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**Reconstruction and Development of  
Rural Cambodia—From *Krom  
Samakki* to Globalization—**

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**Abstract**

This paper reveals how rural Cambodian people reconstructed their social relationships after the collapse of the Pol Pot regime by examining farmland, which was the most important means of production in rural areas at that time.

Section 1 and 2 illustrate the process of returning from collective farming under the Pol Pot regime to the family farming system. Section 3 analyzes the structure of land ownership created through land distribution by *Krom Samakki*. Section 4 studies the actualities of tenant farming. Section 5 examines the changes of the land ownership structure during a decade years after the distribution of *Krom Samakki*. This paper concludes that the legacy of *Krom Samakki* started to fade as early as the 1990s.

**Keywords: Cambodia, reconstruction, development, land**

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## Introduction

This paper reveals how rural Cambodian people reconstructed their social relationships after the collapse of the Pol Pot regime by examining farmland, which was the most important means of production in rural areas at that time.<sup>1</sup> This paper presents case studies of *Ping Pung* Village and *Samakki* Village, where the author carried out fieldwork during 1995 to 1996.

Section 1 illustrates the process of returning from collective farming under the Pol Pot regime to the family farming system. In 1979, the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) inherited devastated land, exhausted people, and few means of production from the regime of Pol Pot. KPRP then set up *Krom Samakki* (Solidarity Group)<sup>2</sup> by organizing rural households into groups to engage in collective cultivation. This was done both for the purpose of avoiding land conflicts by denying ownership claims in existence before the Pol Pot era and for the purpose of using limited means of production such as cattle and plows as efficiently as possible. *Krom Samakki*, though it prevailed over most of the country, was actually dissolved in the first half of the 1980s, except for in a few villages. In other words, KPRP failed in agricultural collectivization.

Section 2, after describing the geography of case-study villages, uncovers the actualities of *Krom Samakki* in these two villages. The author arrived at the conclusion that the significance of *Krom Samakki* lies its buffering role in the reconstruction of the family farming system in rural Cambodia. First, the introduction of *Krom Samakki* controlled the confusion over farmland ownership just after the collapse of the Pol Pot regime. Second, it was dissolved after it completed distribution of farmland to its member households so that all of the farmers who at that time lived in the rural areas became landed farmers.

Section 3 analyzes the structure of land ownership created through land distribution by *Krom Samakki*. The same amount of farmland was distributed to each member of a household regardless of age or sex, so that the more members a household had, the more farmland it received. In summary, *Krom Samakki* in these two villages

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<sup>1</sup> Kobayashi (2005) reveals the reconstruction process involved in villagers' relocation and re-creation of a community on the Eastern Tonle Sap Region. Takahashi (2001) researches the restructuring of the family-kinship structure of a rice-farming village in Takaev.

<sup>2</sup> The formal name was *krom samakki banka bangkaoen phal* (solidarity group for increasing production).

functioned as an agent of agrarian reform.

Section 4 studies the actualities of tenant farming. In both *Ping Pung* Village and *Samakki* Village, tenant farming resumed just after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*. The two patterns of tenant farming, which are share tenant and flat tenant, were already reported in the 1950s. The author found that recent tenant farming had not largely changed from the 1950s' reports. However, she points out signs that, in some cases, people reverted from agriculture to other economic activities.

Section 5 examines the changes of the land ownership structure during a decade years after the distribution of *Krom Samakki*. The author discovers three important changes. The first is the appearance of households without farmland that did not exist at the time of the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*. The second is the potential problem when "third generation" couples, who were born after the land distribution, are the major part of rural population. The third is the tendency of households that did not engage in farming before the Pol Pot era to dispose of their ownership or cultivating rights over the distributed farmland.

This paper concludes that the legacy of *Krom Samakki* started to fade as early as the 1990s. Non-agricultural job opportunities should increase until the "third generation" because the shortage of farmland will become very serious.

## Section 1: Agricultural Policy of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party

### 1.1 System of *Krom Samakki*

In the early days of 1979 when the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) had the political power, the economic problems which rural people faced may be summarized as follows.

First, as a result of the collectivization policy of the Pol Pot regime, it was extremely difficult to identify former owners of all pieces of land and every means of production. The former farmland boundaries could hardly be found because the Pol Pot regime squared plots and constructed large dams and canals. Moreover, farmers who had not evacuated to distant areas and came back to their native villages just after the Vietnamese invasion had already started to cultivate plots at their own discretion. There may have been land disputes between earlier-arriving farmers and later-arriving farmers. In fact, a government document dated August 1980 ordered local administrations to

arbitrate land dispute among farmers (Vickery 1986, 138). Moreover, means of production were widely reacquired under the chaos of that time (Frings 1997, 35).

Second, means of production were in very short supply. The number of cattle and buffalo decreased to the level at the end of 1960s.<sup>3</sup> The labor force was totally exhausted due to forced heavy labor and malnutrition under the Pol Pot regime, and the shortage of male labor was a severe problem. Table 1 shows the result of a population census conducted by the KPRP government. Regardless of the fact that the retirement age for men was set five years older than for women, the percentage of males of working age was very low, at around 43.2 percent.

Faced with such chaotic conditions, the KPRP government decided on the introduction of a collective farming system, named *Krom Samakki*, in order to avoid farmland disputes by denying the ownership claims dating to before the Pol Pot era and in order to use the remaining means of production as effectively as possible.

The KPRP government started to promote the policy of collective farming around May 1979 when its military advantage was secured (Frings 1993, 7). At that time, any pattern of collective farming was called *Krom Samakki*, which referred to various patterns of household membership and farming systems (Hun Sen n.d. 240-242). However, there were three common points. The first is that grouping for *Krom Samakki* was done by each village (*Phom*). The second is that *Krom Samakki* collectivized only major farmlands and left other minor farmland and land inside villages to each household. The third is that *Krom Samakki* did not collectivized means of production like cattle and plows because they were already privately claimed and it was difficult to expropriate them. Therefore, in order to ensure the same number of cattle and plows for each group, households possessing them were assigned to each group.

At the end of the harvest season of rainy season paddy cultivation of 1979, the principle of distribution of harvest was established (Vickery 1986, 139-140). A document from the Ministry of Agriculture dated August 1980, entitled “Problems which must be Resolved concerning *Krom Samakki*,” clearly mentions the principles for grouping *Krom Samakki* and allocating harvest (Boua 1983, 261-262; Frings 1993, 8-12; Vickery 1986, 138-139). The summary is as follows.

Composition of Groups: Number of households per group is in principle from

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<sup>3</sup> The total number of cattle and buffalos decreased from 247.9 million to 114.7 million according to Tichit (1981) and the Ministry of Agriculture (1993).

ten to fifteen households so that each group has same number of cattle, plows and adult male labors.

Allocation of Farmland: Farmland of the village is to be allocated to each group to equalize not only land area but also soil and water conditions.

Categories of Labor: Villagers are assigned to one of three labor categories: main labor, supplementary labor, or dependent. The main labor category includes people who are healthy and do heavy tasks. The supplementary labor category includes people who are not so well and do only light tasks.

Distribution of Harvest: The distribution of harvest received by workers is based on their labor category and actual working days. Supplementary labor is equivalent to 70 to 80 percent of main labor per working day. Dependents receive from 30 to 40 percent of the main labor distribution, and owners of cattle or plows used in group work receive distribution for main labor.

*Krom Samakki* which followed the above principles existed in almost all rural areas, but only in the early 1980s.<sup>4</sup> On October 1982, the KPRP government officially recognized the existence of the various patterns of *Krom Samakki* (Frings 1993, 15-16). After this, the KPRP government stated that there were three kinds of *Krom Samakki* as follows (Frings 1993, 16-18).

#### The First Category

The group, or a small team of the group, collectively cultivates. The group, or a small team of the group, also distributes products. There are three patterns:

1) Co-cultivation by groups: All the work is done jointly by the members under the leadership of the group head. The production is divided among the members of the group.

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<sup>4</sup> Ledgerwood (1992, 21). Ebihara also says, "In 1980, authorities reduced the size of solidarity groups to 12 to 13 families because it had been difficult to organize labor and divide produce in the large *krom*. But as production revived in the village, as the number of cattle increased, and as possibilities for extra household income increased through such endeavors as raising pigs, people lost enthusiasm for *krom* labor and preferred to direct their energies to private activities. It is said that by 1984 *krom* existed only on paper, and there was de facto household production and consumption in Sobay".

2) Co-cultivation by small teams. The *Krom Samakki* is divided into small teams of 3 to 4 families. The work is organized by the small teams and production is divided among the members of the small teams.

3) Co-cultivation of one part of the land: The members of *Krom Samakki* work collectively on one part of the land. The remainder is entrusted to the families who may work separately or cooperatively with each other.

### The Second Category

The land is the property of the group, but the group entrusts it to families to cultivate individually but help one another in turn (*provas dai*). The land is divided on the basis of the number of persons per family. The head of *Krom Samakki* simplifies the work of plowing and harrowing by organizing the families to help one another.

### The Third Category

The group entrusts the land to the families and all the families organize their production individually. This is essentially private cultivation by the families.

This categorization does not represent the theoretical development process of *Krom Samakki*. It is an ex-post facto assortment of various styles of farming management in Cambodia which are all called *Krom Samakki*.

In the above kinds of *Krom Samakki*, only the first category, co-cultivation by groups, follows the principles on how to group *Krom Samakki* as directed by the document dated August 1980 from Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, very few cases of this kind of *Krom Samakki* existed in 1983. At that time, many *Krom Samakki* classified in the first category only worked one part of the land in common (Frings 1993. 20).

The second category and the third category of *Krom Samakki* can hardly be called collective farming because the land is entrusted to families and the production belongs to the family. The difference between the second category and the third category is the existence or non-existence of a norm of group members helping one another. As mentioned in Section 2, in *Samakki Village*, co-cultivation by groups occurred only during the first year. In the second year, the land was already entrusted to families. However, the villagers said that “private agriculture (*kasekam aekachon*)” began from the third year. The difference between the second year and the third year in the villagers’ eyes was the norm of helping one another in the group. The villagers call it

*Krom Samakki* if there is a norm of helping one another in the group. If each family raises freely other help in the village, it is considered to be “private agriculture.” To the villagers of *Samakki Village*, *Krom Samakki* was enforced for only two years.

According to the report of the Fifth National Agricultural Conference (February 2 – March 1, 1984), out of more than 100,000 *Krom Samakki* in the country in 1983, 15.46 percent belonged to the first category, 46.88 percent belonged to the second, 37.66 percent belonged to the third (Frings 1993, 44). When we consider these percentages mentioned above, we conclude that the effectiveness of *Krom Samakki* as a collective farming system was very limited.

### 1.2 Political Meaning of *Krom Samakki*

We have not found political documents which show the degree of importance placed on the building of a collective farming system by the KPRP government. Frings tells us that the primary concern of the KPRP government was not to develop the socialist forms of production, but to enlarge the cultivated area and to increase food production because, when giving awards to *Krom Samakki*, the government placed more emphasis on production results, the amount of patriotic contributions, the paddies sold to the State<sup>5</sup>, and the number of volunteers sent to serve in the armed forces (Frings 1993, 56).

Hun Sen, one of the members of the National Union Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea and a leader of KPRP, wrote about *Krom Samakki* as follows:

“Our intention in introducing *Krom Samakki* was to promote people helping one another so that both the people who could work and those who could not work and both the people who had cows and tools and those who did not have them could continue living. There was no way other than this in the conditions of that time.” (Hun Sen n.d., 240)

“We immediately improved the organization (of *Krom Samakki*). The number of families per group was reduced to ten to fifteen, with a maximum of twenty. However,

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<sup>5</sup> From the establishment of the government until 1984, KPRP did not levy any kind of taxes on farmers. However, at the public commodity exchange, farmers were able to buy daily necessities such as pots, dishes, lamp oil, and salt at low prices in return for selling their rice paddies at below-market price. In 1984, KPRP introduced a tax titled ‘Patriotic Contribution.’ Under this tax system, farmers paid a part of their production according to the class of farmland.



the essence (of *Krom Samakki*) is the management method which follows the thought of the regional authority or productivity in the region. As a result, after several years passed, the categories from the first to the third were created.” (Hun Sen n.d., 241)

“Generally speaking, we observed that the people living in the field-cropping areas and the industrial-cropping areas were making an easier living than the people living in the paddy-cropping areas because *Krom Samakki* was more correctly organized in the field-cropping areas than the paddy-cropping areas. (In the field-cropping areas,) mutual-aid *Krom Samakki*, as the second category of *Krom Samakki* was called was organized.” (Hun Sen n.d., 246)

“Our productive capability and tools were correctly used in *Krom Samakki* where the land was entrusted to families. This *Krom Samakki* was the type in which families exchanged their labors. However, if we forced the people to work in the type of *Krom Samakki* in which the members worked jointly and the production was distributed according to the labor, production increases would have been hindered because people’s motivation to produce would not have been stimulated and farmer’s will to work would have been obstructed.” (Hun Sen n.d., 310-311).

The quotations above are a kind of afterthought because they are from a private reminiscence. However, there is a suggestion here that the KPRP government did not place much emphasis on the building of a collective farming system as a policy, but rather, since agricultural production was increasing, removed collective farming from the discussion.

The tone of discussion in political reports also changed. The report to the 7<sup>th</sup> Plenum in 1983 noted that *Krom Samakki* of the first category has many good points for pushing the countryside forward in the direction of socialism and that *Krom Samakki* of the third category should shift into the second category in the future and be completely eliminated (Frings 1993, 20-21). In 1987, a report of Ministry of Agriculture insisted on strengthening the second category of *Krom Samakki*, which uses *provas dai* (helping one another in turn) (Frings 1993, 36).

Judging from these government/party papers, we can conclude that the KPRP government did not consider collectivization to be an urgent necessity when enforcing the process of *Krom Samakki*.

## Section 2: Actualities of *Krom Samakki*

### 2.1 *Ping Pung* Village

#### 2.2.1 Location

*Ping Pung* Village is a paddy-cultivating village in *Krang Yov* commune, *S'ang* district, *Kandal* province, and is located about forty kilometers south of *Phnom Penh*. This village was composed of 93 households at the beginning of 1996, which made it somewhat smaller than the other villages in *Krang Yov* commune.

The main economic activity is rainy season paddy cultivation.<sup>6</sup> Rainy season paddy fields spread as far as the eye can see around the village. Besides these, there are dry season paddy fields several kilometers to the east, at the western end of the hinterlands of the Bassac River. In 1996, the area of dry season paddy fields was about 30 percent of that of rainy season paddy fields. There also is a river flowing from *Choeng Long* Lake in the north. Many villagers engage in fishing and fish are an important income source. Some villagers plant vegetables on village land.

#### 2.2.2 Enforcement of *Krom Samakki*

When the Pol Pot regime collapsed, it was the high season of harvesting the rainy season paddies in *Ping Pung* Village. The villagers then cultivated the dry season paddies. After the dry season, *Krom Samakki* started in *Ping Pung* Village, with the rainy season paddy cultivation in 1979.

The villagers were grouped into *Krom Samakki* just before the rainy season of 1979. They were divided into seven groups, each with an equal number of members. According to the head of the village, there were seventy-five households in *Ping Pung* Village and all of the households participated in *Krom Samakki*. The author did not find any couples who were married and living in *Ping Pung* Village but who did not participate in *Krom Samakki*.

The rainy season paddy fields of the village were divided into three categories

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<sup>6</sup> After 1994 when Second Prime Minister Hun Sen visited *Krang Yov* commune, roads and waterways were built as his private project. Owing to this project, the road in front of *Ping Pung* village was widened enough for pick-ups to pass.

as follows.

First category: paddy fields near the village (*dey phoum*)/ good fields

Second category: paddy fields at a distance of five hundred meters from the village/ middle-class fields

Third category: paddy fields at a distance of one kilometer from the village/ inferior fields

The dry season paddy fields were not divided into categories.

These three categories of paddy fields and the dry season fields were distributed to each group so that each received the same land area with the same conditions such as irrigation, and the fields assigned to a group were called “the group’s fields.” Collective cultivation by the groups continued for two and a half years, from growing rice seedlings for the rainy season paddies in June 1979 to harvesting rainy season paddies in December 1981.

The land inside the village (*dey phoum*) was left out of the system of *Krom Samakki*. After the end of the Pol Pot era, most of the villagers returned to their former residences. The villagers who had owned vegetable fields on the land inside the village resumed cultivation of them as their own fields.

The villagers were classified according to their labor strength into three categories as follows.

First category: strong labor = adults (over eighteen years old)

Second category: middle labor = schoolchildren

Third category: weak labor = persons who cannot work in the fields, such as the elderly, babies and infants, sick persons, and handicapped persons.

The villagers who were over eighteen years old but went to school were classified in the second category. The elderly who did not work in the fields but took care of babies and infants of the same group’s families were also classified in the second category.

According to the government principles on *Krom Samakki*, production should be distributed not only on the basis of labor strength but also on the basis of the number of working days. In *Ping Pung* Village, however, the number of working days was not considered. In other words, regardless of whether they worked or not, villagers of the same category received the same quantity of production. The second category received over 80 percent of the first category, and the third category received about 50 percent of the first category. The distribution principle was also simplified in *Samakki* Village. This simplification was generally seen, and *Krom Samakki* which considered the number of

working days was very limited (Frings 1993, 51-53).

Cows and tools were not the co-property of the group but the private property of the members. However, the owners did not receive more production than the others. The man who was the head of Group No.1 said that the persons who owned cows or tools did not ask for more production than the others because they thought they should help each other in the village and the persons who did not own cows or tools also helped those who owned them.

Because rice was distributed every day just after threshing, the total quantity of rice per person or family is not clear. However, according to interviews with villagers by the author, the production from *Krom Samakki* alone is not adequate to feed the villagers.<sup>7</sup>

### 2.2.3 Dissolution of *Krom Samakki*

Under *Krom Samakki* in *Ping Pung* Village, which started with the rainy season paddy cultivation of 1979, rainy season paddies were co-cultivated three times and dry season paddies were co-cultivated two times, until the end of 1981. During these years, the village households had the right to cultivate paddy fields only as members of *Krom Samakki*.

Before the rainy season paddy cultivation of 1981, land distribution was first tried. At that time, not all of the rainy season paddy fields were distributed; a portion of the fields were kept for co-cultivation by each group. The head of the village told the author that the *Krang Yov* commune decided to distribute rainy season paddy fields after hearing that the villages along the *Bassak* River had already stopped co-cultivation. In other words, one portion was kept as “group land” to keep up the appearance of co-cultivation. for the details are unclear concerning this first trial of land distribution. The author was told that there were disputes among the villagers about the good or bad condition of paddy fields and speculates that this first distribution may not have been so equal.

In February 1982, all of the dry season paddy fields were distributed by

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<sup>7</sup> The villagers of *Ping Pung* Village did many kinds of work to obtain food. Examples include 1) teachers and commune vigilantes who were supplied with rice, (2) artisans such as blacksmiths, bicycle repair persons, traditional medical healers, (3) sellers of confectioneries and miscellaneous goods, (4) cultivating, pickling, and selling vegetables, (6) feeding and selling pigs and chickens, (7) making fish paste (*prahak*) and exchanging it for rice from rice-farming villages.

assigning two are per person regardless of sex or age.

In June 1982, the second distribution of rainy season paddy fields was conducted. The previous year's distribution was completely annulled and the retention of one portion for co-cultivation was abolished. All of the rainy season paddy fields were distributed according to the principle below.

First category: five are per person regardless of sex or age

Second category: three are per person regardless of sex or age

Third category: two are per person regardless of sex or age

Therefore, households that had more members, regardless of whether they were able work or not, received a larger area.

In *Ping Pung* Village, some villagers remembered that the first distribution in 1981 was the time of the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*, but some villagers thought that the second distribution in 1982 was the time of the dissolution. In any case, they shared the common recognition that *Krom Samakki* was dissolved at a time when paddy fields were distributed and households were given the right to cultivate them, following which “private cultivation (*tevu aekachon*)” started. In addition, the practice of work for a daily wage appeared at the same time. Therefore, in *Ping Pung* Village, agricultural management by households had been restored by the middle of 1982.

## 2.2 *Samakki* Village

### 2.2.1 Location

*Samakki* Village is a field-crop cultivation village in *Preaek Dambang* commune, *Muk Kampul* district, *Kandal* province, and is located about forty kilometers north of *Phnom Penh*. The village chief said that 398 households belonged to *Samakki* village in September 1995. However, the author interviewed only 176 households located at the southern end of the village, which was divided by a stream from other parts of the village. After this, *Samakki* Village as used in this paper refers to the area researched by the author.

The main economic activity is field-crop cultivation. The crop fields extend to the horizon. Tobacco was a traditional commercial crop, but from the beginning of the 1990s, cayenne pepper for export became widely planted. In 1996, most of the households grew cayenne pepper and quite a few households stopped cultivating

tobacco. Besides these, white corn, sesame, and vegetables were planted for villagers' own consumption. Rice was supplementarily grown in dry season paddy fields for villagers' own consumption. The dry season paddy fields were located at a distance of three to four kilometers from the village, west of the crop fields.

### 2.2.2 Enforcement of *Krom Samakki*

During the Pol Pot era, the villagers of *Samakki* village were forced to relocate to the neighboring wildness which was mostly on the *Chroc Chonva* peninsula. At the time of the author's research, *Samakki* Village was composed of households which returned there before *Krom Samakki* began and households started by their children. The author did not find any couples who were married and living in *Samakki* Village but who did not participate in *Krom Samakki*.

On the water receding season of 1979, the village households were grouped. As already mentioned in the case of *Ping Pung* Village, because the labor power, cows, and tools had to be equal for each group, neighboring households did not always belong to the same group.

The land which was the objective of *Krom Samakki* was the crop fields surrounding the village which the villagers cultivated before the Pol Pot era. These crop fields were divided among each group so that the land area and features such as soil quality were equivalent.

In *Samakki* Village, villagers carried out co-cultivation corresponding to the first category of *Krom Samakki* for only one year, from the water receding season of 1979 to the water submerging season of 1980. During this one year, when members of a group produced a crop harvest on their group's fields, they at once took the harvest to the house of the group head and then distributed it to the households according to each household's labor strength. At that time, *Krom Samakki* planted tobacco, white maize, sesame, sweet potatoes, cassava, and pulse. Tobacco was distributed after processing was finishing. The classification of labor was the same as that of *Ping Pung* Village, except that the age limit was sixteen years old between the first and the second category.

In the second year of *Krom Samakki*, from the water receding season of 1980 to the water submerging season of 1981, *Krom Samakki* in *Samakki* Village corresponded to the second category. The groups' fields were distributed to each group's households according to the number of family members. Plowing, leveling and transplanting the seedlings were done by the groups. The heads of the groups then ordered the owners of

cows and tools to plow and level the fields of the members who did not have cows and tools. After transplanting, each household took responsibility for caring for the its plots and received the harvest from them.

Moreover, under *Krom Samakki* of *Samakki* Village, group members were sometimes mobilized to reclaim dry season paddy fields. However, the production of dry season paddies was very low at that time. The villagers obtained most of their rice through bartering field crops, especially tobacco and sesame which were the regional traditional cash crops. Villagers traveled by bicycle to rice-growing villages where they had connections, but this was not part of the groups' work.

### 2.2.3 Dissolution of *Krom Samakki*

In *Samakki* Village, the farmland was distributed during the water receding season of 1981, and after that, all of the farm work was done by households. The land area received by the households was determined by multiplying a constant by the number of household members regardless of sex or age.

As for the crop fields, one person received two plots that each was less than a one-meter width. Because crop fields extend from the natural bank of the Mekong River to backward, it is the custom that Cambodian people segment the width of fields when they need to divide a crop field (Delvert 1994, 395). The distributed plots were sometimes the same as those allocated in the previous year and sometimes different.

After this distribution of the groups' crop fields, group members stopped helping each other. The villagers of *Samakki* Village recognized that *Krom Samakki* was dissolved at that time.

In addition, the dry season paddy fields were distributed by assigning three plots (one plot is 25 square meters) to three persons at the same time. The dry season paddy fields were not completely reclaimed. There were many cases in which villagers who were given unreclaimed plots made them into dry season paddy fields by themselves.

The timing is not clear, but land inside the village was also redistributed equally to some degree among the households.

Two years following this first distribution of crop fields, the village authority distributed the distant land in the west, which the villagers still call the *Bobos's* land.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *Bobos* is a kind of reed. In *Samakki*, villagers cut its stems vertically, weave it plainly

This was wild land where grass called *Bobos* grew thick. The *Bobos*'s land was distributed so that each person received over one meter in width, and the land was reclaimed by each household. When the author researched *Samakki* Village, all of the *Bobos*'s land had become crop fields.

### Section 3: Results of Farmland Distribution by *Krom Samakki*

#### 3.1 Discontinuity in Ownership of the Pre-Pol Pot Era

In the system of *Krom Samakki*, the allocation of farmland and the assignment of villagers to their respective groups did not have any relation to the former land ownership before the Pol Pot era. Although the vested interests in cultivation were settled just after the collapse of the Pol Pot regime, they were also made to disappear by introducing *Krom Samakki*. Therefore, at the starting point of *Krom Samakki*, the former ownership of farmlands which were taken over by *Krom Samakki* was annulled.

The group's farmlands were distributed to its member households at the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*. As a result, there is no relationship between the plots which a household received from *Krom Samakki* and the plots which it owned before the Pol Pot era.

Table 2 shows how the farmland owned at the time of author's research (1995-96) was acquired. At that time, more than 60 percent of households in *Ping Pung* Village and more than 70 percent of households in *Samakki* Village owned all or part of the farmland distributed by *Krom Samakki*.

Table 3 shows the responses of households which had experience of dividing and giving farmland to children. Although the percentage of "by reclaiming" is somewhat high for the dry season paddy fields of *Ping Pung* Village and the crop fields of *Samakki* Village, most households divided and gave part of the farmland which they acquired through the distribution of *Krom Samakki*.

Consequently, in the ownership structure of farmland in 1995-96, the main sources of acquisition were "the distribution of *Krom Samakki*" and "the succession of farmland divided and given from the farmland distributed by *Krom Samakki*."

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and fix it in frames. This is called *taem*. Villagers use *taem* as house walls and dry shredded tobacco leaves or red pepper on them.



The ownership structure of farmland in 1995-96 was created by the distribution of *Krom Samakki* as the starting point and through later succession, reclaiming, and buying and selling. There is no continuity with the pre-Pol Pot era.

### 3.2 Equalization of Farmland Area Owned

The distributional principle of *Krom Samakki* was already mentioned in Section 2 of this paper. According to this principle, each household received an area which was calculated by multiplying the area per person by the number of household members.<sup>9</sup> This sub-section examines how the distribution of *Krom Samakki* was done with loyalty to the above principle.

The coefficients of correlation between the area which each household actually received and the number of household members at that time are as follow.

#### *Ping Pung* Village

Rainy season paddy field:  $r = 0.77$  ( $n = 54$ )

Dry season paddy field:  $r = 0.79$  ( $n = 53$ )

#### *Samakki* Village

Crop field:  $r = 0.65$  ( $n = 120$ )

Dry season paddy field:  $r = 0.64$  ( $n = 122$ )

There are strong positive correlations for all fields. It is clear that households with more members received a larger area of farmland. The distribution of *Krom Samakki* created a situation where households with many members owned a large area of farmland.

### 3.3 Conclusions from the Two Villages

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<sup>9</sup> Other distributional principles are reported. Kobayashi reports a case of 'equal division on the basis of households' (Kobayashi 2007, 549). This case may not have considered the number of household members. Sato stated that 'about fifty people who engaged in farming at the time of dissolution were seen to receive distributions. . . . One unit of land for households that had one member farming, two units of land for ones that included two members farming. . . . The average distributed area was 0.51 hectares per farmer.' (Sato 2007, 5; translated by the author).

The KPRP government, which was installed in January 1979, adopted a policy that organized the villagers into groups to work collectively in the fields in order to avoid land disputes and to use the limited cows and tools as effectively as possible. This system is called *Krom Samakki* (Solidarity Group).

Although the KPRP government officially continued *Krom Samakki* for about ten years until the restoration of private land ownership in 1989, at the village level the co-cultivation stopped in the early 1980s. In *Ping Pung Village* and *Samakki Village*, the co-cultivating system continued for only two to three years. The KPRP government also was aware that there were various agricultural management styles which did not follow the original principles of *Krom Samakki*, especially de facto household farming. Moreover, it formalized de facto household farming by calling it “the third form of *Krom Samakki*.” It follows from what has been discussed that the collectivization of agriculture was hardly realized by the introduction of *Krom Samakki* under the KPRP government regime in Cambodia.

However, *Krom Samakki* played an important role in the recovery of the farmers from the collective farms under the Pol Pot regime. At the time of its “dissolution,” *Krom Samakki* provided a structure for farmland ownership by distributing farmland to each group’s households. As a result, the structure of farmland ownership in the 1980s had two features. The first was that there was no continuity from the pre-Pol Pot era. The second was that the more members a household had, the larger its farmland area.

### 3.4 Different Patterns in the Reconstruction Process

Rural villages in Cambodia are divided into two categories: paddy cultivation villages where paddy cultivation is the main means of earning a living, and field-crop cultivation villages where field-crop cultivation is the main means of earning a living. The main farmland that allowed villages as a whole to make a living was the “group’s land” which was co-cultivated under the system of *Krom Samakki*. Vegetable gardens, fruit trees and banana gardens on the land inside the villages were retained by each household.

In *Ping Pung Village* and *Samakki Village*, when *Krom Samakki* distributed the “group’s land,” there was no concern about the former owner before the Pol Pot era. To make the distribution as equitable as possible, there was no relationship between the distributed plots and the plots owned before the Pol Pot era. Other researchers also point out this feature of land distribution.

“Provincial, district, subdistrict, and village officials joined in planning an equitable division of land, an exceedingly difficult task given the fact that paddies vary in features like soil types and location. (There was no attempt to take pre-1975 holdings into account.)” (Ebihara 1993,160)

“In order to be fair, lands were distributed by lots because the soils differed.” (Yaoi 1997, 130)<sup>10</sup>

“The process was that, first, the district allocated land to a village. The village divided the farmland so that farmland nearer the village was divided into smaller plots and farmland farther away was divided into larger plots, equivalent to the number of villagers<sup>11</sup> who engaged in paddy cultivation at that time. Representatives from households gathered to decide the land assigned to each household by lots”. (Sato 2007, 5)<sup>12</sup>

However, there are a few reports which indicate a continuity of ownership, such as the quotation below.

“*Krom Samakki* disappeared in 1983. Farmers started to cultivate rice on pre-1972 holdings again. . . . Provisional owning progressed, and around 1986, most of the owners of farmland became the same as in 1972.”<sup>13</sup> (Tanikawa 1997, 254)

Kobayashi reports that among 14 villages of a commune he studied, there were 11 villages where ownership continuity was not observed and three villages where he

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<sup>10</sup> Translated by the author.

<sup>11</sup> In W village, Siem Reab District, Siem Reab Province, where Sato researched, only part of the village households which wanted to cultivate paddy fields worked as *Krom Samakki*. How the households which did not participate in *Krom Samakki* made a living is unclear from Sato’s description. However, the 108 households that she sampled out of 500 households in the village included only 17 households that owned paddy fields. In addition, the Siem Reab District is categorized as ‘urban’ in ‘General Population Census of Cambodia 1998: Final Census Results.’ Therefore, the author supposes that villagers in W village traditionally had easy access to jobs in the third sector.

<sup>12</sup> Translated by the author.

<sup>13</sup> The year 1972 is when the villagers were forcibly relocated to northern forestland by the Khmer Rouge. They remained there until the end of the Pol Pot era.

heard that each household had re-obtained the paddy plots which it had owned prior to 1975. He points that there was little change in the paddy plots around the latter three villages. In contrast, in cases where the original paddy ridges disappeared and the plots were greatly changed, it was not possible to identify the former ownership. He concludes that it is necessary to consider in detail the changes in the landscape during the Pol Pot era when the land right resolution process in the 1980s is analyzed (Kobayashi 2007. 550).

In keeping with Kobayashi's points, in the village which Tanikawa studied, the original paddy ridges were probably not significantly destroyed during the Pol Pot era and the village population probably remained much the same as in the pre-Pol Pot era.

In the case of *Ping Pung* Village, most villagers remained but were forced to live collectively. Urban people were forced to relocate to this village, but they left after the collapse of the Pol Pot regime. It seems reasonable to suppose that the original paddy ridges were largely destroyed as a result of collective farming under the Pol Pot regime, but village population did not change much. As a result, *Krom Samakki* in *Ping Pung* Village both had to and was able to distribute paddy fields equally.

In the case of *Samakki* Village, village population after the Pol Pot era was probably much larger than before the Pol Pot era. In the 1980s and 1990s, houses were concentrated along the western side of National Road No. 6A. Along the eastern side, there were banana gardens and no houses. The villagers called the eastern side the "old village land." Many villagers lived in the area of the "old village land" in the 1960s, but during the early 1970s when the civil war became intense, they moved to the western side to avoid shells flying from the opposite bank of the Mekong River. The people who once lived in the "old village land" did not return there even after the collapse of the Pol Pot regime, but instead they settled on the western side of National Road. As a result, *Krom Samakki* in *Samakki* Village needed to redistribute the land inside the village where there were house plots and banana gardens even though that land was not expropriated. The redistribution of the crop fields may have been easier than redistribution of the paddy fields because there were no ridges on the water inundated crop fields.

The reconstruction process in each village varies depending on its experience during the Pol Pot era. However, the important common point shared by the various patterns is that *Krom Samakki* gave main farmland to "all" households<sup>14</sup> so they could

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<sup>14</sup> In the case of W village, 'all' the persons (50 people) who engaged in farming at the

become independent farmers through introducing and then stopping co-cultivation. As a result, through introducing and then dissolving *Krom Samakki*, the KPRP government enabled the survival of almost all the rural people and assured a minimum standard of living.

#### Section 4: Tenant Farming

This paper is based on the implicit assumption that the owner is the same person as the cultivator of the farmland. As mentioned above, the author concludes that *Krom Samakki* gave main farmland to “all” households in the villages. It is a fully appropriate supposition that, at the time of land distribution by *Krom Samakki*, producing food for oneself by farming by oneself was the only way to make a living. Therefore, the author considers it rational that the authorities forced all households at that time to become independent farmers.

However, in rural Cambodia recently, there are two patterns of tenant farming: share tenant (*provas dey*) and flat tenant (*chuol*). Actually the tenant farming custom was resumed just after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*. This section examines the recent actualities of tenant farming in rural Cambodia. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first report that explores the recent situation of tenant farming in Cambodian villages.

##### 4.1 Share tenants

Table 4 shows cases from the author’s fieldwork. In these cases, we see two patterns. In the first pattern, the farm rent is extremely low because the owner has income sources apart from agriculture (household numbers p-18, p-54, s-39 s-64). In the second pattern, the farm rent is the owner’s main income source (household numbers s-7, s-72).

Delvert, who left a bulky description of Cambodian rural villages in the 1950s, noted that in share tenancy, “More frequently, the owner is an old man or a widower who makes a miserable living by lending land (Delvert, 1994, 503)” and that “In many cases, the owner is a parent who is old or living out of the village, and this share tenant

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time of the dissolution of *Krom Samakki* received equal distributions of farmland averaging 0.51 ha.

shows the solidarity of the family (Delvert, 1994, 504)<sup>15</sup>. Some of the cases found by the author conform to these descriptions by Delvert (s-72 and s-7).

However, Delvert did not mention the first pattern in which the farm rent is extremely low because the owner has income sources apart from agriculture. The first pattern of recent share tenancy functions a kind of income transfer from tenant farmers. In particular, the author's view is that farmland rental to non-family members is a phenomenon that was created through *Krom Samakki* when it distributed farmland to households that were not farming households before the Pol Pot era.

#### 4.2 Flat tenants

Table 10 shows cases from the author's fieldwork. At the time of the author's fieldwork, any currency, gold, or rice was accepted as payment of rent. Although it is unclear when tenants paid the flat on rice rent in currency or gold in *Ping Pung Village* and *Samakki Village*, villagers in *Samakki Village* consider the rent of fields like tobacco and pepper to be payable at the time of the rental agreement or before transplantation of saplings. Therefore, the renter (owner) can obtain a sum of income some months before the harvest season. Because of this payment timing, there are some cases in which owners rent fields to tenants as temporary measure for money when household members are sick, etc. (s-3, s-38, s-163, s-176).

Table 10 also shows that, in *Samakki Village*, there are a few cases in which households have rented their fields ever since the distribution of *Krom Samakki* (s-34, s-157). The reason these households gave was lack of male labors. Behind these cases, the author perceives the influence of the process of reconstruction of family-kinship structure.

Finally, it is reasonable to suppose that who are the landlords or the tenants is not fixed. At the time of this fieldwork, villagers engaged in flat tenancy when the necessities between the household which want to rent farmland and the ones which want to borrow it coincided. It seems that this custom has not changed since the 1950s. Delvert wrote about "this small tenant farming," as he called it, of *Takaev Province* and *Kandal Province*, stating that "It is difficult to explain in detail this small tenant farming. The agreement is oral. The lease is something fickle. The owner farmer for a year (if the rent advantageous) but does not rent the next year.(Delver, 1994 597)"

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<sup>15</sup> Translated by the author

The author found five patterns that support Delvert's opinion above. The first pattern consists of cases in which the tenant said that the agreed-upon rent level is a criterion for choosing the tenant (s-44, s-152). The second pattern is one in which the tenant said that the tenant on farmland is changeable (s-74, s-89). The third pattern is where the tenant said that he would cultivate the land by himself in the next year (s-5, s-149, s-176). In the fourth pattern, the duration of some tenant contacts is clearly one year or a few years. In the fifth pattern, as mentioned above, the owner said that the reason for renting is an immediate need for money.

Consequently in recent years, just as in the 1950s, the same household may be both a tenant and a renter, depending on the household's lifecycle and specific reasons in a given year.

## Section 5: Problems behind Changes of Ownership Structure

### 5.1 Appearance of Households without Farmland

This section examines the changes in the ownership structure from the distribution of *Krom Samakki* until the middle of the 1990s. Table 6 shows in detail the changes in the dispersion of owned area between the time of the distribution and the time of this study. The most important change is the appearance of households with no farmland and those with very little farmland, since such households did not exist at the time of the land distribution. The other important change is that the percentage of household which own a much larger area has increased.

The author pays particular attention to the appearance of households with no or little farmland because the introduction of *Krom Samakki* was meant to assure a minimum standard of living for all villagers.

Tables 7 and 8 list the reasons why such households lost their land. Among the households without land, there are three patterns: (1) households which returned or moved into the village in recent years, (2) households which finished dividing and giving all farmlands to their children and (3) households which sold all their farmland. Among households with less than ten are, there are also three patterns: (1) households which received less than ten are of farmland from their parents, (2) households which have almost finished dividing and giving farmland to their children, and (3) households which sold most of the farmland distributed from *Krom Samakki*.

Examining the reasons for selling, regardless of whether the households have no farmland or have less than ten are, there are two patterns: (1) the households have a means of earning a living other than farming and (2) the households had an immediate need for money, for example for medical costs. The first pattern of de-agrarianization is preferable because it reflects an increasing variety of economic activities in addition to subsistence farming. On the other hand, the second pattern of de-agrarianization may represent a fall into poverty. From Tables 5 and 6, the households' way of living and living standards are unclear. However, it is clear that they had to part with the legacy of *Krom Samakki* because they had no property other than the distributed or inherited farmland.

## 5.2 Inheritance of Farmland for “the Third Generation”

In rural Cambodia, parents generally give farmland to their child when he/she marries (Ebihara 1968, 353). Table 9 shows the cases of inheritance of farmlands. Among the households in the village at the time of the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*, the author did not find any cases in which households did not distributed farmland. Therefore, we can conclude that *Krom Samakki* gave land to all the households in the village at that time.

Consequently, “inheritance cases” in Table 9 refers to children who were raised in households given farmland from *Krom Samakki*, married, and became independent from their parents. In other words, if the generation that received the land distribution of *Krom Samakki* is called the “first generation,” this is evidence that the “second generation” has been born.

The year of marriage verifies this point (see Table 10). Even in the middle of the 1990s, the majority of couples married before the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*. Except for the exceptional couples who came back after the dissolution, they received farmland. This is the “first generation.” Couples who became independent from the “first generation” by receiving farmland are the “second generation.” In the middle of the 1990s, there were no married children of “second generation” couples; the “third generation” has not yet married. This means that the inheritance of farmland in *Ping Pung* Village and *Samakki* Village has occurred only one time, from the “first generation” to the “second generation.”

The method of distributing *Krom Samakki*'s farmland was that the area distributed to each household was calculated by multiplying the area per person of each kind of farmland with the number of household members. Therefore, the farmland for



the children was secured in their household. Afterwards, however, when the children who were not born at the time of the *Krom Samakki* land distribution married and become the “second generation,” and when the children of the existing “second generation” marry and become the “third generation,” the new households may not be inherit enough farmland from their parents to make a living. Because the pressure of the increasing population is very high and there is not much cultivatable land remaining in Cambodia, access to non-agricultural jobs will be extremely critical for the “third generation.” The period when the legacy of *Krom Samakki* protects the daily life of the rural people will come to an end in the near future.

### 5.3 Disappearance of Farmland Mortgages

In the fieldwork for this study, the author heard the word “farmland mortgage,” which refers to the rights of creditors who lent money or gold and who are also farmers to the cultivation and production of farmland until the debt is repaid. In other words, profits obtained from cultivating mortgaged farmland means interest receipts for the creditor. Table 11 shows cases of farmers in debt.

It is strange that Delvert did not mention farmland mortgage even though he devoted many pages to describing multiple examples of share tenants and flat tenants. He also wrote, “Short-term loans are absolutely the general practice in Cambodia,” and he mentioned, as examples of lenders, retailers, merchants buying paddies, land owners who have some property, and small landholders following a very good harvest (Delvert 1994, 518). Therefore, if farmland mortgage was prevalent, one would have expected that he would have been interested in it.

Given the above, the author assumes that farmland mortgage is a “new” practice that emerged in the 1980s. Until 1989, selling and buying land was officially prohibited, and professional private retailers and merchants did not exist. The largest and only buyer of agricultural production was formally the government. Reconstruction of the national banking system had just started. Almost all households made their living by farming. Under this situation, the only way to obtain a sum of currency immediately was to lend cultivating rights to other farmers who have little other property. The author very much regrets not interviewing debtors concerning the reasons they needed money. However, Table 11 shows that the sum of the debts is not small.

In 1989, private ownership of land was reintroduced, and selling and buying farmland was openly permitted. As has already been mentioned in Section 6, rural

households without farmland began appearing after 1990. Economic sectors other than agriculture have been restored, and farming is not the only way to feed families. The utility value of land is no longer restricted to cultivation. Considering these changes in the economy, the author thinks that farmland mortgage will go out to practice in the near future.

#### Conclusion: End of Legacy of *Krom Samakki*

The KPRP government failed to shift the people into collective farming for a sustained period of time. However, the government succeeded in calming the socially and economically disordered situation in rural areas and enabled people to reconstruct their societies. It also provided assurance of survival through *Krom Samakki* for a few years. In the early years of the 1980s, *Krom Samakki* was naturally dissolved, and its farmland was distributed to the villagers. As a result of the method of this land distribution, villagers' farmland ownership was highly equalized. At that point, all the villagers were independently farming to feed themselves.

However, tenant farming also resumed just after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*. There were many reasons to rent farmland, but the cases in which households rented land received from the distribution due to lack of male laborers may be characteristic of the social reconstruction process from the Pol Pot era.

During the 1980s, rural societies in Cambodia were very "quiet." Almost all the rural people cultivated for self-support. Aside from the government sector, the only economic activities other than subsistence agriculture were small family-based businesses and bartering. Because selling and buying farmland was officially prohibited, farmland with no cultivator had no value. The author considers farmland mortgage to be a system symbolic of this "quietness." In this "quiet" society, equality created through *Krom Samakki* was almost maintained until the 1990s.

At the same time, the author witnessed indications of breaks in the equality. Already in the mid-1990s, there were households with no or little farmland, although such households did not exist at the time of dissolution of *Krom Samakki*. Some households sold distributed farmland to obtain money even though they made their living by farming. Most of the "second generation" couples received farmland from their parents. However now, more than ten years have passed since the author's research, and children who were born after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki* may be married. It is

a matter of concern whether or not they will inherit enough farmland from their parents to live.

Many of the “third generation” people are likely to find non-farming jobs. The investment law of 1994 and the normalization of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1996 triggered an inflow of foreign investment in the garment sector. The sudden rise of the garment industry has created a labor market for young women. Large numbers of rural women immigrate to the Phnom Penh area to work in garment factories. The percentage of female employees increased more than 10 percent from 1993/4 to 2001 (Amakawa 2004, 33). Work in garment factories is now the main non-agricultural job opportunity.

The problem is that the garment industry is the only major industrial sector in the Cambodian economy. Since the legacy of *Krom Samakki* is disappearing, more non-agricultural job opportunities are needed. Otherwise, agrarian problems will come to the forefront in near future.

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Table 1 Population Structure (at the End of 1980)

Age	Actual Number			Percentage to Total Population (%)			Sex Distribution of the Population in Each Age Group (%)	
	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female
All Ages	6,589,954	3,049,450	3,540,504	100.0	100.0	100.0	46.3	53.7
0~15years	3,092,083	1,556,526	1,535,557	46.9	51.0	43.4	50.3	49.7
Labor Population	3,112,649	1,346,107	1,766,542	47.2	44.1	49.9	43.2	56.8
Older Population	385,222	146,817	238,405	5.8	4.8	6.7	38.1	61.9

Source: Judith Banister and E Paige Johnson, p.84.

Notes: 1) 'Labor Population' means from 16 to 60 years old as for male, from 16 to 55 years old as for female.

2)'Older Population' means more than 61 years olds as for male, more than 56 years old as for female.

Table 2 Obtaining Sources of Own Farmland

(1) *Ping Pung* Village (Total 93 Households)

<Rainy Season Paddy Filed> (83Households)

Acquired Sources	Number of Households			Percentage		
Distribution	31			38.3		
Distribution + Buying	16			19.8		
Distribution + Inheritance	1 <sup>(1)</sup>	52		1.2	64.2	
Distribution + Inheritance + Buying	1		77	1.2		95.1
Distribution + Reclamation + Buying	3			3.7		
Inheritance	16 <sup>(2)</sup>			19.8		
Inheritance + Buying	9	25		11.1	30.9	
Buying			4			4.9
Total			81			100.0

<Dry season paddy filed> (64 households)

Acquired Sources	Number of Households			Percentage		
Distribution	30			46.9		
Distribution + Reclamation	5			7.8		
Distribution + Buying	3	41		4.7	64.1	
Distribution + Reclamation + Buying	2		59	3.1		92.2
Distribution + Inheritance + Buying	1			1.6		
Inheritance	12			18.8		
Inheritance + Reclamation	2	18		3.1	28.1	
Inheritance + Buying	4 <sup>(3)</sup>			6.3		
Reclamation			3			4.7
Buying			2			3.1
Total			64			100.0

(2) Samakki Village (Total 176 Households)

<Field> (166 Households)

Acquired Sources	Number of Households			Percentage		
Distribution	100			60.2		
Distribution + Reclamation	6			3.6		
Distribution + Buying	11	123		6.6	74.1	
Distribution + Inheritance + Buying	1		161	0.6		97.0
Distribution + Reclamation + Buying	5			3.0		
Inheritance	35 <sup>(4)</sup>			21.1		
Inheritance + Buying	3	38		1.8	22.9	
Reclamation			1			0.6
Buying			1			0.6
Others			3 <sup>(5)</sup>			1.8
Total			166			100.0

<Dry season paddy field> (164 Households)

Acquired Sources	Number of Households			Percentage		
Distribution	78			47.6		
Distribution + Inheritance	3			1.8		
Distribution + Reclamation	32	120		19.5	73.2	
Distribution + Buying	6			3.7		
Distribution + Reclamation + Buying	1		152	0.6		92.7
Inheritance	26 <sup>(6)</sup>			15.9		
Inheritance + Reclamation	1			0.6		
Inheritance + Buying	4	32		2.4	19.5	
Inheritance + Reclamation + Buying	1			0.6		
Reclamation			8			4.9
Reclamation + Buying			1			0.6
Buying			2			1.2
Others			1 <sup>(7)</sup>			0.6
Total			164			100.0

Definition in the table:



Distribution: Farmland distribution by *Krom Samakki*

Inheritance: Cases that couples inherited their parents farmland because they died, and cases that couples married after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki* and were given farmland from their parents.

Reclamation: Cases that villagers reclaim savage lands after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*

Buying: Buying after re-introduction of private ownership in 1989.

- Notes: (1) Included the couple that inherited farmland because of the father went out the village.
- (2) Included the case that was given farmland by the husband's sister at the time of marriage.
- (3) Included the couple that inherited farmland because of the father went out the village.
- (4) Included the couple that was given farmland by the husband's brother at the time of marriage.
- (5) Included the case that is 'distribution + inheritance + buying + buying the common farmland from the village chief one year after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*,' and the case that is 'distribution + reclamation + buying + buying non-reclamation land from the villager after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*.' The details of these buying just after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki* are not clear. Moreover, included the case that is 'buying + giving by the village chief the confiscated farmland of villagers who went out the village after the distribution of *Krom Samakki*'.
- (6) Included the paddy field located in the other village where the husband was born and the paddy field given by the husband's brother.
- (7) Included the case that is 'buying + given by the village chief the farmland confiscated from the household who went out the village.'

Source: Author's Interview.

Table 3 Acquired Sources of Farmlands Giving to the Children

*Ping Pung Village*

Acquired Sources	Rainy Season Paddy Field		Dry Season Paddy Field	
	Number of Households	Percentage	Number of households	Percentage
Distribution	27	87.1	13	72.2
Reclamation	0	0.0	3	16.7
Buying	1	3.2	0	0.0
Others	3 <sup>(1)</sup>	9.7	2 <sup>(2)</sup>	11.1
Total	31	100.0	18	100.0

*Samakki Village*

Acquired Sources	Water Recession Filed		Dry Season Paddy Filed	
	Number of Households	Percentage	Number of Households	Percentage
Distribution	32	86.5	20	87.0
Reclamation	5	13.5	1	4.3
Others	0	0	2 <sup>(3)</sup>	8.7
Total	37	100.0	23	100.0

Notes: (1) Included the case that is 'distribution' or 'buying,' and the case that the obtaining source is completely unclear.

(2) Included the two cases that are 'distribution' or 'reclamation.'

(3) Included the two cases that are 'distribution' or 'reclamation.'

Source: Authors interview.

Table 4 Cases of Share Tenants

*Ping Pung Village*

Serial Number of Households	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Classification of Land	Renter	Duration	Rental Fee	Reason to Rent	Notes
p-18	46	45	Dry season paddy field	Brother of the wife	From 4 years before	Not decide. (When good season, bring 6 from him, but when bad season, only 3 <i>baw</i> )	Lack of labor (the husband work in the police and the children are too small to labor.	Before renting to the wife's brother, they rent to husband's cousin.

Samakki Village

Serial Number of Households	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Classification of Land	Renter	Duration	Rental Fee	Reason to Rent	Notes
s-7	60	60	Water Recession Field, Dry second paddy field	Married son	Five years before	Water recession filed: half of the selling money of the production. Paddy field: half of the paddy	Retired from farming because of old.	Two daughters living together help the renter (brother)
s-39	48	49	Dry season paddy field	Villager not relative in <i>Samakki</i> Village	From the distribution of <i>Krom Samakki</i>	two thirds for cultivator, one thirds for owner	Not having cows and car and children were small.	Grocer. the last year of authors research, they bought banana field. They got money by selling bananas.
s-64	61	45	Water recession	Villager not relative	From 4 years after	20 percent of money of selling	No cultivators in the households	Change renter every year.

			filed	in <i>Samakki</i> Village	the distribution of <i>Krom</i> <i>Samakki</i>	production.	because the husband is furniture maker.	
s-72	none	50	Water recession filed	(1) Nephew couple in <i>Samakki</i> Village. (2) Villager not relative in <i>Samakki</i> Village	(1) every year (2) from three years before	Half of production	Lack of labor. The wife must take care of old father, and the son lives in Phnon Penh.	

Note: *Baw* is a Khmer word that means a sack for rice. One *baw* is nearly equal to 60 kg.

Source: Author's interview

Table 5 Cases of Flat Tenants

*Ping Pung Village*

Serial Number of Household	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Own Farmland	Rental farmland				Notes
				Classification of Farmland	Duration	Renter	Rental fee	
p-25	32	31	R 40 a D 10 a	D 10a	1 year	A nephew living in the next village	100kg/year	They rent R 50a from the relative in the near village.
p-35	39	38	D 4 a	D 4 a	Unconfirmed	Wife's sister	10 thousand <i>riel</i> / year	This household is a grocer's shop. Distributed rainy season paddy field already sold to the wife's sister.
p-37	42	40	R 75 a D 26 a	D 10 a	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed	
p-40	none	78	D 4 a	D 4 a	Unconfirmed	A person in the next village	3 <i>taw</i> / year	
p-92	92	None	unclear	R 20 a D 20 a	R: 2 years contraction D: unconfirmed	R villager in <i>Ping Pung</i> Village D villager in <i>Ping Pung</i> Village	R 1 <i>chi</i> gold / year D 16 <i>taw</i> paddy / year	Total production of her dry season paddy field is twenty <i>tan</i> .

Samakki Village

Serial Number of Household	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Own Farmland	Rental farmland				Notes
				Classification of Farmland	Duration	Renter	Rental fee	
s-3	47	45	F 29 a	F (all)	1 year	A neighbor in <i>Samakki</i> Village	unconfirmed	They said to need money for children's sickness and mother's funeral.
s-5	none	44	F 19 a D 11 a	D (all)	unconfirmed	A villager in <i>Samakki</i> village	120 kg paddy / year	She said she will cultivate by herself in the next year.
s-22	65	60	F 2.4 a D 44 a	F (all)	All the years after <i>Krom Samakki</i>	The cousin	Unconfirmed (receives before harvesting season)	
s-23	35	33	F 8 a	F (all)	7 years before	The aunt	unconfirmed	They need money for funeral of their uncle, aunt and mother died.
s-26	46	42	F 9 a D 19 a	F (all)	All years after <i>Krom Samakki</i>	Husband's cousin	Unconfirmed (receives before harvesting season)	They said that the reason to rent is wife's sickness and husband's job (buying and selling tobacco)
s-34	none	55	F 16 a D 13 a	F (partly)	All years 1 year after <i>Krom</i>	She changes every year. She chooses a	unconfirmed	She receives the rent fee just after seeding field. She said that the reason to rent was

					<i>Samakki</i>	person who give higher rent.		the lack of male labor in her household.
s-39	48	49	F 16 a D 13 a	F (partly)	This year	villager	30 thousand <i>riel</i> / year	They rent their field every year.
s-40	none	70	F 16 a	F (all)	4 years contract	Wife's brother	30 thousand <i>riel</i> for the first and second year, 40 thousand <i>riel</i> for the third year, 70 thousand <i>riel</i> for the fourth year.	
s-44	37	35	F 37 a D 13 a	D (all)	2 years before	Ex-wife's relative	13 <i>Tan</i> / year	They said that the reason to choose the ex-wife's relative was higher rent fee than other people.
s-48	26	28	F 8 a	F (all)	2 years contract	Wife's brother	15 thousand <i>riel</i> /year	They said that the reason to rent was baby birth and sickness.
s-59	45	38	F 22 a D 13 a	D (all)	Before two years	Second cousin	10 <i>tan</i> paddy /year	The productivity of the dry season paddy field they rent out is thirty <i>tan</i> .
s-72	none	50	F 39 a D 31 a	F (partly) D (all)	F: this year D: 4 years before	F: Nephew's couple in the other	F: gold one <i>chi</i> D: 13 <i>tan</i> /	They changes person to rent every year.



						village D: villager in <i>Samakki</i> Village	year	
s-73	38	35	F 11 a D13 a	D (all)	From 1991	Relative	600kg paddy / pear	
s-74	40	37	F 36 a D 31 a	D (all)	Before a few years	Villager in <i>Samakki</i> Village	300kg paddy / year	At former times, they rent the other persons.
s-89	35	33	F 20 a D 31 a	1)F(2 parts) 2)F(1 parts)	1) all the years from <i>Krom</i> <i>Samakki</i> 2) before 3 years	1)2) villagers in <i>Samakki</i> Village	1) gold 1 <i>chi</i> / year 2)45 thousand <i>riel</i> / 5 years	1)field given by his mother 2) They said that at former times, they rent the other persons.
s-91	37	36	F 16 a D 25 a	F (all)	All the years from <i>Krom</i> <i>Samakki</i>	1) cousin in <i>Samakki</i> Village	Gold 1 <i>Chi</i> / year	They rent to the same person during all years.
s-95	None	45	F 18 a D 25 a	F (all)	All the years from <i>Krom</i> <i>Samakki</i>	Wife's brother	20-30 thousand <i>riel</i> / year	Shi said that the rent fee is not high because the renter is brothers.
s-98	64	48	F 44 a D 50 a	F (1 part)	3 years before	Wife's brother	100 thousand <i>riel</i> year	
s-99	none	50	F 8 a D 25 a	F (rented area is unconfirmed)	Near 10 years	Died husband's brother	Unconfirmed	
s-103	40	35	F 12a	F (1 bigger	2 years	A villager in	200	

			D 8 a	part)	before	<i>Samakki</i> Village	thousand <i>riel</i> / year	
s-107	40	37	F 150 a D 38 a	F (9 a)	1995 and 1996	A villager in <i>Samakki</i> Village	500 thousand <i>riel</i> / year	They said that the reason to rent is to buy a rice cleaning machine.
s-148	30	31	F 13 a D 406a	F (all)	This year	Cousin in <i>Samakki</i> village	60 thousand <i>riel</i> / year	They said that the reason to rent is to need money for child's sickness.
s-149	48	46	F 13 a D 25 a	1) F (all) 2) D (all)	1) 3 years before 2) 4 years before	1)2) villagers in <i>Samakki</i> Village	unconfirmed	They will cultivate by themselves from the next water recession season.
s-150	51	38	F 10a D 25a	F (1 part)	5 to 6 years before	Owner who have the next part of field	unconfirmed	They said that the reason to rent was too narrow to plow.
s-152	31	30	F 14 a D 31a	F (area for 2 thousand seedlings)	2 years before	unconfirmed	unconfirmed	As for the selecting the renter, they said that they agreed on the fee.
s-157	none	50	F 4a D 19a	F (all)	All the years from <i>Krom</i> <i>Samakki</i>	Owner who have the next part of field	unconfirmed	They said that the reason to rent was too narrow to plow.
s-163	40	39	F 27a D 13a	F (area for 3 thousand seedlings)	1995 and 1996	Wife's brother	unconfirmed	He said that the reason to rent was to need money for wife's sickness. He will cultivate himself for the next year.

s-176	49	48	F 11a D 20 a	F (all)	3 years from 1994 to 1996	cousin	unconfirmed	she said that the reason to rent was to need money for husband's sickness. She will cultivate himself for the next year.
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Notes: R = Rainy Season Paddy Field  
D = Dry Season Paddy Field  
F = Water Recession Field

'Unconfirmed' means that the author failed to ask on that item.

*Taw* is a Khmer word that means a unit of bulk and is equal to 18 liter.

*Riel* is the Khmer money. In 1995 and 1996 1 dollar was equal to around 2 thousand 5 hundred *riel*.

*Chi* is a Khmer word that means a unit of weight and is equal to 3.75 gram.

Source: Author's Interview

Table 6 Distribution of Acreage of Own Farmland

*Ping Pung Village*

Own Are	At the Time of Distribution by <i>Krom Samakki</i>		At the Time of Author's Interview (1995-96)	
	Number of Households	Percentage	Number of Households	Percentage
0	0	0.0	7	7.6
1-10	0	0.0	5	5.4
11-20	1	2.2	8	8.7
21-30	6	13.0	7	7.6
31-40	10	21.7	15	16.3
41-50	5	10.9	8	8.7
51-60	3	6.5	7	7.6
61-70	6	13.0	3	3.3
71-80	6	13.0	7	7.6
81-90	2	4.3	5	5.4
91-100	5	10.9	7	7.6
101-110	2	4.3	2	2.2
111-120	2	4.3	1	1.1
121-130	3	6.5	2	2.2
131-140	2	4.3	1	1.1
140<	1	2.2	7	7.6
Total	54 <sup>(1)</sup>	100.0	92 <sup>(2)</sup>	100.0

*Samakki Village*

Own are	At the Time of Distribution by <i>Krom Samakki</i>		At the Time of Author's Interview (1995-96)	
	Number of Households	Percentage	Number of Households	Percentage
0	0	0.0	5	2.9
1-10	0	0.0	3	1.7
11-20	6	5.0	12	6.9
21-30	13	10.7	24	13.8
31-40	25	20.7	38	21.8
41-50	24	19.8	28	16.1
51-60	19	15.7	18	10.3
61-70	17	14.0	16	9.2
71-80	4	3.3	8	4.6
81-90	5	4.1	5	2.9
91-100	2	1.7	4	2.3
101-110	3	2.5	4	2.3
111-120	1	0.8	2	1.1
121-130	1	0.8	3	1.7
131-140	0	0.0	0	0.0
140<	1	0.8	4	2.3
Total	121 <sup>(1)</sup>	100.0	174 <sup>(2)</sup>	100.0

Notes: (1) Among the total investigated households ( 93 households in *Ping Pung* Village, 176 households *Samakki* Village), households that author got both acreage distributed by *Krom Samakki* and number of household members.

(2) From the total investigated households, excluding the households whose acreage of own farmlands are unclear.

Source: Author's investigation

Table 7 Households without Farmland

*Ping Pung Village*

Serial Number of Household	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Age of Marriage	Reason to Lose Farmland	Notes
p-16	none	69	Unconfirmed	She had given to her children all farmland distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> .	Single old woman household
p-28	34	29	1993	Unconfirmed	This couple came into <i>Ping Pung Village</i> 2 years ago.
p-36	46	40	After the dissolution of <i>Krom Samakki</i>	The wife disposed of all farmland distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> through giving to her brother in the 1980's and selling to her sister in 1990.	During <i>Krom Samakki</i> , the three of brothers and sisters lived together without their parents. This couple bought vegetable garden in 1990.
p-54	31	31	1985	They sold out all of distributed farmland in 1992 and 1994.	They sold farmland to repay the loan because of failure of business which buys and sells vegetables.
p-60	none	34	Unconfirmed	Unconfirmed	She came back to <i>Ping Pung Village</i> because of divorce.
p-62	30	28	1986	They sold out all of distributed farmland in 1991 and 1994.	Selling of 1991 was for the cost of childbirth and selling of 1994 was for the cost of house building.
p-90	Unconfirmed	58	Unconfirmed	She had given to her children most of farmland distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> and sold out the rest.	Her husband died 4 years ago. She carries business on buying and selling fishes.

*Samakki Village*

Serial Number of Household	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Age of Marriage	Reason to Lose farmland	Notes
s-46	38	38	1979	They sold our all of the farmland distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> .	The husband engages in fishing and daily job. The wife sells some vegetables.
s-90	none	75	unconfirmed	She had given to her children all farmland distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> .	Single old woman household
s-118	29	25	1991	Unconfirmed	They did not receive farmland from their parents. The husband engages motorcycle taxi.
s-159	57	37	1979	When they lived in other places from the mid-1980's to the end of 1980's, the village chief confiscated their distributed farmland.	They came back to <i>Samakki Village</i> 7 years ago.
s-160	42	36	1985	unconfirmed	After the marriage, the husband joined the army with together the wife. They came back to <i>Samakki Village</i> 4 years ago.

Source: Author's interviews.

Table 8 Households with Less Than 10 a Farmland

Serial Number of Household	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Time of Marriage	Way to Acquire the Farmland	Reason to Lose the Farmland	Notes
p-10	31	30	1983	Distribution (R 10 a)	Unconfirmed	
p-31	40	39	Under the Pol Pot regime	Buying (R 5 a, in 1994)	They sold out all of the farmland distributed in 1991 and 1993.	The reason to sell in 1991 is unconfirmed. The reason to sell in 1993 was Husband's sickness.
p-35	39	38	Just after the Pol Pot regime	Distribution (D 4 a)	The sold all of the rainy season paddy field distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> .	They manage general merchandise.
p-40	none	78	Unconfirmed	Distribution (D 4 a)	She had given to her children most of farmland distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> .	Single old woman household
p-65	27	25	1988	Distribution ( R 10 a)	They sold 10a of 20a rainy season paddy field distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> .	The reason to sell was unconfirmed.



*Samakki Village*

Serial Number of Household	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Time of Marriage	Way to Acquire the Farmland	Reason to Lose the Farmland	Notes
s-23	35	33	unconfirmed	Distribution (F 7 a)	The sold all of the fields distributed by <i>Krom Samakki</i> .	The husband a haircutter.
s-48	26	28	unconfirmed	Distribution (F 8 a)	Unconfirmed	
s-128	30	26	1991	Buying (F 10 a, in 1993)	Unconfirmed	

Source: Author's interviews

Table 9 Number of Cases of Ownership Transfer by Inheritance

*Ping Pung Village*

Time of Marriage	Rainy Season Paddy Field		Dry Season Paddy Field	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
From the Dissolution of <i>Krom Samakki</i> to 1989	12	36.4	8	38.1
From 1990 to 1995/96	17	51.5	10	47.6
Unclear	4	12.1	3	14.3
Total	33	100.0	21	100.0

*Samakki Village*

Time of Marriage	Field		Dry Season Paddy Field	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
From the Dissolution of <i>Krom Samakki</i> to 1989	12	30.0	10	32.3
From 1990 to 1995/96	23	57.5	16	51.6
Unclear	5	12.5	5	16.1
Total	40	100.	31	100.0

Notes: The cases that both husband's parents and wife's parents gave the same classification of field at the same time are counted 'one.'

Source: Author's Interview

Table 10 Time of Marriage of the Household Couples

*Ping Pung Village*

Time of marriage	Number of households
Before the collapse of the Pol Pot regime	43
Between the collapse of the Pol Pot regime and the dissolution of <i>Krom Samakki</i>	14(1)
Between the dissolution of <i>Krom Samakki</i> and 1989	16
Between 1990 and 1995/96	18
Unconfirmed	2
Total	93

*Samakki Village*

Time of marriage	Number of households
Before the collapse of the Pol Pot regime	111
Between the collapse of the Pol Pot regime and the dissolution of <i>Krom Samakki</i>	24(4)
Between the dissolution of <i>Krom Samakki</i> and 1989	28
Between 1990 and 1995/96	12
unconfirmed	1
Total	176

Noted:

As for the couple of second marriage, the first marriage of the husband or the wife was 'the time of marriage' on this table.

The number in the parenthesis is the number of the cases that they married during *Krom Samakki* and they became independent from their parents after the dissolution of *Krom Samakki*.

Source: Author's interview

Table 11 Cases of Mortgage

*Ping Pung Village*

Serial Number of Household	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Their Farmland (are)	Mortgaged Farmland	Debt	Loan Years	Lender	Notes
p-10	31	30	R (10 a)	R (10 a)	Gold 0.5 <i>chi</i> (corresponding US23)	4 years before	A second cousin in <i>Ping Pung Village</i>	
p-17	32	31	R (35 a) D (10 a)	R (35 a)	Gold 3.5 <i>chi</i>	1 year before	Husband's mother	The debt was for sickness of husband's and a child.
p-53	59	none	R (unconfirmed)	R (13 a)	unconfirmed	From this year	Cousin in <i>Ping Pung Village</i>	
p-57	37	34	R (40 a)	R (40 a)	Unconfirmed	Three years until this year	Aunt	
p-70	41	39	R (1 hectare) D (35 a)	R (40 a)	Gold 4 <i>chi</i>	3 years before	A villager in the next village	
p-82	36	35	R (1 hectare) D (24 a)	D (24a)	Gold 1 <i>chi</i>	2 years before	A villager in the next village	
p-87	none	38	R (30 a) D (14 a)	D (8 a)	Gold 0.8 <i>chi</i>	From the last year	Wife's sister	
p-88	63	62	R (60 a) D (12 a)	R (10 a)	Gold 1 <i>chi</i> (corresponding US47)	From the last year	Daughter living with together	

*Samakki Village*

Serial Number of Household	Age of Husband	Age of Wife	Their Farmland (are)	Mortgaged Farmland	Debt	Loan Years	Lender	Notes
s-24	none	46	F (area corresponding to 3 thousand seedlings)	F (area corresponding to 3 thousand seedlings)	Gold 3 <i>chi</i>	4 years (the next year is the 4th year)	A villager in <i>Samakki Village</i>	She sold field are corresponding to 2 thousand seedlings in the last year.
s-50	56	52	D (25 a)	D (25a)	Gold 3 <i>chi</i>	6 years	A villager in <i>Samakki Village</i>	He finished repaying all of the debt in this year.
s-53	48	42	F (17 a) D(50 a)	F (17 a)	unconfirmed	3 years	A cousin in <i>Samakki Village</i>	He just finished repaying all of the debt.
s-89	35	33	F (20 a) D (5 parts = 31a)	D (2 parts)	Gold 1.5 <i>chi</i>	3 years	A villager in <i>Samakki Village</i>	
s-143	37	33	F (8a) D (10 a)	D (8a)	Gold 3 <i>chi</i>	unconfirmed	Wife's brother	

Source: author's interview