japanese Statistic Almanac]. [ ] denotes the total city population expressed as a percentage of the nationwide total population. The figures less than 1,000 are omitted.

TABLE 2. Increase and Decrease in the Population

	Increase in the population of villages and towns with less than 10,000 (%)	Increase in the population of cities and towns with 10,000 to 50,000 (%)	Increase in the population of cities and towns with 50,000 to 100,000 (%)	Increase in the population of cities and towns with 100,000 to 200,000 (%)	Increase in the population of 6 metropolitan cities (%)	Increase in the nationwide population
1903 - 08	998 (31.3)	872 (27.3)	276 (8.6)	136 (4.3)	911 (28.5)	3,194
1908 - 13	1,491 (43.9)	1,225 (36.1)	277 (8.2)	160 (4.7)	242 (7.1)	3,395
1913 - 18	285 (9.6)	827 (28.0)	489 (16.5)	466 (15.8)	889 (30.1)	2,956
1920 - 25	-387 (-10.3)	834 (22.1)	1,340 (35.5)	1,550 (41.1)	436 (11.6)	3,773

Source: Nippon Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan of each year.

TABLE 3. Cities with a Population of Over 50,000 (1918)

6 metropolitan cities	
Tokyo	2,347,442
Ōsaka	1,641,580
Kyōto	670,357
Kōbe	592,726
Yokohama	447,423
Nagoya	436,609

Cities with a population between 100,000 and 200,000 (8 cities)	
Nagasaki	198,147
Hiroshima	162,391
Kanazawa	158,637
Kure	154,687
Hakodate	133,698
Sasebo	123,555
Sendai	122,720
Otaru	102,467

Cities with a population between 50,000 and 100,000 (31 cities)			
Fukuoka	98,583	Shimonoseki	67,866
Niigata	97,274	Toyohashi	66,839
Okayama	96,446	Hamamatsu	61,029
Sapporo	94,647	Fukui	59,932
Kagoshima	92,306	Naha	59,362
Yawata	89,472	Kōfu	58,453
Yokosuka	88,742	Muroran	58,349
Wakayama	84,603	Matsuyama	58,346
Sakai	75,346	Maebashi	58,320
Shizuoka	73,972	Gifu	57,909
Kumamoto	73,613	Utsunomiya	57,377
Moji	73,377	Tsu	54,522
Tokushima	73,096	Mito	53,030
Toyama	73,032	Kōchi	50,955
Ōmuta	72,482	Matsumoto	50,356
Asahikawa	69,421		

Source: Formulated from Nippon Teikoku Tōkei Nenkan

TABLE 4. The Population of Kanazawa

Year	Total population
1889	94,209
94	89,593
99	90,471
1904	99,594
09	110,511
14	128,660
19	158,954
24	141,499
29	158,363
34	165,719
39	193,502
44	219,203
49	248,899
54	273,650
59	297,247
64	301,540
69	323,415

Source: Formulated from Kanazawa-shi Tōkei Sho and others.

TABLE 5. Main Industries in Cities (1920)

Ranking by industrial population		No. of industrial workers	Types of industry with more than 10% industrial ratio (in the classification standard)						Industrial ratio
1	Yawata	29,986	Metal (65.2)						66.6
2	Maebashi	17,096	Textile (69.0)						58.3
3	Sakai	17,763	Textile (30.8)	Metal (13.5)					50.7
4	Wakayama	15,018	Textile (37.8)	Wood and bamboo (21.8)					49.7
5	Kure	28,609	Machinery and tools (39.4)	Metal (31.6)					49.4
6	Gifu	14,226	Textile (44.7)	Clothing (18.1)					48.9
7	Hamamatsu	13,679	Textile (39.2)	Clothing (10.1)					48.2
8	Fukui	11,091	Textile (49.1)	Clothing (10.7)	Wood and bamboo (10.5)				46.2
9	Nagoya	80,628	Textile (20.8)	Clothing (12.2)	Wood and bamboo (11.8)	Metal (11.0)			45.8
10	Kōfu	11,209	Textile (48.5)	Clothing (12.6)					45.5
11	Toyohashi	14,577	Textile (64.9)						45.0
12	Tokushima	12,391	Textile (30.8)	Wood and bamboo (16.6)	Clothing (13.9)	Food and drinks (12.5)			44.6
13	Nagasaki	30,831	Metal (29.1)	Machinery and tools (23.9)	Civil engineering (10.1)				44.5
14	Okayama	17,169	Textile (37.4)	Drinks (14.0)	Civil engineering (11.3)	Clothing (11.0)			42.9
15	Kōbe	107,785	Machinery and tools (21.7)	Metal (17.8)	Civil engineering (14.2)	Chemical (10.9)			41.6
16	Kanazawa	19,645	Textile (22.5)	Metal (17.6)	Food and drinks (12.5)	Wood and bamboo (10.7)			41.3
17	Muroran	8,748	Metal (65.3)	Civil engineering (13.5)					41.2
18	Kagoshima	15,454	Textile (30.4)	Food and drinks (22.3)	Clothing (11.5)	Civil engineering (11.2)			41.0
19	Shizuoka	11,734	Wood and bamboo (33.8)	Food and drinks (14.9)	Clothing (14.8)	Civil engineering (10.2)			39.9
20	Naha	10,057	Textile (25.3)	Clothing (24.3)	Food and drinks (17.8)	Wood and bamboo (11.0)			39.3
21	Matsuyama	7,331	Textile (38.4)	Food and drinks (14.0)	Clothing (11.8)	Civil engineering (10.3)			38.3
22	Ōmuta	9,467	Textile (17.8)	Metal (17.4)	Chemical (17.2)	Civil engineering (15.8)			36.7
23	Toyama	7,794	Wood and bamboo (14.6)	Clothing (13.9)	Chemical (12.8)	Civil engineering (12.7)	Textile (12.0)	Food and drinks (10.8)	36.7
24	Yokohama	63,709	Metal (15.7)	Civil engineering (14.5)	Machinery (14.4)	Clothing (12.1)	Textile (11.9)		36.5
25	Sapporo	13,540	Civil engineering (17.3)	Food and drinks (15.4)	Wood and bamboo (15.3)	Textile (10.6)	Metal (10.4)	Clothing (10.1)	36.5
26	Hiroshima	23,035	Clothing (19.7)	Wood and bamboo (13.7)	Food and drinks (13.0)	Metal (11.5)	Civil engineering (10.7)		35.2
27	Utsunomiya	7,984	Food and drinks (28.5)	Civil engineering (14.6)	Clothing (14.5)	Wood and bamboo (12.1)			33.5
28	Fukuoka	11,914	Civil engineering (19.9)	Food and drinks (13.1)	Clothing (12.6)	Textile (11.7)	Metal (11.2)	Wood and bamboo (10.0)	33.2
29	Sasebo	13,633	Machinery and tools (33.4)	Metal (25.1)					32.9
30	Kumamoto	8,935	Food and drinks (28.2)	Clothing (16.9)	Civil engineering (10.7)	Textile (10.1)			31.5
31	Yokosuka	14,528	Machinery and tools (32.2)	Metal (27.1)	Civil engineering (10.0)				31.4
32	Niigata	11,389	Wood and bamboo (21.2)	Clothing (14.4)	Metal (12.5)	Civil engineering (11.6)	Textile (10.2)		31.0
33	Sendai	13,606	Food and drinks (20.1)	Textile (17.5)	Civil engineering (15.9)	Clothing (12.7)	Wood and bamboo (10.7)		30.4
34	Hakodate	13,609	Civil engineering (17.5)	Food and drinks (15.8)	Clothing (13.6)	Metal (13.5)	Wood and bamboo (12.7)	Machinery and tools (11.7)	25.0
35	Moji	7,927	Civil engineering (22.4)	Ceramic (17.5)	Metal (14.3)	Food and drinks (10.9)			24.4
36	Asahikawa	6,415	Wood and bamboo (23.9)	Civil engineering (22.1)	Food and drinks (19.4)	Clothing (11.1)			24.4
37	Otaru	9,704	Civil engineering (20.5)	Food and drinks (18.5)	Clothing (16.4)	Wood and bamboo (13.9)			23.7
38	Shimonoseki	6,203	Civil engineering (18.3)	Food and drinks (16.1)	Metal (11.9)	Wood and bamboo (11.7)	Clothing (11.7)		19.7

Source: Fukuju Umino, "Kōgyō Hatten to Toshi no Dōkō", Meiji Taishō Kyōdō-shi Kenkyū-hō (Asakura Shoten, 1970), pp. 150-153. The original data from the 1920 National Census Survey Report.

TABLE 6. Production Value of Major Industrial and Manufactured Products in Kanazawa (Top 10 Items)

1898		1908		1918		1928	
Major industrial and manufactured products	Production value	Major industrial and manufactured products	Production value	Major industrial and manufactured products	Production value	Major industrial and manufactured products	Production value
	(Yen)		(Yen)		(Yen)		(Yen)
Silk fabrics	314,000	Silk fabrics	3,113,000	Silk fabrics	13,114.000	Tabacco	12,353,000
Sake	289,000	Sake	542,000	Tabacco	3,390,000	Silk fabrics	11,588,000
Cotton fabrics	256,000	Ceramic	286,000	Lumber	2,095,000	Cotton spinning	6,417,000
Dyed goods	192,000	Net weaving	259,000	Cotton and other fabrics	1,443,000	Confectionery	3,550,000
Goldbeating	159,000	Embroidery	254,000	Ceramic	1,136,000	Western clothing	3,308,000
Floss goods	105,000	Shoes	249,000	Goldbeating	1,087,000	Goldbeating	2,790,000
Ceramic	92,000	Soy sauce	158,000	Sake	993,000	Cotton fabrics	2,489,000
Lacquer ware	68,000	Goldbeating	154,000	Confectionery	838,000	Sake	2,237,000
Confectionery	61,000	Paraffin	144,000	Filature	827,000	Printing	1,900,000
Soy sauce	59,000	Lacquer ware	135,000	Weaving machinery	802,000	Net weaving	1,652,000
Total value of industrial and manufactured products	4,350,071	Total value of industrial and manufactured products	8,646,738	Total value of industrial and manufactured products	38,390,924	Total value of industrial and manufactured products	63,372,105

Source: Formulated from Kanazawa-shi Tōkei-sho

TABLE 7. Composition of Factories by Industry in Kanazawa (1921)

By industry	No. of factories (composition ratio)	Of which factories with motor power (composition ratio)	No. of operatives	Value of production	Composition ratio	Size of factory by the number of operatives				
						More than 5	More than 10	More than 30	More than 50	More than 100
	%	%		(Yen)						
Textiles	82 (35.5)	64 (78.0)	4,287	13,497,000	(62.0)	12	37	12	4	17
Machinery and tools	64 (27.7)	42 (65.6)	1,157	1,910,000	(8.8)	30	27	3	-	4
Chemical	13 (5.6)	8 (61.5)	752	1,505,000	(6.9)	4	4	3	-	2
Food and drinks	36 (15.6)	23 (63.9)	404	2,234,000	(10.2)	20	15	1	-	-
Miscellaneous	36 (15.6)	20 (55.6)	670	2,633,000	(12.1)	20	12	1	1	2
Total	231 (100.0)	157 (68.0)	7,270	21,779,000	(100.0)	86	95	20	5	25

Note: From Kanazawa-shi Tōkei-sho, value is rounded to the nearest ¥1,000.

TABLE 8. Production of Kanazawa Leaf

Year	Total production value of Kanazawa A	Value of leaf production: Total value	% over A	Of which gold leaf production: Value of production	Of which gold leaf production: No. of leaf units produced	Production value of western leaf	No. of workers engaged in leaf work	No. of leaf factories equipped with motor power: No. of factory workers	No. of leaf factories equipped with motor power: No. of factories
1909	6,721,000	363,000	5.4	272,000	1,360	48,000	1,341	-	-
14	12,988,000	439,000	3.4	325,000	1,810	33,000	791	-	-
19	58,892,000	3,151,000	5.4	2,064,000	4,800	378,000	1,880	470	13
24	45,853,000	2,872,000	6.3	1,840,000	4,600	292,000	1,460	396	20
29	57,750,000	2,645,000	4.6	1,849,000	4,301	229,000	826	305	19

Source: Formulated from Ishikawa-ken Tōkei-sho and Kanazawa-shi Tōkeo-sho.

TABLE 9. Workers' Wages in Kanazawa City in the Middle of the Taishō Period. (Unit: *sen*)

Year	Leaf worker		Daily-wage earner		Painter		Caster		Carpenter	
	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum	Minimum
1915	100	30	75	50	85	60	90	55	95	65
16	100	30	70	40	85	60	90	55	95	65
17	100	40	75	50	115	60	100	65	100	70
18	109	66	84	65	160	75	140	87	154	81
19	180	100	170	80	250	100	250	120	230	90

Source: Formulated from *Ishikawa-ken Tōkei-sho*.

TABLE 10. The Number of Rice Riots by City and the Scale of Activity

Population	Less than 10,000	More than 10,000	10,000 - 50,000	50,000 - 200,000	6 metro-politan cities	Metal and coal mines
More than several hundreds by (A)	153		33	32	23	
Less than 100 by (A)	98	12	2	6	3	38
(B)	72	7	3	9	7	
(C)	118	14	15	8	0	
Total	441	71	53	55	33	38

Source: Formulated from Kome Sōdō no Kenkyū, vol. 1, a table showing the location of outbreaks by prefecture, and ibid., vol. 5, a table showing the dates of outbreaks and other related accounts in each volume.
The following categorization is based upon vol. 1:
(A) Rioting and demonstration by the masses.
(B) Dispersed after meetings.
(C) Threatening situations.
However, when more than one hundred people were involved in rioting in the category of (A), the cases are treated independently as large-scale riots.
The population is based on the figures as of 1918. Towns with a population over 20,000 are included in the cities with a population of 10,000 to 50,000.
One day of unrest is counted as one case and thus the total number of cases was 691.

TABLE 11. Those Indicted and Their Sentences Due to the Kanazawa Rice Riot

Name	Age	Address	Occupation	Prosecutor's statement	Sentence
Yosoji Inami	42	Kami-Kurumi-cho, Kanazawa	Second-hand dealer	Penal servitude 1 year	Penal servitude 1 year
Yoshihisa Tanabe	25	Fuchigami-cho, "	Lead beater	" " 8 months	" " 10 months
Saburō Ōyamaguchi	46	Matagoro-cho, "	Daily labourer	" " "	" " 6 months
Genemon Itō	28	Shin-Nagahei-cho, "	Leaf beater	" " "	Penal servitude 6 months (2-year suspended sentence)
Kanosuke Ōnishi	21	Fuchigami-cho, "	"	" " 6 months	Penal servitude 6 months (2-year suspended sentence)
Benji Kariya	33	Kawagyotei, Kami-Honda, "	"	" " "	Fine 30 *yen*
Sakuji Hata	26	Fuchigami-cho, "	"	" " "	" " "

Source: From *Hokuriku Mainichi Shimbun*, 11 and 31 October 1918.