Part II

Case Studies in the Middle East and Central Asia: who move, who retreat?

5. THE DYNAMICS OF NATION-BUILDING IN THE SUDAN

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Preface

While it has become quite fashionable in Western academic circles to sneer at the notion of the "nation-state,"[1] the building of a nation-state and the achievement of national integration continue to be issues of vital importance for the Sudanese people today. Thus, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA: the alliance of political forces opposed to the present dictatorial regime in the Sudan) speaks of the building of a "New Sudan" and searches for a new national identity, rather than denying the notion of the nation-state.

Obviously, this is a reflection of social realities and historical experiences in many Asian and African countries (among which is the Sudan) for the past two centuries, where the issues of national liberation and of social revolution have been inextricably intertwined, and where national movements were not the products of a handful of intellectuals, but had some true popular basis. It is also worth noting that, in such cases, "nation" is often conceived not as a mystic cultural entity tied to the past (based on race, religion, etc.) but rather as a political community based on the people's free will and choice—a community of people who share a political and social plight and struggle for a common political future. Nation-building, in such cases, is conceived as a dynamic process open to the future.

In this chapter, we will analyse the dynamics of nation-building in the Sudan over the past two centuries, and try to locate within this context the various social movements which the modern Sudan has witnessed. (These

will include movements which are not usually perceived as "nationalist" ones—such as the Mahdist movement in the nineteenth century and the movement of the Sudanese Communist Party.)

The Social Content of the Mahdist Movement

The Mahdist movement in nineteenth-century Sudan has been generally treated as an Islamic movement. This is understandable, since the concept of the "*Mahdī*" itself is an Islamic one. A more recent tendency has been to emphasize the "Islamist" (or "Islamic fundamentalistic") nature of the movement.[2]

To call an Islamic movement an "Islamic movement" is, however, tautological. Again, while there might have been "Islamic fundamentalistic" elements in the ideology of the Mahdist movement, the mere term "Islamic fundamentalism" does not clarify its nature. If the Mahdist movement was an "Islamic movement," then what did "Islam" stand for in nineteenth-century Sudan? If it was an "Islamic fundamentalistic" movement, what was the significance of this "fundamentalistic" discourse in Sudanese society in those days?—In a word, we must be more conscious of the social content of the movement.

In this context, it may be interesting to look into the concept of "*bid'ah* (innovation)" in the Mahdist movement. While both the "Wahhabists" on the Arabian Peninsula and the Sudanese Mahdi denounced *bid'ah*, what was considered the most serious *bid'ah* in the case of the Sudan was excessive taxation by the Muḥammad 'Alī dynasty, which was described as "imposition of *jizyah* (poll tax) on the Muslims."[3] There is evidence that, among the ordinary masses, the Mahdi was primarily conceived as a figure who prohibited the payment of taxes to the government, and thus was enthusiastically welcomed.[4]

A famous slogan heard among the masses in the early days of the Mahdist movement was "*'asharah fī turbah wa-lā riyāl fī ṭalibah*" (literally, "Ten dead men in a tomb is better than paying a riyal for tax").[5] Thus, the Mahdist movement was a protest against excessive taxation by the "*Turkīyah* (Ottoman-Egyptian)" regime, which itself was beginning to fall under European influence.

Similarly, the concept of the "*hijrah* (immigration) to the Mahdi," which came to constitute a key element in the Mahdist strategy, was also in a sense the continuation of a popular way of resistance during the *Turkīyah*, in accordance with which poor peasants abandoned their villages, fleeing from the heavy taxation imposed on the *sāqiyah*s (water wheels).[6]

Thus, even concepts such as *"bid'ah"* and *"hijrah,"* which on the surface appear to be purely abstract and religious, should be analysed in the context of the concrete social realities amidst which the Mahdist movement emerged.

Another important point which we should bear in mind in dealing with the Sudanese Mahdist movement is the great diversity of social forces which took part in the movement. Thus, if we are to grasp a comprehensive picture of the movement as a whole, it is not enough to simply analyse the ideas of the highly "religious-minded" people who constituted its leadership. We should be aware of the existence of various social forces which participated in the movement and in practice contributed to its success.

Perhaps, in this context, it is important to note that in the Mahdist movement not only peasants and nomads—the "traditional" social forces which first come to mind as likely supporters of a religious movement— but also modern and urban social forces took part. These social forces had been newly created (or developed) in the nineteenth century as a result of the *Turkīyah* rule in the Sudan.

Thus, we can discern in the movement such elements as *jallābah* (traders), whose activities developed due to the *Turkīyah* rule itself (the territorial unification of the eastern Sudan, the development of traffic, etc.). Ironically enough, however, some of these *jallābah* were originally poor peasants who had been compelled to abandon their villages because of heavy taxation. As their commercial activities developed along the Nile and then into the South, their interests increasingly came into conflict with those of the *Turkīyah* government and those of the European officials who were beginning to penetrate it.[7]

Another example of urban and modern elements in the Mahdist movement was the slave soldiers. These people were originally from the (predominantly non-Muslim) South and the Nūba Mountains. However, with the conquest of these areas by the *Turkīyah* government and the "development" policy pursued by the regime, they were violently uprooted from their original home, enslaved, and many were conscripted as soldiers in the state army (*jihādīyah*) or as private troops (*bāzinqir*) organized by the Northern traders. The military success of the Mahdist movement was due, to a great degree, to the presence of these elements, since they were virtually the only force versed in the use of fire-arms in Sudanese society. Indeed, with regard to the genesis of the Mahdist movement, there is a rather astonishing—but revealing—remark made by a contemporary observer:

"[The *Turkīyah* government] was anxious to economise, and disbanded

many regiments of Sudanese who had been soldiers for years and knew no other trade. These men only needed a master,"[8]

who turned out to be the Mahdists.

It is important to note that, in the Mahdist movement, not only slaves of Southern or Nūba origin, but also the inhabitants of the same regions, took part, especially in the earlier stage of the movement. It was under the auspices of these non-Muslim areas that the Mahdist movement was protected and developed. As is well known, it was to the Nūba Mountains that the Mahdi made his *hijrah*. The Dinka in the Baḥr al-Ghazāl province rose up in rebellion against the *Turkīyah* regime, responding to the Mahdi's call, and there is a famous song (collected among the Southern masses) which goes as follows:

"It is the Mahdi, the son of Deng.

To whom we ants pray on earth."[9]

There is also a tribe among the Dinka which adopted "Allāhakbar and hilāl" (literally, "God is great" and the "crescent") as its "totem" as a result of its participation in the Mahdist movement.[10]

The Mahdist movement was, thus, a large-scale popular movement against the *Turkīyah* rule, in which various social forces took part; the concept of the "Mahdiship" served as the weapon of the movement and the symbol of the unity of all these social forces. In accordance with the Sudanese Mahdist doctrine, anyone who did not believe in the Mahdiship of Muḥammad Aḥmad was regarded as a "*kāfir* (infidel)." This enabled the Sudanese masses to rise in *jihād* against the Ottoman Sultan and the Egyptian Khedive, even if these rulers were "nominally" Muslims. Conversely, all who believed in the Mahdiship of Muḥammad Aḥmad and joined the battle against oppression were regarded as true Muslims and treated equally, irrespective of their former social background. It is noteworthy, in this context, that in accordance with this doctrine, even the non-Muslims from the South or the Nūba Mountains were guaranteed equal treatment (theoretically at least), as long as they participated in the movement. Thus, in the Mahdi's letters, we find the following expression: "If it is the order of the Mahdi, obey even a Shilluk."[11] (The Shilluks are a people from the South).

Although the Mahdists themselves never used terms such as the "Sudanese nation" instead using expressions like "*aḥbāb al-mahdī* (the lovers of the Mahdi)" or "*anṣār al-dīn* (supporters of the religion)," this alliance of social forces, whose unity was guaranteed by a common cause and symbolized by the concept of the Mahdiship, undeniably constituted a political community based on a sort of "social contract." Outside observers

noticed a tendency toward the building of a "Sudanese nation-state (*dawlah waṭanīyah sūdānīyah*)"[12] and the establishment of a "national government."

The 1924 Revolution

After the British invasion and the overthrow of the Mahdist state in 1898, the Sudan was placed under an Anglo-Egyptian "Condominium." (Since Egypt itself had been under British occupation since 1882, this was in effect British rule.) This situation continued until the Sudan achieved its independence in 1956.

The conventional way of explaining the course of the development of Sudanese nationalism in the twentieth century has been as follows: There were two types of "Sudanese nationalism." One was typified by the Umma Party (led by the Mahdi's descendents—the "House of Mahdi"), which called for "the Sudan for the Sudanese." The other was represented by the "Unionist" parties (led or inspired by another religious family, the House of Mīrghanī), which called for a union between Egypt and the Sudan. Both were nationalist in the sense that they aimed for the liberation of the country from foreign rule, but their approaches and strategies were different and, it was argued, they were always opposed to one another. The political history of twentieth century Sudan has been continuously narrated and analysed within this dichotomous framework.[13]

This picture of Sudanese nationalism, however, is inaccurate. The biggest problem is that it portrays the history of Sudanese nationalism as if it were the property of the two families. While it is true that the Mahdi family continuously attempts to monopolise the legacy of the Mahdist movement in the nineteenth century, and the Mīrghanī family attempts to monopolise the Unionist movements, and that these two families were opposed to one another, the nationalist movement was not the property of the two families, and at the popular level, there were unexpected continuities between the Mahdist legacy and the Unionist movements.

The precursor of the Unionist movements in twentieth century Sudan was the 1924 Revolution. It was a political movement inspired by the 1919 Revolution in Egypt, but was swiftly suppressed by the British authorities. In the short run, it was a complete fiasco. If we look more closely into its social content, however, it becomes clear that this movement occupies quite a significant place in the history of nation-building in the Sudan. (At the same time, in some aspects, it displays rather unexpected continuity with the Mahdist movement.)[14]

To begin with, it posed the first serious criticism of British colonial

policy in the Sudan. The leaders of the Revolution revealed the essentially undemocratic nature of the colonial state (such as the inequality between British and Sudanese officials, poor urban conditions under which the Sudanese were compelled to live, lack of welfare services, etc.). Colonial economic policy, which was essentially aimed at the exploitation of Sudanese wealth for the benefit of British capitalists, was also severely attacked.

Secondly, for the first time the possibility of a revolutionary alliance between Egypt and the Sudan was seriously considered. True, even at the time of the Mahdist movement, there was an exchange of "greetings of solidarity," so to speak, between an ex-'Urābist, Aḥmad al-'Awwām, and the Mahdists.[15] Since Egypt was hopelessly in the grips of the British at the time, however, the alliance between the two revolutionary movements never came to fruition. After the 1919 Revolution in Egypt, however, the situation changed. The Sudanese people became aware of revolutionary potential of the slogan of the "unity of the Nile Valley," and the possibility of a joint struggle by the Egyptian and Sudanese peoples was seriously pursued.

Thirdly, it was modern and urban social forces such as officers and officials (the *effendīyah*) who played the central role in the 1924 Revolution. If we stick to the conventional image of the Mahdist movement (according to which it is conceived as one supported only by rural and traditional social forces), it might seem as if the two movements share nothing in common. Now that we know that modern social forces such as the *jallābah* (traders) and the *jihādīyah* (slave soldiers) played an active role in the Mahdist movement, however, it is not surprising if we discover that there is little discontinuity between the supporters of the Mahdist movement and those of the 1924 Revolution. Indeed part of the *effendīyah* drew its origins from the elements who accumulated expertise as bureaucrats and soldiers in the Mahdist state.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the same ex-slave elements who were conspicuous in the Mahdist movement also played an important role in the 1924 Revolution. 'Alī 'Abd al-Laṭīf, an ex-officer who became the president of the White Flag League ("*jam'īyat al-liwā' al-abyaḍ*," an organization which played a central role in the Revolution), was the son of ex-slaves (his mother was a Dinka from the South and his father was from the Nūba Mountains). These *effendīyah* of ex-slave origin were an interesting social force, since they could serve as liaisons between the elite (*effendīyah*) and the urban lower classes (a considerable part of which were ex-slaves).[16]

One significant consequence of the presence of these ex-slave ele-

ments in the leadership of the movement was that it led to the emergence of the concept of a "Sudanese nation," which transcended racial affiliation. It is reported that in the course of the ideological struggle among the leadership, 'Alī 'Abd al-Laṭīf opposed the use of the term "an Arab people" (as a description of the Sudanese nation) and proposed, instead, the use of the term "the Sudanese people," saying that there should be no discrimination between the "Arabs" and the "Blacks" from the South.

While the British colonial authorities were beginning to emphasize the role of tribal or religious notables (such as the Mahdi family and the Mīrghanī family) as the "natural leaders of society," for the leadership of the 1924 Revolution it followed from this conceptualisation that the "Sudanese nation" should be represented by modern social forces such as the *effendīyah*, since tribal and religious notables in the North could represent neither the South and Nūba Mountains nor the people of ex-slave origin from these areas, who were living inside Northern society.

Another point of significance concerning the 1924 Revolution is that it can be regarded as a missing link, so to speak, between the Mahdist movement in the nineteenth century and the Sudanese Communist Party in the twentieth century.

The Sudanese Communist Party Seen in the Light of the History of the Nationalist Movement in the Sudan

Thomas Hodgkin, in his famous article titled "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism in the African Setting" (1969), raises an interesting question about the relationship between millenarian and modern revolutionary movements.[17] At the end of the article he asks: what kind of relations could be found between the Mahdist movement in the nineteenth century and the Sudanese Communist Party in the twentieth century? . . . However, he himself never answered this question in a comprehensive way.

Now that we have examined the social and national content of the Mahdist movement, it seems clear that, generally speaking, the two movements share common elements, in the sense that both were national liberation movements. With regard to communism, as in most of the "Third World" countries, it was enthusiastically accepted by young intellectuals in the Middle East, essentially as an ideology of national liberation. Many of the communists began their careers as single-minded nationalists, and, in the course of their struggle against imperialism, discovered the theory of Marxism-Leninism, which turned out to be the most rational and comprehensive criticism of imperialism. Obviously, this applies to the case of the

Sudan. The exact location occupied by the Communist Party in modern Sudanese history becomes clearer, however, if we focus our attention on the relationship between the Sudanese Communist Party and the 1924 Revolution.

Many of the first-generation members of the Sudanese Communist Party were sons and daughters of people who had taken part in the 1924 Revolution. Thus they were aware of the essentially undemocratic nature of the colonial state, criticized it, and sought national liberation. The first issue, published in 1950, of *The Red Flag* (*al-liwā' al-aḥmar*), the organ of the Sudanese Communist Party ("the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation" at the time), contained the following: "Our flag used to be white. But it turned into red, because of a large quantity of blood which was shed afterwards."[18] Needless to say, this was a reference to the "White Flag League," an organization which played a central role in the 1924 Revolution.

Being the sons and daughters of participants of the 1924 Revolution, which advocated the "unity of the Nile Valley," the members of the Sudanese Communist Party had a natural inclination toward, and interest in, Egyptian political culture; this enabled them to embrace Communism through Egyptian channels. The idea of the "unity of the Nile Valley," as advocated by the leaders of the 1924 Revolution, was later developed into a more democratic and revolutionary strategy, the "joint struggle (*al-kifāḥ al-mushtarak*) of the Egyptian and the Sudanese people against imperialism." This strategy was adopted by both the Egyptian and Sudanese communists.

Another interesting point concerning the Sudanese Communist Party is that the intellectuals of ex-slave origin (from the South and the Nūba Mountains), whose role in the 1924 Revolution we have just looked at, continued to play a significant role in the early days of the Communist Party. This partly explains why, in the case of the Sudan, the alliance between the revolutionary intellectuals and the workers' movement[19]—a difficult task for communist parties in many developing countries—was possible. As we have seen, the intellectuals of ex-slave origin were a social force who were able to serve as a liaison between the intellectuals and the urban lower classes.

The emergence of the Sudanese Communist Party and the upsurge of the workers' movement in the late 1940s undeniably influenced the grass-roots of other political parties (the Unionist parties and the Umma Party), thus indirectly forcing the hands of the even essentially pro-colonial religious and tribal notables who constituted the leadership of these parties. These developments consequently led to the Sudan's achievement of inde-

pendence in 1956. (It is interesting to note, in this context, that of all the political forces which existed in the Sudan at that time, the only one which did not take part in the independence struggle was the Muslim Brotherhood, the present National Islamic Front.)

The mere achievement of political independence, however, did not radically change the nature of the Sudanese state. The state apparatus, which was inherited from the colonial period, remained undemocratic and authoritarian. Its economic structure, too, remained essentially colonial, and the development gap between different areas of the country intensified. Struggles between the working masses and the ruling strata (whose interests the leaders of the Umma Party and the Unionist Parties represented) continued, and beginning in 1958 the ruling strata started to resort to military coups d'etat in order to suppress popular movements. In addition, from the 1960s the ruling strata began to use Islam as a convenient ideological tool for the suppression of democratic aspirations. This led to the rapid growth of "Islamist" tendencies (as represented by the Muslim Brotherhood) in Sudanese politics. These factors eventually led to the coup d'etat of 1989.

As regards the question of Northern-Southern relations (or the question of the Southern factor in Sudanese politics), one significant development in the post-1924 period was that, as a result of the "Southern Policy" pursued by the British colonial authorities, interactions between the North and South were disrupted, hampering the possibility of any cooperation or alliance between political movements in the North and the South.

In Search of a "New Sudan"

In face of the "Islamist" regime, which came to power through the 1989 coup d'etat, the Sudanese people organized the National Democratic Alliance.

One of the most interesting points about the National Democratic Alliance is that it aims not only at overthrowing the present dictatorial regime but also at re-considering the nature of the Sudanese state. According to it (as expressed through conferences and declarations), the present crisis in the Sudan is not a product of a single coup d'etat, but originates in the nature of the Sudanese state inherited from the colonial period. Thus, in 1992 the NDA declared that after the overthrow of the present regime, a constitutional conference would be held, discussing such questions as "identity (*huwīyah*), growth and development, the division of

power and wealth, and the relationship between religion and state." More recently, at the Asmara conference in 1995, it declared that, after the overthrow of the present regime, a "New Sudan" would be built. According to the "Asmara Declaration," this "New Sudan" would be a state based on the concept of "citizenship (*muwāṭanah*)," in which there would be no discrimination based on "religion, race, gender, or culture," and where the rights of "marginalized peoples" would be respected. The principle of the "separation between politics and religion" was also confirmed.[20]

Without doubt, the NDA's adoption of the idea of a "New Sudan" is due, to a great degree, to the existence within its ranks of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM)—a movement which is mainly based in the South and the Nūba Mountains. Indeed, one of the most striking features of post-1989 Sudanese politics is that, as a result of the brutal rule of the present regime all over the country, for the first time (after Independence, at least) the Northerners and the Southerners have come to fight together against this common enemy. Thus, the NDA includes not only political parties (the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, and the Sudanese Communist Party) and labour unions from the North, but also the mainly Southern-based SPLM. The SPLM has played a central role in the activities of the NDA, both in the political and military fields, and its existence has undeniably contributed to the development of the concept of the "New Sudan." Actually, the term "New Sudan" was first used by the SPLM in its political documents.

It is noteworthy, at the same time, that it is not only the Southerners who have enthusiastically accepted and advocated the concept of a "New Sudan." (The SPLM itself, incidentally, includes many Northerners who joined this movement out of sympathy for the idea of the "New Sudan," and consequently the SPLM cannot be regarded as a purely "Southern" movement. The organization itself, when it started its activities in 1983, refused to be regarded as a "Southern" movement and claimed to be a national movement.) Moreover, in recent years, the idea of a "New Sudan" has been advocated enthusiastically by Northern political forces such as the Communist Party. An organization called the "New Sudan Brigade (*liwā' al-sūdān al-jadīd*)" was also built, mainly by a group of Northerners who sympathized with the cause of the "New Sudan" and who were interested in developing the idea of "Sudanism."[21] (The name of the organization, incidentally, is taken from a combination of the "New Sudan" and the "White Flag (*al-liwā' al-abyaḍ*) League," revealing an interesting attempt to fuse the revolutionary traditions of the Sudan.)

We can conclude that, by now, the idea of a "New Sudan," within

which every citizen can live equally irrespective of race and religion, has been accepted by a wide range of people as a future image for the country. Obviously, the Sudanese people today are trying to rebuild their nation-state on a new basis, of a sort of "social contract."

Some Additional Remarks

In the course of the discussions which have been going on for the past few years inside the Sudanese Communist Party toward the renewal of its pro-gramme, one party member submitted a document in which he presented the following analysis:

    (a) The present-day so-called "globalization" is a particular stage in the development of imperialism. (The preceding stages were the colo-nial stage, and the neo-colonial stage).

    (b) While nation-states in Western Europe represented the interests of the rising bourgeoisie, those in the Third World are products of popular struggle against imperialism, in which the whole people took part. The nation-state in the Third World is, therefore, the property of the whole people, and should be responsible for their living and welfare. The social function of state is the fruit of the popular struggle.

    (c) Since the world is entering a new stage of imperialism, it is possible that national liberation movements, too, are acquiring renewed impor-tance.

He then proceeds to discuss this "new stage of national liberation move-ments."[22]

    This argument, which distinguishes between "nation-states" in Europe and those in the Third World, emphasizing the role of masses in the latter, may bear resemblance, incidentally, to the argument by Anwar Abdel Malek, in accordance with which "nationalism" in Europe (which is regarded essentially as reactionary) and "nationalitarianism" (which is regarded essentially as progressive) in the Third World are strictly distinguished.[23]

    If we return to the question posed by Thomas Hodgkin, at the end of the afore-mentioned article about Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism, he asked: "Even where, as in the Sudan itself, there would seem to have been no significant structural relationship between the late nineteenth century Mahdist movement and the Sudanese Communist Party,

    . . . how far did the mere possession of a revolutionary millennial tra-dition contribute to the growth of modern forms of revolutionary organization and consciousness?"[24]

If we replace the phrase "the possession of a revolutionary millennial

tradition" with "the possession of the tradition of building a political community on the basis of social contract," Hodgkin's remark might have relevance. Without doubt, the Sudanese people, for the past 120 years, have been in a continuous struggle in search of a nation-state. And the "nation-state" in this context is neither an "imagined community" nor an "invented tradition," but something to be won in the future, as a result of the continuous struggle of the people, and built on the people's own free will and decisions.

Notes:

[1] Needless to say, such works as Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (2nd ed., London/New York: Verso, 1991), and Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), have set the trend. As an example of an attempt to apply the same kind of attitude toward nationalism in the Middle East, see some of the articles in James Jankowski and Israel Gershoni, eds., *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). On the other hand, Ralph M. Coury criticizes this kind of "scholarly negativity displayed towards nationalism." Ralph M. Coury, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: The Early Years of Azzam Pasha, 1893–1936* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1998), p. 6.

[2] See, for example, John Voll, "The Sudanese Mahdi : Frontier Fundamentalist," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, No. 10, 1979; Kazuo Ohtsuka, *An Anthropological Approach to the Modern and Islam* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2000).

[3] Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Abū Sālim, ed., *Al-Āthār al-Kāmilah lil-Imām al-Mahdī*, Vol. 1 (Khartoum: Dār Jāmiʿat al-Khartūm lil-Nashr, 1990), pp. 180–181.

[4] Yūsuf Mikhā'il, *Mudhakkirāt Yūsuf Mikhā'il* (London: Dār al-Nāṣirī lil-Nashr, n.d.), p. 17; ʿAlī Jifūn, "Memoirs of a Sudanese Soldier," *Cornhill Magazine*, 74/N.S.1, 1896, p. 485. (I am grateful to Robert S. Kramer for providing me with a copy of this document.)

[5] Mikhā'il, *Mudhakkirāt Yūsuf Mikhā'il*, p. 17; Nāʿum Shuqayr [Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Abū Salim, ed.], *Tārīkh al-Sūdān* (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 1981), p. 316.

[6] Concerning this sort of popular resistance, see Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Qaddāl, *Tārīkh al-Sūdān al-Ḥadīth 1820–1955* (Beirut: Sharikat al-Amal lil-Ṭibāʿah wa-al-Nashr, 1993), pp. 83–84, 93–94.

[7] Concerning the role of the *jallābah* in the Mahdist movement and the Mahdist state, see Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Qaddāl, *Al-Siyāsah al-Iqtṣiādīyah lil-Dawlah al-Mahdīyah*, (Khartoum: Dār Jāmiʿat al-Khartūm lil-Nashr, 1986).

[8] Jifūn, "Memoirs of a Sudanese Soldier," pp. 484–485. "Sudanese" in this context means "blacks" (non-Arab people from the South and Nūba Mountains).

[9] Francis Mading Deng, *Dynamics of Identification*, (Khartoum: Khartoum

University Press, 1973), p. 28. An almost identical song has been collected by Muorwel Ater Muorwel.

10 Information by Muorwel Ater Muorwel, Cairo, May 8, 1994.

11 Ibrāhīm Fawzī, *Kitāb al-Sūdān bayna Yaday Ghurdūn wa-Kitshinir*, Vol. 1 (Cairo: Jarīdat al-Mu'ayyad, 1901), pp. 200, 212.

12 Fawzī, *Kitāb al-Sūdān* . . . , pp. 159, 246, 256.

13 This kind of explanation has been most typically tried by Gabriel Warburg.

14 For more details about the 1924 Revolution, see Yoshiko Kurita, *'Alī 'Abd al-Laṭīf wa-Thawrat* 1924 (Cairo: Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Sūdānīyah, 1997).

15 Concerning Ahmad al-'Awwām, see Mohammed Omer Bashir, "Nasihat Al Awam," *The Sudan Notes and Records*, No. 41, 1960, pp. 59–65.

16 Concerning the role of these ex-slave people in Sudanese society, see Kurita, *'Alī 'Abd al-Laṭīf wa-Thawrat* 1924; Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, *Slaves into Workers: Emancipation and Labor in Colonial Sudan* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996).

17 Thomas Hodgkin, "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism in the African Setting," in Yusuf Fadl Hasan, ed., *Sudan in Africa: Studies Presented to the First International Conference Sponsored by the Sudan Research Unit, 7–12 February, 1968* (Khartoum: Khartoum Univresity Press, 1971), pp. 109–127.

18 Interview with al-Tijānī al-Ṭayyib Bābikr, Khartoum, December 18, 1986; Interview with Ahmad Muhammad Khayr, Khartoum, December 20, 1986.

19 The happy marriage between revolutionary intellectuals and the workers' movement has been considered as the secret of the success of the Sudanese Communist Party. Muhammad Sa'īd al-Qaddāl, *Ma'ālim fī Tā'rīkh al-Hizb al-Shuyū'ī al-Sūdānī* (London, 1999), p. 29.

20 National Democratic Alliance, *Conference on Fundamental Issues—Final Communique; Resolution on the Issue of Religion and Politics in the Sudan* (Asmara, June 1995).

21 The New Sudan Brigade, *Working Programme*, (n.p., c.1997). An example of Northern Sudanese sympathy for the cause of the "New Sudan" and their interest in "Sudanism" can be seen in the following article: Mohamed Abusabib, "Back to Mangu Zambiri : Art, Politics and Identity in Northern Sudan," *New Political Science*, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2001, pp. 89–112.

22 Al-Hizb al-Shuyū'ī al-Sūdānī, *Mabādi' Muwajjihah li-Tajdīd al-Barnāmaj* (Khartoum, 1997).

23 Anouar Abdel-Malek, ed., *Contemporary Arab Political Thought* (London: Zed Books, 1983), pp. 8–10.

24 Hodgkin, "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism in the African Setting," p. 124.