

TANZANIAN AGRICULTURE UNDER THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO TWO VILLAGES IN KILIMANJARO REGION

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1. INTRODUCTION

Tanzanian government launched the three-year Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in the 1986/87 financial year (July-June). Then its second phase, the three-year Economic and Social Action Programme (ESAP) has been started in 1989/90. These programmes were intended to bring a transformation in Tanzanian economy as well as society. The recent noteworthy issue is "Zanzibar Declaration". The Party National Executive Committee of Chama cha Mapinduzi, which is the single political party in Tanzania, held in middle February, 1991 in Zanzibar decided to allow Party members to acquire shares in private companies, drawing more than one salary and renting houses (The Sunday News 17/2/91), which had been regarded as deeds of capitalists or feudalists in the clause 8-(7) of chapter 2 of Katiba ya Chama cha Mapinduzi (Chama cha Mapinduzi Constitution). In spite of the propaganda of the continuation of the "socialism and self-reliance" policy by the senior staffs of the government and the Party such as "Ujamaa is not dying" (by the Party Vice-Chairman, Hon. Rashidi Kawawa, The Daily News 2/3/91), "Economic reforms within socialist policy" (by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Ahmed Hassan Diria, The Daily News 9/3/91) and so on, at least some transformation has been going on steadily.

Although this policy change since even before middle '80s was partly influenced by the drastic changes in East European countries and the forerunners of the structural adjustment programmes in

African countries, more important were several aspects of the Tanzanian economic crisis which has started in early '70s when Tanzanian government has strengthened its famous policy, "Ujamaa" through the forced mass involvement from the voluntary participation. The alleged causes of the economic crisis, however, are (1) drought and first oil crisis in 1973/74, (2) destruction of cooperative unions in 1976, (3) collapse of the East African Community in 1977, (4) anti-Uganda war in 1978, (5) second oil crisis in 1979, (6) East African Drought in 1981/82, and (7) African Continental Drought in 1983/84. With these disasters, Tanzanian economy has fallen down completely during late '70s and early '80s.

My recent research work in Tanzania aims to shed light on the direction, speeds and magnitude of the rural transformation under the new economic situation which has been brought by the Structural Adjustment Programmes, ERP and ESAP. In the first half of this paper, I would like to examine some results of ERP and ESAP in the field of agriculture, while in the second half I will present some findings from case studies of 2 villages in Mwanja District, Kili-manjaro Region.

## 2. SOME RESULTS OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY PROGRAMME

Tanzanian government highly appreciated the Economic Recovery Programme. In the ESAP policy paper, which is the second phase of ERP, Tanzanian government stated as follows:-

"At the end of ERP, the most positive aspect of economic performance has been the recovery in agricultural production, which has contributed significantly to the revival in GDP growth and more importantly, growth in per capita output. The revival in agriculture has come mainly from grain and cotton. Although production of other export crops has not yet recovered to the extent expected, the long trend of decline has been arrested. While favorable weather conditions contributed significantly to the agricultural

performance, producer incentives and other reforms played an important role as well. It is, however, unfortunate that the revival in agricultural production has not fully been reflected in the performance of agricultural exports nor in the easing of urban food prices because of transportation, processing and marketing bottlenecks" (Tanzanian Government, Economic Recovery Programme II: Economic and Social Action Programme 1989/90-1991/92, 1989, Introduction, para.3). "The agricultural sector which continues to be the mainstay of the economy showed very positive signs of moving towards recovery. The food situation improved substantially due to particularly big increases in the production of maize, paddy and root crops. The production of cotton more than doubled showed very encouraging signs of commencing an upward trend. At the same time the production of minor export crops as well as hides and skins increased. Overall, the agricultural sector registered an annual growth rate of 5.7 percent in 1986, 4.4 percent in 1987, and 4.8 percent in 1988, compared with an annual average of less than 3 percent during the 1981/85 period. The impressive performance in agricultural production was mainly due to the favorable weather conditions, improved availability of inputs, better producer prices and marketing arrangements as well as improved availability of incentive goods" ( ibid., I. Review of The Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), para. 21).

According to this statement, ERP, at least its sectoral programme of agriculture was performed quite well. But, I think that we should read this statement carefully, because the ESAP policy paper was a document which was submitted to the international agencies and the donor countries. Tanzania government would like to express its intention of continuing ERP and its desire of getting further foreign supports.

On the other hand, "Tanzania: Paradise postponed" was the cover story of the December, 1990 Issue of the "Africa Events". Under

this title, there were some articles on the current economic and political situations of Tanzania. Mr. Martin Rimmer contributed one article on agriculture with the headline of "From Bad to ... Not Quite so Bad", and its summary was as follows:-

"After four years of IMF/World Bank backed structural adjustment, Tanzania's agricultural performance remains disappointing" (Africa Events, Vol.6, No.12, Dec.,1990, p.22).

And most of the articles of TAAMULI: special volume on politics of liberalization (Vol.1 No.1/2, 1990, published by The Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam) criticized ERP. Prof. Mbilinyi wrote that:

"The structural adjustment policy (SAP) of the 1980s has become a form of counter-reform, a return to colonial state policies which gave preferential treatment to capitalist enterprises and blocked the development of a strong class of peasant or yeoman farmers. Through SAP the World Bank insists that priority in resource allocation be given to the most productive regions and enterprises, and that expenditures in social services be drastically reduced" (Mbilinyi, Marjorie, "Structural Adjustment and Agribusiness in Tanzania: Struggles Over the Labour of Women Peasants and Farm Workers", ibid., p.93). Another contributor, Dr. Maganya stood on the same stance.

"In short, the ERP is a programme for the rich peasants - it is a disguised way of implementing the 1950s and 1960s "progressive" farmer policy" (Maganya, E.N., "The Structural Adjustment Programmes and the Agricultural Sector: The Case of Tanzania, ibid., p.112).

It is rather surprising that there was not any debate on ERP and ESAP between the critics at Department of Political Science, and the supporters at Department of Economics and Economic Research Bureau within University of Dar es Salaam.

Was Tanzanian agricultural performance quite well or disap-

pointing? Tanzanian government has been reforming its agricultural policies drastically in both fields of production and marketing since even before ERP when Tanzanian government has introduced "The Agricultural Policy of Tanzania" in 1983. In this section, the impact of each policy will not be investigated, but only the results of these policy reforms will be referred. My starting point is that any kind of agricultural policy reform such as the present ones has been inevitable under the serious economic crisis. This position is different with the views in TAAMULI. From this starting point, our question is whether the structural adjustment policies had the real positive impacts on Tanzanian agricultural sector despite of the government's own appraisal.

Table 1 shows the share of agriculture in GDP, and the index of agricultural development for 1976 to 1990. This sector has constantly maintained more than 35% share in GDP. It is noteworthy that even during the Great Drought Years in African Continent, Tanzanian agriculture had experienced not only a fair development, but also the increase of the share in GDP. Compared with manufacturing and public service sector, we can say that agriculture was a more stable and reliable sector. During ERP, the share of agriculture in GDP has been maintained and the faster development attained.

Then, Table 2 shows the trends of the production of some important food and export crops. Although some data are not available, we can see that the productions of maize, paddy and cotton were increased remarkably up to 1989/90 as mentioned in the ESAP policy paper. The production of all food crops had their peak volumes in 1980s. Especially paddy production in 1980/81 became four times higher than in 1989/90. As far as export crops are concerned, most crops had their peak volumes in '70s. Even cotton which performance during the ERP period was highly appreciated couldn't exceed the peak volume in 1971/72. Moreover most export

crops couldn't reach even 1980/81 production level during ERP.

According to the above data, it seems that Tanzanian agriculture, especially food production, moved upwards. But, we get another picture when we look at the main roles of agriculture: (1) earning the foreign currencies through export; (2) achieving the food self-sufficiency; (3) providing the industrial sector with the raw materials; and (4) providing the other sectors with the market through improving the standard of living of rural societies. Although the ESAP policy paper referred to the reasons why these issues remained as a matter of time-lag, it seems that they are more structural problems.

First, the export of Tanzanian traditional agricultural products (coffee, cotton, sisal, tea, tobacco, and cashewnuts) did not increase in US\$ base, although the total amount of the export recovered since 1985 (see Table 3). On the other hand, the release of the tight restriction of the import brought the rapid increase of the imported goods, and the deficit of external balance of payment became bigger and bigger.

Second, Tanzania had the flood in southern and northern parts early in 1989, and since the following rainy seasons many regions experienced little rainfalls which led to the food shortage. It means that the vulnerability of the food supply was not overcome. On July 1st, 1991, the Minister for Agriculture, Livestock Development and Co-operative stated that Tanzania had to import more than 490,000t of grains. This amount is larger than the actual grain import of 389,000t in 1980/81 and 297,000t in 1983/84. But according to a reliable source, Tanzanian government has already modified the figure from 490,000t to 190,000t, and 3,000t to 4,000t import will be needed. If so, Tanzania will manage to supply food, but it shows the existence of another problem: Tanzania government worsened its inability to estimate the food in markets as well as their production after the liberalization of the food marketing.

Now we turn our eyes to the food supply in the urban areas. We will look at the standard of living of urban workers during the ERP period in order to examine whether they could afford to remit to their rural bases or not. The expenditure for food in the urban households occupied 67% of the total expenditure in 1976/77 (Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania, National Socio-Economic Profile of Tanzania 1989, 1989, Table EA12). The urban life became more difficult in 1980s than in '70s. Prof. Maliyamkono and Dr. Bagachwa, who analyzed Tanzanian economy just before ERP, wrote as follows:-

"a more detailed breakdown reveals that, in 1986, an average full-time self-employed person earned a monthly income of T.Shs 7,300; an average full-time formal wage earner received T.Shs 2,000 per month; while a full-time wage earner also involved in part-time informal activity earned about T.Shs 4,500 per month. --- the monthly wage of T.Shs 2,000 could hardly meet the minimum monthly expenses of about T.Shs 5,000. At most, the formal wage could only keep the family going for 12 out of the 30 days in the month" (Maliyamkono, T.L., & M.S.D. Bagachwa, The second Economy in Tanzania, London/Athens/Nairobi/Dar es Salaam, James Currey/Ohio U.P./Heinemann Kenya/ESAURP, 1990, p.61).

TABLE 4 indicates that their conditions have been terrible in recent years even after ERP. The urban dwellers in 1973 could buy 10.0 kg of sembe (maize flour), 4.8 kg of rice, or 4.8 kg of wheat flour at the price equivalent to the daily minimum wage. But in 1985 they could buy only 2.0 kg of sembe, 3.6 kg of maize, 1.9 kg of rice, or 1.6 kg of wheat flour at the official prices, and 2.9 kg of maize, 0.8 kg of rice or wheat flour at the open market prices, and this situation didn't change thereafter. Their purchasing power of staple foods have declined considerably. Tanzania government could cut the huge subsidy to the notorious loss-making parastatal, National Milling Corporation through the liberalization of food marketing, but this measure was not able to provide food at affordable

prices for the urban dwellers.

Generally speaking, the surpluses of the incomes over the normal expenditures of the urban households declined so much that they could remit less amount of money to the rural households. Even the ERP period, this tendency didn't cease. The remittances might lose their share of 4.0% of the rural household income in early 80s (Collier, Paul, Samir Radwan, & Samuel Wangwe, Labour and Poverty in Rural Tanzania: Ujamaa and Rural Development in the United Republic of Tanzania, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p.66).

Third, Tanzania did not make use of the bumper harvest of industrial crops. For instance, cotton production recovered recently, but local textile industry could not increase its working capacity and lost its share in the domestic market. According to Dr. Mbelle's paper, Tanzanian local textile industry produced 96 million sq.m. in 1981 (the capacity utilization was 48%), but its production stagnated between 57 mil. sq.m. and 73 mil.sq.m. since 1983 up to 1990 (the capacity utilizations were less than 30%). During this period, the demand to the textile became higher and higher. Tanzanian local textile manufactures provided only 10% (43 mil.sq.m.. At the same time another 20.9 mil.sq.m. of local products was exported) of total sale of 426 mil.sq.m. for domestic market in 1988, while 49% (61 mil.sq.m.) of total sale of 124 mil.sq.m. was supplied in 1985 (Mbelle, A.V.Y., "Restructuring the Public Textile Industry in Tanzania: Nature and Prospects", paper presented at The 7th National Economic Policy Workshop on 2-4/12/1991, pp.7-8).

Fourth, the producer prices which were and are most important cash income sources of the rural households have not been increased so much in the real term. TABLE 5 shows the indices of the real producer prices of various crops at constant price, which were deflated by the National Consumer Price Index (NCPI). We can find out some notable points easily.



1. The producer prices of most crops in the ERP period were higher than those in early '80s, but lower than in middle and late '70s. It means that the production of food crops as well as export crops have fallen down in spite of the maintenance of the higher producer prices during '70s. And Tanzanian government could not keep the level of producer prices in early '80s.

2. The producer prices of the food crops had been increased in the previous period of ERP when the new agricultural policy was announced, while the producer prices of export crops remained at lower levels. It indicates that Tanzania government felt more serious problem on the food supply than the export earnings in the early implementation of the new agricultural policy. The reason why the food production was large in the ERP period is partly because the producer prices of food crops are absolutely higher than before and relatively higher than those of export crops. If it is the case, the production of export crops which would get higher producer prices in the ERP period did not have effects even now, especially taking it into account that coffee, tea and cashewnuts are perennial crops.

3. However, the producer prices of most crops could not be maintained even during the ERP period, and declined in the first year of ESAP. For instance, maize, paddy and cotton whose performance was highly appreciated by Tanzanian government showed the decrease of their producer prices indices to 83, 95 and 79 in 1989/90 respectively. Then, producer prices increased again, under the bad weather. But production of main food crops fell down in 1990/91 and probably in 1991/92. The government could not keep the promise to the peasants that each year producer prices would be increased by at least 5% above the increase of general prices in the previous year or the government would pay 60%-70% of the world market prices, whichever was higher.

At the same time, Tanzanian government cut subsidy to the

fertilizer. Producer prices did not reach the level which farmers expected and they had to pay more to buy agricultural inputs whose distribution were unreliable. It appears that the real earning from agricultural sales had not increased so much or at all.

Judging from the data mentioned above, the performance of ERP was very limited, although we must recall the increase of agricultural production. Apart from the good weather during the early period of ERP, the most important reason of increase was the availability of commodities, not only luxury incentive goods but also the basic necessities. TABLE 6 shows the availability of consumer goods in the urban as well as rural areas. In 1984, many commodities were sold at the unofficial prices which were twice or more higher than the official prices. But, even if the consumers were willing to buy them at the unofficial prices, it was very difficult to obtain the commodities before ERP. For instance, housewives in towns managed to get sugar after they went to and came back from several shops 5 to 7 times with nothing. Even as regards maize meals, they could get it at most once a twice. This situation has been improved dramatically during the ERP period, although they were sold at high prices.

### 3. RURAL AREA UNDER POLICY REFORM

#### 3-1. HYPOTHESIS: Multi-Occupation Oriented Rural Household

Rural households are referred to as basic entities of socio-economic activities. Then the rural transformation would be defined as a process of changes brought by the aggregate results of the interaction among the socio-economic activities of the rural households themselves and with those of other actors. It goes without saying that a rural household is a leading actor of the rural transformation, while the government through policies, especially agricultural policies, plays the role of an indispensable supporting actor. I would like to stay away from the word "rural

development" which often gives us an impression of a positive change or a result of a policy. The rural transformation is necessarily neither a positive change nor a direct result of any policy.

A rural household intends to diversify its economic activities through the division of labor among the household members in order to attain the stable and higher level of income. Let us begin with an example from one semi-arid rural area in Eastern Kenya where I conducted a socio-economic research on 275 sample households from 1982 to 84. The economic diversification or the multi-occupational form of the rural households was quite common there. 55% of sample households had rural non-farm income generating activities, while 50% included emigrant laborers as their "non-resident" household members, most of whom remitted to their rural base more than once a month. Totally, 81% of the households was involved in either or both forms of off-farm activities. According to this finding, the off-farm activities of the rural households are performed not only by the marginalized households, but also by all the other strata in terms of acreage of land managed for cropping and grazing. In this Kenyan case, the upper stratum of the sample households (20% of the sample households) was more active in the off-farm activities at the research sites and in sending their members as migrant laborers than the other strata. Rather, "successful" migrant laborers belong to the upper households (IKENO, Jun, UKANBANI: Toubu-Kenia no Shounou Keiei [Ukambani: Economic Diversification of Peasant Households in Eastern Kenya], Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economies, 1989). A combination of these activities with cropping as well as animal keeping, that is the multi-occupation, is considered as a peasants' rational strategy for survival under uncertain economic and ecological conditions. The rural households intend to diversify their income generating activities.

My hypothesis is that the rural households incline to develop

the multi-occupational form under either or both of the safety first principle and/or the profit maximization principle. The multi-occupation seems to be the opposite extreme of agricultural specialization which is often regarded as a precondition of higher productivity. I assume, however, that multi-occupation is to be an important source of capital formation at household level which might lead agricultural development. In this sense, I agree with Prof. P. Collier's argument that the income transfer from urban areas to rural areas by migrant laborers leads rural transformation. But I disagree with his argument that this rural transformation accompanies necessarily agricultural development (Collier, Paul & Deepak Lal, Labour and Poverty in Kenya 1900-1980, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986). It is not a oversimplification that the main interests of the rural households are to survive and to stabilize their incomes, while these of the governments are to feed urban people properly and to get more earnings from agricultural exports. The rural households are not willing to invest money and labor forces to agriculture, if agriculture is not so profitable compared with other activities. In Eastern Kenyan case, the upper stratum households which afforded to get more than the ordinal household expenditure wanted to invest in purchasing land and/or livestock, and education for children, not to invest in agriculture so much. They acquired pieces of land at the expense of the lower stratum households which were forced to emigrate to drier areas, and thereafter upper stratum households were utilizing such a land at more extensive manner because their main purpose of the acquisition of land was the preparation for the succession among the sons. It means that income transfer from urban areas does not lead always to agricultural development in rural areas, and that peasants do not respond to the change of the agricultural policy straightforward, even though that policy is much better than previous ones. Their responses become visible after their modification

of the strategy of the economic diversification.

This hypothesis would be able to be applied to Tanzanian rural households. Especially, in Tanzania after the introduction of ERP, peasants' households have been facing the drastic economic changes in which this strategy could be activated.

### 3-2. SOME FINDINGS AND IMPRESSIONS FROM THE FIELD SURVEY:

#### The Case Study of North Pare Area, Kilimanjaro Region

Kilimanjaro Region is composed with 6 Districts; Moshi Urban, Moshi Rural, Hai, Rombo, Mwanga and Same. Mwanga and Same Districts are the homeland of Wapare people, while Hai, Moshi and Rombo Districts surrounding Mt. Kilimanjaro are Wachagga homeland. Kilimanjaro Region is one of the most populated regions (1988: 83/sq.km. Tanzania Mainland av. 26/sq.km) and was one of the most prosperous agricultural regions in Tanzania. In 1980, its regional per capita GDP was the 3rd highest out of 20 regions in Tanzania Mainland (following Dar es Salaam Region and Arusha Region), but it became 9th in 1981 and 17th since 1984 (Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania, National Accounts of Tanzania 1976-90, 1991, Table 19). It means that Kilimanjaro Region became one of the poorest regions in Tanzania Mainland, although it was and is the main production area of coffee which is a leading export crop.

Two villages were chosen from Mwanga District which was called north Pare area. Mwanga District has 4 Tarafa (Divisions), 16 Kata (Wards) and 59 Vijijio (Villages. singular Kijiji). Total population at 1988 population census was 98,260. There are North Pare Mountains in the center of Mwanga District, which highest peak is 2,113m above the sea level. According to the 1989 Annual Report of Mwanga District Agricultural Office, Mwanga District has 2,641 sq.km; and it is divided into 2 agricultural zones; Milimani (mountainous) area has 808 sq.km with 32 villages, while Tambarare (lowland) area has 1,833 sq.km with 27 villages. More than half of

the population stay in Milimani (63%). Crops produced in this District are as follows:- kahawa (coffee), migombi (banana trees), viazi vitamu (sweet potatoes), iliki (cardamon), mahindi (white maize), maharage (beans), kunde (cow peas), mtama (sorghum), mihogo (cassava), alizeti (sunflower), nyonyo (cater seed), some kinds of vegetables and fruits (Ofisi ya Mkuu wa Wilaya, Idara ya Kilimo, Taarifa ya Maendeleo ya Sekta ya Kilimo, Mwaka 1989-Wilaya ya Mwanga, unpublished, section of utangulizi).

Historically, Milimani area has been developed earlier than Tambarare area, and the population of Mwanga District is concentrated on Milimani area even now. Many farmers in Milimani have fields in Tambarare. They plant plantain and sweet potatoes as food crops, and coffee and cardamon as cash crops in their fields in Milimani, while they plant maize and beans as food crops in fields in Tambarare. Many farmers in Tambarare have their fields only in Tambarare. Animal keeping is more important for Tambarare farmers than for Milimani ones. Most villages in Tambarare have higher sex ratios, and those in Milimani have lower. It means that there are not only out-migration of males from Mwanga District to other districts, but also a population movement from Milimani to Tambarare within the District. It seems that young men go to Tambarare to find fields at the first stage, then they ask their fiances or families to live with.

I chose Kiruru Lwami Village as a sample of Tambarare and Mshewa Village as a sample of Milimani. Kiruru Lwami Village has the lowest sex ratio (87) among 14 villages in Mwanga Division. This village is located just next to Mwanga Town at about 800m above the sea level. It appears that this location gives villagers a possibility to commute to Mwanga town every day. Therefore, some development of the off-farm activities are expected as well as emigrant laboring to some extent.

It takes half an hour by car from Mwanga Town to T junction

between Usangi and Ugweno which are 2 Divisions of Mwanga District in Milimani. Then it takes another half an hour from this junction to Mshewa Village via Usangi shopping center. Mshewa village is located at about 1300m above the sea level. Its sex ratio, 83, is slightly lower than an average of villages in Milimani. One of the reason why I chose this village was its accessibility.

It goes without saying that this study is only a case study, therefore these two villages may not be the representatives of villages neither in Mwanga District nor in Tanzania Mainland. What I will intend is to show some concrete data on village level and household level.

The rainfall patterns of both sites are bimodal, that is 2 rainy seasons; the Short Rain (Vuli) from November to January, and the Long Rain (Masika) from March to May. The annual rainfall in Mwanga Town near Kiruru Lwami village is 785.2mm, while that of Lomwe Secondary School near Mshewa village is 1130.0mm. There are some amounts of rain during the two dry seasons. The difference of total effective amounts of rainfall during the agricultural seasons are one of the most important determinant factors of the agricultural activities in two villages.

There are no lists of neither households nor villagers in village offices. Therefore, village chairman (Mwenyekiti wa Kiji-ji) of both villages kindly asked ten cell leaders (Barozi), who are a kind of coordinator and representative of each about 10 households (Kaya), to prepare the list of household heads under them. According to these lists, there were 252 households in Kiruru Lwami village and 350 households in Mshewa Village. After compiling these lists and numbering them, I chose 19 households from Kiruru Lwami Village and 26 from Mshewa village as sample households on the random sampling basis.

A simple definition of a household is a group of people staying, eating and working together, and depending on a same in-

come sources. But if we consider about the common phenomena of migrant labor in Africa, migrant laborers ought to be included into household members at least in economic terms. And children in boarding schools, who depend on their parents' expenditures, should be also included.

In my field survey, I asked respondents to include the persons who stay outside and seem to regard respondents' households as their home. It is funny for me that family members, for instance a wife and children accompanied by "non-resident" members of the household were seldom referred to. I excluded these persons from household members because of not only the respect of their feelings, but also difficulties to collect data on such family members.

The average number of "resident" members of a household, who stay in the research sites, is 7.68 in Kiruru Lwami and 6.27 in Mshewa, while the average number of "non-resident" members per household in Kiruru Lwami is 1.68 and 2.04 in Mshewa. In both sites, male young adults whose age are between 15 and 35 are most active to go outside. In Mshewa, the number of "non-resident" male young adults is over the number of "resident". The first important reason of "non-resident" of the households is "working"; 26 out of 32 "non-resident" member in Kiruru Lwami and 44 out of 53 in Mshewa.

Most of "non-resident" members of households are sons and daughters in terms of kinship relation to household heads (TABLE 7). The range of extension of kinship relations within one household is rather narrow in both sites. Very few households include even brothers and sisters of household heads as members. It seems that one unit of marriage is a core of household. More than one marriage leads a household to a hiving off.

Compared with Eastern Kenya, the rural households are divided into small pieces in North Pare. The landscapes of a homesteads are similar. Father's "household" and his son's "household" are located within one compound or nearby. In Eastern Kenya, these



compose one household, although each "household" is a rather autonomous subdivision part of one household. But in North Pare, these "households" have a status of a complete independent household. It means that the number of household members is smaller in North Pare than in Eastern Kenya. Therefore, each household of North Pare is limited in its decision of labor allocation to several activities, because they do not have enough labor forces.

Moreover, mutual helps within the village are not strong. Building schools, constructing and repairing roads and so on are performed by Msara Gambo which is a kind of forced mutual help organized everywhere in Tanzania. But there are very few cases of voluntary mutual helps of agricultural activities even among the close kin's households. The peasants in North Pare where more mutual helps are needed than Kenya seem to be more individualistic. Although it must be analyzed whether this people have had such a characteristic "traditionally" or not, Ujamaa Policy in 1970s is supported to have some effects on their thoughts on mutual helps. In fact, communal farms formed in '70s have been collapsed completely in both research sites.

Before we examine the cropping, animal keeping, and off-farm activities within and near villages as well as migrant laboring, I would like to look into the overall view of the multi-occupation at household level (Table 8). The households which specialize in agriculture are only 3 out of 19 in Kiruru Lwami and 6 out of 26 in Mshewa. 10 out of 19 sample households in Kiruru Lwami have one or more members who are involved in some off-farm activities within or near the village, 10 households have migrant laborers, and totally 16 households (84%) commit to any off-farm activities at any places. Those figures for Mshewa are 11, 17, and 20 (77%) out of 26 households respectively. These figures are rather high. 15 households in Kiruru Lwami and 18 in Mshewa are involved in more

than 2 income generating activities.

The agricultural performance in two villages in which data were collected from October to November in 1990 and August in 1991 shows the characteristics of the agriculture in Tambarare and Milimani well.

TABLE 9 shows the percentages of households which plants each crop during the agricultural season from March to June, 1990, which is called Kilimo cha Masika (another agricultural season from October to January is called Kilimo cha Vuli). To collect data on planting acreage is so difficult that the percentages of households planting crops are used as data indicating the importance of each crop indirectly. In Kiruru Lwami, maize is the most important food crop, which is followed by cow peas, beans and cassava, while in Mshewa, plantain/banana (there is no differentiation between plantain and banana). Both trees are called Mgomba, pl. Migomba, and both fruits are Ndizi in Kiswahili language), sweet potatoes and beans are common. Although maize is the main staple food in Tanzania as a whole, Wapare people as well as Wachagga (around Mt. Kilimanjaro), Wahaya (northwestern part) and Wanyakyusa (southern part) prefer plantain to maize. Wapare in Tambarare of Mwanga District tolerate to eat ugali made of maize meal as ordinary dishes. Even though maize has an advantage in marketing compared with plantain, maize production in Kiruru Lwami is for just self-consumption.

As regards fruits, there are some differences between two villages. The percentages of households planting many fruits are higher in Mshewa. Most significant differences are in cash crops or so-called export crops. Cotton, sunflower and castor seed are grown under Kiruru Lwami agricultural conditions, while preferable coffee and cardamon are planted in Mshewa. Sugar cane is more important in Kiruru Lwami than in Mshewa. In fact, sugar cane is the major cash crop in Kiruru Lwami. During the ERP period, it seems

that agricultural productions of "traditional" crops in both villages have not been increased so much. According to my impression, households in Kiruru Lwami have only the intention to produce for their own consumption. They appreciated the ERP policy, because many consumer goods became available within village and Mwanga Town.

But they have complained that they did not have enough money to purchase these consumer goods. They intend neither to extend their cropping areas, nor to cultivate intensively. On the other hand, farmers in Mshewa village started to plant horticultural crops; paddy, vegetables and fruits, while they continued to grow their "traditional crops", i.e., coffee and cardamon. It is surprising that one fourth of the households tried to plant paddy. One reason of introduction of new crops in Mshewa is that ERP brought peasants some opportunities of marketing of these crops, including the smuggling to Kenya. Another reason is the decline of the net agricultural earning from former cropping patterns; producer prices of coffee in recent years were quite well, but those of cardamon and most food crops were going down (see Table 5). At the same time, the cost of agricultural inputs at constant price were increased. For instance, the retail price of hybrid maize in 1988/89 was 46% higher than that of 1986/87 (calculated from Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania, Agriculture Statistics 1988, 1990, Table 5.12, using National Consumer Price Index at 4th quarter of both years as the deflator). There is also the problem of availability of inputs on time. One household head in Mshewa complained that he harvested only 5 to 7 bags of coffee from 1685 trees since 1987 due to the lack of the agricultural chemicals for coffee trees, while he got 26 bags in 1974. In fact, total production of coffee in Mshewa which was brought to Kindoroko Rural Co-op Society under Vuasu Co-op Union was 17,554 kg in 1985/86, 9,325 kg in 1986/87 and 11,635 kg in 1990/91. It seems that rural households even in better agricultural areas couldn't realize enough surplus from the crop

selling in order to buy incentive goods.

As regards animal keeping of both villages, there are also some differences (Table 10). In Kiruru Lwami, number of local cattle and goats are kept in around 80% of sample households, while in Mshewa improved cattle, mostly dairy cattle is rather important. In Kiruru Lwami, death of animals is so common that households want to keep as many animals as possible. Within this one year, 31 heads of local cattle, 1 head of improved cattle, 121 goats and 16 heads of sheep died, while in Mshewa 6 heads of local cattle and 1 head of improved cattle died. Although animal keeping in Kiruru Lwami seems to be more stable and reliable income source than cropping, it has a tremendous risk. Although it is not clear from my survey whether the overgrazing problem has already arisen or not, any effective checking mechanism of overgrazing is not working well because most grazing areas in villages are open to all villagers and even to outsiders. Then the restrictions of animal keeping in Kiruru Lwami are the low rate of reproduction of animals and peasants' purchasing power of animals. On the other hand, the low availability of the grazing land is most serious restriction in Mshewa, because most grazing areas open to the public became scarce as number of animals increased (zero-grazing and growing pasture are present solutions of this problem). Animal keeping in Kiruru Lwami under serious risk does not have more advantage than that in Mshewa.

As for the off-farm activities in or near the research sites, male members in Kiruru Lwami and female members in Mshewa are active (Table 11). The adjacent location of Kiruru Lwami to Mwanga Town offers some business opportunities to male members of this village at semi-full-time base, while female members of Mshewa are engaged in pottery making and selling at part-time base.

Male members in Mshewa prefer the migrant laboring to the rural off-farm activities. Especially when we take account of the re-

mittances, the difference between two villages becomes clearer. In fact, most of non-resident working members, i.e., migrant laborers do not contribute to their rural household budgets. In spite of the feeling of resident members on "household" or family as well as the existence of the substantial number of migrant laborers, only 4 out of 26 migrant laborers in Kiruru Lwami and 16 out of 44 in Mshewa remit to their rural households (Table 11). At household level, there are 10 households in Kiruru Lwami (more than half of sample households) and 17 in Mshewa which include migrant laborers as households) and 17 in Mshewa which include migrant laborers as household members, however, only 2 households in Kiruru Lwami and 9 in Mshewa received remittances (Table 8). About 1/4 of active labor forces in both sites is economically idle from the viewpoint of rural household budget. One reason why most migrant laborers escape from remittance is that they are not the responsible persons of rural households budgets. Most of the migrant laborers are sons and daughters in relation to the household heads. Another reason is the hardships of the urban life recent years as mentioned above (Table 4).

16 persons each from both sites started to stay outside of their rural households before the ERP, i.e. in 1986 (Table 12). After ERP started, 19 sample households in KIRURU Lwami produced an other 10 migrant laborers of which only one had substantial amount of remittance, while 26 households in Mshewa produced 28 migrant laborers of which 8 were with remittances. If the remittance from the migrant laborers are and/or will be an important source of investments in the rural areas, Mshewa has and/or will have bigger opportunity of rural transformation than Kiruru Lwami. At least we can say that one village in the semi-arid Tambarare do not have any advantage in migrant laboring than one village in the fertile Mili-mani.

According to the findings mentioned above, it seems that the

multi-occupational form of the rural households will be probably developed more in the better agricultural areas than the harsh rural areas. If it is the case, regional imbalance will be widened.

Before closing this chapter, I would like mention one impression of both sites in North Pare peasants compared with Eastern Kenyan ones. That is the farmers' strong mentality of dependency on the government. In the '70s, Tanzanian government supplied schools, dispensaries and piped water everywhere in the country. We should appreciate this efforts highly as a good example of the provision of basic human needs. But it seems to be unable to encourage the rural people to maintain and improve these provisions by their own efforts. They think that the maintenance and the improvement of these provisions are government's task, not theirs. As mentioned above, their mutual help within a village is so weak that little efforts are expected to be performed within a village.

##### 5. TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

The agricultural production is performed by rather smaller units in North Pare. The development of the rural off-farm activities is not so strong. Moreover, the urban wings of the rural household fall into such severe living conditions that it become more difficult for them to remit any part of their incomes. The peasants' households in North Pare area were obliged to rely on agriculture more than previous periods. This means that the agricultural policies become more influential to the standard of living in North Pare. In the case of Eastern Kenya, rural households have several sources of income, so the evaluation of the results of agricultural policies are complicated. For instance, one agricultural policy which is offered to farmers more production with higher labor inputs and financial inputs than previous policies are not evaluated only within agricultural dimension. The levels of urban wage and possibilities of rural off-farm activities have

strong influences on the effects of agricultural policies. On the other hand, Tanzanian agricultural policies, at least present ones, seems to have more direct impact on peasant' standard of living.

The recent increase of the agricultural production is one of the indicators which shows the success of the present policy. But the main roles of agriculture have not yet been achieved. Especially, the high producer prices which enable peasants to purchase consumer goods have not been realized as the government promised. And it seems to be almost impossible for Tanzanian government to maintain the high level of the producer prices in the long term. Even during ERP, some signals of declining the producer prices have appeared. In addition to producer prices, Tanzanian government can not support overall public projects. According to Table 13, the development expenditure of Tanzanian Central Government decreased, and at the same time its dependency to external financing (grant/loan and import support) became higher and higher. Under these conditions, Tanzanian government started to request the people to share the cost of economic and social policies; fertilizer, education and so on.

Rural households will protect themselves from the future economic hazards. In one sense, the present economic liberalization policies means a shift from "self-reliance" by the government to that of individual households. Some measures need to be taken to promote the economic diversification and to strengthen the multi-occupational form of rural households.

TABLE 1 Agricultural Development in Tanzania

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
1. Share of Agriculture* in GDP at 1976 Prices (%)	36.5	36.1	35.7	35.1	35.0	35.5	35.8	38.3	38.6	39.6	40.1	40.5	39.9	40.3	39.8
2. Annual Growth Rates of GDP at 1976 Prices (%)		0.4	2.1	2.9	2.5	-0.5	0.6	-2.4	3.4	2.6	3.3	3.9	4.0	3.3	3.6
2-1. Annual Growth Rates of Agriculture* (%)		1.4	0.2	1.7	2.6	1.0	2.1	4.8	4.0	5.5	4.7	6.1	2.6	4.6	2.5
2-2. Annual Growth Rates of Manufacturing (%)		-6.1	3.4	3.3	-4.9	-11.2	-3.3	-8.7	2.7	-3.9	-4.1	4.5	7.1	7.7	7.8
2-3. Annual Growth Rates of Public Administration and Other Services (%)		6.6	20.0	8.6	-2.1	11.4	0.1	-0.4	0.2	1.9	-10.8	0.6	3.1	4.0	2.2

source) Calculation from the data of Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania, National Accounts of Tanzania 1976-1990, 1991, Chart 1, 3, 4 & Table 4, 10.2.

note)\* Forestry, fishing and hunting are excluded.

TABLE 2 Index of Agricultural Production of Food Crops & Export Crops; (1986/87=100)

year	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86	86/87	87/88	88/89	89/90	90/91	Peak index	Volume year
Maize 1)	85	77	76	90	96	99	100	108	145	108	105	145	88/89
Paddy	31	50	54	55	66	77	100	95	111	112	73	112	89/90
Wheat	125	132	81	103	115	99	100	106	135	146	106	146	89/90
Sor./Millet	74	102	83	121	89	97	100					121	83/84
Cassava	85	97	115	111	113	120	100					120	85/86
Mixed Pulses	64	70	67	66	96	81	100	89				100	86/87
Coffee	125	95	100	92	91	102	100	91	92	103	111	125	80/81
Cotton	104	79	76	83	92	63	100	104	112	112	67	137	71/72
Tea 2)	120	113	124	84	119	110	100	98	111	143		143	89/90
Cashewnuts	388	262	197	285	196	124	100	147	117	100		879	73/74
Tobacco	104	106	86	68	83	77	100	80	72	33		111	76/77
Sisal 2)	285	239	199	133	126	107	100	53	50	17		762	63/64

source) Food Crops: Calculation from the data of Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report for the Year ended 30th June, 1987, Table 2.3; Tanzania Economic Trends, Vol.4, No.2, July 1991, Statistical Appendix Table 12(a); Daily News 14/6/1991.

Export Crops: Calculation from the data of Bank of Tanzania, Economic and Operations Report for the Year ended 30th June, 1990, Table 27(a); Daily news 14/6/1991.

Peak Volume: above documents & Msambichaka, L.A., "Agricultural Development in Tanzania: Problems and Priorities," in L.A. Msambichaka & S. Chandrasekhar (eds.) Readings of Economic Policy of Tanzania, Economic Research Bureau (Univ. of DSM), 1984, p.59.

note)1) There are two different figures on maize productions in 1985/86 and 1986/87. 2, 127,000t for 1985/86 and 2,159,000t for 1986/87 are used.

2) For tea and sisal the figures relate to calendar year-hence 1980/81 will refer to calendar year 1980. For the other commodities the figures refer to the crop year for that particular commodity.



TABLE 3 EXPORT/IMPORT (US\$ million)

year	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
EXPORT	505.8	553.7	415.4	379.7	388.3	286.6	347.6	347.3	372.0	379.6	399.8*
trad.agri.	(264.2)	(338.6)	(251.8)	(244.9)	(268.0)	(196.1)	(261.6)	(201.2)	(224.3)	(212.8)	(201.1)*
IMPORT	1218.6	1161.0	1112.8	814.5	874.0	999.2	1047.5	1150.0	1185.0	1278.6*	1216.8*
DEFICIT	-712.8	-607.3	-697.4	-434.8	-485.7	-712.6	-699.9	-802.7	-813.0	-899.0*	-817.0*

source) Tanzania Economic Trends, Vol.4, No.2, July 1991, Statistical Appendix Table 6(a),(b).

note) trad. agri.=traditional agricultural products(Coffee, Cotton, Sisal, Tea, Tobacco, Cashewnuts)

\* provisional.

TABLE 4 Minimum Urban Wage and their Purchasing Power of Staple Foods

year	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Minimum Wage (TShs./month)	240	340	380	380	380	380	380	480	600	600	600	810	810	1053	1260	1646	2075	2500
Purchasing Power of Minimum Wage (kg/day's wage)																		
Sembe	10.0	9.1	10.1	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	12.8	8.0	8.0	8.0	3.4	2.0					
Maize																		
Official									6.0	4.6	5.0	3.6	2.9	2.5	3.2			
Open Mkt													2.9	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.7	
Rice																		
Official	4.8	5.7	3.2	3.2	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.0	3.7	3.7	2.8	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.3	0.9	0.8	
Open Mkt													0.8	0.9	1.1	1.1	1.0	
Wheat flour																		
Official	4.8	4.7	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	2.8	3.5	3.5	2.5	1.9	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.8	
Open Mkt													0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.6	

source) Minimum Wage:1973-1986: Maliyamkono, T.L. & M.S.D. Bagachwa, The Second Economy in Tanzania, London/Athens/Nairobi/Dar es Salaam, James Currey/Ohio U.P./Heinemann Kenya/ESAURP, 1990

Table 3.14. 1987, 88: YOSHIDA, Masao, "Organized Labourers in Tanzania's Urban Society" (in Japanese), Ajia Keizai, Vol.XXXI No.8(Aug., 1990), Table 9, 1989, 90: Daily News.

Purchasing Power:Official Prices (which are used for calculations) : Sembe, Rice, Wheat flour: 1987-89:Tanzania Economic Trends, Vol.2, No. 3 & 4, III. Statistical Appendix Table 11. Open Market Prices (whice are used for calculation):1985-1989:calculation from the mothly data of the Open Markets of ibid.

note)1) Minimum wages and Official prices are figures at December of each year.

2) Open Market prices are average prices from January to December of each year.

3) The Government has given flexibility to the Parastatals in fixing the price of maize.

TABLE 5 Index of Agricultural Producer Prices at 1988/89 Prices (1986/87=100)

year	av. of	av. of	av. of	av. of	86/87	87/88	88/89	89/90	90/91	91/92
	74/75- 76/77	77/78- 79/80	80/81- 82/83	83/84- 85/86						
Maize	122	107	82	100	100	100	85	83	74	75/147
Paddy	101	101	89	105	100	115	108	95	115	101
Wheat	151	134	109	105	100	96	86	86	180	164
Sorghum/Millet	167	157	92	105	100	96	82	72	67	
Cassava (Gr.1)	129	132	78	94	100	96	82	72	67	
Beans (Gr.1)	109	184	93	95	100	115	103	91	98	
Groundnuts	102	140	83	100	100	96	82			
Coffee										
(Mild Arabica										
Parch, advance)	118*	125	74	77	100	100	106	119	109	140
(Robusta Dry										
Cherry advance)	114*	110	55	74	100	100	105	91	75	74
Cotton (AR)	120	112	85	90	100	88	79	79	87	127
Tea (Green Leaf)	118	149	81	88	100	100	106	107	126	162
Cashewnuts (SG)	65	63	88	89	100	126	131	220	216	232
Tobacco (flue)	152	119	101	92	100	98	92	87	85	153
Cardamon	110	181	111	89	100	91	92	74		
Sugarcane	172	159	109	114	100	99	97	95		
Sunflower (mixed)	104	124	87	103	100	96	82			

source) Calculation from the data of Tanzania Economic Trtends, Vol.4 No.2 July 1991, Statistical Appendix Table 9(b), 10(b).

note)\* figure of 1976/77 only.

TABLE 6 Availability of Consumer Goods in Urban and Rural Areas, 1984 (%)

Item	Urban		Rural	
	Times when Product was available		Times when Product was available	
	Official	Unofficial	Official	Unofficial
Sugar	12	19	9	22
Salt	18	22	15	19
Cooking Oil	17	15	19	15
Maize meal	30	60	40	42
Rice	14	30	21	51
Cement	9	15	5	9
Roofing sheet	29	28	10	17
Hoe	40	35	5	20
Radio	5	4	5	7
Khanga/Kitenge	6	15	3	12

source) Maliyamkono, T.L. & M.S.D. Bagachwa, The Second Economy in Tanzania, London/Athens/Nairobi/Dar es Salaam, James Currey/Ohio U.P./Heinemann Kenya/ESAURT, 1990, Table 3.1 0.

note) Unweighted averages for 10 regions including Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Kagera, Musoma, Mwanza, Mbeya, Kigoma, Donoma, Coast and Ruvuma.

TABLE 7 Percentage of HOUSEHOLD Including Persons  
Classified into Categories as Below (%)

	Kiruru Lwami		Mshewa	
	RES.	NON	RES.	NON
Household Head				
male	89	5	62	12
female	5	-	27	-
Spouse(=Wife)				
1	74	-	73	-
>=2	16	-	4	-
Son	84	47	77	58
Son's Wife	16	-	15	-
Daughter	79	32	73	42
Grandchild	21	-	23	-
Brother	-	5	-	-
Sister	-	11	-	-
Father	5	-	-	-
Mother	26	-	-	-
Other Kin	11	-	8	-
Other Relative				
by Marriage	11	-	-	-
Others	11	-	8	-

source)field survey on 10-11/1990.

note) RES.=resident household member,  
NON=non-resident household member

TABLE 8 Distribution of Household by Economic Diversification (household)

KIRURU LWAMI (N=19)						MSHEWA (N=26)					
WITHIN(RURAL)						WITHIN(RURAL)					
		AGRI. ONLY	OFF-F. ONLY	AGRI.+ OFF-F.	TOTAL			AGRI. ONLY	OFF-F. ONLY	AGRI.+ OFF-F.	TOTAL
MIG.	NO	3	1	5	9	MIG.	NO	6	2	1	9
LAB.	YES	6	-	4	10	LAB.	YES	9	1	7	17
	REM. NO	(4)	(-)	(4)	(8)		REM. NO	(5)	(-)	(3)	(8)
	YES	(2)	(-)	(-)	(2)		YES	(4)	(1)	(4)	(9)
TOTAL		9	1	9	19	TOTAL		15	3	8	26

source)Field Survey on 10-11,1990.

note) AGRI.=agriculture, OFF-F.=off-farm activities, MIG.LAB.=Migrant Laboring, REM.=remittance

TABLE 9 Percentage of Household Planting Crops (%)

	Kiruru Lwami (N=19)	Mshewa (N=26)		Kiruru Lwami	Mshewa
<b>CEREAL</b>			<b>FRUITS</b>		
maize (mahindi)	100	69	mango (embe)	74	42
Sorghum (mtama)	16	-	coconuts (nazi)	68	15
paddy (mpunga)	11	27	lemon (limau)	42	46
<b>PULSES</b>			pawpaw (papai)	37	35
cow pea (kunde)	89	8	guava (pera)	21	35
beans (maharage)	84	92	orange (chungwa)	16	31
groundnuts (karanga)	47	8	lime (ndimu)	11	-
green gram (choroko)	37	8	avocado (parachichi)	11	81
<b>ROOT CROPS</b>			custard-apple (topetope)	5	38
cassava (muhogo)	63	-	pineapple (nanasi)	-	50
plantain/banana (ndizi)	42	92	soursoop (mstafeli)	-	50
sweet potato			jack fruit (fenesi)	-	31
(kiazi kitamu)	11	100	<b>INDUSTRIAL CROOPS</b>		
coco-yam (gimbi)	11	46	sugar cane (muwa)	74	65
? (hombo)	-	42	cotton (pamba)	26	-
yam (kiaazi kikuu)	-	23	sunflower (alizeti)	26	-
<b>VEGETABLE</b>			castor seed (nyonyo)	26	-
tomato (nyanya)	32	54	coffee (kahawa)	-	65
edible leaves like			cardamon (iliki)	-	65
spinach (mchicha)	26	15			
okra (bamia)	21	15			
cabbage (kabachi)	11	27			
onion (kitunguu)	5	12			

source) field survey on 10-11/1990.

note)1) There are no households planting finger millet(ulezi), bulrush millet(uwele), and kale(sukumawiki).

2) Some crops which are planted in less than 10% of households of both research sites are omitted. These are soya beans(soya), pepper(pilipili), chinese cabbage(chainzi), grape(zabibu).

TABLE 10 Average Number of Animals Owned per Household & Percentage of Household Which Owns Animals

	Kiruru Lwami		Mshewa	
	(head)	(%)	(head)	(%)
LOCAL CATTLE				
ox/bull	1.1	42	0.5	31
cow	5.3	79	0.8	50
calf	2.3	68	0.5	42
total	8.6	79*	1.8	54*
IMPROVED CATTLE (DAIRY CATTLE)				
ox/bull	0.0	0	0.2	19
cow	0.7	11	0.7	42
calf	0.2	11	0.3	27
total	0.9	11*	1.3	50*
GOAT	12.4	84	0.2	8
SHEEP	2.5	53	0.6	23
POULTRY	11.2	89	9.0	92

source) field survey on 10-11.1990.

note) \*The percentage of households which own ox/bull, cow and/or calf.

TABLE 11 Distribution of Labor Forces by Main Occupation (person)

	KIRURU LWAMI (N=96)			MSHEWA (N=104)		
	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	TOTAL
RESIDENT						
AGRICULTURE	17	38	55	18	27	45
OFF-FARM	13	2	15	6	9	15
NON-RES.	20	6	26	31	12	44
with REMIT.	( 3)	( 1)	( 4)	(13)	( 3)	(16)
without REMIT.	(17)	( 5)	(22)	(19)	( 9)	(28)
<hr/>						
TOTAL	50	46	96	56	48	104

source) Field Survey on 10-11/1990.

TABLE 12 Distribution of Non-resident Working Member by Length of Absence (person)

	after ERP ←		→before ERP			No State.	TOTAL
	< 2 years	< 5 years	< 10 years	< 20 years	>=20 years		
KIRURU LWAMI (N=96)							
Male	5	3(1)	4(2)	5	2	1	20( 3)
Female		2		1(1)	2	1	6( 1)
TOTAL	5	5(1)	4(2)	6(1)	4	2	26( 4)
MSHEWA (N=104)							
Male	12(2)	9(5)	4(2)	4	3(3)		32(12)
Female	5	2(1)	4(2)	1(1)			12( 4)
TOTAL	17(2)	11(6)	8(4)	5(1)	3(3)		44(16)

source) Field Survey on 10-11/1990.

note) Figures in brackets are the number of migrant laborers with substantial amount of remittance.

TABLE 13 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET

year	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/84	84/85	85/86	86/87	87/88	88/89	89/90*	90/91**
a. RECURRENT (TSh. billion)											
REVENUE	8.87	10.96	13.65	15.47	19.14	22.32	34.50	55.45	71.79	94.66	124.04
EXPENDITURE (TSh. billion)											
b. recurrent	10.14	13.21	14.87	18.18	21.34	27.40	40.39	60.07	92.26	115.98	159.48
c. development (US\$ mil.)	4.76	5.19	4.40	5.74	5.39 (298)	5.81 (353)	15.09 (292)	17.26 (206)	15.75 (126)	16.26 (85)	34.96 (178)
DEFICIT (TSh. billion)											
a-(b+c)	-6.03	-7.44	-5.62	-8.45	-7.59	-10.89	-20.98	-21.88	-36.22	-37.58	-70.40
EXTERNAL (Tsh. billion)											
d. grant/loan	1.87	1.80	1.85	2.97	1.49	1.42	5.46	9.38	9.59	11.68	14.96
e. im. support		1.16	1.87	1.27	1.19	1.49	3.11	8.85	20.10	30.31	46.13
f) total(d+e)	1.87	2.96	3.72	4.24	2.68	2.91	8.57	18.23	29.69	41.99	61.09
EXTERNAL/EXPENDITURE (%)											
	12.6	16.1	19.3	17.7	10.0	8.8	15.4	23.6	27.5	31.8	31.4

source) Calculation from Mbogoro, D.K., "Economic Recovery and National Budget Dependence: A Short Term Phenomenon?", paper presented at The 7th National Economic Policy Workshop on 2-4, Dec. 1991, appendix 1, 2.

note) 1) Exchange rates of December in the middle of the financial year are used. For instance, 1984/85 development expenditure is translated in US\$ million by the exchange rate on 12/1984.

\* Anticipated results, \*\*Projected outcome