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China: Politics and Society

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The Rapid Development of Contemporary Chinese Studies in Japan

Japanese prewar scholarship on China concerned itself primarily with Sinology and Chinese philosophy where an wealth of research was accumulated. The emphasis of much of this research dealt with the politics of dynastic China. There had also been a certain amount of research dealing with contemporary Chinese affairs, but the greater part of this work came out of research institutes involved in government policymaking, and these looked upon contemporary China as a stagnant society. It was only after the war that the primary interest of Japanese research on China was redirected toward the study of the modern period that arose after 1912.

The backdrop to this change of interest was the rapid rise of China's prestige in the postwar world. In October 1950, following the outbreak of the Korean War, Chinese "volunteer" troops entered the war, and thereafter the U.S. military forces found themselves confronted with extremely difficult fighting. As a result, the truce worked out at Panmunjom in 1953 was regarded by many as a victory for China which increased its prestige within the Third World countries. In 1954 when the Geneva Peace Conference took place to work out an end to the Indochina War, China joined as one of the participants along with the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France, all permanent members of the UN Security Council. Such events signaled the emergence onto the world stage of a new and energetic sovereign China.

During this same period Japan reemerged formally as a sovereign nation when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952, but it remained virtually subordinate to the United States and very far from filling a regular international position among the nation-states of the world. This contrasting difference between Japan and China in the early postwar period caught the attention of Japanese scholars and stimulated their interest in research on contemporary China. Debate arose over the fact that prewar Japanese scholars had been unable to predict the rise of a vigorous postwar China, and there was also argument over what to make of the fact that prewar research had been conducted solely to support Japan's expansion onto the continent.

War Responsibility and Adoration of China

In the field of modern Chinese studies, the first learned society to come into being in the early postwar period was the Institute of Chinese Affairs (Chūgoku Kenkyūsho) which began in 1946. This institute then spawned the Japan Association for Modern China Studies (Gendai Chūgoku Gakkai), which started up in 1951. The ICA gathered into its ranks many of the old Marxists who had been affiliated with the prewar research institutes that had worked in support of the government's expansionist policy. These people had participated in these institutes to avoid official censure and suppression, but many among them had also sympathized strongly with the idea of an "Asian federation" as advocated by Kanji Ishihara following the Manchurian Incident of 1931. After the war these old Marxists looked upon their earlier support for an Asian federation as equivalent to assisting and conspiring with Japan's invasion of China, and they were well aware of the necessity for the self-examination of their war responsibility and mistaken views. The ICA's first president was Yoshitarō Hirano, and its first members included Michio Iwamura, Shirō Nohara, Naokichi Ubukata, Kō Nakanishi, and Shōtarō Ozaki. Near the end of the war, Hirano had published a work entitled *Dai-Ajia-shugi no rekishiteki kiso* [The historical basis for greater Asianism], and in the early postwar years there arose a debate among the Japanese researchers engaged in modern Chinese studies on how to judge this work. According to the recollections of Yutaka Nozawa, then a young member in the ICA, he along with Shirō Nohara and others in the institute pressed Hirano to reflect on his earlier misjudgment and carry out self-criticism, but Hirano refused to comply with their requests. The reason he gave for his refusal was his feeling that the only way he could make up for his own war responsibility was by "genuine acts" to see that all influences of militarism were swept out of postwar Japan and that a democratic government was established (Nozawa 1985). As the acknowledged leader of academic research on China at the

time, Hirano's refusal to take steps to correct his prewar and wartime misperception acted to restrain other China scholars from submitting their prewar and wartime research to academic criticism and examination. Thereafter the attitude to face the issue of war responsibility squarely disappeared from within the ranks of Chinese studies at that time, but scholars as individuals continued to feel the inward need for self-examination. This repressed need for self-examination was withdrawn from the conscious level and passed to a subliminal mental level and further changed into an emotional feeling of atonement that induced a total and unconditional adoration for China.

During this time the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded and came into effect. It heightened feelings in Japan for building up the nation's autonomy and independence, and there was a noticeable renewal of nationalistic feeling which had remained quiescent since the end of the war. At the same time the peace treaty excluded the People's Republic of China from the realm of Japan's diplomatic relations with the result that a condition of war continued to exist between Japan and the PRC until 1972 when the two countries signed a joint declaration. Meanwhile the Japanese government had concluded a treaty of peace with Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China government on Taiwan in 1952. With this treaty the Chiang government (presumably under American pressure) relinquished all claims for reparations from Japan which allowed the problem of wartime responsibility to be pushed out of sight in the relations between the two countries. Thus at this time there was a simultaneous upsurge in Japanese nationalistic feeling along with a submerging and loss of awareness of responsibility for the war. Going against this trend, Yoshimi Takeuchi (1951) used the academic reasoning of his own self-examination as a sort of scalpel to cut into the issue of Japanese nationalism. It was his opinion that Japan's efforts since the Meiji Restoration to distance itself from Asia and draw closer to Europe had in fact created friction with Britain and the United States, and this in turn had heightened anti-Western feelings among the Japanese which worked to reverse Japan's course and push it to seek a sphere of co-prosperity in East Asia which in due course led to Japan's invasion of the continent. In his view this shift toward a nationalism without any set principles could be attributed to the failure to establish any firm notion of subjective responsibility as a nation among the Japanese people. As a way for Japan to become clearly conscious of its subjective responsibility as a nation, Takeuchi advocated in 1951 the introduction of a category of thought that he termed "the national literature." But the issues Takeuchi posed at the time elicited little sympathetic response among his colleagues.

The attitude of the People's Republic of China toward the outside world

after the Korean War followed a nationalistic course of anti-Americanism and national independence, and the Japanese leftist movement at the time also took the same course. But the nationalistic emotion of the latter was not the sort that consciously took up the subjective responsibility as a nation like that pointed out by Takeuchi. Rather scholars holding subliminal feelings of guilt about the research they had done before the war by and large aligned themselves with this leftist emotion out of feelings of atonement. These scholars extolled the Chinese Communist Party for its use of the mass line (which relied on the spontaneous actions of the people and not on orders from above) to mobilize and organize the people both before and during the war to fight an anti-Japanese war for national independence, and praised the PRC's anti-American national independence policy line which they regarded as in accordance with the mass line. This admiration for the mass line led to a further heightening of their arguments in admiration of China.

The Japan Association for Asian Political and Economic Studies (Ajia Seikei Gakkai), set up in 1953, undertook research on other Third World countries besides China. This made it easier for scholars working in this group to bring a comparative point of view into their research, and among the members there was a lesser degree of argument than within the ICA regarding erroneous prewar perceptions and war responsibility. The research on Chinese political affairs coming out of the JAAPES tended to be influenced by the direction of studies within political academia in general. A case in point was the influence of Masao Maruyama, a leading political scientist, who highly praised China's 1956 "Hundred Flowers" movement liberalizing controls over thought and expression. His analysis of this movement which allowed criticism and free expression was that it was an effort at modernization seeking to establish a basis for a national and social homogeneity through a broadening of various forms of democracy (Maruyama 1963). Following Maruyama's lead, the general view of scholars was to see China in a positive light, and a majority of the people in the JAAPES followed suit in their high praise of the PRC. At the same time, the JAAPES worked in cooperation with the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's Cabinet Research Office and also with financial circles, and the influence of these government and financial organizations kept the JAAPES from going to extremes in its adoration of China.

The Theory of a System of Political Equilibrium in China

At the end of the 1950s preparations began for the organization of the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) which was supported by a number of people

in the JAAPES, and the influence of these people kept the IDE from going the way of blindly admiring China. At the beginning of the 1960s when the IDE was formally established, Noriyuki Tokuda* was the only staff member who pursued research on Chinese political affairs. At that time Tokuda engaged in joint research with Tadao Ishikawa on the history of the Chinese Communist Party, and his research was in line with that carried on by the JAAPES.

Ishikawa pointed out in his analysis of the history of the CCP that the contradiction between the Comintern and Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the CCP on the other started to appear as the CCP began to increase its autonomy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This contradiction caused a discrepancy between China and the Soviet Union over how to cope with the Middle East crisis that developed in 1958. Ishikawa (1958) was one of the first at this time to point out that China was already in confrontation with the Soviet Union; however he concluded that this confrontation would not destroy the solidarity between the two countries. From his analysis he concluded that the political leadership of the CCP from the 1930s until 1960 had demonstrated a certain degree of effectiveness (Ishikawa 1961). Thus Ishikawa saw the control exercised by the CCP as rational even when compared with the modern nation-state model. Shinkichi Etō also took the same view.

After joining the IDE, Noriyuki Tokuda's* interest, like that of Ishikawa and Etō, concentrated on proving the rationality of the CCP's political control. Ishikawa and Etō only took into consideration the effectiveness of leadership within the power elite to prove the rationality of the CCP's political control; Tokuda brought in a new point of view by considering not only the effectiveness of leadership but also the relationship between the leaders and the governed and the effectiveness of the CCP's political mobilization and mass participation. Tokuda (1961) presented his hypothesis using the theoretical framework of the sociologist, Barrington Moore, Jr. He hypothesized that: Under socialism the expansion of bureaucratic control is required in order to exercise authority effectively; if this exercise of authority is effective, people lose interest in active political participation, and leadership becomes ossified which leads to a loss of vitality in the system; in order to revitalize the system, there has to be redemocratization; however this redemocratization will again bring about ineffectiveness in the exercise of authority which in turn will require the expansion of bureaucratic control. Based on this hypothesis, Tokuda explained that the "blooming and contending" of the "Hundred Flowers" period in 1956 was the time of the redemocratization process, while the anti-rightist movement in 1957 against

criticism of the government was the time when bureaucratic control expanded. He predicted that China would go through the same cycle from the 1960s onward. Some people saw the 1957 anti-rightist movement against criticism of the government as political suppression by Mao Zedong's arbitrary exercise of power, and this later became the general view within academia. However, Tokuda considered that rational political equilibrium which worked to preserve the system and transcend all authoritative arbitrariness was inherent within the control exercised by the CCP.

Kōji Kobayashi* followed Tokuda's lead in the research of Chinese political affairs at the IDE. In his paper written in 1965, Kobayashi adopted the theory (structural-functional analysis) of the political sociologist, Gabriel Almond, and like Tokuda and Ishikawa, he concentrated his interest on the system of equilibrium within the system of political control in Chinese socialism. Kobayashi's term for "democratic centralism" in Chinese politics is the "interest aggregation process," and the "mass line" is the "interest articulation process." It was his view that the system of equilibrium would be maintained by the rotation of these two processes. In this way, Kobayashi, like Tokuda, considered that the effectiveness of the interaction between the major focus of popular opinion and the views of the leadership provided an index showing whether the system of political control was rational.

Trying a Dynamic Approach

A major problem with the concepts of both Noriyuki Tokuda* and Kōji Kobayashi* was that they ignored the failure of the Great Leap Forward which had already come to light and which had the capability of destroying the stability and equilibrium of the CCP's political authority. Likewise the concepts of the two completely failed to predict the possibility that a political movement like the Great Cultural Revolution would break out. The theoretical model they used was one of static equilibrium which lacked the dynamic view provided by a time-series approach. But at that time there were virtually no Japanese scholars who applied a dynamic equilibrium model to China. The first effort to introduce dynamic factors into analyses of China was the work of Tokuda himself (1965). In this article, Tokuda for the first time brought into perspective a series of political issues which until then had been treated separately, such as the distortions of the 1956 anti-rightist movement, Mao Zedong's personality cult during the Great Leap Forward, and the confrontation between the Soviet Union and China, thereby bringing to the analysis of China's political system the importance of a dynamic equilibrium that introduced a time line.

In this 1965 article Tokuda demonstrated through a comparative analysis of the party's membership structure that the Chinese Communist Party worked as a driving force for perpetuating the revolution and not for the stability of government authority. Tokuda noted that the percentage of the membership in the CCP from the peasant class reached a high of around 70 per cent in 1956, seven years after the victory of the revolution. He contrasted this with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union a few years after the 1917 revolution when the percentage of the party membership from the peasant class remained at less than 30 per cent even at its highest, despite the fact that the peasantry made up over 80 per cent of the country's population. Meanwhile within the leadership ranks of the CCP in 1956, people who had come out of the student and intellectual ranks made up a very high 63 per cent of the membership. For Tokuda these figures showed that the CCP was aiming for the realization of communism through emphasizing the purification, social reeducation, and spiritual reform of the party's non-proletarian members. For this reason the organizational fluidity of the party was usually kept at a high level through the entry into, and expulsion from, the party of large numbers of people. In order to maintain the unity of the party as a driving force based on this high fluidity, it was necessary, in Tokuda's view, for the party to personify its authority as an entity for spiritual reform, and this was done through the formation of a personality cult around Mao Zedong. However, Tokuda concluded that the personification of party authority and formation of the cult of Mao caused the leadership of the CCP to lose all substance as the driving force of the revolution, and reliance on "persuasion" to maintain obedience inevitably changed to reliance on "force" which led to a loss of dynamism.

Evaluating the Concept of Mass Line

Later Fumio Kobayashi* joined the IDE and continued research on Chinese political affairs along with Noriyuki Tokuda* and Koji Kobayashi.* Fumio Kobayashi had been associated with both the Institute of Chinese Affairs and the Japan Association for Modern China Studies which made him more concerned about the problems of war responsibility and erroneous prewar perceptions. For this reason he put greater importance on the significance of the CCP's mass line than did the other two. In his 1965 article dealing with education in China, F. Kobayashi greatly praised the various independent and self-supporting privately-run schools set up by the Chinese peasantry and other mass groups between 1955 and 1957. In his view, during the period of the Great Leap Forward from 1958, these private schools became the basis

for introducing the half-labor-half-learning system within the people's communes that combined school and production work. This article one-sidedly emphasized the role of the masses in the process of establishing the Chinese socialist system which Tokuda and K. Kobayashi had termed the "redemocratization" and "interest articulation" of the masses. At the same time, however, Fumio Kobayashi completely overlooked the level of efficiency of the bureaucratic system and democratic centralism in the exercise of authority which is another process in the establishment of the system. When the Great Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966, F. Kobayashi was among the first to praise this movement as an extension of the Great Leap Forward and the emphasis on the mass line. On this basis he regarded the Cultural Revolution as an endeavor to found a proletarian culture through the intellectualizing of the worker and peasant masses and to bring about the realization of communism in one continuous process.

Meanwhile in a 1966 article following the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, Noriyuki Tokuda* expanded on the analysis of his 1965 article. He pointed out that in Mao Zedong's view there was no differentiation between the revolutionary process and the process of reconstruction after the revolution; both processes were perceived as one continuous revolutionary process. It was his opinion that this very perception had brought about a harmful political system at the start of the Cultural Revolution. In other words, this perception of continuous revolution brought an ambiguity and arbitrariness into the concepts of New Democracy and socialism and into those of revolution, dictatorship, and the transition period to communism. Tokuda concluded that this gave the top leader room to employ Machiavellistic terminology which inevitably accelerated the formation of the personality cult around Mao and the belief in the omniscience and omnipotence of his words.

Tokuda's views were in keeping with Tadao Ishikawa's analysis during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Ishikawa (1966) also pointed out that the causes for the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural Revolution were the contradictions that arose in the political process by the failure to differentiate between the revolutionary process and the post-revolutionary reconstruction process and the attempt to apply mass mobilization methods which were effective during the period of revolution to the period of reconstruction. Ishikawa considered that the use of mass mobilization methods in the reconstruction process was based on the view that "reconstruction could not be achieved without relying on human power," a view which was supposed to be a reflection of China's retrogressiveness. For this reason, when implementing policies, irrationality and the spirituality of the CCP leadership were strongly evinced rather than rationality and economy. At the same time

Ishikawa played down the argument current among scholars at the time that behind the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were the crisis conditions facing China. Instead Ishikawa was of the opinion that during both periods, domestic and external conditions had actually developed favorably for China, and because of this China turned to the use of mass mobilization methods.

Domestic and External Affairs and the Commune System

During the night of the Cultural Revolution, Kōji Kobayashi* also changed his view. He discarded the conceptual framework of static equilibrium based on the accepted model of political modernization, and moved closer to Fumio Kobayashi's* position of assessing the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution as the mass line. K. Kobayashi (1967) pointed out that to grasp the fundamental point of the mass line, attention had to be paid to the revolutionary movement that the CCP carried out within its base area of Yen'an in 1941 and 1942 during its war against the Japanese. Some examples of this revolutionary movement were the abolition of the division of labor, the elimination of the three differences (those between workers and peasants, between town and country, and between mental and manual laborers), and the promotion of commune-related programs such as self-reliance, mass mobilization, and "people's warfare" methodology. K. Kobayashi's view was the same as Tokuda's and Ishikawa's in the way which he confirmed that the CCP did not differentiate between the processes of the revolution and reconstruction during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution periods. However, he considered that the commune system was adopted in order to overcome the domestic and external difficulties and crises facing China during those times, and he objected to the arguments of some people who asserted that the main cause for adoption of the commune system was the party's subjective desire of wanting to realize communism. Here K. Kobayashi's views contrasted with those in Ishikawa's article mentioned above that domestic and external conditions had developed favorably for the CCP.

By 1968 Kōji Kobayashi* was concentrating his research on analyzing the "path of development led by urban and industrial policy." This policy was followed by the CCP from the eve of the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1948 until the end of 1952, and Kobayashi (1968) carried on this research in order to reinforce his own views. This policy was adopted by the CCP for the purpose of moving from the revolution to reconstruction at the time of the founding of the People's Republic of China. Unlike Tokuda

and Ishikawa, Kobayashi did not take the view that the CCP from the start was aiming for a continuous revolution and did not differentiate between revolution and reconstruction. Rather his view was that the CCP at the beginning had started by promoting reconstruction in accordance with the path of development led by urban and industrial policy, but there were various problems in the revolutionary process that had been left unresolved and which the new regime was later forced to deal with, and in the end the CCP was pressed to choose between the opposing demands of “revolution” and “reconstruction.” It was Kobayashi’s opinion that the CCP had no choice but to once again choose revolution, and he concentrated his efforts on proving this view.

Meanwhile Noriyuki Tokuda* started his work (1970) to verify the historical origins of Mao Zedong’s personality cult tracing it back to the 1935 through 1945 period of the revolution. Like K. Kobayashi, Tokuda saw the circumstances surrounding the CCP during the period of the revolution as in a state of real crisis. This crisis situation itself aroused the fanatical expectations and religious devotion within the masses for a heroic leader, and the very criticalness of the situation itself was the main factor which formed the system of Mao Zedong’s charismatic leadership. Tokuda’s argument was that the necessity to extend the system of charismatic leadership, which had been effective for the revolution, into the post-revolutionary period of reconstruction had been built into the system from the beginning of the revolution. Unlike K. Kobayashi, Tokuda emphasized that from its beginning the CCP was inclined toward uninterrupted revolution under a charismatic leader and not differentiating between revolution and reconstruction. Tokuda considered that the irrationality of the system of leadership had germinated within the revolution from its beginning. In another article (1976), Tokuda pointed out that by continuing the system of charismatic leadership into the period of reconstruction, charisma itself brought about its own debilitation, thereby inducing conditions that destroyed the equilibrium of the system. During the period of reconstruction, Mao’s charismatic qualities were no longer able to inspire revolutionary fervor against crises arising from outside the system, and therefore Mao had to direct revolution from inside the system through stirring up “subjective” factors among the people. Tokuda’s view of the period of reconstruction, like Ishikawa’s, criticized the idea that external crises were the cause for the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Tokuda emphasized that in Chinese politics domestic affairs one-sidedly affect diplomatic affairs, and he considered that Mao’s view of the world and his thoughts would one-sidedly stipulate China’s foreign policy. Other researchers such as Shinkichi Etō, Tatsumi Okabe, and Mineo Nakajima have also put forward somewhat similar views.

Both K. Kobayashi and F. Kobayashi did not see revolution based on the mass line as harmful to the system; rather they saw it as a rational political process. In contrast to this, Tokuda pointed out that expansion of the personality cult wholly advocating the mass line into the reconstruction process contained irrationalities which is destructive to the system.

The Importance of Subjective Factors and Individual Initiative

Susumu Yabuki* and Mitsuyuki Kagami* took up research on Chinese politics at the IDE following Noriyuki Tokuda,* Kōji Kobayashi,* and Fumio Kobayashi.* Both Yabuki and Kagami joined the institute in 1967 when the Cultural Revolution was in full swing, and both were greatly influenced by the mainstream Chinese studies academia which greatly admired the Cultural Revolution.

Yabuki (1967) did not support the idea that objective factors in the system or critical conditions that emerged domestically and externally had caused the Cultural Revolution. Rather he emphasized subjective factors such as Mao Zedong's personal philosophy and his views on revolution. For Yabuki the original cause was Mao's concept of class which was based not only on the relationship over the ownership of the means of production but also on the main contradictions in production relationships. Yabuki stated that Mao's concept of class was fundamentally influenced by his ideas of the philosophy of contradiction. Yabuki noted that although China had already reached the socialist stage during the Cultural Revolution where the system of public ownership was practiced, the struggle directed at building the communes was still called "the class struggle." He concluded that the reason why this struggle was called "the class struggle" was because of Mao's concept of class. In his 1968 article he went further in his argument to assert that Mao in his philosophy did not consider the existence of class to be "substantial existence." He stated that Mao viewed class as a relative phenomenon which would be redefined every time there was a change in the main contradictions existing in production relationships, and the concept of class would change accordingly. Therefore the composition of class would shift limitlessly in accordance with the limitless shift in the main contradictions. Yabuki was therefore critical of many Japanese scholars in Chinese studies who interpreted the meaning of class as having a substantial existence in accordance with the theory of class struggle during the socialist stage. Yabuki argued that in Mao's philosophy, there was no construction process which could be distinguished from the revolutionary process, and the whole process would become the perpetual transition period which would ultimately lead to the implementation of a communist society.

Yabuki explained that the contradictions during the transition period were different from the class contradictions in capitalist society, and these contradictions would manifest themselves as confrontation and struggle over the spiritual choice within each individual human entity of whether to choose liberation of the human subjectivity or alienation. Yabuki stated that owing to Mao Zedong's philosophy, for the first time in historical development the way was open for individual human entities to choose truly on their own initiative. Yabuki concluded that establishment of subjectivity by the human entity itself was the direction of the revolution that Mao was aiming at.

Like Yabuki, Mitsuyuki Kagami* started his research with the idea that in the development of history, the important issue was the establishment of the subjectivity of the human entity. Kagami (1968) criticized the common view represented by K. A. Wittfogel, Max Weber, and Karl Marx of Chinese society as being "Oriental despotism," "a stagnant society," "an Asiatic mode of production." He criticized these views as ignoring the fact that Chinese farmers carried out the reform of consciousness on their own initiative. In the villages on the eve of the revolution a dramatic change could already be seen in the farmers' consciousness, and Kagami demonstrated that this set in motion the destructive process from inside the village community. Kagami (1970) expanded this arguments further, pointing out that under the critical conditions during the 1930s not only the revolutionary forces under the leadership of the CCP but also some groups supporting the Kuomintang endeavored to carry out reforms in the villages. According to Kagami, the Kuomintang tried to persuade indigenous capitalists, who had been just like parasitic landowners, to undertake productive investment in agriculture, and to turn them into industrial capitalists intent on carrying out reforms in the villages. However, this effort ended in failure which led to the success of the CCP's revolution. For Kagami the major issue of the Chinese revolution lay in the effort of the struggle to establish the human subjectivity through reform of the consciousness of the peasants and indigenous capitalists. Ultimately the CCP which associated itself with peasants beat the Kuomintang which approached the indigenous capitalists, but Kagami thought that both of these groups made equal effort at reforming the human subjectivity.

Chaos Theory, the Concept of the Commune-State, Reform, and Market Opening

From around 1968 an argument began to be put forward by Keiji Yamada and Atsuyoshi Nijima that China under the Cultural Revolution had become a commune-state. This argument closely resembled that of Kōji Kobayashi*

which he presented in articles in 1967 and 1968 wherein he pointed out that the essence of the Chinese revolution was in the commune movement that went back to the Yenan period at the beginning of the 1940s. But it was K. Kobayashi's view that the commune movement was fundamentally effective only during the revolutionary process, and incompatible with national reconstruction which was the same interpretation as that of Tokuda and Ishikawa. By contrast, Yamada and Niijima argued that the commune movement could also be effectively brought into the system for the stage of national reconstruction. This view was also set forth by the American historian, Mark Selden, in his book, *The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China* (1971). K. Kobayashi and Mitsuyuki Kagami* translated Selden's work into Japanese (Selden 1976); they also interviewed the author and raised the question of how the commune movement, born during the Yenan period, could be worked into the system for the period of reconstruction (Selden et al. 1973). Ultimately Selden himself was unable to provide a sufficiently clear answer to this issue.

This question became the issue of Mitsuyuki Kagami's* research after 1973 on the Cultural Revolution. He concentrated his analysis on trying to understand the paradox of why the Great Cultural Revolution, which had been viewed as a commune movement for establishing the human subjectivity, had instead ended by betraying this objective and causing tragic chaos and the loss of the human subjectivity. Another person interested in this issue was the philosopher, Saburō Ichii, who was working at applying chaos theory to the field of social sciences, and the two together took up the study of the problem.

Ichii (1977) dealt with a philosophical question of how the social forces draw a society towards an ordered arrangement (cosmos) at a certain historical stage, then when that stage has been reached, those forces suddenly change their direction and start operating destructively and moving towards chaos. However, a "key person" emerges from the midst of the chaos who, through his own subjective initiative, changes the situation and moves the society forward, and history shifts towards a new stage.

If Mao Zedong's communal revolutionary movement until the 1940s was to be seen as overcoming the chaotic situation in China at the time and fulfilling the role of leading society towards order, then this could not be seen as revolution destroying the condition of things. However, the same communal revolutionary movement acted destructively and brought about chaos when the period of national reconstruction had come about. Why would this be? Mitsuyuki Kagami* (1985a, 1985b) answered by explaining that both the commune movement and national reconstruction could in their own right overcome the chaotic conditions arising from domestic and external crises

and move in a constructive way directed at building an orderly cosmos. At the same time however, each also contains the vector (the force of direction) which mutually contradicts and negates the other. Thus Kagami concluded that during the Cultural Revolution period when the leadership pursued the ideal of realizing a commune society, the peasant and worker masses, who were dissatisfied with the established order, moved toward negating that order, thus bringing about the paradox and the extremely chaotic conditions of the Cultural Revolution.

Kagami (1986) then concentrated his attention on verifying the key people who had appeared by that time to change the conditions of charismatic, autocratic rule. He found that these people included Wei Jingsheng, Li Yizhe, and Yu Luoke of the Red Guard generation who came to the fore through their support of the pro-democracy movement after the Tiananmen Incident in 1976. All of them came forth from the chaotic conditions of the Cultural Revolution, aroused by the right of the people to protest against the state. These key people played a major part in bringing about China's present swing toward reform and market opening. However, Kagami sees that the issue of establishing the human subjectivity still remains unresolved in Chinese politics today, and he evaluates the pro-democracy movement of 1989 in the same way.

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