

Chapter I

Politics and Diplomacy after the Cold War in terms of its Relations with the United States

1. *Introduction*

The disintegration of the former Soviet Union gave Cuba a great shock because that meant for Cuba not only the termination of Soviet economic assistance but also the ideological crisis in which the socialist system based on the Marxist ideology had broken down. This crisis has forced Cuba to reconsider its political system.

As will be analyzed in detail in the following chapter, Cuba established a more highly centralized economic system than most of its East European counterparts. At the same time, the Castro regime obtained popular support through free education and medical services, the preferred distribution of resources on the provinces outside of Havana, under its egalitarian ideology, while it strengthened its control over the nation and accomplished national unification through the mono-party system, the popular mobilization such as mass organizations and revolutionary armed forces. Through the Revolution, Cuba made up a unique system which is quite different from other Latin American countries. In recent years, there is a trend which analyzes the Cuban Revolution from viewpoints other than socialism, such as utopian socialism and the Humanist thoughts¹, but this book takes the view in which we consider that Cuba's political and economic regime which was established in the 1970s and modified in the 1980s was created based principally on the socialist ideology with Soviet assistance.

However, a small country with little natural resources like Cuba has not been able to adopt an isolationist policy as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China could have adopted, because such a policy is not practical or rational for the reality of Cuba. Although 80 percent of its trade had been with the Soviet bloc, most of the rest had been with developed capitalist countries. Cuba's trade with Japan used to be at a significant level, especially during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Japan bought sugar and seafood, and Cuba bought various manufactured goods. While eco-

nomic relations between Cuba and the United States have remained at a low level, Cuba has maintained economic relations with other developed countries, as well as many of the Third World countries. In terms of diplomatic relations, Cuba has never suspended its relations with those countries, including economically powerful ones such as Canada, Japan and nations in Western Europe, except West Germany because of the recognition of East Germany.

In this sense, Cuba has never been isolated internationally, and the "blockade" by the U.S. government has never been realized at the worldwide level. Up to the middle of the 1970s, most Latin American countries had suspended their diplomatic relations with Cuba because of U.S. pressure, and Cuba was dismissed from the Organization of American States (OAS). But most of those countries in Latin America reopened their diplomatic relations with Cuba in the 1970s, except those such as the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, and have not been subject to U.S. embargoes, either, for the past twenty years.

On the other hand, Cuban-U.S. relations have been more complicated. It is well known that Cuba and the United States have not had normalized diplomatic relations since 1961, and the U.S. economic embargo (The Cuban side calls it an "economic blockade."²) impedes economic relations such as trade and investment. The officially low level diplomatic relations between the two countries started in 1976 under the Carter administration, and the interests section was permitted in both capital cities.

Although trade and investment do not exist between the two, the dollar remittance from Cuban American citizens to their families in Cuba³ and humanitarian aid by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and churches, for example, cannot be ignored in the Cuban economy which has been suffering from a shortage of hard currency.

Yet after the end of the Cold War, the official relations between Cuba and the United States have not changed as much as had been expected. The United States does not need to fear the communist ideology and the "domino effect," and therefore has no reason to fear the Castro regime, either. Nevertheless, there has been no big change in U.S. policy toward Cuba. The aim of the U.S. embargo is to encourage the change of Cuba's system through the domestic power, by taking advantage of, or by advancing, the economic crisis in Cuba. In this sense, it can be said that as long as the economic difficulties in Cuba continue, the United States keeps believing in the effect of the embargo.

Under the socialist economic system and the U.S. embargo, and without Soviet assistance, the material shortage has been very serious in Cuba. From June to August of 1994, more than 30 thousand refugees escaped from Cuba to Florida by rafts and other means. The main reasons for these people fleeing were economic, not political. For fear that the refugee flow might be endless, the U.S. government suspended the Cuba Normalization Act which had been valid for 30 years. The Act permitted all Cuban refugees political asylum and residence in the United States. Because of the Act, a Cuban could enter the United States automatically and get permanent residence in one year, if only he risked his life to reach the U.S. coast or to be found by the U.S. Coast Guard. It was one of the important factors which triggered the refugee rush of 1994.

Yet in spite of the material difficulties, the Castro regime has been quite stable. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many people in the United States believed that Cuba also would break down within a short period of time, but this expectation has yet to be fulfilled. On August 5 of 1994 a riot took place near the Havana port, but since this incident the social order has been maintained. After the shooting down of two aircraft sent by a Cuban American group "Brothers to the Rescue" on February 24, 1996, some members of an anti-Castro group "Concilio Cubano" were arrested. Yet generally speaking, the opposition groups are not so active as they were, for example, in the former Soviet Union.

While relations between Cuba and the United States have not changed, Cuba's status in the international community has been changing. Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Cuba's military interventions in other countries in Africa and Cen-

tral America were threats to some countries, but now without the East-West confrontation, and for Cuba's economic crisis, such threats disappeared. Now many countries in the world support Cuba's position against the U.S. embargo. At the General Assembly of the United Nations, five years continuously resolutions against the U.S. embargo have been passed.

On the other hand, in terms of the democratization and respect for human rights, many criticize the Cuban government and demand improvement. The European Union (EU) adopted a common position toward Cuba for democratization and respect for human rights, while stressing the importance of doing so through peaceful measures. The majority of the countries in the Western Hemisphere (Canada and the majority of Latin American countries) also have taken a similar position.

However, the Castro government has been passive regarding the international demand for democratization. It should be noted that the regime still has maintained national control, and this is the source of Castro's confidence to keep the present system. After the shooting down of the private aircraft, the Cuban government domestically tightened its grip on corruption and information systems, and economic reform was frozen for several months. It can be analyzed that the regime took a temporary break in order to deal with various contradictions appearing in the difficult process in which the government keeps socialist principles and the revolutionary regime and at the same time exercises reforms toward an open economy⁴. However, in the long term, this phenomena is temporary. It is evident to everyone that it is impossible for Cuba to go back to the circumstances before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this fact should be well recognized inside the Cuban government. It can be thought of as a sign to advance the process that this January Cuba agreed in a common declaration with Canada to some provisions for the improvement of human rights. It is great progress in the history of the Cuban Revolution that Cuba takes some measures for human rights.

In this chapter, the current situation of Cuban politics and diplomacy and changes of the international circumstances around Cuba are analyzed, especially the content and problems of the Helms-Burton Act.

2. *The fluctuation of anti-Cuban legislation at the U.S. Congress*

By the end of the Cold War, the significance of Cuban-U.S. relations has dramatically changed in quality and grade. The Soviet military threat in Cuba disappeared, and ideologically the United States has no need to fear the spread of communism. In Latin America, which the United States believes to be its backyard and has interfered many times to keep its hegemony, the leftist parties have shifted their policy and ideology. Under these circumstances, U.S. policy toward Cuba has not changed, and in terms of Congressional policy toward her, it is more hostile than before. Yet part of the administration tends to have a more conciliatory policy, and when there is a necessity to consider the effect on the presidential election or objection of Congress, it turns its policy to a hard line.

It is the political pressure of conservative Cuban American groups mainly located in Florida that support the continuation of the U.S. embargo to Cuba. Those groups have failed to present an explanation of what are the most appropriate conditions for Cuba, only focusing on their discussion on how to topple Fidel Castro from power. Yet their influence through financial support cannot be ignored in Washington.

Behind the official hardliner policy such as stronger economic embargoes, both the Bush and Clinton administrations gradually practiced more moderate policy. The dollar remittance was permitted under the Bush administration, although the limit of the amount is 100 dollars per month. Also, the visits of journalists and academic researchers from both sides increased, and more family visits from the United States were authorized. Direct charter flights between Miami and Havana started. Under the Clinton administration, this tendency continued to advance. The charter flights between Miami and Havana increased to 11 flights a week. The check procedure of luggage and money of the visitors to Cuba at the Miami International Airport was loosened. More Cuban academics succeeded in receiving visas to visit the United States. This opening was suspended once again on August 19, 1994, because of the refugee rush. President Clinton announced that all refugees found after that day would be sent to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo (Cuba), and that the U.S. government would suspend the charter flights, and prohibit dollar remit-

tance to Cuba. It seemed that the relations between Cuba and the United States were frozen in the middle of the process of readjustment. However, one year later on October 6, 1995, the president announced that the U.S. Government would permit U.S. news agencies to establish their branch offices in Cuba, student exchange programs and academic relations between the two countries. In January 1996, moderate members of the U.S. Congress visited Cuba.

However, the conservative Cuban-American groups in Florida also became active. On July 13, 1994, an old Cuban wooden ship was sunk by the Cuban Coast Guard on the Gulf of Havana, near the port, and 30 or 40 people including women and children died. In order to memorialize the anniversary of this incident, a group in Miami declared in July of the following year that they would send some boats and planes to bring flowers for the victims of the incident. Their attempt failed because the Cuban Coast Guard blocked it, but the next month, a group called Brothers to the Rescue sent two planes to scatter anti-Castro propaganda. The Cuban Government sent a letter to the U.S. Government to make a protest through the diplomatic channels, but Washington made no measures to stop the group from further provocative actions. The group sent planes more than once, and the Cuban side had not resorted to violence. In spite of the protests by the Cuban Government to its U.S. counterpart, when the group sent three planes to Cuba on February 24, 1996, the Cuban Air Force shot two of them down. (The remaining plane escaped.)

However, this incident played a decisive role in the discussion on the Helms-Burton Bill at the U.S. Congress. As it was stated before, President Clinton had objected to the Act for the reason that to sanction Cuba under the free trade law, the Torricelli Act of 1992 was sufficient. He had been working in Congress, prepared to veto if the act were passed in both the Senate and the House. Yet after the incident of the shooting down of the planes, the president was obliged to accept the assertion of the conservative group in Congress⁵.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, three bills to strengthen the embargo against Cuba have been submitted; the Connie Mack Bill (1991), the Torricelli Bill (1992), and the Helms-Burton Bill (1995-96). All of them were presented by congress-people from Florida and New Jersey, where many

Cuban-American citizens live, and the latter two were passed to be the 'Cuban Democracy Act' and the 'Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.' All of them were made based on the thought that to establish a free and democratic government and market oriented economy in Cuba is for the sake of the Cuban people's welfare. For this purpose, they focused on the point how to take Fidel Castro out of power, and how to realize universal suffrage in the multi-party system. They believe that to accomplish this object, the best measure is to strengthen economic pressure over Cuba. The pressure increase has added to the Cuban people's suffering and discontent, but the U.S. government does not necessarily wish that Cuba would change in a violent way⁶.

(1) Torricelli Act

The Torricelli Act provides to strengthen the embargo through (1) the prohibition of dollar payment to Cuba such as remittances; (2) tax disadvantages to a third country's firms which deal with Cuba and have branches in the United States; (3) prohibition of vessels' docking at a U.S. port for 180 days, which load or unload their cargo in Cuba, among others. On the other hand, the Act promotes the increase of communications between the two countries so that both peoples gain an understanding of each other, and that especially the Cuban people have broader views on their situation. For that purpose, the Act permits the increase of telephone lines between Cuba and the United States.

In fact, the policy officially provided in the Torricelli Act had existed before the Act was passed in Congress. The dollar remittances had been already prohibited except in the case of family remittances of the limit of 100 dollars per month, as humanitarian assistance. The firms of third countries which had had business in both Cuba and the United States always had been exposed under the U.S. government's pressure. Because of the prohibition of entrance to U.S. ports of vessels which passed Cuba, the freight cost of trade with Cuba had always been much higher. All had been so before the Torricelli Act, and the Act only officially recognized them. The change after the Act was the increase of psychological pressure of the U.S. government over the firms of third countries. It is said that especially foreign subsidiaries of U.S. compa-

nies in third countries in Europe and the Western Hemisphere were affected by the Act and refrained from doing business with Cuba.

The apparent change after the Torricelli Act is in telecommunications between the two countries. In 1995 when the telephone system was renewed, calls from the United States to Cuba dramatically increased, more than 4 times the number of calls in 1994, and the amount of revenue for the Cuban government by the calls in 1995 was \$53.8 million⁷. Needless to say, this policy has helped increase the communication between Cuba and the United States, but at the same time, U.S. telephone companies pay larger amounts of money to the Cuban government for the use of telephone lines, when the U.S. government is trying to decrease the income of the Cuban government.

(2) Helms-Burton Act

Congress started to discuss the Helms-Burton Bill in 1995, and after the incident of the shooting down of two private planes by the Cuban Air Force, the Bill was passed in both the Senate and the House. President Clinton expressed that to sanction Cuba under the free trade principle, the Torricelli Act is enough to accomplish the purpose, but after the shooting down of the planes, he was obliged to sign the bill.

1. The content of the Act

It is declared in the beginning that the major purpose of the Act is "to seek international sanctions against the Castro government in Cuba," and "to plan for support of a transition government leading to a democratically elected government in Cuba." The reasons for which Congress favors this act are (1) violations of human rights by the Cuban government, breaching of international laws such as the United Nations Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of the Organization of the American States (OAS); (2) The Cuban government should suspend the construction and management of the nuclear electric plant in Juraguá of which construction was started with Soviet assistance and it is said that it is 90 percent completed, as well as the intelligence facility in Lourdes; (3) The United States should impede the Cuban government from permitting a limitless flow of refugees to the U.S. coast; among others.

There are some points which have not been changed, such as the provision that the United States oppose Cuba's entry to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the OAS, and the prohibition of investment by U.S. citizens in Cuba. There are other provisions which are harder than before.

The first one is that the president needs to submit a report on commerce and assistance of third countries with or to Cuba during the preceding 12-month period. The report should contain trades, investments, government and non-government assistance, debts and use of ex-U.S. properties. Based on that report, the U.S. government prohibits the imports of the goods which contain Cuban material or semi-finished or finished goods (Section 108). Furthermore, it can import goods containing sugar only from the producers that have license certifying that Cuban sugar is not used in the products (Section 110). This limit was already in effect in the case of Cuban nickel, but now it is extended to Cuban sugar. In order to scale away the influence of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), it is prohibited to import goods produced with Cuban materials and goods (Section 110).

Furthermore, it provides that the U.S. government suspends its assistance to a country which invests or assists for the construction of the nuclear plant in Juraguá (Section 111). This is the case with Russia whose government had helped Cuba with the construction until 1992. As the reason of this restriction, the Act points out that Cuba has not signed the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nor ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco, of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere.

According to Section 112, in order that the U.S. government permits the family remittances to Cuba, the Cuban government needs to permit the operation of small businesses with the right to hire others out of the owner's family. In order that the United States allows its Treasury Department to issue the license of family visits to Cuba, the Cuban government should abolish the system to penalize its people who wish to leave Cuba, give freedom to the political prisoners, and recognize basic human rights and freedoms.

At the table of negotiations between Cuba and the United States, the Cuban side always claims that the U.S. government should respect Cuba's sover-

eignty as an independent nation. Prepared for the criticism that this Act is based on U.S. interventionism, Section 201 asserts that the Cuban government should recognize the self-determination of the Cuban people, as a sovereign right of the citizens, so that the people are to be able to have a government which reflects their self-determination (Section 201 (2) and (3)).

Another character of the Helms-Burton Act is that in Title II the blueprint of the new political system and the conditions if a democratically elected government is established are described in detail. It should come through a peaceful transition to representative democracy and a market economy, and provide the procedure of the election of a transition government and then, a democratically elected one which should be elected within 12 months, and the change of policy of the U.S. government in the moment of the transition government and of the democratic one.

The major policy change is, of course, to lift the economic embargo against Cuba. When a democratically elected government is established, the United States should allow trade and investment by U.S. firms with Cuba, government assistance programs for Cuba, the status of most favored nation in trade, and it is possible also that the U.S. government would negotiate with Cuba for participation in NAFTA, and the return of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo, Cuba, which the U.S. Navy has been utilizing since 1903.

As conditions for the transition government, it should legalize all political activities, liberate political prisoners, and dissolve the present Department of State Security in the Ministry of the Interior, including the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the Rapid Response Brigades (Section 205). Also, the transition government should officially promise to organize free and fair elections for a new government. However, Fidel and Raul Castro are to be excluded from those elections (Section 205 (7)).

The Section which may affect Cuba most seriously is Section 204 (e), which provides when the president determines to suspend the embargo, he shall notify Congress that he wishes to lift it because he determines that a democratically elected government is in power, according to Section 203 (c). If both the Senate and the House submit a joint resolution against the president's decision, the embargo cannot be suspended. By this provision, the

decision of lifting the embargo which was to be determined only by the president, was transferred to the hands of Congress.

The other part which has caused international objection is Title III, protection of the property right of the United States. Among the property confiscated by the revolutionary government since 1959, if the ex-owner is a U.S. citizen, including naturalized citizens of Cuban origin, and when a firm or individual of a third country utilizes that property, the ex-owner can sue the user or beneficiary of the property for compensation. The amount of the compensation shall be calculated on the present market price or the value of that time with interest (Section 302 (a)).

Furthermore, to the nationals of third countries and their families, who own or do business utilizing the confiscated property of U.S. citizens, the State Department shall deny the visa to the United States (Title IV).

Yet Section 401 (2) (b) provides that the Act excludes the property owned by Cuban nationals who reside in Cuba. The revolutionary government confiscated property of the nationals who left Cuba especially in the 1960s, such as houses, automobiles, furniture, fine art, and jewelry. As for the real estate, part was given to various governmental and semi-governmental organizations, and the rest was sold to people who needed houses for a low price. When the Helms-Burton Bill was first discussed in Congress, Cuban people felt uncertain because it was reported in Cuba that people who live in houses whose ex-owners are now U.S. citizens would be sued in the United States for compensation. This section was probably added to ease such uncertainty.

(3) Problems of the Act

The Helms-Burton Act has been much more criticized outside of the United States than the Torricelli Act. The international criticism is focused on Title III, but there are many other problems. The basic problem is not only the Act itself, but also general U.S. policy toward Cuba, on which the Act is based.

Firstly, Section 112 refers to the Cuban government's allowance of small businesses, as the condition of U.S. permission of family remittances. However, for this reason the small and medium scale

businesses can relate with family remittances. Now family remittances to Cuba are done for the purpose of helping their families in Cuba which are having serious difficulty surviving. Or rather, sometimes, the remittances are helping some of them open private businesses such as family restaurants. In this sense, dollar remittances from the United States are encouraging the opening of small businesses, although the government has not yet permitted its people to hire others outside of their family. To prohibit the remittances impedes the small businesses and makes the lives of Cuban people more difficult. It is more likely that the Cuban people are forced to resort to a more violent solution with many more sacrifices, and it is contradictory to the provision of Section 201 (6), which talks of seeking "a peaceful transition."

Secondly, it has not been internationally recognized to seek a market-oriented economic system. Regarding the respect of basic human rights, democracy, and political freedom, there are treaties and conventions, and according to those international laws, it is legally possible that one country demand that another respect those values. However, as for the economic liberalization and introduction of a market mechanism, an international consensus has not been formed, and therefore one cannot intervene so easily to another country's economic policy.

Especially if this Act is aimed at the democratization of Cuba, it is not logic to include economic liberalization or market economy as a condition of democracy. Economic liberalization does not necessarily lead a country to political democratization, as can be seen in China's example. Section 206 requires a democratically elected government to have a policy to move to a market-oriented economy, but a market economy cannot be a condition of democracy, if the democratization is the purpose of this law.

In addition, the Act provides that the economic liberalization is the condition that Cuba becomes a member of the World Bank and other international financial institutions, which encourage a country to open its economy. To liberalize the economy, it will be easier if Cuba first becomes a member of those institutions, and then those institutions will require Cuba to liberalize. In this sense, the U.S. policy goes in the opposite direction. Furthermore, with the cooperation of those institu-

tions, the U.S. government can avoid the criticism that the United States alone is putting pressure on Cuba.

Thirdly, the problem that how Cuba realizes free and fair elections is not an issue that only the United States has the right to decide. Even if Cuba does not have the capacity to hold such elections on their own, it should be proposed under the international consensus, not through a domestic law of a third country.

In particular, the provision of Section 205 (7) prohibits the participation of Fidel and Raul Castro in those elections. If it is true that they do not have the popular support in Cuba, it should be proved through a fair election. If they do not have the right in the first place, they may possibly claim later that the election is invalid. If their actions during the period when they are in power are to be judged, the judicial system to judge them should be improved, as is also proposed in Section 206 (5).

On the other hand, Section 114 provides establishment of news bureaus on both sides. They are to be established to increase the mutual understandings and communications, as was permitted in the field of telecommunications in the Torricelli Act. However, last November (1996), the Cable News Network (CNN) gained the authorization of the Cuban government to establish its bureau in Havana, yet the U.S. government has not authorized it yet. It was reported later that the reason was that other media firms opposed and pressed the government⁸, and not the government's political decision concerned with Cuba, but this tendency is not favorable for the purpose of the Act.

Title III, which provides the compensation of U.S. properties in Cuba, triggered most international criticism. The Cuban government, needless to say, has criticized it, as well as other provisions of the Act, through *Granma* newspaper and other national media. The National Union of Cuban Jurists pointed out that the problem of confiscated properties should be discussed between the Cuban and the U.S. governments, and that according to the international law, a compensation claim to a party of a third country is not recognized⁹. The European Union (EU) have criticized this provision many times, saying that it violates domestic jurisdiction and is against the free trade principle of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some of the members of the EU, Canada and Mexico have put forth

domestic legislation to invalidate Title III of this Act. On October 1, 1996, the EU took the complaint before the WTO¹⁰.

The U.S. Congress asserts in Section 301 (8) that the present international judicial system "lacks fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property," and in the same section (9) that "international law recognizes that a nation has the ability to provide for rules of law with respect to conduct outside its territory." To the EU complaint before the WTO, the U.S. government responded with the reasons of national defense. However, those are not sufficient to stand against international criticism.

The Act has a provision that the president may suspend the effect of Title III for a 6-month period when he considers that it is necessary to the U.S. national interests and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba (Section 515 (1)). Under this provision, President Clinton has suspended Title III twice, last July and January of this year (1997). If he keeps doing so every 6 months, it is possible to suspend it eternally.

While the president can keep Title III from going into effect, if he opposes this title, he does not have this political measure in the case of Section 204 (e) on the authorization of lifting the economic embargo. According to this section, the President cannot authorize the suspension of the embargo without the recognition of Congress. Mr. Clinton was reelected as president this year, and in his second term he does not have to concern himself with the next presidential campaign, as he cannot be elected three times continuously. Therefore, he does not need to worry about the opinion of the powerful rightist groups of Cuban Americans in Florida, and he is able to make a decision on his own to lift the embargo. Yet under the Helms-Burton Act, he is not authorized to do it.

3. *International Reactions to the Helms-Burton Act*

Compared with the uncertainty and contradictions in the relations between Cuba and the United States, the attitude of other countries toward Cuba has been much clearer; one is the opposition to the U.S. policy toward Cuba, and the other is the request to Cuba in terms of democratization and respect of human rights.

As for the U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba, international criticism has been increasing especially since the end of the Cold War. At the General Assembly of the United Nations, a resolution against the U.S. embargo against Cuba has been passed 5 years continuously, and each year the number of the member countries which favor the resolution is increasing¹¹. The opposed members have remained no more than two or three for the past five years. It can be said that the international opinion against the U.S. embargo has been established. At the summit of the Rio Group held on September 3-4 of 1996, a resolution against the Helms-Burton Act passed in spite of U.S. protest. The reason was the violation of the domestic jurisdiction of third countries. It was not the opposition to the whole U.S. embargo, but it is notable that the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean region, which have had deep relations with the United States, have been forming a consensus against the U.S. policy toward Cuba.

On the other hand, the international community has strengthened its criticism of Cuba on democratization and human rights. As stated before, the European Union (EU) has criticized the United States on its policy toward Cuba, but at the same time, its members have agreed that Cuba needs to democratize the political system and to resolve human rights problems. Especially Spain, which had not claimed democratization so strongly toward Cuba under the socialist González government, changed its policy last year as the administration changed to the conservative José María Aznar.

The former Spanish prime minister Felipe González, who is from the Socialist Party, had been requesting the democratization of Cuba, but especially in the final part of his term, he considered that Spain and the EU should encourage Cuba to make a political transition gradually through the strengthening of human and economic relations with Cuba. On the other hand, the new prime minister, José María Aznar, changed it into a policy claiming Cuba democratization as a first priority.

Under the Aznar Government, Spain has actively asserted the necessity of claiming democratization toward Cuba at the discussions in the EU, and Sr. Aznar made his position clear that he is not ready to tolerate Cuba's political system, for example, at the Ibero-American Summit in November, 1996. After the Summit, the Spanish foreign minister Abel Matutes stated that the Spanish government was

looking for a peaceful transition led by Castro himself, and that the government was considering to halt all non-humanitarian aid to Cuba¹². The diplomatic relations between Cuba and Spain have cooled down. The new Spanish ambassador to Cuba, José Coderch, announced that he would give open audience to Cuban dissidents in his embassy, and the Cuban government did not recognize him as ambassador to Cuba until the beginning of December, a few days before he was replaced by his successor Eudaldo Mirapeiz.

Spain has been a very important economic partner of Cuba, especially in trade and investment. In the foreign affairs, it has been an intermediary between Cuba and the United States, and it is said that Spain played an important role in realizing the meeting of moderate Cuban American groups with Fidel Castro at Havana in 1994 and 1995. It is possible that now this policy may change under the new government.

As the freedom of religion is being approved in Cuba, the dialogue between the Castro government and Vatican has started. Last November Castro visited the Vatican and met with the Pope for the first time since the triumph of the Revolution. The first visit of the Pope to Cuba since 1959 is planned for January, 1998. This new movement can be seen under the situation where the Cuban Catholic church has become politically active since the end of the Cold War. In 1994 some Cuban Catholic monks sent a public letter to Castro, saying that the government should consider the reasons that a large number of its people were leaving the country. In this sense there is a possibility that Vatican and the Cuban Catholic church may take part in the process of democratization.

The Latin American countries are also taking a similar position toward Cuba to that of the EU countries; to oppose the U.S. embargo, especially the Helms-Burton Act, and to request democratization including the respect of human rights. From the 1980s to the first half of the 1990s, the military regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean passed power to civilians chosen by elections, and since Haiti established democratization in 1995, all the countries in the region except Cuba have had a government elected through a democratic procedure, no matter how democratic it is in reality. Under these circumstances, those Latin American and Caribbean countries have presented stronger requests for democratization to Cuba. All the coun-

tries in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba were invited to the America Summit held in Miami in 1995. President Clinton stated that only democratic governments were invited. The isolation of Cuba was noted on that occasion.

At the 6th Ibero-America Summit held in Chile in November 1996, along with condemnation to the Helms-Burton Act, almost all the participant countries except Mexico criticized Castro on democracy. Their attitude was that, while they opposed the U.S. economic sanctions toward Cuba as a violation of international law, such as principles of free trade and respect to sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, they do not recognize the present political system in Cuba.

At the Summit, the Cuban foreign minister Roberto Robaina said that Cuba had a democratic system of elections with some differences, and that Cuba was always improving it. President Eduardo Frei of Chile criticized that he would not recognize that there were two democracies, and that only the legitimate democracy which respects human rights and makes decisions through majority rule in sincere elections can be recognized. The Portuguese president Jorge Fernando Branco Sampaio stated that the authoritarian model no longer had legitimacy, and pointed out the reasons that the model lacked the ability to solve economic and social crises. The only leader who supported Cuba was President Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico. Yet his party has been in power in the country for 67 years, maintaining de facto mono-party rule. The economic liberalization policy caused a political crisis in Mexico, and the Zedillo government is confronting domestic protests.

To defend against all of the criticism, Fidel Castro pointed out that all the countries in Latin America except Cuba had not been able to resolve the problem of poverty and the imbalance of income distribution, and of external debt, and those problems were worsening now. According to him, the first condition of democracy is equality, and criticized that those countries which have adopted a neo-liberal economic policy had not satisfied this condition.

On the problem of democracy and human rights, there had not been significant changes until January of this year, when Canada made a bilateral declaration on commerce and other issues between Canadian foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy and his Cuban counterpart Roberto Robaina. The declara-

tion contains some reference to cooperation on the issue of human rights, such as academic exchanges, development of judicial training in Cuba, including exchanges of judges, support for Cuba's intention to strengthen a Citizens' Complaints Commission, and increased cooperation between Canadian non-governmental organizations and Cuban organizations.

Canada was the fifth in trade with Cuba in 1995¹³; in the area of foreign direct investment in Cuba, Canada was the largest in mining. These profound relations between the two countries, especially Canada's economic commitment in Cuba, surely helped the accomplishment of the declaration. The attitude of the Canadian government is in contrast to that of the U.S. government, and could be proof of the incapacity of the U.S. economic embargo against Cuba, although in order to estimate the effect of the agreement, it is necessary to look at what improvement and changes the Cuban government will really take.

Along with European and the Western Hemispheric countries, in recent years, Japan has been also claiming respect of human rights and democratization to Cuba. In December, 1995, Castro visited Japan for the first time, for a technical reason on the way back from his visit to China and Vietnam. At the meeting with Prime Minister Murayama from the Japanese Socialist Party, it was reported that while Castro expressed his wish to deepen the economic cooperation between Cuba and Japan, Murayama responded that Japan wished the improvement of situation of human rights and democracy. Japan had expressed few opinions on other countries' political system, and had not put democratization as a condition of government assistance. It was in April of 1991 that Japan changed its policy and referred to "encouragement of democratization and efforts of introduction to market-oriented economy" as one of the conditions of the government assistance to developing countries. This time, the new attitude was also officially headed to Cuba.

Cuba has not adopted any new policy to answer those requests from the international community. The agreement with Canada of this January can be estimated as a big change. Yet the provision on human rights in the agreement was reported inside Cuba that its existence implied that the problem of human rights existed in Cuba, but that was exaggerated¹⁴. Mr. Axworthy himself commented

that he was not too optimistic that the agreement would realize any instant effect in human rights in Cuba.

Yet it was also reported that there had been some political changes in the Cuban Communist Party. In an unofficial document of the party in August 1996, it was stated that the party should accept the fact that the role of the party was changing according to the decentralization of the economy, as some domestic groups were weakening their support to the party for the economic crisis¹⁵. Even if it is not publicly visible, it is possible that the movement to recognize some political transition does exist internally. At the same time, last year (1996) was the year that the ethical control was strengthened inside the party, which punished corruption of some party cadres. For example, some directors of tourist hotel chains who had taken advantage of the position to get access to materials and money, were dismissed from the party¹⁶. The dissatisfaction of the Cuban people on the corruption of high ranking members of the party has been eased to some extent, and by doing so, the Party is trying to maintain its legitimacy and popular support.

4. Conclusion

The end of the Cold War which put an end to the East-West ideological confrontation has made most of the countries of the Western Hemisphere head for democratization and on a quest for economic development. Even many Latin American leftists have changed their Marxist-Leninist ideology into more moderate ones, for example, social-democracy¹⁷. The idea of respect of human rights and democracy based on a plural party system and free elections is becoming established as a common value in the region. Of course, in this movement, the question if the democratization as a procedure has the real effect as democracy has been left unresolved. There are still various discussions if the procedure of democratization can lead to a real democratic system.

Furthermore, the assertion of Castro that democracy is equality still sounds attractive, because the problem of poverty and income distribution in Latin America is still serious. Yet the reason that those countries have chosen liberalization in spite of these defects is that the so-called socialist coun-

tries including Cuba all accomplished a system where everyone is "equally poor," as they failed to develop its economies to make the pie greater, or to show an attractive model to the world.

On the other hand, there are factors of concern in the case of Cuba's democratization. In a free election, there are serious concerns of the influence of Cuban American rightist groups in Miami; for example, one of those powerful conservative Cuban-American groups may exercise strong influence, or in an extreme case, may become president of the Republic; or the domestic political situation may become chaos. But it is unlikely that those Cuban American citizens who have lived in the United States for almost 30 years have such close national identity to Cuba as to wish political participation. Rather, it is more likely that they have economic interests so that trade and investment between the two countries will further develop. The most possible factor which may trigger uncertainty in Cuba is the conservatives in Florida, but taking advantage of the international framework such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS), it could be possible to proceed with a peaceful transition with justice¹⁸.

It should be noted that the U.S. sanction against Cuba is also contradictory to its policy to China and Vietnam. In spite of the fact that the Chinese government has never agreed to put the problem of human rights on its negotiation agenda, the U.S. government has continued to approve China for the status of most favored nation. Even considering the political system in Vietnam, the United States lifted the embargo against that country in 1994. The difference between the case of Cuba and that of China and Vietnam is the possibility of getting economic interests by deepening relations. In the decision to suspend the embargo against Vietnam, the pressure of U.S. business field to open the relations had surpassed the protest of veterans groups. In this sense, the question if Cuba will be able to show its economy in a more attractive way, will be a key in changing the situation.

In any case, as the Eastern Bloc disappeared, Cuba is obliged to build a good relationship with countries which have different values from itself. It will become more necessary for Cuba to modify its system in order to maintain to some extent the accomplishment of the Revolution and sovereignty as an independent nation although it had been possible with the assistance of the Soviet Union.

Notes:

- 1 Masako Goto, *Kasutoro Kakumei o Kataru (Castro talks on the Revolution)*, Tokyo: Dobunkan, 1995, p.26. The author's idea is that Castro's purpose of the Revolution has been, from the beginning of the Revolution, close to the thought of José Martí, and in her view to that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that all these years until now he has been trying to realize the ideal of the utopian system influenced by the Humanist idea. Her idea is very interesting, but the tendency that she writes in this book may have been realized only at the beginning of the Revolution. Even if Castro was thinking of keeping this philosophy in mind, all the policy put into practice especially after 1968 has much more Soviet-styled socialist character rather than Humanist.
- 2 The word "embargo" means to penalize a country in economic terms in the international circle when there is an international consensus that that country did an unfavorable action to the international community, such as military invasion. Thus when only the United States levels an economic sanction against Cuba (In the 1960s most of Latin American countries followed the Washington government, but now they are not doing so.), the word "embargo" is not appropriate to explain the reality. On the other hand, the word "blockade" in this case means that the United States blocks up the border of Cuba by force using warships, for example, and impedes Cuba from having commercial relations with other countries. It can be called a blockade in the sense that the United States puts pressures on third countries in various indirect ways, but in reality most of the countries in the world have continued trade and investment with Cuba since the triumph of the Revolution. The first reason that the trade and investment in Cuba have not been increasing so much is the debt problem on the Cuban side, not the threat of the United States. For private firms, if a business is profitable, they take the opportunity and are not concerned with U.S. pressure (See Yamaoka (1993).) Therefore, the word blockade is not appropriate, either. In this book, as we are unable to find a better word, and in Japan the word is widely utilized in news media and the like, we adopted the word embargo.
- 3 The direct remittance from the United States is prohibited now, and people send money through a third country or bring it personally when they visit their families in Cuba. Therefore, the gross amount of the remittances cannot be investigated. Some say that the amount surpasses the hard currency income of the Cuban government through sugar exports. According to the Cuban government, Cuba annually receives 40 to 50 million dollars.
- 4 A similar point of view can be seen in David Rieff, "Cuba Refrozen," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 1996.
- 5 According to an interview of Dr. Esteban Morales and Lic. Carlos Batista of the Center for Studies on the United States of the University of Havana, published in *Visión USA*, vol.5. No.3, March, 1996, they stated that even if the shooting down of the planes had not had taken place, the Helms-Burton Bill would have been passed. According to them, Clinton's negotiation in Congress had failed before the incident, and the majority of Congress had already decided in favor of the Bill. As for the possibility of resorting to veto, considering the possibility that the Bill would pass with more than two thirds of Congress in favor after the veto, the president would not have been able to take such a risk and have decided not to exercise it.
- 6 According to the *Miami Herald*, October 1, 1996, when President Clinton considered CIA operations in Cuba in 1994, they were not interested in "any kind of violent action." The goal was, according to an unnamed official, to create independent power centers that could receive U.S. assistance openly. It can be seen that the U.S. government wanted a kind of peaceful interference.
- 7 *CubaNews*, November, 1996.
- 8 *CubaINFO*, Vol.9, No.1, January 15, 1997, p.2.
- 9 An interview by one of the Cuban national television stations of Olga Miranda Bravo, president of the Union, on June 6, 1995.
- 10 But the effect of the complaint can be negative, because if the WTO recognizes the complaint, the U.S. government possibly would weaken its support for the WTO, and if it does not recognize it, the WTO would lose authority to the other members. No matter what conclusion the WTO will reach, the WTO would have problems, and the decision may be delayed for a long time.
- 11 The resolution against the U.S. embargo of last year's General Assembly was passed in November, 1996, with 137 in favor, 25 abstained, and 3 opposed (the United States, Israel and Uzbekistan.) Yet the resolution has no power to be enforced. The EU favored it for the first time as the EU. The European nations which had abstained until 1995 are Great Britain, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Poland. Japan had abstained until last year.
- 12 *CubaINFO*, Vol.8, No.15, November 21, 1996, p.2.
- 13 In 1995, the major trade partners of Cuba were in order; the largest Russia, Mexico, Spain, France and Canada.
- 14 By broadcasting of Radio Habana in Cuba. *Cuba INFO*, Vol.9. No.2, February 6, 1997, p.5.
- 15 Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cuba*,

Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico, 1996 No.4, p.10.

16 Ibid., pp.10-11.

17 It was reported that the leader of the Nicaraguan Sandinista, Daniel Ortega, stated before the general election of October, 1996, that he had become a social-democrat.

18 On the attitude of Cuban-American conservatives, in September of 1996, for the first time the CBS television realized a public discussion by satellite between Ricardo Alarcón, Chairman of the National Congress of People's Power of Cuba, and Jorge Mas

Canosa, president of the Cuban-American National Foundation. To the question if they would support the other if chosen by election as the Cuban president, Alarcón answered that Mr. Mas Canosa was a naturalized U.S. citizen and therefore did not have the right to become president according to both Cuban and the U.S. law. Mas Canosa replied that he would support Alarcón if he was elected by fair and democratic election (*CubaINFO*, Vol.8, No.12). It cannot be known to what extent Mas Canosa meant to state so, but it is progress that he would respect a peaceful and legal procedure.