

STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND AGRICULTURE IN COTE D'IVOIRE

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Introduction

As is well known, Côte d'Ivoire achieved a remarkable high rate of economic growth (Table 1) following independence in 1960, which was exceptional as compared with the growth rates of the other West African countries. The achievement was described as "Miracle Ivoirien". The main motivating factor of this miracle was rapid increases in cocoa and coffee production and export. The Ivoirien government, which intervened in the process of commercialization, was able to accumulate capital for industrialisation and improvement of social infrastructure, which also contributed to accelerating the economic growth.

The turning point came at the beginning of 1980s when the international prices of these two products began to drop. It coincided with the repayment of external loans which poured into Côte d'Ivoire during the preceding decade the economic boom. The financial situation of the country deteriorated rapidly. The cocoa and coffee production which had so far supported public finance, became a burden on government budget because the government had to cover the balance between the guaranteed producer prices and the drop in world prices.

Under these circumstances, it can be argued that structural adjustment started in Côte d'Ivoire as early as 1981, when the Ivorien government received the first structural adjustment loan, amounting to 150 million dollars, from the World Bank. It came along with conditions which compelled the government to reduce sharply its Special Budget for Investment and Equipment (BSIE), freeze the salary of government employees, abolish or integrate the various public enterprises, and so on. The government faithfully took measures to fulfil these conditionalities, but the situation did not improve as expected, in spite of the additional loans of 250 million dollars in 1983 and of the same amount again in 1986. Meanwhile the World prices of cocoa and coffee, which had shown a slight recovery in 1985,

turned downward again to a slump since 1987. As a consequence, the Ivoirien government found itself almost bankrupt at the end of 1980s.

Under this situation, the World Bank requested firmly the Ivoirien government to reduce the guaranteed producer prices of cocoa and coffee, which had been raised to 400 CFA francs per kilogram (cocoa) and 200 CFA francs per kilogram (coffee without shell) in 1985 and kept at those levels since then in spite of the fall in their respective world prices, imposing a heavy burden on government budget. President Houphouët-Boigny refused to reduce the prices, insisting that he could not request sacrifice only on the part of cocoa and coffee farmers (who had hitherto contributed substantially to the "Miracle Ivoirien"), only because of the slump of the prices of the products in the world market.

In autumn of 1989, however, the Ivoirien government accepted the recommendation of the World Bank and reduced the producer prices of cocoa and coffee to 200 CFA francs and 100 CFA francs per kilogram, respectively, 50% reduction of the previous levels. This was the first and serious effect of the structural adjustment on the agricultural sector in Côte d'Ivoire. It was estimated that this cut down enabled the government to reduce its budget by about 200 billion CFA francs, representing about 33% of the total budget. This reduction, however, was achieved only by the sacrifice of the equivalent amount of cash income of around 500 thousand cocoa and coffee farmers.

In this paper I examine the kind of transformation the structural adjustment has brought about in agriculture in Côte d'Ivoire and analyses some aspects of the effects.

1. Public Enterprises in Agricultural Sector

The basic strategy of Ivoirien government had been to promote agricultural development with the initiatives of public enterprises. As is shown in Table 3, the government created various public agencies in order to promote agricultural development. They can be classified according to the mode of intervention in the process of production and commercialization.

The agencies directly engaged in production were PALMINDUSTRIE (palm oil), SAPH and SOGB (rubber), and SODESUCRE (sugar). They produced these products in their own plantations with wage labour. The most important and largest project, carried out by the government in agricultural sector during 1970s was the construction of 6 big sugar complexes (irrigated sugarcane plantations with a refinery plant) in the savannah area of the

northern part of the country. This project, which cost 164 billion CFA francs in total, proved to be not so successful as expected, mainly because the world price of sugar dropped sharply after the boom during the latter half of 1970s, and because the ecological conditions proved to be not so favourable for sugarcane cultivation as projected. As a result two complexes among the six were forced to close in 1984, less than 10 years after they were established.

The other agencies, such as SATMACI and CIDV, except for CAISTAB and CIDT, provided technical assistance to producers. CIDT not only assisted cotton growers technically, but also bought all the raw cotton, and ginned it at several of their cotton mills, dotted in the cotton growing regions on behalf of CAISTAB at a fee.

CAISTAB was, until the end of 1980s, the sole agency authorised to buy all the main agricultural products for export and to sell them abroad through the intermediary of foreign and domestic private trading companies which received commission from CAISTAB. Thus CAISTAB played a very important role during the period of "Miracle Ivoirien", as an apparatus for the government to accumulate the enormous fund for investment as shown in Table 4.

2. The Structural Adjustment Program and Public Agricultural Enterprises.

Changes that have taken place in the public agencies since the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme are examined in the paragraphs below.

1) CAISTAB

As mentioned above, CAISTAB was forced to reduce its purchasing prices of cocoa and coffee. In addition to that, this agency was requested to reduce the sphere of its activities in order to give room for economic liberalisation. CAISTAB was no longer the sole purchasing agency of some of the main agricultural products for export, namely, cotton, palm oil, and sugar. The purchase and export of these products were transferred, respectively, to CIDT, PALMINDUSTRIE, and SODESUCRE to handle on their own account.

As for cocoa and coffee, CAISTAB suspended the quota system imposed on exporters and abolished the license system under which private buyers

bought cocoa and coffee from producers. The private buyers are now free to operate with only identification card, issued by the authorised exporter. CAISTAB also suspended quality control at the level of local collecting centers as done before. These measures justified the dismissal of 400 employees (mainly quality control personnel at local collecting centers) out of 1,200 employees of this agency.

2) CIDT

CIDT, which succeeded CFDT (Compagnie Francaise pour le Dveloppement des Fibres Textiles) in 1973 was established by the colonial government in 1949, and contributed to the development of cotton production in the northern savannah. CIDT succeeded in mobilizing about 150 thousand farmers for cotton production and increased the production level from almost negligible 69 tons in 1960 to about 250,000 tons at the end of 1980s. CIDT collected all the seed cotton from the farmers on the account of CAISTAB and produced around 100,000 tons of cotton fibers at its own processing mills until the structural adjustment programme (SAP) was introduced. Under the SAP, CIDT was to become financially independent. As a result cotton growers were deprived of subsidy on chemical fertilizer which they enjoyed from 1977 to 1983. The subsidy added about 2.6 billion CFA francs to government budget in 1983. The producer price which had been guaranteed at 115 CFA francs per kilogram was successively reduced to 100 CFA francs in 1990, 90 francs in 1991, and 70 francs in 1993, because of slump of the cotton price in the world market.

CIDT, now a self accounting enterprise, was also forced to reduce the number of its employees in order to improve its financial situation. The appointments of 1,000 employees, about 37% of the total workforce were terminated in 1992. Many of those terminated had been involved in providing technical instructions to farmers at the village level. These measures taken as part of the SAP resulted in a decrease of both the number of cotton growers and production as shown in Table 5.

3) PALMINDUSTRIE

PALMINDUSTRIE was established with a state capital of about 3.36 billion CFA francs in 1969, separating the production department of palm oil from SODEPALM which had been established in 1963 and transformed into CIDV in 1986. In contrast with CIDT which encouraged and assisted farmers

to cultivate cotton on their own account, PALMINDUSTRIE engaged in direct cultivation of oil palm on plantations of about 60,000 hectares in total and employed about 11,000 wage laborers. In addition there were about 17,000 contract small scale farmers who cultivated a total of about 80,000 hectares on their account like cotton growers in the case of CIDT. PALMINDUSTRIE produced at its own processing plants about 260,000 tons of crude palm oil in 1992, 60% of which was exported.

Under the structural adjustment programme, this agency was included in the list of public enterprises to be privatized. The financial situation of this enterprise, however, has always been in a deficit in recent years, due to declining trend of the international price of palm oil, from 800 dollars per ton in 1985 to 350 dollars per ton in 1993. Consequently, the management was requested to carry out reforms. The management has already dismissed 3,000 workers, many of them were contract small scale farmers. There are also plans of office automation to discharge in the near future about 300 office workers, about 25% of the total office workforce.

4) SODESUCRE

SODESUCRE, which started as the biggest agricultural project in 1970s was forced to close two complexes in 1984. With 4,000 permanent employees and 2,500 seasonal workers, SODESUCRE produced sugar at four complexes in the northern savannah. SODESUCRE dismissed 1,500 employees including permanent ones in 1991, as a measure of rationalization under the structural adjustment programme. The World Bank report, which advocated the privatization in general in Côte d'Ivoire, said that SODESUCRE as well as National Railway were "structurally" deficient and not capable of attracting private capital unless some structural reforms were carried out.

5) SAPH AND SOGB

Crude rubber production in Côte d'Ivoire increased rapidly to reach about 60,000 tons at the end of 1980s, starting from less than 10,000 tons in 1960s. Around 80% was produced by SAPH and SOGB, which were described as mixed enterprises with French private capitals, though the share of the State was over 90% in the case of SOGB. Private individual farmers who cultivated rubber trees on contract with these companies contributed less than 7% of the total production. The structural adjustment recommended to the government to sell its shares in the companies.

6) SATMACI, CIDV, AND SODEPRA

These three agencies in charge of technical assistance to cocoa and coffee farmers (SATMACI), food crop farmers such as yam, cassava, rice and maize (CIDV), and livestock producers (SODEPRA) were scheduled to be integrated into a new agency called ANADER (Agence Nationale Pour le Dveloppement Rural) in 1994 as a measure of the structural adjustment to rationalize and reduce technical assistance of the State to farmers.

SATMACI, established in 1958, has been very proud of playing an important role in the remarkable development of cocoa and coffee production in the country. It had more than 2,000 staffs providing technical instructions and distributing good quality seedlings and other inputs such as insecticides to farmers. The situation, however, has changed since the end of 1980s when the government decided to control the land under cocoa and coffee plantations, because of increasing overproduction which caused a slump of their prices in the world market. The structural adjustment has already forced SATMACI to discharge more than 1,000 of its staff. SATMACI itself is to be absorbed into ANADER.

CIDV, which was established in 1986 to take over the function of providing technical assistance to food crop farmers from SODEPALM, was not as successful as SATMACI in encouraging farmers to increase food production, except in the case of irrigated rice. Rice has long been considered as a strategic food crop in a struggle to achieve self-sufficiency in food supply. This was due to the fact that the demand for rice as well as wheat has been increasing along with the rapid urbanisation in the country. The government has made several efforts to increase rice production through SODERIZ during the 1970s and through CIDV since 1986 but without much success with respect to reducing imports of cereals which reached about 7% of total imports in value terms in 1993. CIDV was in touch with about 300,000 farmers producing yam, cassava, maize and rice. Anyway technical assistance activities to food crop and livestock farmers will be reduced when CIDV and SADEPRA are merged with ANADER along with SATMACI.

3. Production of Food Crops

In contrast with export products, the production of food crops in Côte d'Ivoire has been out of direct or indirect public intervention except for rice. Accordingly the structural adjustment has not affected directly and deeply

the production of food crops in general.

However, without any obvious support or assistance from the State, the production of the main food crops increased enough to meet the increasing demand except for rice which demand for it consistently exceeded supply and therefore required imports (Table 6).

In order to achieve food self - sufficiency, the government has emphasized rice production since the end of the 1960s and consequently established SODERIZ in 1971 to promote its production. SODERIZ constructed dams and irrigation canals, developed irrigated rice fields and encouraged farmers into settlements with the view to cultivating rice. A guaranteed price scheme was implemented for producers. In response to the strong support and incentives offered by SODERIZ, farmers participated actively in rice production which nearly doubled in ten years, from about 250,000 tons in 1965 to 496,000 tons in 1975. By the end of this period the country succeeded in reducing the imports of rice to a negligible level of less than 2,000 tons.

SODERIZ, a seemingly successful public enterprise, however, was suddenly dissolved in 1977. This sudden dissolution, though officially explained to be a simple structural reform, was in fact a result of its financial failure. The bankruptcy was caused mainly by the high guaranteed producer price of paddy which had been kept as high as 75 CFA francs per kilogram and reduced to 65 francs after SODERIZ was dissolved; and the controlled and low consumer price of white rice which was 100 francs per kilogram. The financial failure of SODERIZ was reportedly worsened by corruption of the management. After the dissolution of SODERIZ, importation of rice increased steadily to reach over 300,000 tons at the end of 1980s. The domestic production of rice continued to increase during the period but less rapidly than during the era of SODERIZ.

Another intervention of the government in the production of food crops was in the process of marketing. The government wanted to control the process of marketing of food crops which had been left in the hands of Dioula merchants at the wholesale level. As a measure in the name of modernization of marketing, the government established in 1972 an agency, called AGRIPAC, to intervene in the process of marketing of food crops, buying directly from producers, and selling them in model shops built in corners of city markets. AGRIPAC introduced weighing scale in buying and selling food which had rarely been used by Dioula merchants in the traditional marketing system. It was expected that both producers and consumers would accept the innovation and also private traders would adopt it. This project of modernisation was, however, a failure. The activity of AGRIPAC did not

have the expected influence on the traditional marketing practices. The activities of AGRIPAC was also not patronized by either producers or consumers. Consequently, AGRIPAC was forced to close down in 1980.

Another measure taken by the government to modernize the food marketing system was the construction of a central wholesale market in the suburb of Abidjan in order to gather Dioula wholesalers in one place, so that the government could control them easily in order to prevent wide seasonal fluctuations of prices of food crops due partly to speculative activities. This project was suspended halfway because the financial situation of the government suddenly worsened since the beginning of 1980s as mentioned above.

After all, it can be concluded that food crops production as a whole in Côte d'Ivoire has always been out of direct public intervention though there were a few trials on the part of government, none of which was successful. Paradoxically food crops production is least influenced by and resistant to policy changes like the structural adjustment.

4. Devaluation of CFA Franc

As an important general measure of the structural adjustment, the CFA franc was devalued in January 1994 by 50% against the French franc, to which CFA franc is convertible at a fixed rate. As is well known, almost all the French speaking countries, including Côte d'Ivoire use, even after independence, the CFA franc. It was originally a common colonial currency which has always been convertible at a fixed rate under special convention between those African countries and France. The exchange rate between CFA and French francs (50:1) had not changed for 45 years or since 1948. The linkage of CFA franc with the French franc assured the value of CFA franc and prevented the currency from being devalued as demanded insistently since the end of 1980s by IMF and the World Bank, which deemed the devaluation as an inevitable and indispensable measure to improving the balance of payment of CFA franc countries and to completing the structural adjustment.

Soon after the devaluation which was finally decided after a long negotiation among concerned countries and international financial organisations, the Ivoirien government announced an increase in producer price of cocoa to 240 francs per kilogram from 200 francs and coffee to 220 francs per kilogram from 170 francs. It means that the gain of the devaluation

was shared between CAISTAB and producers in the ratio of 4 to 1. The government also announced a freeze on prices of 34 regularly consumed commodities for 3 months, though it is not clear by what means the freeze could be sustained.

It is too early to examine the effects of the devaluation on the Ivoirien economy in general and the agricultural sector, in particular. There are, however, two points to be brought into focus. One is the producer prices of export crops. As is the case with cocoa and coffee, the producer prices will be raised a little due to the devaluation but not proportionally to the rate of devaluation and would be reduced in terms of foreign currency. Whether an increase in nominal price and a reduction in real price would contribute to increased real income of producers depends upon the rate of inflation which devaluation never fails to cause.

In this respect what is vitally important as the second point would be the development of rice production. Will the devaluation be effective enough to make the domestic rice production competitive against imported rice, not only in price but also in quality? The domestic rice has always been estimated to be less competitive, particularly in quality. The consumer price of imported rice was kept relatively high by government in order to protect domestic production. The devaluation will automatically double the import price of rice. Accordingly if the domestic production of rice did not increase to change its share in domestic consumption, which is now estimated to be about 60%, it would accelerate inflation which will reduce the effective increase in producer prices of export crops.

5. Concluding Remarks

The Ivoirien government implemented a "Midium Term Economic Program" in December 1991 on structural adjustment. This Program does not expect production to increase, but to strengthen the international competitiveness of cocoa, cotton, palm oil, rubber and timber. For coffee, pineapple and banana, it is estimated that there is still room to increase their shares in world markets, and therefore a need to increase their production. Most strongly emphasized in the Programme was to increase the production of rice, meat and dairy products to substitute for increasing imports.

By what means is the government going to carry out this programme now that almost all the public agencies concerned with agriculture have been forced to reduce their activity under the structural adjustment programme?

Among the factors which the government can rely on to increase production or to strengthen the competitiveness is the initiative of producers themselves. The government says that the farmers are now strong and trained enough to act without the assistance which was provided in the past. This is seen as a means to justify the series of measures taken under the structural adjustment programme. The answer lies in the future.

Another important negative effect of the structural adjustment is the dismissal of more than 10,000 employees of public agencies. Those dismissed employees have been trained more or less for specific functions and have acquired some experience in providing assistance to farmers in the field. Their knowledge and experience should be reintegrated and mobilized in one way or another in the process of agricultural production so long as agriculture remains a key sector for the economic development in Côte d'Ivoire.

Table 1: The growth of GDP (1975~91)

	Value		Growth Rate		
	billion CFA francs		Nominal %	Real %	
1960	143	↑		↑	
1975	835	14.4		6.2	
1976	1,114	(Annual	33.5	(Annual	19.3
1977	1,539	Average)	38.2	Average)	7.7
1978	1,783		15.8		9.9
1979	1,945		9.0		1.4
1980	2,150	↓	10.6	↓	7.7
1981	2,291	↑	6.6	↑	3.4
1982	2,487		8.5		-0.5
1983	2,606	1.6	4.8	1.2	-2.0
1984	2,883	(Annual	10.7	(Annual	-4.2
1985	3,138	Average)	8.8	Average)	7.7
1986	3,232		3.0		5.3
1987	3,133		-3.0		-1.6
1988	3,150		0.5		-3.7
1989	2,950		-6.5		-0.2
1990	2,639		-10.5		-4.6
1991	2,690	↓	1.9	↓	-0.8
1992	2,685		-0.1		0.1

Sources:

- 1960~77 Côte d'Ivoire, Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan, *La Côte d'Ivoire en chiffres*, Paris, Société Africaine d'Édition, 1980/81
- 1978~86 *ibid.* 1986/87
- 1980~89 Real Rate according to the World Bank, *The World Development Report*, 1991
- 1987~92 EIU, *Country Profile, Côte d'Ivoire* 1993/94
EIU, *Country Report, Côte d'Ivoire*, No.4, 1993

Table 2: Producer and International Prices of Cocoa and Coffee (1970~90)

Year	A. Cocoa			B. Coffee			A+B		C Total Export	Trade Balance	Balance on current account
	Inter- national Price	Producer Price	Export Price	Inter- national Price	Producer Price	Export Price	Export ×100	Total Export			
	Cent per Pound	CFA franc	billion CFA francs	Cent per Pound	CFA franc	billion CFA francs	%	billion francs	million dollars	million dollars	
1970	30.6	85	27	50.5	105	43	70	53.7	130	122	-88
1971	24.4	"	22	44.7	"	42	64	50.8	127	96	-106
1972	29.2	"	23	50.4	"	37	60	42.7	140	136	-97
1973	51.3	110	28	62.2	120	44	71	37.4	191	161	-219
1974	70.8	175	62	68.0	150	64	126	43.2	292	359	-61
1975	56.5	"	48	72.4	180	62	110	42.9	255	227	-379
1976	92.8	180	71	142.0	250	133	204	52.0	393	574	-249
1977	172.0	250	99	229.1	"	199	300	56.2	529	815	-177
1978	154.4	"	161	155.0	"	131	292	55.6	524	573	-839
1979	149.4	300	116	169.5	300	167	283	52.9	535	489	-1,383
1980	118.1	"	168	150.7	"	136	304	45.7	664	399	-1,827
1981	94.2	"	200	115.8	"	121	321	46.5	689	367	-1,411
1982	79.0	"	163	125.6	"	162	326	43.5	748	558	-1,017
1983	96.1	"	163	127.9	350	159	322	40.4	797	431	-931
1984	108.7	"	397	141.2	375	183	576	48.7	1,184	1,137	-77
1985	102.3	400	398	133.5	400	278	671	50.9	1,318	1,351	63
1986	93.8	"	393	170.3	"	233	626	47.5	1,160	1,548	-301
1987	90.6	"	313	107.3	"	118	431	46.4	929	1,092	-951
1988	71.8	"	207	115.1	"	116	323	39.1	827	1,078	-1,102
1989	56.3	200	367	91.3	200	96	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,141	-858
1990	57.5	"	n.a.	n.a.	"	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Sources 1) International Price IMF, IFS Year Book 1991 pp.176~177

2) Producer Price Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, *La Côte d'Ivoire en Chiffres*, 1986/87, Fraternité
Matin

3) others IMF, IFS Yearbook 1991 pp.315 ~316

Table 3: Public Enterprises in Agricultural Sector

	Year of establi- shment	Capital billion CFA francs	State Capital %	Number of employees	Number of Discharged	Activities*
1 CAISTAB	1955	4.0	100	1426	626	
2 PALM INDUSTRIE	1969	3.4	100	16926	5926	
3 SAPH	1956	8.8	55.3	6516	?	
4 SOGB	1979	21.6	94.8	5000	?	
5 SODESUCRE	1971	30.5	100	6500	2153	
6 CIDT	1986	7.2	75	3511	1800	
7 SATMACI	1958	0.1	81.67	2387	700	
8 CIDV	1963	0.4	100	1536	750	
9 SODEFEL	1968	0.1	100	1200	?	
10 SODEPRA	1972	0.4	100	1632	?	
11 SODEFOR	1966	2.5	100	2150	?	
12 MOTOGARI	1966	** (5.9)	100	1050	?	

* Activities

- 1 Purchase and export of products for export
- 2 Oil palm plantation and palm oil
- 3 Rubber plantation and rubber
- 4 ibid.
- 5 Sugarcane plantation and sugar
- 6 Technical assistance for cotton production and cotton fiber
- 7 Technical assistance for cocoa and coffee
- 8 Technical assistance for food crops
- 9 Technical assistance for vegetables
- 10 Technical assistance for livestock
- 11 Afforestation
- 12 Clearing with tractors

** () : the amount of investment

Source: *Répertoire des industries et activités de Côte d'Ivoire*, 1986/87, and others

Table 4: CAISSTAB and BSIE

	Contribution to BSIE		Cocoa	Coffee	Cotton	the others
	value					
	billion CFA francs	%				
1976	42	78.4	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1977	119	48.7	"	"	"	"
1978	179	70.5	"	"	"	"
1979	135	56.6	"	"	"	"
1980	126	45.4	"	"	"	"
1981	16	5.9	"	"	"	"
1982	25	8.5	"	"	"	"
1983	17	8.6	"	"	"	"
1984	10	5.5	"	"	"	"
1985	31	26.0	"	"	"	"
1986	135	74.1	63	100	-21	-7
1987	-59	-	-37	3	-17	-8
1988	-104	-	-59	-2	-16	-8
1989	-170	-	-134	-1	-21	-2
1990	-50	-	-10	-4	n.a.	n.a.

Sources: 1976~79 Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, *Budget Special d'Investissement et d'Equipment, année 1986*, Rapport de Presentation.

1980~85 Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, *La Côte d'Ivoire en Chiffres*, Inter Afrique Press, Abidjan, 1986/87.

1986/90 La Banque Mondiale, *Côte d'Ivoire, Examen des Depenses Publiques*, 1990,

Table 5: Cotton Production

	Number of Planters 1,000	Surface 1,000ha	Producti- vity kg/ha	Production	
				Grain 1,000T	Fiber 1,000T
1968/69	61.9	48.1	867	41.7	16.9
1969/70	43.8	33.3	970	32.3	13.2
1970/71	46.6	35.9	817	29.3	11.7
1971/72	61.9	51.4	944	48.3	19.7
1972/73	66.6	56.5	935	52.8	21.4
1973/74	68.4	58.2	1,005	58.5	23.1
1974/75	69.2	58.8	1,020	59.9	23.9
1975/76	78.7	65.5	944	65.0	26.2
1976/77	71.4	64.8	1,164	75.4	30.7
1977/78	90.4	87.5	1,176	102.9	41.4
1978/79	93.9	107.2	1,071	114.9	46.7
1979/80	97.9	123.0	1,161	143.0	59.0
1980/81	95.5	126.3	1,081	136.6	55.7
1981/82	91.3	124.6	1,086	135.4	56.5
1982/83	90.7	128.4	1,223	157.0	65.7
1983/84	93.5	136.4	1,044	142.3	58.4
1984/85	104.5	145.8	1,454	212.1	88.4
1985/86	109.2	153.1	1,237	189.3	82.4
1986/87	112.6	159.3	1,340	213.5	93.1
1987/88	124.4	180.3	1,418	258.8	113.8
1988/89	145.0	213.4	1,362	290.6	128.3
1989/90	138.7	201.4	1,200	241.7	107.5
1990/91	123.9	198.5	1,316	261.1	115.7
1991/92	119.2	190.4	1,017	193.8	86.8

Source: CIDT, *Rapport annuel 91/92*

Table 6: Production of Food Crops (1960~88)

unit 1,000tons

	Production							Import
	Yam	Cassava	Plantain	Rice	Maize	Millet	Sorghum	Rice
A 1960	1,150	450	450	160	147	42	10	42
B 1970	1,551	540	650	316	231	30	13	79
C 1980	2,040	1,010	910	420	380	34	21	253
D 1984	2,500	1,250	1,000	540	480	40	22	320
E 1988	2,600	1,460	1,460	635	480	45	25	323
E/A	2.26	3.24	2.34	3.97	3.27	1.07	2.5	7.69
E/C	1.27	1.45	1.15	1.18	1.26	1.32	1.19	1.28

Sources: *La Côte d'Ivoire en Chiffre*, 1975 *ibid.*, 1986/87*Annuaire Statistique Agricoles et Forestières*, 1989