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IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No.912

Networked Governance and Awards for Local Government in Indonesia

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January 4, 2024

Abstract

This study aimed to assess the factors that determine the number of awards received by local governments in Indonesia. Since Indonesia was democratized, decentralization made significant progress, and local governments were required to initiate various reforms for efficiency and public service. Various public and private award schemes emerged to promote such initiatives. This study drew on the results of a 2011 survey of local elites of Java Island in Indonesia and conducted a regression analysis on the number of awards received by local governments. The results showed that, in a broad sense, the wide network of local government elites in the political, governmental, and business worlds is linked to the high number of awards received. The significant relationship between the elite network and the number of awards might not be a surprising fact, but this is the first study to prove this statistically.

Keywords: Government awards, Networks, Indonesia, Decentralization, New Public Management

JEL classification: D73, D85, H70

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Networked Governance and Awards for Local Government in Indonesia¹

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Abstract: This study aimed to assess the factors that determine the number of awards received by local governments in Indonesia. Since Indonesia was democratized, decentralization made significant progress, and local governments were required to initiate various reforms for efficiency and public service. Various public and private award schemes emerged to promote such initiatives. This study drew on the results of a 2011 survey of local elites of Java Island in Indonesia and conducted a regression analysis on the number of awards received by local governments. The results showed that, in a broad sense, the wide network of local government elites in the political, governmental, and business worlds is linked to the high number of awards received. The significant relationship between the elite network and the number of awards might not be a surprising fact, but this is the first study to prove this statistically.

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1. Introduction

In the public sector, awards were initially intended to honor senior civil servants for their long service and were granted by governments (agencies) to individual civil servants. In the 1990s, awards were granted to organizations as well as individuals, and the variety of awards multiplied (Borins 2000; Hartley & Downe, 2007). The primary reason for this is that, as the idea of New Public Management (NPM) became popular, calls for administrative reform and innovation became more robust. Raising the quality of government has become the key to good governance, and bestowing awards is considered essential to this aim. It is also argued that granting an award makes the recipient persons and organizations proud of their administrative efforts and changes the organizational culture and performance of the government, leading to innovations. It has also been argued

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¹ This paper is a product of the Research Project “New Waves of Decentralization in Southeast Asia: Local Governance Survey Data” (Institute of Developing Economies –JETRO).

that through award schemes, best and good practices can be recognized and disseminated, and public services can be improved (Bourgault & Gusella, 2001; Bovaird & Löffler, 2003; Rogers, 2003).

As for the local government, which is the focus of this study, the spread of the ideas of NPM and good governance has led to decentralization in many countries. Local government has expanded its authority and has been required to actively promote innovation in all areas. A number of award-winning schemes emerged to appreciate the local government's efforts for reform and innovations. These include the Ford Foundation-Kennedy School of Government State and Local Government Innovation Awards, the Innovations in American Government Awards in the U.S., the Beacon Scheme in the U.K., the Institute of Public Administration of Canada's Public Management Innovation Award in Canada, the Innovations and Excellence in Chinese Local Governance Awards in China, and the Galing Pok Award in the Philippines.

Indonesia is no exception to this. During the authoritarian regime under President Suharto, which lasted for 32 years until 1998, local government budgets were limited and local heads were usually appointed according to the wishes of the central government. They were not responsible to the public. It was more important for local governments to efficiently implement central government policies at the local level than for them to actively take the initiative in administrative reform and service improvement. In these circumstances, it was challenging to develop an award scheme that would encourage competition among local governments. Only Adipura, which began in 1986, continued as an award scheme for urban beautification run by the Ministry of the Environment, which targeted urban municipalities (*kotamadya*) with more than 100,000 inhabitants and evaluated them based on more than 200 criteria related to beautification. Awards were bestowed when a specific score was achieved. The mayors' desire to gain advantages for themselves and their cities and to avoid losing face to the central government and among their peers ensured the success of the program. The award was regarded as a prestigious award given to local governments committed to keeping the environment clean (Dethier, 2017, 85).

The Asian currency crisis of 1997 brought economic and even sociopolitical crises to Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and other Asian countries. In particular, Indonesia experienced a severe economic crisis, including a sharp decline in the local currency and resulting mass unemployment, accompanied by a political crisis and the collapse of the Suharto authoritarian regime in 1998. Subsequently, Indonesia began democratization, and unexpectedly achieved political stability in the mid-2000s. Democracy was institutionally consolidated. As part of democratization, decentralization began, and the Autonomy Law enacted in 1999 substantially transferred authority to local governments, especially districts (*kabupaten*) and cities (*kota*). This decentralization of power in Indonesia, which the World Bank described as a "big bang approach," brought about significant changes in inter-governmental

relations, and local politics has become highly dynamic, with more room for the discretion of local governments and the introduction of a direct election of the local head in 2005. Suharto's authoritarian regime was characterized by a top-down approach that was strongly bureaucratic, and local heads were either military or civilian bureaucrats. Bureaucracy was a key player in local Indonesian politics at the time. The end of Suharto's regime and the start of the democratic and decentralized regime weakened the dominance of bureaucracy as an institution. Donors from developed countries flooded into Indonesia to help with this democratization and decentralization project, introduced the idea of good governance, and implemented good governance projects. Local bureaucrats who had become used to the top-down command system were suddenly attacked as symbols of corruption and inefficiency and were required to adopt NPM theory and to follow the good governance concept, including the idea of a bottom-up and participatory approach. And the role of the bureaucrats was demanded to change from the sole development actor to a facilitator for development. Indonesian adoption of NPM is slow and sporadic but some NPM items such as downsizing, performance management, budget management and private sector techniques for increased economic competitiveness have been applied, and other models such as New Public Governance and New Public Service have been promoted (Turner et al. 2019). These foreign concepts were brought as the viable solution to erase the legacy of Suharto regime by the donors.

These changes have significant impacts on local politics and administration. These impacts have two dimensions: On the one hand, the aggrandizement of local political stakes has intensified the local elite's struggle and conflict, and money and coercion have become tools for ushering power. On the other hand, winning people's minds has become important for local heads and governments. Local heads were demanded to implement populist and reform-oriented policies such as free basic education and medical care before the central government initiated the new policies. Central government ministries and agencies, private and non-government organizations, and international organizations started various award programs to promote these local initiatives and to disseminate good and best practices to other local areas. The Adipura, which had been prestigious during the Suharto era, "became only one of many awards, a political commodity to capture the hearts and minds of voters and gain the support of the central government" (Dethier, 2017, 85).

It is difficult to determine precisely how many award schemes have been created for local governments in Indonesia. However, we can guess the increasing weight of numbers from the number of awards received by two of the most well-known reform-oriented local heads, former Bandung Mayor Ridwan Kamil (now Governor of West Java) (known as Emil) and former Surabaya Mayor Tori Rismahrini (now Minister of Social Affairs) (known as Risma). Emil served as the Mayor of Bandung from 2013 to 2018. During that time, he received 345 awards (detik.com 2018/09/04). He also received 92 awards during his two years

as governor of West Java (medcom.id 2020/08/19). When Risma served as mayor from 2010 to 2020, she received 322 awards (Liputan6.com 2020/12/20).

With many awards for local governments, it is somewhat naïve to assume that the awards are bestowed simply because of innovation or outstanding performance in the field for which the award is given. An award could be given to the local government or local government head without strict evaluation of the innovation and performance. Some local governments receive more awards than others even though their actual performance or innovation is not so spectacular. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the characteristics of local governments that receive more awards than other governments. For local governments and leaders, receiving an award is essential in raising the prestige of the local government in question and of the leaders themselves, as well as appealing to voters. It is not uncommon for them to win an award as an objective. Adipura has now become a ceremonial and tool for the image building of local governments. A local government holds meetings and only beautifies the locations which the evaluation team from the ministry of environment comes to evaluate. There was even an incident in which a mayor was arrested for forcibly collecting the budget from local government departments to win Adipura (detik.com 2011/1/21a; 2011/1/21b). These facts suggest that it is necessary to consider the key factors for a local government to receive many awards. The hypothesis of this study is that the key to more awards received by local governments is the amount of external activity of the local heads and bureaucrats, or their wider network with multiple stakeholders. All previous research on awards has only focused on a few authentic award schemes and has assumed that the award-winning government is a high-performance government. This study aimed to provide different perspectives from these studies by paying attention to the number of awards that a local government received.

2 Literature Review

2.1 Award Schemes Research in general

Previous literature on awards in the public sector discuss awards from a normative perspective (Hartley & Downe, 2007, pp. 331-332). However, empirical studies have also emerged, particularly regarding awards to local governments. These studies tend to focus on the award schemes of developed countries. For example, Hartley and Downe (2007) discussed the Beacon Scheme in the United Kingdom. Borins (1998) discussed the Ford Foundation-Kennedy School of Government State and Local Government Innovation Awards. A rare work analyzing award schemes in developing countries was conducted by Borins (2000b, 2001). It compared the Institute of Public Administration of Canada's Public Management Innovation Award and the Innovations in American Government Awards, and the Commonwealth countries' Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management

International Innovations Award. Several works have been conducted on award schemes for Chinese local governments; Zhao (2012) and Wu et al., (2013) discussed Innovations and Excellence in Chinese Local Governance Awards, while He (2016) compared American Innovations in American Government Awards and China's awards.

All empirical studies on these awards have only focused on the most prestigious awards in the countries studied. They assume that an organization won the award because its practices, such as implementing innovations or improving public services, meet the objectives of the respective award and assume that a high-performance organization is an award-winning organization². This assumption might be understandable if the analyzed awards have rigorous and objective review processes.

As Borins (2000a) and Hartley and Drowne (2007) noted, the number of public sector awards is growing significantly and not all are subject to rigorous screening. It is natural for any award to have some bias. It may not simply be the case that the number of awards received by a given government organization correlates with how well that organization performs. Nevertheless, for any government organization, awards are sought after by the head and staff of that organization, partly because winning an award is an appeal to voters. This suggests that not creating innovations, but winning awards may become the uppermost purpose for some government organizations that disproportionately receive more awards. Specific characteristics of some government organizations may increase their chances of winning awards. This study aimed to assess the factors that determine the number of awards received by local governments in Indonesia. After Indonesia was democratized, decentralization made significant progress, and local governments were required to initiate various reforms for efficiency and public service. Various public and private award schemes emerged to promote such initiatives. Therefore, it was appropriate to focus on Indonesian local governments to examine the factors that determine the awarding of prizes.

2.2 Local Government and Politics Studies on Indonesia

Regarding the dynamism of decentralization, various studies have emerged, including studies focusing on the negative and positive aspects of decentralization, such as money politics in direct local head elections (*pilkada*) (Erb eds., 2009), the decentralization of corruption, the rise of coercive power associated with the increased authority of local governments (Hadiz, 2010), the emergence and entrenchment of local political dynasties (Okamoto & Hamid, 2008; Buehler, 2013; Aspinall & As'ad, 2016; Rozaki, 2016), and analyses of the emergence of reformist and populist local heads (Okamoto, 2009; Bunnell et. al., 2013; Hamid, 2014) and the rising civil society participation (Ida Widianingsih and Morrell 2007; Antlov and Wetterberg 2013). There are not so many works

² One exception is the work by Hartley and Downe (2007) that examined whether the Beacon Scheme has contributed to the improvement of public services as the scheme is expected.

focusing on local bureaucracy (Pepinsky et. al., 2017), but there are some such as the politicization of bureaucracy and the remaining negative Suharto-era's legacy embedded deeply in the bureaucracy (Berenschot 2018), the non-efficient and self-beneficial culture kept intact (Kristiansen et al. 2008: 67). Weak accountability and less transparency is the norm of local bureaucracy (Antlov and Wetterberg 2013). Corruption is rampant in the business contract with third parties and the recruitment and promotion (Kristiansen and Muhid 2006). A quantitative analysis was done on differences in the performance of local administrations after decentralization (von Luebke, 2009). However, there is no work on awards for local governments even though various types of awards for local governments have been created and the local heads have been extremely proud of winning the awards and publicizing them as indications of the success of their governance. The only exception is the work of Dethier (2017), who conducted a study on Adipura after democratization and decentralization and statistically identified the characteristics of municipalities that could win the award. Unlike Dethier (2017), this study dealt with various awards and aimed to identify the factors that influence the number of awards by relying on survey data from local elites³.

3 Research

This study mainly relied on the results of a local governance survey on Indonesia's Java Island as part of a project entitled "Local Government Survey in Southeast Asia: Comparison among Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines" (Principal Investigator: Nagai Fumio). This project was supported by JSPS Kakenhi, Grant Number 21252003 (FY2009-2012)⁴. We visited provinces and cities in West Java and Banten in January 2010 and provinces and cities in North Sulawesi in March 2011 to test the draft questionnaire and exchanged opinions on the questionnaire with the staff of Indonesian Survey Institute (*Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI*), the most well-established survey institute in Indonesia, university researchers, and senior officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs. The questionnaire was finalized after exchanging opinions on its content with LSI personnel, university researchers, and senior officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs, who conducted the survey. LSI conducted the actual survey using the questionnaire that our research team made.

³ Determining the variables that determine the performance of a local government is not that easy. As an experiment, we analyzed the rankings and scores of the 2010 and 2011 rankings of districts and cities by the Ministry of Interior as independent variables indicating municipal performance and the number of awards received as explanatory variables, and found no correlation.

⁴ The analysis of the survey result was financed by JSPS Kakenhi Grant Number 25283009 (FY2013-2016) (Principal Investigator: Nagai Fumio). See Okamoto and Sunahara (2019) for simple aggregate results.

This was the first large-scale local elite survey conducted in Indonesia; therefore, the Indonesian study team proceeded with the research through trial and error. First, the team planned to conduct an elite survey for local government heads (*kepala daerah*) and also for local government secretaries (*sekretaris daerah, sekda*), covering the entire country. The team decided to conduct the survey, not by sending the questionnaires to be completed, but by interviewing government officials face-to-face. The team assumed that the return rate would be quite low if the survey was sent by post. The team soon encountered some difficulties in covering the whole of Indonesia, even with a sampling method, because of financial and time constraints. The team also discovered that it was difficult to schedule interviews with local government heads because they were normally quite busy and were not used to being interviewed with questionnaires. Based on these considerations, the team decided to focus, not on the local government heads, but on the highest local government officer, the local government secretary, in each of the 112 districts and cities on Java Island (except for five non-autonomous cities and one district in the special province of Jakarta). In November 2011, the LSI staff began conducting interviews using the questionnaire. The study team also sent a questionnaire survey by mail to all local government heads in the country with an attached letter from the Ministry of Home Affairs, but the return rate was less than ten percent. The elite survey for local government secretaries in Java went smoothly thanks to the hard work of LSI, and 103 out of the 112 local government secretaries responded to the questionnaire. The total response rate was 92.0%. Of the nine local government secretaries who did not respond to the questionnaire, some were from districts or cities where direct local head elections were being held or were going to be held soon. It appears that they were afraid of the politicization of the survey results in the elections. Others refused to respond to the questionnaire because their local government heads did not give them permission to do so. The team successfully achieved a high response rate of 92.0%, mainly because of LSI's vast network and careful preparation. The LSI chose and trained 15 surveyors with master's degrees or who were knowledgeable in surveying local governments (Okamoto and Sunahara 2019).

4 Discussion

The survey began with questions about the respondents' age configuration (Table 1). Exactly 85.5% of the respondents were in their fifties, which means that a bureaucrat requires a certain amount of experience, especially in local government, to become a high-ranking officer such as the local government secretary. Of the respondents, 84.5% were local bureaucrats in a district or city before becoming local government secretaries (Table 2). Fifteen of the

respondents were still in their forties, and 13 were local bureaucrats in a district or city before becoming local government secretaries.

Table 1. What is your current age?

	Frequency	Ratio
41-45	2	1.9
46-50	13	12.6
51-55	59	57.3
56-60	29	28.2

Source: Calculated from the local governance survey on Indonesia’s Java Island by authors.

Table 2. What was your previous profession before you took up the position of local government secretary?

	Frequency	Ratio
1. Large or medium-sized entrepreneur	0	0.0
2. Director, manager, or important department in the private sector	0	0.0
3. Small entrepreneur	0	0.0
4. Central government civil servant	7	6.8
5. Provincial government civil servant	4	3.9
6. District/City government civil servant	87	84.5
7. Police/Army	0	0.0
8. Central board member of a political party	0	0.0
9. Local board member of a political party	0	0.0
10. Activist of a NGO and/or mass organization	0	0.0
11. Journalist	0	0.0
12. Farmer	0	0.0
13. Trader	0	0.0
14. Housewife	0	0.0
15. Others	5	4.9

Source: Calculated from the local governance survey on Indonesia’s Java Island by authors.

All the respondents were Muslims owing to the fact that our research focused on Java Island, which is predominantly Muslim. There was a significant bias in this survey as it did not grasp the characteristics of Indonesia’s local governments as a whole, but only those of Java. Approximately 15% of Indonesia’s population is non-Muslim, and some local governments have local

government secretaries who belong to other religions. Regarding the respondents' academic careers, 79.6% had master's degrees or Ph.D. degrees (Table 3). Higher-ranking local bureaucrats in Indonesia tended to be highly educated Indonesian bureaucrats who usually obtained their master's degrees after joining the local bureaucracy because high educational attainment is a critical factor for promotion.

Table 3. What is your highest educational qualification?

	Frequency	Ratio
1. Graduate at Senior High School/ the school of same level	0	0.0
2. Diploma III/Vocational School	0	0.0
3. Did not complete a bachelor's degree	2	1.9
4. Obtained a bachelor's degree	19	18.4
5. Obtained a master's degree	78	75.7
6. Obtained a doctor's degree	4	3.9
7. Others	0	0.0

Source: Calculated from the local governance survey on Indonesia's Java Island by authors.

As for careers, 21.4% of the respondents had been local civil servants since the 1970s, with some having worked as local civil servants for 40 years (Table 4). Only a few of the respondents had served as local government secretaries for ten years, with many respondents having served in the position for less than four years. The direct local head election, which is held every five years, may be the cause of the short transfer cycle. Even the youngest respondent had served as a local bureaucrat for approximately 20 years before being appointed as the local government secretary. This means that the local government secretary position is only for the longest-tenured and most experienced bureaucrats.

Table 4. In what year were you hired in your position as a civil servant (PNS)?

	Frequency	Ratio
– 1975	1	1.0
1976 – 1980	21	20.4
1981 – 1985	52	50.5
1986 – 1990	29	28.2

Source: Calculated from the local governance survey on Indonesia's Java Island by authors.

We mainly used their answers in the survey as the variables because they have the most extensive knowledge on their own governments. For the number of awards, we rely on the question posed to local government secretaries in the survey as in Table 5. For good governance, public health, and infrastructure, respectively, we took 0 for "none," a median of 3 for "1-5" and 8 for "6-10," and 10 for "more than 10," and we regarded the total number of awards based on this calculation as the dependent variable⁵.

Table 5. How many awards*1 have district/city authorities received in the following areas over the last year, whether from the central government or the private sector? (Upper : Frequency, Lower : Ratio)

Subject	none	One to Five	Six to Ten	More than Ten	N.A.
1. Good governance (Including budgeting and financial responsibility)	21 20.4	64 62.1	9 8.7	5 4.9	4 3.9
2. Community health	16 15.5	67 65.0	10 9.7	4 3.9	6 5.8
3. Infrastructure	38 36.9	56 54.4	3 2.9	1 1.0	5 4.9

Note: *1 An award is something a local government can receive through selection. Mere certification is not regarded as an award.

Source: Calculated from the local governance survey on Indonesia's Java Island by authors.

We used the survey results asking the frequency of the local head's opinion exchange with different actors when they think of ideas for a new program of development as the explanatory variable for the local head network. Actors included not only bureaucrats and politicians from central, provincial and local levels, but also representatives of NGOs and international organizations. We hypothesized that the more frequent the exchange of opinions, the greater the chance of winning awards because a local head with a wider network has more chances of proactively appealing the achievements to the government and private organizations that judge awards, and a local head has more chances to

⁵ Suhanara and Okamoto (2019) used the same variable of the number of awards to analyze the relationship between the local leadership and government styles and the sectors in which the awards were given. The focus of the analysis differs from this paper, which analyzes the relationship between the local network types and the number of awards.

obtain tips on how to win the award. We summarized them using principal component analysis (Table 6). We found three principal components with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first principal component had a positive value for all actors. Thus, we interpreted this as representing whether a local head frequently discusses policy decisions with various stakeholders.

Table 6. Results of Principal Component Analysis on the Local Head Network

Variable	Comp 1	Comp 2
Vice Local Head	.422	-.452
Local Government Secretary	.535	-.517
Head of Local Development Agency (Bappeda)	.613	-.570
Local Department Heads (Kepala Dinas)	.659	-.453
National Members of Parliament	.660	.397
Local Assembly Members of Local Head's District /City	.692	-.131
Other Politicians (Board Members etc.)	.509	.637
Persons that Local Head Can Rely on Personally (Husband, Wife, Family Members, Friends etc.)	.406	.594
Socially Respected Figures (Religious Figures, Activist of NGO and/or Mass Organization, Lecturer)	.536	.368
International Bodies	.639	.196
Entrepreneur/Business Association (Chamber of Commerce, Construction Company Association etc.)	.402	.140

Source: Calculated from the local governance survey on Indonesia's Java Island by authors.

Another indicator of the local head network was whether a leading political party in the direct local head election endorsed the local head. Specifically, we focused on the two major parties in the ruling coalition. The first party is the Democrat Party, led by President Yudhoyono in 2011, based on the hypothesis that the stronger the network with the president's party, the more likely they are to receive more awards from the central government. The second party is the Golkar Party. The party had the most expansive network in the political and business world since the Suharto authoritarian regime and endorsed Yudhoyono in the presidential election. Support from the party suggests that the local head had a broader network in the political and business world, which led to more awards.

Next, regarding local bureaucracy, we focused on the survey results which asked about the frequency of local government secretary meetings with various

actors. The actors included bureaucrats and politicians from the central, provincial, and local levels as well as representatives of NGOs and international organizations. As explained earlier, the local government secretary is the highest-ranking and most experienced career bureaucrat in the local government. The local government secretary has the highest chance of opportunities to exchange views with actors in all fields. We hypothesized that the more frequent the meeting with other actors, the greater the chances of winning awards because the local government secretary has a broader network to promote the initiatives and to gain the tips and connections to obtain the awards. We summarized the survey results of the local government secretary network using principal component analysis (Table 7). We found three principal components with eigenvalues greater than 1. The first principal component had a positive value for all actors. Thus, we could interpret it as representing whether the local government secretary frequently meets various actors.

Table 7. Results of Principal Component Analysis on Local Government Secretary Network

Variables	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3
Minister	.710	-.110	.402
Ministry's Office (Director-General, Director)	.645	-.419	.226
National Members of Parliament	.641	-.217	.176
Provincial Assembly Members	.735	-.135	-.006
Assembly Members of Local Government Secretary's District/City	.465	.309	-.359
Provincial Governor	.750	-.194	-.286
Provincial High-Ranking Officer (Provincial Government Secretary, Provincial Department Heads)	.696	-.111	-.378
Local Head and High-Ranking Officers of Neighboring Local Government	.474	.672	.158
Sub-district Heads	.426	.484	.541
Village Heads	.547	-.451	.132

Entrepreneur/Business Association (Chamber of Commerce, Construction Company Association etc.)	.704	.268	-.208
Activists of NGOs and/or Mass Organizations	.632	.316	-.200

Source: Calculated from the local governance survey on Indonesia's Java Island by authors.

Next, we used the type of local government as a control variable. The basic local government in Indonesia is divided into two types: districts (*kabupaten*) and cities (*kota*). The city government is located in urban areas, such as the provincial capital area, whereas the district government is located in rural areas. We also assumed that the city government has more opportunities to access award information and more exposure to the central government and the media, which will lead to more chances of winning awards than the district government⁶.

Table 8 shows the results of the regression analysis of the above five variables: 1) the network of local government heads, endorsement of the local head by two political parties, 2) the Democrat party, 3) the Golkar party, 4) the network of local government secretaries, and 5) the geographical conditions of urban or rural areas as independent variables, with the number of awards as the dependent variable.

Table 8. Results of Regression Analysis

	B	t-value	P
Local Head Network	0.297	2.918	0.005
Local Gov. Secretary Network	0.352	3.606	<0.001
Golkar Party	0.196	1.997	0.050
Democrat Party	-0.060	-0.617	0.539
City(0)/District(1)	-0.205	-2.141	0.036
Adjusted R ²	0.293 (F-value=7.453, p<0.001)		
N	79		

Source : Calculated from the local governance survey on Indonesia's Java Island by authors

⁶ There are more economic or geographic variables such as GRDP and the proximity to the provincial and national capitals as control variables, but this paper just used the local government type (urban/rural) because adding more than five variables is statistically undesirable because the sample size is small, and also because this urban/rural dichotomy is more basic and important for differences of local government characteristics.

It can be seen from this result that the endorsement of the Democrat Party has nothing to do with the number of awards received. The city is naturally gaining more attention than the district itself. The critical finding is that the network of the local head and the network of the local government secretary are significantly related to the number of awards. The endorsement of the Golkar Party is more important than that of the Democrat party for more awards. This regression analysis shows that the strength and breadth of the network of the local government elite determine the number of awards won.

5 Conclusion

Whether an individual, group, or organization, winning an award is desirable. However, it is often not always easy to indicate who or which group or organization is eligible for an award, or the determining factors. Formally, the decisive factor is the evaluation by the selection committee. However, it is not certain whether the selection committee is entirely objective regarding the criteria used to make its decision. In the case of the Indonesian local governments discussed here, there is significant variation in terms of size, population, distance from the national or provincial capital, and major industrial sectors. If this is the case, possibly other factors may have contributed to the award rather than a straightforward causal relationship in which the selection committee awarded the award to the local head or local government with the highest scores in a particular field. With this intention in mind, this study drew on the results of a 2011 survey of local elites of Java Island in Indonesia and conducted a regression analysis on the number of awards received by local governments. The results showed that, in a broad sense, the wide network of local government elites in the political, governmental, and business worlds is linked to the high number of awards received. The significant relationship between the elite network and the number of awards might not be a surprising fact, but it has not yet been proven statistically. In this sense, the findings of this study may be applied to other studies on awards. More nuanced research could be conducted in the future by selecting some well-regarded award schemes and less-regarded schemes and comparing the different characteristics of local governments that receive more awards from each scheme.

Acknowledgment

We appreciate the strong support from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Republic of Indonesia. Our research was done with the endorsement letter from the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia We also appreciate the dedicated efforts by LSI. Our analysis was done based on the local elite survey conducted by LSI.

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