

8. REZA SHAH'S CHANGING DICTATORSHIP AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN IRAN, 1925-1941

Shintaro YOSHIMURA

Introduction

Iran experienced many major changes under the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941).¹ For instance, although an integrated state framework had been institutionalized through the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, its actual development occurred through various modernization and centralization policies during the rule of Reza Shah. In addition, there were significant changes in international relations. In the face of British-Russian rivalry that had continued since nineteenth century, Iran was on the verge of disintegration after the First World War.² But with the abolition of the capitulations in the second half of the 1920s, Iran was liberated from the yoke at last. This, linked with the achievements of Reza Shah's modernization policies, undoubtedly marked the beginning of Iran as a modern state.

On the other hand, the same period had elements of destructiveness and stagnation. While industrialization was emphasized, the rights of laborers were neglected. The regime attached no importance to agriculture, and the lives of the peasants (who constituted about 90 percent of the population) deteriorated, largely because large landowners, who were taxed more systematically than in the past by the government, strengthened their exploitation of the peasantry.³ The government monopoly on foreign trade as well as the trend toward a capitalized agricultural economy also accelerated the dependency of the peasantry on the state economy. Furthermore, the introduction of Western values into Iranian society resulted in the oppression of the Shi'i clergy, which had functioned as an influential inter-

mediary community between the state and society.⁴ The semi-independent tribes who had formed the main pillar of the armed forces for the Qajar Dynasty (1779–1925) were also persecuted. What is more, the regime destroyed the basis for parliamentary democracy, which was one of the heritages of the Constitutional Revolution. Reza Shah wielded absolute power; and therefore the years of his rule are inscribed as the period of 'Pahlavi Dictatorship' in the modern history of Iran.

As mentioned above, the Reza Shah regime certainly tried to convert the old system, which had been dominant under the previous dynasty, into a new state order with partial continuities. Needless to say, this attempt was not easy and inevitably faced several challenges organized in the society. As a result, the regime's program had to be frequently modified.

In this paper, I will divide the period of 1926–1941 into three stages, and attempt to examine his changing dictatorship. Then, I will consider in particular the protest movements under the leadership of the Shi'i clergy that constituted a major threat to his rule, as they constitute a barometer for measuring the intensity and change of his dictatorship.⁵ And finally, in consideration of continuity and change in the modern history of Iran, I shall discuss some points regarding the characteristics of those protest movements as well as his dictatorship.

Institutional Reforms in a Compromise and Protest Movements (1925–1928)

It is difficult to draw out a grand design for state-building, or so-called "Pahlavism," from the policies of Reza Shah's regime. In comparison with the contemporary Turkish nationalist leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (1881–1938), his political vision was never completely clear.⁶ The reason may relate not only to the fact that he was originally a military officer with little education, but may also be an outcome of the situation that he was confronted, which involved more difficulties, and that he had to apply his more energy to the consolidation of his power base than did Ataturk, who successfully established himself as a revolutionary nationalist leader in the early 1920s.

In this respect, one of the main obstacles for Reza Shah was certainly the socio-political influence of the Shi'i *ulama*, who had frustrated his republican movement in 1924. Next come the armed tribes, which persisted although he overthrew some tribal forces, including Sheikh Haz'al in Mohammarah. In addition, chronic financial straits are seen as having affected the progress of his scheme for state-building. Finally, the British-

Soviet rivalry and their pressure on Iran made it hard for Reza Shah to initiate drastic reforms at will.⁷ Therefore, it is not surprising that he had to respect political continuity from the Qajar era. One example is the appointment of Hasan Mostoufi (Mostoufi al-Mamalek)⁸ as premier in June 1926 following the resignation of Mohammad 'Ali Foroghi (Zoka al-Molk).⁹ His cabinet included politicians and bureaucrats, regardless of their allegiance to the new dynasty. Yet, it is noteworthy that Abd al-Hosein Khan Teymurtash (Sardar Mo'azam Khorasani),¹⁰ the Court Minister, was vested with the power to interfere in almost all decision-making, except for the military issues upon which Reza Shah concentrated his whole mind. Moreover, this was also related to the circumstances in which military problems were given ultimate priority.

Although the army was reorganized into five divisions in 1921–1922, all apprehensions regarding military riots or plots had not been dispelled as of 1926. In particular, there were strong feuds between ex-Cossacks and ex-Gendarmes, and the regime was sympathetic to the accumulated grievances of the latter against the former.¹¹ Also, as a result of embezzlement by corrupt commanders, salary payments to the rank and file were often several months in arrears. Consequently, mutinies broke out in the garrisons of Salmas and Maraveh Tappe in June. Given the prevalence of corruption in those days, there was genuine fear that such riots might spread throughout the country. Reza Shah was even warned of the seriousness of the situation by Sir Percy Loraine, the British Minister in Tehran. In addition, “unusually large” desertions were reported, including from the units of the Tehran Division.¹² In short, it can be said that the army was not a stable and adequate prop at that time for Reza Shah, who needed to cope with the internal disorder caused by the challenges from tribes such as the Kurd, Lor and Baluch.

The government, after successfully suppressing the above mutinies within one month, announced that conscription would be enforced from the coming October. Also, Reza Shah decided to apply for a loan of 200,000 tomans from the British-owned Imperial Bank, even though the budget of the ministry of war occupied 38 percent (9,400,000 tomans) of the total expenditure of the fiscal year. Moreover, the government not merely adopted a policy of imposing severe punishment against officers implicated in illegal money grubbing, but also raised the salary of conscripts from 7 to 31 krans.¹³ Outside of the military field, however, no policies deserving special mention was implemented under the initiated of the Government of Mostoufi. In spite of receiving support from the sixth Majles that opened in July, Mostoufi intimated several times that he intended to resign, only two months after taking office as premier.

With his cabinet reshuffle of February 1927, institutional reforms were launched, and the first "triumvirate" was established, composed of Teymurtash, Firuz Mirza Firuz (Nosrat al-Douleh),¹⁴ Minister of Finance, and 'Ali Akbar Davar,¹⁵ Minister of Justice. In particular, Davar, who had graduated in law from the University of Geneva, declared on the 9th of the month that he would sweep almost all the officials out of the ministry and halt the functions of the existing nationwide judiciary organizations. Ten days later he submitted to the Majles a law on the reorganization of courts and amendments to the Civil and Penal codes. The main points of the reform that was put into practice throughout the 1930s can be summarized as follows: the hiring of judges from among specialists in law who were educated in Europe, in place of religious scholars; the secularization of laws, modeled on Italian and French ones; the redress of problems involving jurisdiction and necessary procedures between *'urf* (customary law) and *shari'ah* (the religious law of Islam) courts; and the subordination of *shari'ah* courts to the justice ministry, and their final abolition.¹⁶

The judicial reforms, as is clear from the contents, were considered anti-Islamic or anti-clerical at the least. But one notes that they were carried out step by step. For instance, it was not until March 1932 that the power over the registration of legal documents regarding marriage, divorce and property was stripped from the *shari'ah* courts and incorporated into the jurisdiction of the secular courts. The thorough expulsion of religious scholars from the post of judges was not enacted until December 1936.¹⁷ According to Amin Banani, while many Western concepts and rules were introduced into the new Civil and Penal Codes, not all *shari'ah* provisions were excluded.

In addition, the early judicial reform bore a relationship with the abolition of the capitulatory regime that had been in place since the conclusion of the Turkmanchai Treaty in 1828. The capitulations had been seen as a primary cause of Iran's century-long dependence on the West; therefore, their abolition was a national desire for Iran. At the opening ceremony of the new judicial organization held on April 26, 1927, Reza Shah equated judiciary reform to the progress of national welfare and prestige, and simultaneously declared the abolition of the capitulations.¹⁸ This probably weakened the cries of the Shi'i clergy against the early judicial reform, which was approved by the sixth Majles, with *ulama* occupying 23 percent of 126 seats.

The educational reform of the Reza Shah regime was also generally anti-Islamic. Especially since the *mullas* (lower-ranking clergymen) depended completely on the administration of *maktabs* (elementary reli-

gious schools) for their livelihoods, state intervention in the form of the establishment of public schools with secular curriculums undoubtedly came as a serious blow to their social prestige and economic income.¹⁹ Indeed, the number of secular elementary schools increased from 3,285 in 1924/25 to 8,281 in 1939/40, with the number of students growing from 108,959 to 457,236 in the same period. It is true that the number of students enrolled in the *maktabs* also increased from 22,929 to 54,069 in the same 15 years, but they made up only 11.8% of the children enrolled in secular elementary schools. Also, the number of *madrrasah* (traditional theological college or seminaries of Islamic sciences) decreased from 282 in 1924/25 to 206 in 1940/41, and the number of the students registered there from 4,879 to 1,341.²⁰ However, those were the final outcomes of a gradual secularization policy in education, rather than representing any characteristic of the reforms in this first stage.

Seyyed Mohammad Tadayyon,²¹ who was Minister of Education in Mostoufi's reshuffled cabinet and temporarily remained in office under the premiership of Mehdi Qoli Khan Hedayat (Mokhber al-Saltaneh),²² did not introduce any anti-Islamic reforms. In May 1928, after Tadayyon's resignation, the Majles passed a law on the state-sponsored dispatch of students to Europe, and the government decided to establish 30 more elementary schools as well as secondary schools and reorganize the curriculum. A government scholarship system was introduced in September as well. However, the policy cannot be said to be anti-Islamic, considering that when a circular notice was issued by the ministry for American missionary schools in the same month, it demanded that they teach *shari'ah* along with Persian, Arabic, Iranian history and geography.²³ It even banned the teaching of the Bible to Muslim students. The first-stage reforms, therefore, do not seem to have caused resent among the Shi'i clergy.

As a lesson of the failed republican movement of 1924, Reza Shah professed his pro-Islamic stance at his coronation, saying, "Firstly, the object to which my special attention has been and will be directed is the safeguarding of religion and the strengthening of its basis, because I deem this as a measure which is beneficial for national unity and to the social morals of the Persians."²⁴ No drastic change can be seen in this stance, thereafter. But there is no doubt that the creation of the Iran-e Nou Party in July 1927 filled the Shi'i clergy with suspicion about his regime. According to a dispatch dated August 26 from the British Minister Sir Robert Clive to London, the party was founded based on a proposal from Teymurtash, who had returned from Europe at the end of the previous year. Davar, Firuz, Major General Morteza Khan Yazdanpanah, other military

officers and young deputies joined the party, whose principles were "devotion to the Shah, maintenance of sovereign rights, and opposition to Socialism, Communism and to the domination of the clergy."²⁵ It even rejected the clergy's membership.

Therefore, there is nothing strange about the fact that the clergy showed hostility toward the party. Bazaars instigated by the clergy were intermittently closed from August, and crowds assembled at telegraph offices in Esfahan and Shiraz to protest against the party. On August 24 Prime Minister Hedayat issued a proclamation against such moves, worded in the following terms:

"It has been observed that some time past certain persons, on the pretext of defending religion, have taken such action and made such statements as to disturb public opinion and inspire enmity and differences among citizens . . . The Government therefore orders its agents, in accordance with this circular, to strictly check such seditious and malicious propaganda, and to punish severely all those who create such agitations."²⁶

However, the clerics in Tehran, Esfahan and Mashhad continued protest campaigns against the party. In Esfahan they allegedly threatened to go into a sort of "*bast*" (sanctuary) at Qom, and those in Mashhad appealed to their counterparts in Tehran to extirpate the party. Although Donald N. Wilber explained that "Riza Shah had in mind building up the Iran-e Nou party as the majority party of the government along the lines of the Turkish model,"²⁷ it was also true that he was willing to sacrifice the party if it caused serious socio-political unrest. Immediately after he returned to the capital from Azarbayjan, angered at the critical situation, he negotiated with some representatives of the Tehran *ulama*. He made a decision to prohibit any member of the court, army or police from joining any political party. He then telegraphed, through one of the capital's *mojtaheds* (Shi'i clergymen who may issue authoritative opinions in matters of Islamic law), to the Esfahan *ulama* a request to pacify the situation. As a result, the Iran-e Nou Party was obliged to suspend its activities by mid October.

The above strife was interlocked with the continuing protest movement against conscription. The conscription law that was passed in June 1925, with the support of Seyyed Hasan Modarres,²⁸ the best-known opponent of Reza Shah, imposed two years of active duty on every male citizen reaching the age of 21, followed by four years in active reserve, six years in primary reserve, seven years in the secondary, and finally six years in guard service. Accordingly, it totaled 25 years of military service. However, clerics, religious teachers and students, and others with dependents were exempted from this military obligation.²⁹ But as the conscription started in

villages, and rumors of its successive enforcement spread rapidly in the cities, clergymen who were already distrustful of the regime began to organize protest movements.

Above all, in Esfahan, where the list of draftees was announced in early October, Haj Aqa Nur Allah Esfahani³⁰ became a leader of the movement. Although he had attended the coronation ceremony as one of the leading Esfahan *ulama*, he rejected the Islamic validity of the conscription and declared that he would carry out a *mohajerat* (religious emigration) to Qom to take *bast* until the withdrawal or modification of the law. *Ulama* such as Molla Hosein Feshareki and Seyyed al-'Eraqin acted in concert, and the total number of the participants in the *bast* reached more than 100. After his arrival at Qom, Nur Allah appealed to the clergy in other cities, and another 200 joined the movement. He telegraphed the Majles and the prime minister, saying that the conscription should be annulled as soon as possible to remove the anxieties of the people. He wrote, "Compulsory education is better than the coercive conscription" in consideration of the number of volunteers.³¹

The Majles responded that the conscription would be enforced in a flexible manner, explaining that it would bring about more benefits than harm to the nation. Also, Prime Minister Hedayat requested, in a more menacing manner, that the representatives of the *bastis* (those taking refuge in Qom) visit Tehran for negotiations. Thereafter, Teymurtash visited Qom, but could not meet Nur Allah.

In the meantime, Reza Shah showed a conciliatory attitude: on October 24 he made a speech to emphasize his own devotion to Islam before some 30 *ulama* and merchants of Tehran, and he instructed the army and police to relax the punishment of opponents of conscription. It is reported that 1,111 people were recruited from among a list of 3,342 in Tehran on November 12, but all of them were exempted from military service.³² Thus, it must be noted that Reza Shah adopted measures to avoid decisive friction with the clergy. Finally, the negotiation bore fruit on December 10, when Hedayat, Teymurtash and Emam Jome' of Tehran were dispatched to Qom under the direction of Reza Shah. The concrete demands made by Nur Allah were almost immediately and unreservedly accepted by the government.

The demands were as follows: (1) A revision of the conscription law to be made by the next term of the Majles; (2) Giving seats to five *mojtaheds* of the first degree in the Majles, as provided by the Constitutional Law; (3) The appointment of ecclesiastical supervisors for the provincial press to ensure that nothing anti-Islamic is printed; (4) A strict veto on

practices forbidden by Islam; and (5) Reintroduction of the numerous small *shari'ah* courts for dealing with matters such as personal status, administration of oaths, etc., which the new regulations of the Ministry of Justice had centralized in the Central Court of Justice.³³

Nur Allah and other leading *ulama* sent a telegraph of thanks: "In conclusion we hope that by the acts of the only Savior of Persia (your Majesty) Islam and the Moslems will enjoy happiness." Reza Shah also showed his unchanging attitude toward Islam by expressing in a reply dated 14th December, "We always were, and, indeed, will ever be, eager to see that our respect for the spiritual leaders and our devotion to the cause of Islam shall never suffer hindrance. We hope, likewise, that the *ulama* on their part will welcome this expression of our intention and belief, for from it springs the prosperity of the country and the greatness of our religion . . ." ³⁴ Bazaars in cities such as Esfahan and Shiraz opened one after another. The sudden death of Nur Allah on December 25 marked the end of the protest movement, but without ascertaining the fulfillment of the government's promises.

There are several points to discuss in relation to the movement. Firstly, as shown in the demands of the *ulama*, it was a protest not only against conscription but also demanded the realization of the Shi'i clergy's socio-political role, which had been promised since the Constitutional Revolution. Secondly, there was no sign that the religious community in Qom led by Haj Sheikh Abd al-Karim Hayeri Yazdi³⁵ would vigorously cooperate with the *bastis*. Before and since being invited from Arak to reconstruct a center of Islamic studies at Qom, Hayeri Yazdi always tried to steer clear of involvement in political issues. His apolitical stance seems to have decisive in the appeasement of the movement after Nur Allah died. Thirdly, we should not overlook the fact that there were different views on conscription among the clergy. Some clergymen in Azarbayjan and in certain provinces reportedly supported its enforcement either in rivalry with tribal leaders or for other reasons.³⁶ Accordingly, as long as the government showed flexibility in its enforcement such as increasing exemptions in exchange for the payment of some money, clergy-led anti-conscription movements were rare.

Three months after the first conflict, the so-called "Qom Incident" (Vaqe'e-ye Qom) broke out. The origin of the affair was in a visit by Reza Shah's Consort and mother of the Crown Prince, accompanied with court women, to the Shrine of Hazrat Ma'sumeh at Qom on March 21, 1928 for the celebration of the new year in the Iranian A. H. solar calendar. Apparently, the consort changed her costume from a black *chador* (veil) to a lighter non-ceremonial one (or, according to another account, she care-

lessly let her veil slip off and her face was exposed).³⁷ With the crowds in uproar, a preacher denounced her behavior. However, his warning went unheeded, and Mohammad Taqi Bafqi,³⁸ an influential deputy of Hayeri Yazdi, reprimanded her severely to leave. On the next day Reza Shah rushed to Qom with two armored cars and four hundred troops. He arrested Bafqi and some theological students after using violence towards them.

Even though the *ulama* of Esfahan and Qom resented his reckless act, the affair did not developed into protests. This is because Hayeri Yazdi decided to overlook it, issuing a *fatva* (authoritative opinion by a *mojtahed* on a matter of law) to the effect that discussion of it should be "Haram" (a prohibited act under Islamic law). Reza Shah accepted his request, and released Bafqi from prison six months later.³⁹ Undoubtedly, neither of them wanted to aggravate the situation.

As we have seen, the first stage contained some conditions which brought forth frictions between state and society. These conditions included institutional reforms, especially in the judicial field, the creation of Iran-e Nou Party, and the enforcement of conscription. However, we should also note the conciliatory attitude that was shared by both the Reza Shah regime and the Shi'i clergy. The regime in this period was still unstable due to the lack of unity inside the army and tribal threats. Thus, Reza Shah was an absolute ruler in Tehran politics, but not so throughout the country. On the other hand, the clergy's stance was almost apolitical because of the presence of Hayeri Yazdi, who was devoting his energy to rebuilding Qom as a Shi'i center of theological learning. The situation in which neither could overpower the other was surely reflected in the concessive posture shown by the state and the Shi'i community.

Tribal Revolts in Fars and Purges for Dictatorial Centralization (1928–1934)

A significant mark in the change of Reza Shah's dictatorship seems to be in the thorough dismantlement of legislative power following the seventh Majles which opened in October 1928. It can certainly be said that the Majles did not always reflect the political will of the people, partly because of the restrictive election law, and partly because of the power of the big landowners. In addition, the army actively interfered in the fifth Majles election of 1923–24 in the provinces, leading to the dominance of the pro-Reza camp in parliament.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, it was true that anti-Reza or independent intellectuals who were elected from Tehran in the fifth and sixth Majles often played a role in placing brakes on the advent of his

despotic power, by making use of influence based on their political experience and oratorical power.

In this sense, the elections for the seventh Majles were different from previous elections in the fact that even such deputies from Tehran were removed from the list of candidates eligible to stand for election. In line with the criticism that it was an "*entehab* (appointment)," rather than an "*entehab* (election)," Mohammad Mosaddeq (Mosaddeq al-Saltaneh),⁴¹ Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh,⁴² Mohammad Taqi Bahar (Malek al-Sho'ara Bahar)⁴³ and Modarres, all of whom were opponents of Reza Shah, were defeated. Hasan Pirnia (Mirza Hasan Khan Moshir al-Doureh),⁴⁴ Hosein Pirnia (Mo'tamen al-Molk)⁴⁵ and Mostoufi, although not removed from the list, declined to become deputies in protest against the manipulation of the election results. As a result, the seventh and later Majles became mere rubber stamps for the Reza Shah regime. Moreover, Modarres, who overtly criticized the illegal election and issued *shab nameh* (night letters) against the regime, was arrested in October and exiled to a remote region near the Afghanistan border.⁴⁶

The election marked the beginning of a gradual shift to policies more reflective of Reza Shah's ideas. One typical example was the "Unification of Dress Law" that required all Iranian male citizens to wear a Pahlavi Cap (Kolah-e Pahlavi or Kepi) and short coat. In relation to this, it is reported that a riot broke out in Tabriz, with more than ten thousand inhabitants clashing with the army on October 17, 1928, in protest against the law as well as the arrest of Mojtabeh Haj Mirza Abol Hasan Angaji.⁴⁷ Such movements did not occur in other cities, however. The reasons are thought to include not only the fact that the Majles officially passed the law two months later, but also that the law was enforced differently in each city, town and village.

Another significant issue was the provision that exempted clergy from wearing such costumes. According to the 2nd article, the following categories were exempted: (1) Those recognized as *mojtaheds* by the highest Ecclesiastical body; (2) Expounders of religious doctrines in the villages who have passed an examination; (3) Priests of the Sunni Sect who are permitted to issue *fatvas*, with such permission to be given by two of the highest religious authorities of the Sunni Sect; (4) Preachers in possession of a fixed pulpit; (5) Expounders of Hadith of Muhammad who possess permits from two recognized *mojtaheds*; (6) Students of religious sciences able to pass examinations; (7) Teacher of theology and jurisprudence, and (8) Non-Muslim priests.⁴⁸

Accordingly, it can be said that the clergy was acknowledged as "a

privileged class" in the law, allowing the regime to avert their opposition. Moreover, Article 4 stated that "the act is to be enforced in town and villages from 1st Farvardin, 1308 (March 22, 1929), and in other places as it may become possible on condition that it shall be later than the 1st Farvardin, 1309 (March 22, 1930)." Furthermore, it was not enforced in all cities in a similar way; for instance the police never imposed rigid control in Mashhad, a Shi'i religious city as famous as Qom.⁴⁹ This also seems to have been a lesson which Reza Shah learned from Afghanistan; the monarch of that country, Amir Aman Allah, who had visited Iran on his way back from Europe in June 1928, was forced to forfeit his crown as a result of internal disorder triggered by his modernization policy.⁵⁰ So, it is easy to imagine that the Reza Shah regime felt the need to be more cautious in adopting its policy. Nevertheless, he did face a challenge from the tribes in Fars, especially from the Qashqa'is.

Since 1861/62, Qashqa'i military strength in Fars had been balanced by the pro-Qajar Khamseh confederacy. However, on the opportunity of the transfer of the historical role of the Qavam family to lead the confederacy to the commander of the Fars Brigade, the Qashqa'i revolted against the Tehran government in mid-March 1929.⁵¹ The revolt, under the leadership of 'Ali Khan (Salar-e Heshmat), brother of Qashqa'i Ilkhan Esmā'il Khan Soulat al-Douleh (Sardar-e 'Asha'er),⁵² paralyzed communications and commercial activities in the province. In May the insurgents leveled the following demands: (1) The release of Soulat al-Douleh in Tehran; (2) The appointment of Soulat al-Douleh, or failing him, of his elder son, Nasir Khan, as Ilkhan of the Qashqa'is; (3) The exemption of the Qashqa'i from the disarmament, conscription and uniformity of clothing policies; and (4) The abolition of the Census Department and the Department for the Registration of Title Deeds.⁵³

As similar dissatisfaction with the state intervention in tribal affairs was shared by other tribes, the revolts spread to the Baharlu, Ile-Arab, and Inallu, who constituted the Khamseh confederacy. They occupied Darab, about 200 km east-southeast of Shiraz. Moreover, at the end of April, a rebellion broke out among the Kurd who rejected the demand for disarmament, conscription, stationing of the army in Savoj Boragh (now Mahabad) and the dispatch of a Persian Governor to their land.⁵⁴

Due to the chaos in Fars, the government reinforced the army in May, and dismissed two major-generals, Commander of the Southern Division Mohammad Hosein Firuz (younger brother of Minister of Finance), and Commander of the Amniyeh Fazlollah Khan Zahedi. Both were sent to prison immediately. Akbar Mas'ud (Sarem al-Douleh), the Governor of

Fars, was also arrested.⁵⁵ On the other hand, Major-General Habibollah Khan Sheybani was dispatched to restore order in Fars. At the same time, Reza Shah agreed to the demand to release Soulat al-Douleh, and sent Naser Khan to hold negotiations, though this totally failed to improve the situation. To the contrary, the Mamasani and Boyer-Ahmadi tribes also began to revolt against the central government. As a result, the situation grew worse, to the extent that even 'Ali Khan was unable to take any initiative toward settlement. On July 10, Soulat al-Douleh entered Shiraz by air to persuade the Qashqa'is to agree to a truce. Ja'far Qoli Khan Sardar-e As'ad,⁵⁶ Minister of War, was also sent to Esfahan to prevent the Bakhtiyari from participating in the Fars rebellion.⁵⁷

Meanwhile, Reza Shah evolved some interesting policies designed to win the favor of the clergy. The sale of alcohol was restricted, and a crackdown on prostitution launched. Persian newspapers emphasized Islam by printing articles on the life of Prophet Muhammad.⁵⁸ Although the regime had placed restriction up to that time on religious ceremonies, including 'Ashura, Reza Shah himself participated in the rouzeh khani (meeting for the recitation of the life of Imam Hosein) held in a government facility (takye) on June 18, 1929, and offered a prize of 500 tomans to the most skillful rouze khan. Also, mollahs were given the freedom to wear traditional religious costumes according to their will in Moharram and Safar.⁵⁹ The regime was fearful that the socio-political unrest, including an earthquake that led to the loss of about 1,000 lives in the northeast area in May, might develop into a large-scale protest movement under the leadership of the Shi'i clergy.

Once the negotiations began, the rebellion in Fars, which had created to much strain from June through July, began to move toward pacification in August. At Soulat al-Douleh's initiative, an agreement was reached on the appointment of Malek Mansur, the second son of Soulat, as Ilkhan of the Qashqa'is, and amnesties were given to the rebels. The Bakhtiyari rebellion led by 'Ali Mardan Khan was undermined from within in November, with the active mediation of Sardar-e As'ad as well as Samsam al-Saltaneh, a venerated Bakhtiyari leader, in the truce negotiations. The amicable attitude of the two tribes toward the Reza Shah regime was shown by the fact that they sent military forces numbering 4,000 men to cooperate with the government army in suppressing the revolt of Boyer-Ahmadis and Mamasani in the summer of 1930.⁶⁰

After securing stability in Fars province, Reza Shah moved to suppress the tribes in other areas. In Kurdistan, Esma'il Aqa Semitqu, the most famous Kurd leader in Iran at the time, was killed in battle in July 1930. The

revolt of the Baluch, whose leader Doust Mohammad Khan had been already executed in January, had also been put down thoroughly by December.⁶¹

Now we will turn to examine a series of purges which took place within the regime. The first victim was Firuz, who was one member of the triumvirate. He was suddenly arrested on May 23, 1929, in the midst of the above-mentioned Qashqa'i revolt, on charges of the bribery. Specifically, it was charged that in exchange for giving some assisting in escaping from property confiscation, he accepted 1936 tomans from Hasan Mahdavi, the son of a famous merchant named Amin al-Zarb. However, it has been suggested that his arrest may have been connected to the tribal revolt, because his younger brother, Major-General Mohammad Hosein Firuz, was also sent to prison at almost the same time, and it is possible that he himself may have been involved in a Soviet plot.⁶² In any case, in May 1930, Firuz was given a four-month jail sentence, along with a fine three times the amount of the alleged bribe, and disappeared from the political stage.

The fall of Firuz marked the beginning of the second triumvirate, which consisted of Teymurtash, Davar and Sardar-e As'ad. However, it did not last long. Teymurtash, who was engaged in the negotiations with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) over a concession that was finally nullified in November 1932, was dismissed from his post as Court Minister on December 24. He was likewise prosecuted for taking bribes of £9,000 and 20,000 tomans from a merchant named Amin al-Tojjar Esfahani over an opium monopoly contract. The following June, he was condemned to five years in prison with fines of 38,592 tomans and £1,712.⁶³

In his case, as well, several other reasons were cited for the arrest: for example, his close relationship with Court Treasurer Mirza Abd al-Hosein Khan Diva, who was also arrested in November 1932; suspicions involving bribery from the APOC; secret negotiations with the Soviets on a northern oil and gas exploitation known as the "Khoshtaria concession," and Reza Shah's fear of his power, as he was No. 2 inside the regime. In particular, Sir R. Clive, the British Minister in Tehran sent several telegraphs emphasizing the last point to London.⁶⁴ Aside from guesses as to what caused his fall from power, what differentiates his case from that of Firuz is that Teymurtash died in the prison not quite four months after the sentence. In this relation, it is said that Leo Karakhan, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, demanded an interview with him, and that his death was announced the day before Karakhan was scheduled to see him. It is said that he did not die of pneumonia but was probably poisoned.

In connection with the tribal revolts in Fars of 1929-1930, another series of purges was carried out before and after the fall of Teymurtash. For

instance, Major-General Sheybani's command abilities were suddenly raised as the cause of the heavy casualties suffered by the army, and he was sentenced to three years of confinement at a court-martial in September 1930. Soulat al-Douleh who had played a leading part in the negotiations with the Qashqa'i, was arrested together with his son Naser Khan in August 1932. Since both were deputies of the eighth Majles, 'Ali Mansur explained the reason for their arrests, saying, "I have obtained evidence not only of Soulat's role in the disturbance of 1929 but also of a new conspiracy, from which they should be deprived of their privilege as deputies."⁶⁵ The Qashqa'i, who were hurt by famine and gradual disarmament, organized another revolt under 'Ali Khan's leadership in the spring of 1933, but it was quelled in just three months.

The deteriorating relations between Iran and the British improved with the signing of a new oil concession agreement at the end of April, 1933. In mid-September, after the resignation of Hedayat, Forughi was appointed again to form a new cabinet. The reason for the change of cabinet was allegedly Reza Shah's judgement that Hedayat "was too old to do the job," but Hedayat was also dissatisfied with having to submit to the orders of the monarch and with his cabinet's lack of authority.⁶⁶ Moreover, as a visit by Reza Shah to Iraq or Turkey was being considered, Forughi might have been seen as more suited for the premiership because he was politically unambitious.⁶⁷ If so, Reza Shah is supposed to have needed to eradicate the tribal powers in Fars, which might have posed a serious threat during his trip abroad. In addition, they were, needless to say, regarded as symbols of the country's backwardness or feudalism, and the power of their leaders a socio-political obstacle to him so long as he pursued centralization combined with modernization.

First, Sardar-e As'ad, a tribal leader, was arrested suddenly at Babol in Mazandaran on November 17, and sent to prison in Tehran. Immediately after that, the regime made a mass arrest of more than 20 Bakhtiyari leaders and attendants, including As'ad's bothers, as well as Sardar-e Eqbal and his son. Moreover, The khans of Qashqa'is and Boyer-Ahmadis shared the same fate. According to the British Minister's telegraph to London, which quoted a Persian newspaper dated November 27, 1934, among the 28 leaders accused in military courts, eight (four Bakhtiyaris, two Boyer-Ahmadis, one Qashqa'i and Mamasani, respectively) were executed; four Bakhtiyaris was sentenced to imprisonment for life, and the others to ten years' penal servitude or less.⁶⁸ It is also said that about 400 Mamasani and Boyer-Ahmadi tribesmen living in Koh Giluye were taken to Ahvaz, and 300 of them died in jail.⁶⁹ As for Sardar-e As'ad, his death in jail was also

announced on March 30, 1934, the day when five of the above eight were secretly executed. In the meantime, the regime steadily enforced its policies for disarmament, conscription and settlement towards the tribes.

As pointed out by Wilber, the years 1930–1933 were seen as an age for the “Improvement of Economic Affairs.” In fact, Reza Shah declared his expectations that “the eighth Majles should be inscribed in history as an economic Majles,”⁷⁰ and various economic reforms were introduced. Policies including active public works, new currency regulations, state monopolies on foreign trade, and a new commercial code were adopted to help Iran escape the devastation of the Great Depression. The same principle was followed by the ninth Majles that opened in March 1933, and which ratified the new contract on the oil concession with the APOC and passed the Agricultural Bank Law.

At the same time, however, the above-mentioned internal purges and repression of tribal leaders were thoroughly carried out. As is generally known, the anti-communist law (officially, Law for Safeguarding National Security) formed a part of this repressive system.⁷¹ Based on it, most of the members of the Iran Communist Party were imprisoned, and labor union movements were subjected to suppression. Also, Reza Shah confiscated vast areas of land in the north by force. His landed property was said to make up 80% of the country’s arable lands, or 3 million acres in total.⁷²

Reviewing the period up to the year 1933/1934 (1312 in the Iranian A.H. solar calendar), Hedayat cited the overthrow of powerful politicians and tribal leaders, the reinforcement of the national army, and the centralization of wealth, concluding that security had not yet been established and the judicial organs were only instruments to prepare papers on crime. He summarized as follows:

“In the seventh or eighth year after the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty, hope turned into despair. General regulations on business affairs, the foundation of factories, and the opening of railway and roads were proper, but the foundation of justice was shaken. No merits can compensate for this fault.”⁷³

Although there was no drastic change in the *ulama*-state relation, Reza Shah’s dictatorship made remarkable progress in this second stage. Though he crushed many internal threats through dexterous purges and suppression, he did not dare stir up the hostility of the Shi‘i clergy. But as long as he pursued the seizure of unrivalled political power and was trying to establish an independent and modern Iran based on his power, the elimination of the Shi‘i clergy had an inevitable place on his agenda for state-building.

Anti-Islamic Nationalism and Qiyam-e Goharshad (1934–1941)

The last phase of Reza Shah's dictatorship began with his 40-day visit to Turkey from 2nd June, 1934. The visit was planned by Forughī, who had stayed in Angora (now Ankara) as the Iranian Minister for about three years from 1927 and had enjoyed an intimate relationship with President Mustafa Kemal and Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. Forughī apparently expected that Reza Shah, after witnessing the Turkish case, would launch more liberal reforms.⁷⁴ On the other hand, Reza himself may have also had in mind the construction of a more stable relation with Turkey on the basis of the Frontier and Friendly Treaties signed in 1932.

In any case, the visit undoubtedly had a major effect on Reza Shah, but in a sense it was against Faruqī's hope. The Shah's will to launch policies on the basis of a new line was already apparent in his statement at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 20th that he desired to attain prosperity and progress "by means of the removal of religious superstitions."⁷⁵ At a meeting with Majles deputies after his return, he also expressed the view that such "progress . . . toward a new civilization would be made by the use of his power, independent of the people's will."⁷⁶ As shown in these statements, he had started to evolve new policies, in order to inspire the people from above with a secular, almost anti-Islamic nationalism.

One of the first policies along this line was the millennial celebration of the birth of the poet Hakim Abu al-Qasem Ferdousi (934–1025), the author of *Shahnameh*. It was an impressive ceremony held at Tehran and Mashhad in October, attended by 313 Orientalists including 45 foreign guests from 18 countries. A monument 18 meters high for Ferdousi, who was regarded as the great national poet, was unveiled on the last day, and the name of the best-conditioned street of Tehran, 'Ala' al-Douleh, was changed to Ferdousi Street.

Moreover, in November 1934 the ninth Majles passed the new *awqaf* (religious endowments) law, which provided that the Department of Endowments at the Ministry of Education could supervise any properties of public endowments whose administrators were unidentified. In addition, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued a circular memorandum on December 28, informing that the terms Iran and Iranian would be used for Persia and Persian from March 21, 1935.⁷⁷ From the same date, the Iranian A.H. solar calendar, which was derived from Pre-Islamic Zoroastrianism, replaced the Islamic A.H. lunar calendar, whose usage was officially banned.

Through these acts, Reza Shah tried to appeal to the world the birth of a new Iran but with the glory of the pre-Islamic past. This stance, moreover, evolved into a campaign to purify the Persian language of alien words. For this purpose, Farhangestan-e Iran (Academy of Iran) was established on May 19, 1935. From the 1920s, the Persianization of foreign vocabularies, accompanied by the coining of new words, had been attempted separately in the military and medical fields.⁷⁸ But the aim of the Farhangestan, as an outcome of his visit to Turkey, was to integrate such language purification efforts under the direct control of the state. Consequently, a total of roughly 3,000 new words were coined up to 1940. However, the academy's work, under the leadership of Forughī, did not proceed smoothly because of different opinions among the 24 full members, including Hasan Vosuq and Bahar.⁷⁹ Also, Reza Shah, who hated some of the strange Persian terms substituted for Arabic and other foreign words, is said to have started to check the coinage for himself. Since Islamic and Arabic elements had already taken deep root into Iranian culture, this artificial endeavor could not be as successful as he had expected.

His anti-Islamic attitude then went further to the coercive modification of one of his previous policies. On June 6, 1935 when the opening ceremony of the tenth Majles was held, it was announced that all male government employees would have to wear the "International Hat" (Kolah-e Beinol-Melali or Shapo), and that the "Pahlavi Cap," which had been forced on all male citizens since 1928, would be abolished. Employees who opposed this decree were to be dismissed from office immediately.⁸⁰ And by the beginning of the following month, when enough hats had been produced to supply civil servants throughout the country, the police began to adopt the policy toward ordinary male Iranians more strictly.

It is true that the clergy was exempted from the decree as it was from the previous one. However, the government, under the pretext of preventing non-*ulama* from abusing the exemption provision, placed the following restriction on which clergy were allowed to wear a turban and 'aba (cloak): those who were permitted by the Ministry of Education, which gave it the power to investigate not only licenses issued by two *maraje'* (the highest rank among the Shi'i clergy) but also the certificate given by the *mojtaheds* to them. The government, thereby, narrowed the number of clergy who could enjoy the exemption privilege. This resulted in overt harassment by the police against many clergymen on the streets. There is no doubt that this policy was a cause of the Goharshad riot (Qiyam-e Goharshad) in Mashhad, known as the last protest movement under Reza Shah's dictatorship.

Hosein Makki, the author of *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran (Twenty-Year*

History of Iran), points out that there was an incident in Shiraz in March 1935, which interlocked with the Goharshad riot.⁸¹ It was the arrest of Seyyed Hesam al-Din Fali who, as one of the Shiraz *ulama*, criticized as scandalous the situation in which several female high school students had danced unveiled at a reception in honor of Minister of Education 'Ali Asghar Hekmat. The news incited the *ulama*, including Ayatollah Seyyed Abol Hosein Angaji⁸² in Tabriz. They were also arrested and sent to Semnan for their protest against the government. In addition to such incidents, Reza Shah officially expressed the necessity to abolish the veil (*hejab*) at a cabinet meeting around 20th May, saying, "We need to be westernized not only in appearance but also in custom."⁸³ This also promoted the spread of rumors that the abandonment of the veil would follow the change of the hat.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the *ulama* of Mashhad, including Seyyed Aqa Hosein Qomi,⁸⁴ gathered to coordinate their action against the anticipated abolition of the veil. Qomi was one of the disciples of Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri, a *mashru'eh-khah* (claimant for *shari'ah* as the highest priority) clergyman who had been executed in the process of the Constitutional Revolution. Qomi, following the above discussion, decided to go to Tehran to dissuade Reza Shah from the abolition. He was allegedly prepared to go as far as to kiss the Shah's foot to show his obedience, but in vain. He was arrested in Shahr-e Rey and banished to Iraq immediately. Moreover, Mirza Mohammad Vali Khan Asadi⁸⁵ who was chief custodian (Nayeb al-Touliye) of the Shrine of the eighth Imam Reza, also telegraphed to request Tehran to repeal the adoption of the anti-Shi'i policy "in holy cities like Mashhad." The government replied to the effect that "the order from the Shah must be enforced."⁸⁶ Even Hayeri Yazdi, who had remained silent for a long time, sent a respectful telegraph to Reza Shah in the following terms:

"The present situation, which is against the holy *shari'ah* and Ja'fari religion, is a cause of apprehension for those who call to faith and for ordinary Muslims. It is Your Majesty who is the protector and who is responsible for Islamic laws today, and you could surely and necessarily prevent . . ."⁸⁷

However, a reply sent out in the name of Prime Minister Foroughi the following day pointed out that if the problem mentioned by Hayeri Yazdi was on the rumored abolition of *hejab*, he had nothing worthwhile to comment, and if it was on the costume and hat, it would be a surprise because there were no regulations on them in *shari'ah*.⁸⁸ Hayeri Yazdi, whose request was so contemptuously turned down, rarely appeared in public thereafter and passed away at the end of January 1937.

After the above-mentioned moves, the revolt at Goharshad broke out. First, on July 10, Sheykh Mohammad Taqi Sabzevari, who was lodging at the shrine as a disciple of the ousted Qomi and rouze khan (professional narrator of the tragedies of Karbala), criticized the government vehemently for its policies in relation to the hat and veil. He was known from his eloquence and his Khorasan accent as 'Sheikh Bohlul' after a Muslim in the early 'Abbasid times, who spread the messages of the seventh Imam (Ja'far Sadeq) among Shi'i, pretending to be a madman.⁸⁹ Released after a short period of confinement in a chamber, Sabzevari restarted the same reproach from the pulpit of Goharshad Mosque at the south-west corner of the shrine.

As his preaching fell on the day in the Islamic A.H. lunar calendar when the Russian army bombarded the shrine 23 years earlier, a larger-than-usual number of visitors responded passionately to his anti-regime speech. Consequently, there was a skirmish between the crowd and a squad of police dispatched to the mosque. Following the clash, 200 infantry and 50 cavalry were stationed around the shrine. The situation turned into a bloody affair starting on the 11th. C. K. Daly, Consul-General at Mashhad, reported the tragedy in the following terms:

"Early in the morning of the 11th, the crowd having considerably diminished, the troops entered the shrine to disperse the remainder. A fracas occurred during which the general officer commanding was pushed into a water channel. He appears to have lost control of himself and ordered machine-gun fire to be opened. The official statement was to the effect that 18 persons were killed and some 50 to 60 wounded, of whom 14 subsequently died. There are grounds for believing that the actual number of killed and injured considerably exceeded this estimate, although in no way approaching the great numbers referred to in bazaar rumors."⁹⁰

The general officer was Brigadier-General Iraj Khan Matbu'i, who after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, was accused of crimes for his participation in the bloodshed at Goharshad as well as in the coup d'etat of 1921, as well as for his usurpation of agricultural lands in Shahr-e Ray while he was a senator under the reign of Reza Shah's son. He was executed in September 1979. According to Ettela'at, dated 19th September, 1979, it is said that at Goharshad 25 innocent people were killed and 40 wounded under his orders at the mosque.⁹¹

The rioting did not come to an end with the tragedy. According to the same telegraph by Daly, "vast crowds gathered at the shrine, and some

groups, shouting the words "Hosein is dead!" or "Hosein protect us from this Shah!", paraded the town and returned with "the *mullas* of repute" to the mosque. In the meantime, the army retreated to the barrack without a picket to prevent inhabitants from entering the shrine. While the local administration was completely paralyzed, peasants living in the surrounding villages, "armed with sticks, sickles, shovels, daggers and &c." started to join the movement and the bazaars also closed to protest."

Brigadier-General Matbu'i and Fatollah Pakravan, Governor of Khorasan, rushed to the telegraph office to inform Tehran of the seriousness of the situation and ask for instructions.⁹² On July 13, the government finally instructed them to: "(1) use persuasion and failing success (2) to clear the shrine using sticks and the butt-ends of the rifles, employing bayonets only if the situation demanded it." However, there is no evidence that these instructions were observed. At 2:00 a.m. on the 14th, a single detachment, from the "*Marg*" (meaning "death") regiment was dispatched to Goharshad to attack. This allegedly happened because "the greater part of the garrison who were conscripts, were in sympathy with the agitators," and disarmed themselves at the barracks. The regiment immediately forced to open a door of the shrine and started the assault, firing a machine-gun set on the roof, to clear the protestors from the scene. In the above dispatch, Daly reported, as information from a reliable source, that the actual number of the dead was 128, the wounded not less than 200 to 300, and the arrested some 800 (including 228 casualties).

One week after the incident, Reza Shah criticized the local administrators for being unable to rapidly and successfully cope with the crisis, and said: "A shrine should be set aside as a place of worship, and should not be used for the purpose of sedition."⁹³ As manifested by those words, his regime began a suppression of the Shi'i clergy. Although Savzevari successfully escaped from Mashhad to Afghanistan, some 30 *ulama*, including Aqa Zadeh, the son of the famous Marja' Akhond Khorasani, and Ayatollah Yunos Ardabili were arrested for their role in the revolt and banished. Moreover, four theological colleges, with the exception of Madrase-ye Soleyman Khan, were forcibly closed.⁹⁴ Asadi, the chief custodian of the shrine, who was regarded as the "ringleader" of the riot, was accused of treason and shot to death on December 21, 1935.⁹⁵ In addition, among the imprisoned was his son Akbar Khan Asadi, deputy of the 10th Majles and son-in-law of Forughi.

Following these repressive measures, the clergy appears to have abandoned its stance of opposition against the Reza Shah regime. By the end of 1935, the usage of titles such as khan, beg, mirza, and amir were forbidden,

and many place names were changed; for instance, from Qomshe to Shahreza, from Anzali to Bandar-e Pahlavi, and from Mohammarah to Khorramshahr. With those policies, Reza Shah is said to have reached the "zenith of his dictatorship."⁹⁶ As if confirming this, he declared the abolition of *hejab* on January 8, 1936, when, accompanied by his unveiled empress and two princesses, he attended a celebration ceremony for a college at Tehran. On what he called "the day of emancipation of women," the Shah, showing delight at the awakening of female students as a result of intellect and study, expressed his hope, saying, "It is you who can be good teachers, produce excellent individuals under your guidance, . . . and be useful for the state in every sense."⁹⁷

In February 1936 it was announced that all government employees and military men accompanied by veiled women would be dismissed. The government forbade taxi and bus drivers, restaurant and public bath owners, pharmacists and doctors, and shopkeepers to provide services to veiled women.⁹⁸ Such women were not allowed to appear on main streets. Although traditional women could reportedly usually avoid police harassment by covering their faces with scarves or the lapels of their coats, the policy for the compulsory removal of veils was enforced at the national level. Under the influence of this policy, about 40 Baluch families emigrated to Makran, that was under British rule.⁹⁹ The ban against the wearing of traditional dresses led to a doubling of prices of clothing materials, and this pressured the lives of the poor.

Furthermore, overt ill-treatment aimed at discrediting the clergy also intensified. In Tabriz, four leading *mojtaheds* were forced to attend a reception with their wives unveiled.¹⁰⁰ As shown by the report, there were no exceptions to the policy. Khomeini, who led a life as a clergyman in Qom, remembered those days as follows:

"Rouze was forbidden, and clergy with turbans were not allowed to appear on streets anywhere in the country. A respectable clergyman whose name I do not want to say was taken to a quarantine, where his costume was torn into pieces with a knife. He was released with a coat and trousers on . . . In the days of that impious man (namely Reza Shah) anti-Islamic propaganda of any nature was carried out to prevent giving any room to the clergy! A man, swearing to God, said that he would never allow two groups to ride the bus: the clergy, and prostitutes."¹⁰¹

Thus, Reza Shah succeeded in remarkably weakening the socio-political influence of the Shi'i *ulama*. They were regarded not as a privileged class but as one to be persecuted. For example, the conscription law which was submitted by the Ministry of War to the 11th Majles in

March 1938 imposed two years of compulsory military service onto the judges of *shari'ah* courts, *ulama* and theological students (Article 62).¹⁰² The law of November 1939 provided that *shari'ah* courts would have to observe state laws, not the laws of Islam. Moreover, the 12th Majles passed a law in April 1941 authorizing the government to sell the lands and qanats belonging to *awqaf*. The policy was considered by Wilber as "one of the most unpopular of Reza Shah's decisions" aimed at destroying the economic independence of the clergy.¹⁰³ Even though it was a fatal blow to them, they organized no protest movements.

After December 1935 when Foroughi, who was terribly disappointed by the advent of the suffocative dictatorship, resigned from the premiership, three cabinets under Mahmud Jam, Matin Daftary and 'Ali Mansur were organized one after another.¹⁰⁴ These cabinet were naturally composed of "yes-men," and excluded the independent-minded intellectuals who had played a significant part in the Constitutional Revolution. Rather, many of Reza Shah's opponents were persecuted. For instance, Modarres was allegedly murdered in prison, and Mosaddeq was arrested and banished. Besides, Firuz, Haz'al and Diva also shared the fate of Modarres.

In these final years, Reza Shah established a political system of absolute, literally one-man rule throughout Iran, propped up by a military force more than 140,000 strong. His regime was certainly liberated from the domestic threats which he had faced in 1920s. But, at the same time, there was a literal alienation of Shi'i society from the state. The collapse of his dictatorial regime, therefore, needed only a thrust from the outside.

Some Concluding Remarks

As examined above, the Reza Shah regime was not consistently powerful, but was strengthened in stages through compromises, purges, oppression and other stratagem, finally developing into a dictatorship. By means of the structure of a centralized network, it penetrated from Tehran into all parts of the country, and from the administrative field into judicial and legislative systems. This became a drawing line between the rules of the Qajar dynasty and the Pahlavi. Also, centralization can be said to have given his dictatorship indirect support, as it was recognized as a precondition for overcoming Iran's plight since the nineteenth century by many nationalists such as Modarres, Bahar, and Mosaddeq; therefore, they undoubtedly hesitated to thoroughly criticize his rise to power.¹⁰⁵

However, it is significant that although the aim of centralization was also shared by Reza Shah in order to achieve liberation from dependency

on foreign rule, that of constitutionalism, including democratic aspects, was not. This seems to be related to the way of thinking of Reza Shah, who was brought up in the peculiar atmosphere of the army, where democracy was useless and even obstructive. The nationalists who were cited above could not place too much attention on the gap between their cognizance and his extra-constitutional system. Therefore, centralization, which was located on the same line extending from the Constitutional Revolution, became a device for support for his dictatorship, which failed to guarantee parliamentary democracy.

On the other hand, Reza Shah's modernization program had a marked leaning toward the imitation of Western civilization. He himself demanded that Iranian students travel to Europe to learn moral education, because he supposedly regarded it as the source of Western superiority.¹⁰⁶ But it is difficult to find any vestige of this morality put to practical use. Rather, as is often pointed out, the modernization policies were intended to upgrade his own prestige, and not that of the Iranian nation, much less of national development.¹⁰⁷ Students studying moral education would return from Europe only to witness the superficial policies including the compulsion of the international hat and the abolition of the veil, and to be faced with a dictatorial state system. The regime lacked a democratic system to absorb the demands of the moral education.

Accordingly, the nationalism which Reza Shah advocated so earnestly, especially in the third stage, was defective in its ideological substance. Although he emphasized the glorious Persian past of the pre-Islamic era, this meant a negligence not only of the multi ethnic and religious reality but also of the Constitutional Revolution as an inheritance of Iran's great nationalist movement. As long as he adhered to secular, anti-Shi'i nationalism for centralization, he could not take advantage of the nation's socio-political and cultural heritage.

Needless to say, this had a negative influence on him. It may bear some relation to the decisive difference between Mustafa Kemal and him. Both fought for the removal of the socio-political influences of the Islamic clergy. However, while the former enjoyed a historical condition in which they were considered a reactionary group, the latter did not, because the Shi'i clergy were rather actively committed to nationalist movements in Iran. Reza Shah, who rose to power through the coup d'etat of 1921, which was often criticized as a British conspiracy,¹⁰⁸ failed to realize this historical difference, and his nationalism became hollow.

Let us now examine several characteristics of the protest movements under Reza Shah's rule. Firstly, those movements were almost always com-

munity-based. One of the reasons for this can be seen in the influence of the decentralized structure of Iranian society.¹⁰⁹ As a result, the tribes in Fars could neither rise up together against his regime nor could they revolt in cooperation with the other communities, including the Shi'i clergy. In addition, Hayeri Yazdi's apolitical stance may be cited as a reason for why the protest movements failed to become a national movement. In particular, compared with the leading roles played by high-ranking *ulama* in the movement against Tobacco Regie of 1891–1893 and in the Constitutional Revolution, his quietism certainly could be regarded as a factor which restrained the growth of protest movements.

However, we need to give attention to the fact that all of those *maraje'* were living in *'Atabat* (the Shi'i holy cities in Iraq), which were relatively immune from the political pressure of the Tehran Government. In addition, a comparatively friendly relationship had existed between Reza Shah and the Iraqi *maraje'*, Sheykh Mohammad Hosein Na'ini¹¹⁰ and Sheykh Abol Hasan Esfahani¹¹¹ since 1924. Therefore, it may be a mistake to overemphasize Hayeri Yazdi's quietism. Moreover, as Mohammad H. Faghfoory has already examined, it must be noted that the clergy took a diversity of stances, such as opposition, wait-and-see, adaptability, and cooperation toward Reza Shah's regime.¹¹² In short, the Shi'i clergy was not monolithic at all, and as a result each of the movements failed to go beyond local resistance.

In addition, the protest movements triggered by reform policies were embarked upon mainly in order to defend the traditional customs and values of society. However, they never possessed any ideological dimension which could outshine constitutionalism. They opposed several individual policies that were contrary to Islamic values, but failed to develop any protest movement against Reza Shah's dictatorial reign, which was based on the Iranian constitution. In other words, their lack of concrete aims for state building seems not merely to have prevented the spread of the movements to the national level, but also to have accelerated its easy disintegration.

Furthermore, there was nothing new in the means for struggle; the Shi'i clergy resorted to traditional and Islamic means to signify their intent to protest. However, these means were no longer effective against a regime which saw sacred places as hotbeds of seditionists or reactionaries, and that mercilessly arrested even high-ranking *ulama*. Therefore, the sporadic protest movements, in the face of armed suppression, were doomed to failure. The Goharshad case became a clear turning point from which Shi'i clergy had to fundamentally rethink their relation with the state.

In the above mentioned respects, we can see no more “anti-Pahlavism” than “Pahlavism.” However, the religious centralized network which Hayeri Yazdi and his disciples applied their energies to building progressed quietly and steadily from Qom under the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah (1941-1979). This network changed into a basis for revolution when a clear vision for a future Islamic state as “anti-Pahlavism” was preached by the charismatic leader Khomeini.

Notes:

- 1 Born to a military family in Savadkuh of Mazandaran on March 16, 1878, he joined the Cossack Brigade at the age of 22, and distinguished himself as a military officer under the name of Sardar-e Sepah; he was promoted to brigade commander in 1915. In the coup d'état of 1921, he took the office as Minister of War, and then Prime Minister in 1923, and finally founded the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1925. Although he gradually strengthened his dictatorial power, he stepped down from the throne in favor of his son (Mohammad Reza) in September 1941, one month after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. He died in exile in Johannesburg on July 26, 1944. For biographic works, see Donald N. Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran* (New York: Exposition Press, 1975); Mohammad Essad-Bey, *Reza Shah* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1938).
- 2 On Iranian foreign policies and international relations, especially from the nineteenth century up to the rise of Reza Shah, see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500-1941* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966), pp. 33-167; Abd al-Reza Hushang Mahdavi, *Tarikh-e Ravabet-e Khareji-ye Iran* (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1349), pp. 106-208.
- 3 Joseph M. Upton, *The History of Modern Iran: An Interpretation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 68-70; Nikki R. Keddie, “The Iranian Power Structure and Social Change 1800-1969: Overview,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 2, 1971, p. 10.
- 4 For a general analysis on modernization policy and its effect on Iranian society under Reza Shah's rule, see Amin Banani, *The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); Homa Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), pp. 101-137.
- 5 This paper, which was originally written for Session 5 of An International Symposium of the Islamic Area Studies Project held in Kisarazu, Japan, on October 7, 2001, considerably overlaps the below work of Mohammad H. Faghfoory. He divides the period into three stages as follows; the first stage (1921-1925) as mutual dependence and friendship; the second (1925-1927) as transition from alliance to enmity; and the third (1927-41) as modernization and transformation. Here in particular, I reexamine the changing dictatorship

during 1925–1941, with due regard to the moves inside the regime and counter-measures towards protest movements; Mohammad H. Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran: 1921–1941," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 19, 1987, pp. 413–432.

- ⁶ See Amin Saikal, "Kemalism: Its Influences on Iran and Afghanistan," *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1981–82, pp. 25–32; Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, p. 44.
- ⁷ For details, see Shintaro Yoshimura, "Iranian Politics after the Collapse of the 1921 Coup d'état Cabinet: Notes on the Formation of Reza Shan's Military Dictatorship" (in Japanese), *Studies in Area Culture*, Memoirs of the Faculty of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University, I, Vol. 23, 1997, pp. 135–167; Shintaro Yoshimura, "Iranian Politics in the Period of Reza Khan's Premiership, 1923–1925" (in Japanese), *Journal of Historical Studies*, No. 738, July 2000, pp. 17–32.
- ⁸ Born in Tehran in 1873 as the son of Mirza Yusef Mostofi al-Mamalek, he is said to have started service for the Ministry of Finance at the age of 11. As a competent bureaucrat under the Qajar Dynasty, he was dispatched to Europe for seven years, and thereafter occupied cabinet posts eleven times including six times as premier. In 1927 he retired from Iranian politics, and passed away in 1932; Mehdi Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 3 (Tehran: Zovvar, 1363), pp. 318–321; Cyrus Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power* (London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 17.
- ⁹ Born in Tehran in 1875, he studied medical science at Dar al-Fonun (founded in 1851), the first modern higher educational institution in Iran, but showed an interest in literature and taught a course at the Political Science College. His political career started from the second Majles, where he gained a seat as a deputy elected from Tehran in 1909. After the end of World War I in particular, he experienced a number of ministerial posts including the premiership three times. Under Mohammad Reza he served as Court Minister, but died in 1942. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 3, pp. 450–451; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, pp. 292–293.
- ¹⁰ Born to a landlord family in Khorasan Province in 1879, he stayed in St. Petersburg to be educated at an Imperial Russian Military School and traveled widely in Western Europe. In this relation, he entered the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs first as an interpreter of Russian language; thereafter he was elected as a deputy of the second Majles from Khorasan. After the coup d'état in 1921, he took office as the Minister of Public Works in the cabinet of Reza Khan. With the foundation of the Pahlavi Dynasty, as the most powerful man after the shah, he led Iranian internal and external policies from an anti-British and pro-Russian stance. However, he was dismissed from the post of Court Minister in 1932 and died in prison in October 1933. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 2, pp. 239–243; Miron Rezun, "Reza Shah's Court Minister: Teymurtash," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 12, 1980, pp. 119–137.
- ¹¹ For details, see Stephanie Cronin, "Opposition to Reza Khan within the Iranian Army, 1921–26," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4, October 1994, pp. 724–750.

- ¹² Telegram from Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain, June 3, 1926, FO13084/134.
- ¹³ Intelligence Summary for the period ending July 24, 1926, FO13178/69(i); Intelligence Summary for the period ending August 7, 1926, FO13178/79(i); Intelligence Summary for the period ending October 2, 1926, FO13178/135(i); Intelligence Summary for the period ending February 5, 1927, FO13288/41(i).
- ¹⁴ Firuz, born the eldest son of the powerful aristocrat Abd al-Hosein Mirza Farmanfarma in 1889, studied in Beirut in his middle teens. At the age of eighteen, he was appointed Governor of Kerman. After studying law in Paris as well as in Beirut again for more than five years, he signed the notorious Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1919 as Minister of Justice under Prime Minister Vosuq al-Douleh. It is said that Firuz was instructed by the British to carry out a coup d'etat, but was imprisoned in 1921 by Zia al-Din Tabatabai who successfully held political power for three months by another coup. Becoming an Anglophobe after then, he supported the Reza Shah regime as Minister of Justice, but was dismissed in 1929 and sent to prison. Once released but imprisoned again in 1936, he was murdered in jail two years later. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 3, pp. 114–124; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 32.
- ¹⁵ Born in 1885 as the son of a minor court official, he was educated at Dar al-Fonun, and joined the Ministry of Justice. After his return from Switzerland, where he studied law, he founded the Radical Party (Hezb-e Radikal), and as a deputy of the fourth Majles supported the rise of Reza Khan. Under the new dynasty, he took the office of Justice Minister and implemented secular reforms in the ministry and judiciary systems. Although he assumed the office of Finance Minister in 1932, he allegedly committed suicide by an opium overdose in February 1937. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 2, pp. 427–429; Ehsan Yarshater, ed., *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. 7, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 1996), pp. 133–135; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 294.
- ¹⁶ Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, pp. 68–84.
- ¹⁷ Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 39–40.
- ¹⁸ Dispatch from R. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain and Enclosure on the Royal Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the newly formed Justice Courts, May 5, 1927, FO13288/145, FO13288/145(i).
- ¹⁹ Mohammad H. Faghfoory, "Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran, 1925–41," *Iranian Studies*, Vol.26, Nos. 3–4, Summer/Fall 1993, pp. 286–288.
- ²⁰ On the data mentioned here, see M. S. Ivanov, *Noveishaia istoriia Irana* (Moscow: Mysl'. 1965), p. 86; Reza Arasteh, *Education and Social Awakening in Iran* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962), p. 57; David Menashri, *Education and the Making of Modern Iran* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 102.
- ²¹ Born into the family of a religious narrator (rouzeh khan) of Birjand in 1881, after being educated as a cleric in Mashhad, he founded a religious school in Tehran. After being elected a deputy of the fourth Majles with the recommendation of Hezb-e Demokrat, he actively cooperated with Teymurtash for the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty in the Majles. He was appointed as Minister of Education, but resigned in early 1928. During World War II he

became Minister of Education in Foroughi's Cabinet for a short period. He died in 1951. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 3, pp. 235–236; Naser Najmi, *Bazigaran-e Siyasi-ye 'Asr-e Reza Shahi va Mohammad Reza Shahi* (Tehran: Entesharat-e Einshtain, 1373, pp. 116–120; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, pp. 311–312.

- ²² Born into the family of a bureaucrat in 1864, he served under a total of six monarchs from the Qajar through the Pahlavi Dynasty. When he was only 14 years old, he went to Germany to study. After his return home, he traveled with ex-prime minister Amin al-Soltan to Russia, China, Japan, the United States, etc. He contributed to the Constitutional Revolution mainly by drawing up a new election law. Thereafter, he was consecutively a deputy in the Majles, Minister of Justice and Minister of Education. Under the reign of Reza Shah, his cabinet lasted more than six years, and he retired from the Iranian political scene in 1933. He passed away at the age of 91 in 1955. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 4, pp. 184–187; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 84.
- ²³ Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, p. 96.
- ²⁴ Hosein Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 4 (Nashr-e Nasher, 1361), pp. 38–39.
- ²⁵ Dispatch from R. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain, August 26, 1927, FO13379/86.
- ²⁶ Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 4, pp. 396–397.
- ²⁷ Cited in Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi*, p. 122; The members of Iran-e Javan, which was merged into the Iran-e Nou Party in August, wore the Pahlavi hat and costume. This is regarded as a reason for why he supported the party; Intelligence Summary for the period ending September 3, 1927, FO13379/113(i).
- ²⁸ He was born to the family of a religious preacher of Ardestan in 1870. After studying Islam at a theology school of Esfahan for 13 years, he pursued his studies in Shi'i holy cities in Iraq for seven years. Returning to Esfahan, he was recommended to the second Majles as a candidate of the first-degree *ulama* by the religious leadership of Najaf. Thereafter, he engaged in politics as an active nationalist, participating in the National Defence Committee (Komite-ye Defa'iy-e Melli) during World War I. He antagonized Reza's military dictatorship in the Majles more severely than anyone else: as a result he was assaulted by a ruffian in October 1926, and finally ousted to Khwaf near the eastern border of Iran. In December 1937 he was allegedly murdered in Kashmar prison. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 1, pp. 343–345; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 156.
- ²⁹ Stephanie Cronin, *The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910–1926* (London/New York: Tauris, 1997), p. 127.
- ³⁰ Although the year of his birth is unknown, he was born into the family of a religious scholar of Eivan-e Key, to the south-east of Tehran. After his return from a temporary stay at holy cities in Iraq, he supported the Constitutional Revolution. Although he was recommended as a candidate of the first-rank *ulama*, like Modarres, he did not attend the Majles, as he was disappointed by the progress of the revolution. During World War I he supported the anti-British nationalist movement. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 4, pp.

- 393–394; Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 4, pp. 398–415.
- 31 Haj Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, *Khaterat va Khatarat* (Tehran: Zovvar, 1363), p. 376.
- 32 Intelligence Summary for the period ending November 26, 1927, FO13379/253(i).
- 33 Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 4, p. 420; Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," pp. 425–426; Dispatch from R. Clive to Austen Chamberlain, December 29, 1928, FO13479/34.
- 34 Telegram, Undated, FO13479/13(i).
- 35 Born in a village near Yazd in 1859, he studied mainly in Samarra and Najaf under famous *mojtaheds* such as Mirza-ye Shirazi, who is known for having issued a religious decree for a boycott of tobacco in December 1891. Because of his erudition and piety, he was invited to Arak and later Qom to teach. In particular, he devoted his energy to rebuilding Qom as a center of Shi'i theology beginning in 1922. His disciples include Ayatollahs such as Khomeini, Shari'atmadari, Golpaygani, and so forth. He passed away in January 1937. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 2, p. 275; Aqiqi Bakhshayesh [Alaedin Pazargadi, tr.], *Ten Decades of Ulama's Struggle* (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1985), pp. 157–174; Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism* (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 312–313.
- 36 Intelligence Summary for the period ending February 18, 1928, FO13479/98(i); Intelligence Summary for the period ending April 14, 1928, FO13479/221(i).
- 37 Hosein Makki mistakenly points out that it occurred on new year's day of 1306 (in the Persian Islamic calendar), or March 22 1927. For more on this incident see Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 4, pp. 282–288; Nematollah Qazi, *'Ellal-e Soqut-e Hokumat-e Reza Shah* (Tehran: Entesharat-e Asar, 1372), pp. 28–30; Peter Avery, *Modern Iran* (London: Earnest Benn, 1965), p. 288; Akhavi, *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran*, p. 42.
- 38 He was born in 1875 to a merchant family of Bafq in a suburb of Yazd, where he began to learn theology from the age of 14. Thereafter, he visited Najaf to study further under Mojtahed Kazem Khorasani, and came to Qom after staying in Karbala. He is generally known for having persuaded Hayeri Yazdi to make the city into a theological center of Shi'i. After the fall of Reza Shah, Bafqi returned to Qom, but then lived in Shah Abd al-'Azim until his death in August 1946. Ehsan Yarshater, ed., *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. 3 (London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989), p. 392.
- 39 Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 4, pp. 287–288.
- 40 On interference and manipulation by the army in the election, for example; Malek al-Sho'ara Bahar, *Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Ahzab-e Siyasi-ye Iran*, Vol. 2 (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1363), pp. 27–28; Abdollah Mostoufi, *Sharh-e Zendegani-ye Man ya Tarikh-e Ejtema'i va Edari dar Doure-ye Qajariyeh*, Vol. 3 (Tehran: Zavvar, 134), pp. 582–583, 606.
- 41 Mosaddeq, who was born to a noble Qajar family in 1882, went to Europe for his higher education, and obtained Doctor of Laws at Neuchatel University in Switzerland in 1914. In 1920 after returning home, he assumed the governorship of Fars province and two years later became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Moshir's cabinet. In the fifth Majles he opposed the plan for establishing the

- Pahlavi Dynasty. He remained apolitical in the inter-war period, but was arrested suddenly in 1940. After the fall of Reza Shah, he was elected from Tehran in the 14th and 15th Majles. In 1949 he formed the National Front (Jebh-e Melli) and led the Oil Nationalization Movement as Prime Minister from 1951. However, he was ousted from the government by the coup d'état of August 1953, and sentenced to a three-year prison term. After his release, he was kept under house arrest, and died in 1967. Iraj Afshar, *Taqirrat-e Mosaddeq dar Zendan dar bare-ye Havades-e Zendegi-ye Khish* (Tehran: Sazman-e Ketab, 1359); Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 203.
- ⁴² Born to the family of a preacher in Tabriz, in 1878, Taqizadeh, although self-educated, was a prominent member of the Democratic Party (Hezb-e Demokrat) in the second Majles. Alarmed by his opponents because of their radical activities, he escaped to Europe in 1910. During World War I he published a journal named *Kaveh* in Berlin. Under Reza Shah's reign, he was successively a deputy in the Majles, Governor of Khorasan, Minister to London, and Minister of Finance in Hedayat's government. While in Paris as Minister, he rejected a demand by the Shah to return. After the latter went into exile, he was elected to the 15th Majles and Senate, and died in Tehran in 1969. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 5, pp. 66–68; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 369.
- ⁴³ Bahar, who was born to the family of a laureate in Mashhad in 1886, displayed his ability as a poet during childhood. Therefore, he was conferred Malek Sho'ara, the title of his father and served at the Shrine of the eighth Imam, 'Ali al-Reza. In the Constitutional Revolution, he organized the Mashhad branch of Hezb-e Demokrat, and published its organ *Nou Bahar*. He antagonized Reza's dictatorship as a deputy: as a result, he was arrested several times after 1929. In 1946 he was appointed Minister of Education in Ahmad Qavam's Cabinet, but resigned a few months later. He passed away in 1951. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. III, pp. 476–477; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 156.
- ⁴⁴ Born in 1872 as the son of Nasrollah Khan Moshir al-Doureh, a Prime Minister under the Qajar Dynasty, he was educated in law at Moscow University. After 1907 he took office as Minister of Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Education respectively. At the outbreak of World War I, he declared the country's neutrality as Premier; thereafter he experienced the premierships four times and served in other ministries. However, he virtually left politics in 1923 and died in Tehran in 1935. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 1, pp. 323–325; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 78.
- ⁴⁵ He was born in 1875 as the brother of Hasan Pirnia (the second son of Nasrollah Khan). After returning from Paris, he joined the cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Constitutional Revolution. Thereafter, he also experienced a number of ministerial posts, and was appointed chairman of the Majles from the fourth to the sixth. Under Reza Shah's rule, although elected to the seventh Majles, he declined to serve as a deputy. In 1947 he died in Tehran. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 1, pp. 388–389; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, pp. 83–84.
- ⁴⁶ Hosein Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 5 (Tehran: Nashr-e Nasher, 1362), pp. 82–83; Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi*, p. 129.
- ⁴⁷ Dispatch from B. Gilliat-Smith to Mr. Parr, October 19, 1928, FO13568/85(i).

- ⁴⁸ In addition, Article 3 of the law provided; "Violation of this Act is punishable by a fine of from 1 to 5 tomans and/or imprisonment for from one to seven days if the guilty person is a town dweller; if he is not a town dweller, the punishment will be imprisonment for from one to seven days only." Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 5, pp. 71–72; Dispatch from Sir R. Clive to Sir A. Chamberlain, December 31, 1928, FO13671/31(i); Faghfoory, "Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran," p. 290.
- ⁴⁹ Dispatch from Lt.Col. H. V. Biscoe, February 14, 1929, FO13671/142(i); Intelligence Summary for the period ending May 4, 1929, FO13671/234(i).
- ⁵⁰ In this relation, the government requested Aman Allah's wife to wear a veil when they visited Iran. On the political unrest, including the revolt led by "Bacheche-ye Saqa" in Afghanistan, as well as the request of the Iranian government, see Hedayat, *Khaterat va Khatarat*, p. 379; Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 5, pp. 16–31.
- ⁵¹ Dispatch from H.G. Chick, Consul at Shiraz to Sir R. Clive, March 15, 1929, FO13671/198(i). In addition, for an outline of the relations between those tribal group, the Tehran Government, and the British see Richard Tapper, ed., *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (London/Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983).
- ⁵² Born in 1873 or 1874, he is known, as the leader of the Qashqa'is, for having organized a revolt against the British during World War I. Although the revolt was suppressed, he maintained his influence among the tribe. Also, he was elected to the fifth and eighth Majles, but was arrested in August 1932 and found dead in prison in March of the next year. The police announced his death was due to a heart attack. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 1, pp. 138–140.
- ⁵³ Quoted in Dispatch from A. Davis, Acting Consul at Shiraz to Sir R.Clive, May 15, 1929, FO13678/248(i).
- ⁵⁴ Dispatch from B. Gilliat-Smith, Consul at Tabriz, to Sir R. Clive, June 6, 1929, FO13712/10(i).
- ⁵⁵ On these three officers, see *The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran*, pp. 244–245, 250–252.
- ⁵⁶ He was born as the eldest son of Bakhtiyari Chief Sardar-e As'ad in 1879. During the Constitutional Revolution, he participated in the military campaign to liberate Tehran from the lesser despotism of Mohammad 'Ali Shah, and became a member of the Supreme Court of Judicature, condemning Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri to death. After World War I, he was appointed as Governor of Kerman and Khorasan, and until his death of 1934 in jail he experienced posts in the Ministry of Post and Telegraph, and War in five cabinets. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 1, pp. 245–247; Ghani, *Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah*, p. 331.
- ⁵⁷ Ja'afar Qoli Khan Amir Bahador, "Khaterat-e Sardar-e As'ad Bakhtiyari," Iraj Afshar, ed., *Entesharat-e Asatir* (Tehran, 1372), p. 232; Telegram from Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson, July 12, 1929, FO13712/17.
- ⁵⁸ Faghfoory, "Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran," pp. 300–301.
- ⁵⁹ Dispatch from Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson, June 29, 1929, FO13712/22; Dispatch from B. Gilliat-Smith, Consul at Tabriz to Sir R. Clive, June 19, 1929,

- FO13712/22(i).
- ⁶⁰ Intelligence Summary for the period ending July 13, 1929, FO13712/36(i); Dispatch from Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson, July 27, 1929, FO13712/49; Intelligence Summary for the period ending September 21, 1929, FO13712/89(i); Dispatch from Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson, November 13, 1929, FO13712/122; Dispatch from Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson, July 15, 1930, FO13962/34; Intelligence Summary for the period ending August 26, 1930, FO13962/80(i); Intelligence Summary for the period ending October 7, 1930, FO3962/133(i); Intelligence Summary for the period ending October 23, 1930, FO13962/159(i).
- ⁶¹ On Semitqu and Doust Mohammad, see Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 1, pp. 136–137; Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 5, pp. 126–130.
- ⁶² Ebrahim Safa'i, *Khatereha-ye Tarikhi* (Tehran: Ketab-e Sara, 1368), pp. 31–36; Khosro Mo'tazed, *Polis-e Siyasi* (Tehran: Entesharat-e Janzade, 1369), pp. 391–425; Dispatch from Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson, June 29, 1929, FO13712/22.
- ⁶³ In relation to the court process and his statements there, see Baqer 'Aqeli, *Teymurtash dar Sahne-ye Siyasat-e Iran* (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Javidan, 1371), pp. 301–323; Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 5, pp. 195–199.
- ⁶⁴ Dispatch from Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson, November 16, 1929, FO13712/125; Dispatch from Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson, April 22, 1931, FO13984/98; Dispatch from Mr. Hoare to Sir John Simon, December 29, 1932, FO14430/11.
- ⁶⁵ It is said that one of the factors behind his arrest was the death of Hasan Mostoufi (on August 28) who had a close relationship with him. Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 5, pp. 160–162.
- ⁶⁶ Hedayat, *Khaterat va Khatarat*, p. 402; Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 5, pp. 420–422.
- ⁶⁷ Dispatch from V.A.L. Mallet to Sir John Simon, September 18, 1933, FO14502/63.
- ⁶⁸ The tribal leaders who, it was announced, had been executed as “traitors and robbers” were as follows; Mohammad Reza Khan Bakhtiyar (Sardar-e Fateh), Mohammad Javad Khan Esfandiyari (Sardar Eqbal), 'Ali Mardan Khan Chahar-Lang, Gudarz Ahmad Khosrovi Bakhtiyari, Sartip Khan Boyer Ahmadi, Shokrollah Khan Boyer-Ahmadi, Hosein Khan Darehshuri Qashqa'i, and Imam Qoli Khan Mamasani; Dispatch from H. M. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Sir John Simon, December 1, 1934, FO14599/124.
- ⁶⁹ Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 5, p. 471.
- ⁷⁰ Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi*, pp. 141–152.
- ⁷¹ On the suppression of Communist and labor movements as well as his land confiscation, for example, see Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 154–163.
- ⁷² Ivanov, *Noveishaia istoriia Irana*, p. 69.; M. Reza Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Boulder/London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), p. 102. Also, the British legation reported Reza Shah's land-grabbing all over Tonakabon. Dispatch from R.H. Hoare to Sir John Simon, May 24, 1932,

FO14228/130.

- ⁷³ Cited in Hedayat, *Khaterat va Khatarat*, p. 403.
- ⁷⁴ Mas'ud Behnud, *Az Seyyed Ziya ta Bakhtiyar: Doulatha-ye Iran az Sevvom-e Esfand ta Bist o Dovvom-e Bahman 1357* (Tehran: Nima, 1368), pp. 127–128.
- ⁷⁵ Cited in Hosein Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6 (Tehran: Nashr-e Nasher, 1362), p. 158.
- ⁷⁶ Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6, p. 159.
- ⁷⁷ On the circular letter issued by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the change of the state name and British viewpoints on it, see Memorandum from H.M. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Sir John Simon, December 29, 1934, FO14744/18(i).
- ⁷⁸ Mehrdad Kia, "Persian Nationalism and the Campaign for Language Purification," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2, April 1998, pp. 19–21.
- ⁷⁹ In relation to the full members, the statute of the Academy and different viewpoints on the campaign, see Kia, "Persian Nationalism and the Campaign for Language Purification," pp. 21–27; 'Ali Akbar Dekhoda, *Loghat Nameh*, Vol. 1, (n.p., n.d.), pp. 97–109. On the other cultural policies and organizations such as Women's Club (Kanun-e Banovan) and Patriotic Women's Association (Jami'at-e Nesvan-e Vatankhah) founded in those days, see Veida Hamraz, *Nehadha-ye Farhangi dar Hokumat-e Reza Shah, Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran* (Tehran: Mo'asese-ye Motale'at-e Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran, Shomare-ye Avval, 1376), pp. 50–63.
- ⁸⁰ Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6, pp. 250–251.
- ⁸¹ Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6, pp. 252–253.
- ⁸² Born into the family of a religious scholar in 1865, he was educated in theology not only in his home town, Tabriz but also later in Najaf. After returning home in 1891, he renounced his early support for the Constitutional Revolution and organized a movement against it. Also, he led an anti-Pahlavi movement in 1928–29, but was expelled. He died in Tabriz in 1939. *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. II, p. 31.
- ⁸³ Quoted in Hamid Basirat Manesh, "Ravand-e Kashf-e Hejab va Vakonesh-e Rouhaniyan," *Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran* (Tehran: Mo'asese-ye Motale'at-e Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran, Shomare-ye Dovvom, 1376), p. 81.
- ⁸⁴ Born in Qom in 1865, he visited Teheran to study under Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri and Haj Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani. After returning from his studies in Najaf and Karbala, he settled down in Mashhad in 1913. In 1946 with the death of Seyyed Abol Hasan Esfahani, he became sole *marja*. However, he passed away in Najaf the next year. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 6, pp. 91–92; Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*, pp. 318–319.
- ⁸⁵ Born in Birjand in 1878 or 1879, he acted from his youth as an agent of Amir Shoukat al-Molk, who was influential in that region. He was elected as his representative to the Majles from the fourth to sixth. He had a close relationship with Court Minister Teymurtash, and was appointed chief custodian of the Imam Reza's Shrine by the Shah around 1926. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 4, pp. 15–16; Baqer 'Aqeli, *Zoka al-Molk Forughi va Shahrivar 1320* (Tehran: Entesharat-e 'Elmi, 1368), pp. 176–178; Zahra Shaji'i, *Namayandegan-e Majles-e Shoura-ye Melli dar Bist o Yek Doure-ye Qanungozari* (Tehran:

- Entesharat-e Mo'asese-ye Motale'at va Tahqiqat-e Ejtema'i, 1344), p. 295.
- ⁸⁶ Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6, p. 253.
- ⁸⁷ Cited in Basirat Manesh, "Ravand-e Kashf-e Hejab va Vakonesh-e Rouhaniyan," p. 83.
- ⁸⁸ Basirat Manesh, "Ravand-e Kashf-e Hejab va Vakonesh-e Rouhaniyan," p. 84; Bakhshayesh, *Ten Decades of Ulama's Struggle*, p. 163.
- ⁸⁹ See Michael M. J. Fischer, *Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 99; *Encyclopaedia Iranica*, Vol. IV, pp. 319–320.
- ⁹⁰ Dispatch from C.K. Daly, Consul General at Meshed to Mr. H.M. Knatchbull-Hugessen, July 15, 1935, FO14906/26(i).
- ⁹¹ *Ettela'at*, Shahrivar 28, 1358 (September 19, 1979) & Mehr 2, 1358 (September 24, 1979).
- ⁹² In particular, Pakravan, who had been Iranian Minister at Moscow, took a hard-line attitude toward the revolt, saying, "if such a situation had happened in Russia, it would have been easily suppressed by military force." The government, consequently, instructed 250 soldiers to be put under his command. Hosein Fardoust, *Zohur va Soqut-e Saltanat-e Pahlavi* (Tehran: Entesharat-e Ettela'at, 1347), pp. 69–70.
- ⁹³ Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi*, p. 167.
- ⁹⁴ Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6, p. 256; Imam Khomeini, "Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran az Didgah-e Emam Khomeini," in Seyyed Mohammad Hashemi Tarujani & Hamid Basirat Manesh, eds., *Setad-e Bozorgdasht-e Yek Sadmin Sal-e Tavallod-e Emam Khomeini* (Tehran, 1378), pp. 124–125; Mohammad Hasan Rajabi, *Zendeginame-ye Siyasi-ye Emam Khomeini, az Aghaz ta Tab'id*, Vol. 1 (Tehran: Markaz-e Farhangi, 1377), p. 74.
- ⁹⁵ In terms of the role of Asadi, it is pointed out conversely that he cooperated with the government; he was informed of the oppressive plan in advance, and deceived influential *mojtaheds* like Ardabili to leave the mosque lest the revolt should be intensified. Also, the number of those killed in the incident is said to have been 2,000–5,000. Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6, pp. 255–256.
- ⁹⁶ Hedayat, *Khaterat va Khatarat*, pp. 410–411.
- ⁹⁷ Cited in Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6, pp. 258–259.
- ⁹⁸ On the supplementary policies and local reactions to them, see Dispatch from Mr. H.M. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Mr. Eden, January 11, 1936, FO15370/20; Intelligence Summary for the period ending January 11, 1936, FO15370/21(i); Dispatch from R.W. Urquhart to Mr. Butler, February 3, 1936, FO15370/36(i); Dispatch from N.M. Butler to Mr. Eden, February 7, 1936, FO15370/32; Dispatch from N.M. Butler to Mr. Eden, February 20, 1936, FO15370/36; Intelligence Summary for the period ending February 22, 1936, FO15370/41(i).
- ⁹⁹ Intelligence Summary for the period ending April 10, 1937, FO15536/41(i); Makki, *Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran*, Vol. 6, p. 286.
- ¹⁰⁰ Dispatch from R.W. Urquhart to Mr. Butler, February 20, 1936, FO15370/43(i).
- ¹⁰¹ Khomeini, "Tarikh-e Mo'aser-e Iran az Didgah-e Emam Khomeini," pp. 105, 111.
- ¹⁰² Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, p. 56.
- ¹⁰³ Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi*, p. 200.
- ¹⁰⁴ On those cabinets, see, for example, Baqer 'Aqli, *Nakhost Vaziran-e Iran az*

- Moshir al-Doureh ta Bakhtiyar: 1285–1357* (Tehran: Sazman-e Entesharat-e Javidan, 1370), pp. 444–484; Behnud, *Az Seyyed Ziya ta Bakhtiyar*, pp. 135–173.
- ¹⁰⁵ Malek Sho'ara Bahar, *Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Ahzab-e Siyasi-ye Iran*, Vol. 1 (Tehran: Sherkat-e Sahami, 1357), pp. 243–245, 349–350.
- ¹⁰⁶ Wilber, *Riza Shah Pahlavi*, p. 135.
- ¹⁰⁷ Katouzian, *The Political Economy of Modern Iran*, pp. 101–135; Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century*, p. 103; Similarly, see Hedayat, *Khaterat va Khatarat*, p. 383; Banani, *The Modernization of Iran*, pp. 146–153.
- ¹⁰⁸ For the relation between the coup d'état and the British conspiracy theory, see Shintaro Yoshimura, "A Review of the Coup d'état of Iran, 1921" (in Japanese), *Journal of Historical Studies*, No. 566, April 1987, pp. 1–15.
- ¹⁰⁹ On the communal-based structure of Iranian society, see Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp. 9–49.
- ¹¹⁰ Born into a religiously distinguished family of Na'in in 1860, after undergoing Islamic studies in Esfahan, he moved to Iraq, where he continued to learn under the guidance of Mirza Mohammad Hasan Shirazi in Samarra. In particular, he is known as an ideologue for the Constitutional Revolution, as he wrote *Tanbih al-Ummah wa Tanzih al-Millah* (*The Admonition and Refinement of the People*). In 1920 he led the uprising against the British mandate in Iraq, and was banished to Qom for eight months, while he had friendly relations with Reza Khan. After returning to Najaf, he maintained contact with the Shah. He passed away in Najaf in 1936. *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. 7 (rev. ed., Leiden/New York: E. J. Brill, 1993), pp. 918–919; Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*, p. 318.
- ¹¹¹ Born in a village near Esfahan in 1867, he studied in Karbara and Najaf, and was exiled to Qom together with Na'ini because of his participation in the anti-British uprising of early 1920. In 1942 he was sole *marja'* of the entire Shi'i world. He died in 1946 in Najaf. Bamdad, *Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran*, Vol. 1, p. 34; Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*, p. 315.
- ¹¹² Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," pp. 427–428.