

Executive Summary

On September 11, 2001, the United States was hit by the worst terrorist attacks in world history, by which thousands of people were killed or injured as the World Trade Center buildings in New York City were razed to the ground and the Pentagon buildings suffered immense damage. The U.S. government named Osama bin Ladin the biggest suspect of the attacks and about a month after the devastating attacks launched military actions against military facilities in Afghanistan of the Taliban militia who had been, and who are still harboring him.

The series of events and policies since then have brought Afghanistan to stand on the brink of collapse as a state, while neighboring Pakistan is also coming closer to a crisis situation. This report was prepared to introduce and analyze the conditions of the two countries to help our readers deepen their understanding about them which are not known very well in Japan. It is the authors' hope that this report will prove helpful to the readers in giving some thought to Japan's relations with the two countries. The contents of this report are summarized below.

0. 1 Background of Taliban's Emergence

Who are the Taliban, who had reportedly placed 90% of Afghanistan under their effective control before the military actions by U.S. and British forces began in October, 2001. Originally, they emerged with the cause of remedying the motherland impoverished by the long civil war. It should not be underestimated that their arrival was welcomed enthusiastically by the people at large.

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. A socialist "revolution" took place in 1978, after which Soviet troops invaded the country in 1979 and established a pro-Moscow government in Kabul. Even after the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the Afghan people continued to suffer hardship amid the unending civil war. That was when the Taliban arrived.

Over time, however, the Taliban gradually

lost their will of remedying the country. With the civil war seeing no end to it, the Taliban tightened the noose of their reign of terror. Subsequently, they chose to give shelter to billionaire Osama bin Ladin, who had been chased out of Saudi Arabia. The Taliban's choice did not seem to reflect only their religious belief but also their inability to govern Afghanistan economically, let alone politically. Here we can see a relationship between the political economy and terrorism in a poor country.

0. 2 Pakistan in a Potential Crisis

The ill effects on Pakistan of the sad plight of Afghanistan after the invasion by Soviet troops were enormous. For example, the inflow of refugees on an unprecedented scale destabilized Pakistan's political and economic situation. In particular, complicated ethnic issues gave rise to security problems.

The Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, live in Pakistan also. Though a relative minority in Pakistan, the number of Pashtuns living in Pakistan is larger than that in Afghanistan.

Pashtuns in Afghanistan conduct ordinary commercial transactions with relatives, friends and acquaintances in Pakistan, but they also bring heroin and other narcotics from Afghanistan. A big problem along with narcotics trafficking is the religious extremism of the Taliban. The Pakistani government and the general public are wary of the Taliban's deepening influence or "Talibanization."

But the intensification and deterioration of various problems in Pakistan cannot be blamed always or solely on Afghanistan. It cannot be denied that many of Pakistan's problems stem primarily from maladministration since the country's independence. The accumulation of problems brewed domestically got entangled with the problems pivoting around Afghanistan to push Pakistan into a difficult situation.

This report attempts to shed light on how the situation of Afghanistan has been entwined with the political, economic, religious and ethnic

problems and with the military in Pakistan.

0. 3 Trilateral Relations among Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States

Like many other countries both Pakistan and Afghanistan have long been tossed about by the strategies of the big powers seeking their own “national interests.”

This report pays particular attention to the relationship of the Afghan problem with the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, and the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan (primarily their bilateral relationship within the Cold War framework). It is assumed that focusing on these issues would provide some clues in considering what the military actions against the Taliban (not the “attacks against Afghanistan”) by U.S. and British forces will bring to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Section 3 of Chapter 3 tracks the changes in the Pakistani government’s policy toward the Taliban. The section is intended to confirm that there is no significant difference between the policies the big powers have adopted toward weaker nations and the policies Pakistan has adopted toward Afghanistan, its weaker neighbor. This point has important implications particularly in considering, observing and analyzing a “post-Taliban” Afghanistan.

0. 4 Afghanistan and Pakistan after the Sept. 11 Terrorist Attacks

After the terrorist attacks in the United States

on September 11, 2001 and particularly after the launching of the military actions against the Taliban by U.S. and British forces, Pakistan found itself in a situation where even its very existence as a state began to be questioned in certain quarters. In Afghanistan, it has been long since the “state” ceased to exist. But Pakistan is struggling wisely to avoid following Afghanistan’s footsteps. Should Pakistan ever disintegrate as a state, it would not be in the “national interest” of the United States, Japan or Pakistan’s neighboring countries either.

0. 5 Pakistan’s Choice

In analyzing the relationship between Pakistan and the United States, we need to consider the U.S. policy toward Pakistan in parallel. In Chapter 5, the Pakistani economy in the 1990s onward is reviewed to look into economic factors that prompted Pakistan to choose “cooperation with the United States.” We also examine the present situation Pakistan finds itself in, focusing on its external debts.

Finally, it should be emphasized that bringing a foreign state to collapse is not an act to be tolerated even on the pretext of fighting international terrorism. The authors would be more than happy if this report helps readers understand how hard Pakistan, 54 years after its independence, is struggling to overcome the potential crisis that might threaten its very existence in the aftermath of the unprecedented terrorist attacks in the United States and due to its crumbling relations with Afghanistan.


(Hiroki FUKAMACHI)

Reference Material 1 — Overview of Afghanistan

Name of Country	:	(1) Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban Regime's assertion) (2) Islamic State of Afghanistan (Northern Alliance's assertion)
Area	:	647,497km ² (about 1.7 times as wide as Japan)
Population	:	22.13 million (mid-1997 estimate)
Capital	:	Kabul (population 1.4 million, 1988)
People	:	Pashtuns constitute around 40%. Other ethnic groups include Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Turkmens.
Languages	:	Dari (official), Pashto, others
Religion	:	Islam (99%. 80% of them are Sunnis)
Government	:	(1) Divine state (Taliban's assertion) (2) Republic (Northern Alliance's assertion)
Constitution	:	the Koran (Quran) = constitution?
Head of State	:	(1) Mullah Mohammed Omar (Taliban's assertion) (2) Pres. Burhanuddin Rabbani (Northern Alliance's assertion)
GDP	:	unknown
Natural resources	:	natural gas, coal, iron ore
Currency	:	Afghani
Market rate	:	(March 1999) U.S.\$1 = 31,334 Afghanis (December 2000) U.S.\$1 = 72,000 Afghanis → ¥1.00 = about 600 Afghanis 1,000 Afghanis = a little less than ¥17
Fiscal Year	:	March 21 through March 20 (Afghan calendar = Iranian calendar — solar calendar)

(prepared by Hiroki FUKAMACHI)

Reference Material 2 — Distribution Map of Afghanistan's Main Ethnic Groups



Source: The map is based mainly on Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton University Press, 1980, Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A., p. 58


(prepared by Hiroki FUKAMACHI)

Reference Material 3 — Overview of Pakistan

Name of Country	: Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Area	: 79.61 million km ² (about 2.1 times as wide as Japan)
Population	: 140.47 million (at the beginning of 2001)
Capital	: Islamabad
People	: Punjabis (over 53%), Pashtuns (around 14%), Sindhis (around 12%), Muhajirs (immigrants from India at the time of the 1947 partition and their descendants, around 8%), Balochs (around 4%), others
Languages	: official language = English, national language = Urdu. Four other main languages
Religion	: Islam (95 ~ 97%)
Government	: Islamic Republic
Constitution	: 1973 constitution (suspended since October 1999)
Head of State	: Pres. Gen. Pervez Musharraf
GDP	: \$54.72 billion (fiscal 1999/2000)
Natural resources	: coal, limestone, chrome ore, natural gas
Currency	: Pakistani Rupee (US\$1 = 51.77 Rupees, 2000/2001 average)
Fiscal Year	: July 1 through June 30

(prepared by Hiroki FUKAMACHI)

Reference Material 4 — Land of Pakistan



Source: *Yearbook of Asian Affairs* 2001, Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization

(prepared by Hiroki FUKAMACHI)

Reference Material 5 — Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Neighboring Countries

Country	Total population (10,000)	Pashtuns (ratio to total population)	Tajiks	Uzbeks	Hazaras	Turkmens	Russians
Afghanistan	1,405	760	350	100	87	12.5	
(A)	(1967)	(54.1%)	(24.9%)	(7.1%)	(6.2%)	(0.9%)	
	(1,555)						
	(1979)						
	1,581						
	(1989)						
	1,643						
	(1991)						
Pakistan	8,512	1,115					
(B)	(1981)	(13.1%)					
(D)	10,704	1,402%			A very small number plus refugees		
	(1989)	(13.1%)					
	14,500	+270 to 310					
	(2001)						
Iran	5,420	Pashutuns, Hazaras, and other refugees 2.0 to 2.3 million					
(C)	(1989)				Plus refugees		
Turkmenistan	362.2			32.6		260.8	34.4
(D)	(1990)			(9.0%)		(72.0%)	(9.5%)
Uzbekistan	2,032.2		95.5%	1,451.0			168.7
(D)	(1990)		(4.7%)	(71.4%)			(8.3%)
Tajikistan	524.8		327.0	123.3			39.9
(D)	(1990)		(62.3%)	(23.5%)			(7.6%)

Source: *Ajia Torendo (Asian Trends)* No. 69, Institute of Development Economics

Original Sources: (A), (C) : Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980

(B) : Government of Pakistan, Finance Division, *Economic Survey*, relevant issues

(D) : based on *Sekai Nenkan (World Yearbook) 1992*, Kyodo News Agency, etc.

(Prepared by Hiroki FUKAMACHI)

Reference Material 6 — Chronology of Key Events

Apr 1978	Socialist revolution in Afghanistan, “Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” established.
Dec 1979	Soviet troops invade Afghanistan.
Feb 1989	Soviet troops complete withdrawal from Afghanistan
Dec 1991	The Soviet Union disintegrates, Central Asian republics become independent.
Apr 1992	Anti-Soviet Mujahideen guerrillas enter Afghan capital, Kabul.
Dec 1992	Pres. Rabbani inaugurated.
Mar 1993	Islamabad Accord — Leadership of Pres. Rabbani, Prem. Hekmatyar established, the presidential tenure set for 18 months (through June 28, 1994).
Jan 1994	Civil war intensifies in Kabul between Rabbani supporters and Hekmatyar backers.
Oct 1994	Pakistan’s fleet of trucks headed for Central Asia seized by regional warlords in southern Afghanistan.
Nov 1994	Taliban militia fight Afghan warlords, free Pakistan’s fleet of trucks, send them to Central Asia, begin bringing warlords under control across Afghanistan.
Sep 1996	Taliban capture Kabul, declare establishment of “Islamic State”.
May 1997	Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Yunocal Corporation of U.S. sign a protocol to lay a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan.
June 1997	An anti-Taliban alliance (“Northern Alliance”) announces establishment of a coalition government.
Nov 1999	UN imposes economic sanctions against Afghanistan’s Taliban government over Osama bin Ladin.
Jan 2001	Taliban government recognizes Chechen government.
Mar 2001	Taliban demolishes 2 giant Buddhas in Bamian.
Sep 2001	Terrorist attacks in U.S.
Oct 2001	U.S. and British forces begin attacks on Taliban.

(prepared by Hiroki FUKAMACHI)

Reference Material 7 — U.S. Military and Economic Sanctions against Pakistan

- 1976 U.S. Congress passes the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, banning military and economic aid to countries which deliver or receive nuclear enrichment, materials, or technology not safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- 1977 U.S. Congress passes the Glenn Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, banning aid to any non-nuclear weapon state that carries out nuclear tests.
- Apr. 1979 Pres. Carter decides to impose military and economic sanctions against Pakistan for violation of the Symington Amendment.
- Dec. 1979 U.S. lifts military and economic sanctions against Pakistan after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.
- 1985 U.S. Congress passes the Pressler Amendment, which approves military and economic aid to Pakistan only when the President certifies annually to Congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device and U.S. aid helps reduce the risk of Pakistan owning such a device.
- 1990 The Pressler Amendment goes into effect against Pakistan following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as Pres. Bush declines to certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the U.S. aid will reduce the risk of Pakistan owning such a device.
- 1995 U.S. Congress passes the Brown Amendment, which permits Pakistan's purchase of military equipment before the imposition of the Pressler Amendment sanction in 1990 and also authorizes assistance for humanitarian purposes, eradication of narcotics and anti-terrorism measures.
- May 1998 U.S. imposes military and economic sanctions on India and Pakistan under the Glenn Amendment for their nuclear tests, suspending economic aid, sales of arms, and agricultural credits and trade insurance by the U.S. government.
- July 1998 U.S. Congress allows a one-year exemption from restrictions on purchases of U.S. agricultural products.
- July 1998 U.S. Congress passes the India/Pakistan Sanctions Relief Act of 1998 (Brownback 1) to allow the President to waive the Symington, Glenn and Pressler Amendments for India and Pakistan for one year, except for military assistance, sales of arms, exports and re-exports of nuclear, and military-related technologies.
- Nov. 1998 Pres. Clinton resumes non-military assistance to India under the Brownback 1, lifts restrictions on business activities of U.S. banks in India and Pakistan.
- June 1999 U.S. Congress passes the Brownback 2 and grant the President authority to lift the Symington and Pressler Amendments that prohibit all military and economic assistance to Pakistan since 1990.
- Oct. 1999 Pres. Clinton lifts restrictions on activities in India of the U.S. Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corp. and the Trade and Development Agency. In December of the same year, 51 Indian companies were removed from the list of entities subject to export restrictions.

- Sep. 22, 2001 Pres. Bush lifts all military and economic sanctions under the Glenn Amendment against India and Pakistan, lifts restrictions on trade insurance and credits to Pakistan under the U.S. Export-Import Bank Act, removes the ban on military assistance, transfer of arms and military technology, and military credits under the Pressler Amendment, lifting all the military and economic sanctions imposed after the nuclear tests.
- Oct. 17, 2001 U.S. Congress describes Pakistan as an emerging democracy and allow the President to waive the coup-related sanctions under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Sources: <http://www.clw.org/indopaksaactions.html> and the U.S. State Department press release on September 28, 2001.

(prepared by Hisaya ODA)