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# 3

## ‘Twin Countries’ with Contrasting Institutions: Post-Conflict State-Building in Rwanda and Burundi

*Shinichi Takeuchi*

### 3.1 Introduction

Rwanda and Burundi have a number of critical commonalities as well as differences. On the one hand, the common features of these two adjoining countries are readily apparent: they are both tiny and densely populated countries, lying in the high plateau of the African Great Lakes Region; the overwhelming majority of their nationals live in rural areas; their economies are heavily dependent on agriculture; their populations are composed of three ethnic groups (Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa);<sup>1</sup> these three groups share the same language and the same religions (Christianity and Islam), and have settled in mixed communities; and, finally, in their recent histories both countries have repeatedly experienced serious ethnic conflicts.

On the other hand, the two countries also display many differences. First and foremost, the nature of ethnic relations in their national politics have developed along different and often contrasting lines. Although Tutsi families were positioned at the political centre of both traditional kingdoms, the two countries have developed distinct political processes, especially in the period after independence. In Rwanda, Hutu elites assumed control of state power at the time of independence, and maintained it until the civil war in the 1990s, which resulted in a military victory for the Tutsi-led rebels. By contrast, in Burundi the Tutsi elites consolidated power through repeated violent conflicts in the 1960s; the Tutsi's monopoly of power finally resulted in the harsh civil war of the 1990s.

As a result of these political developments, today these two post-conflict countries have very different ethnic policies. While Burundi introduced a rigorous ethnic power-sharing system, Rwanda denies even the existence of ethnic differences among its nationals. This contrast warrants some serious reflection. The fact that Rwanda and Burundi, often referred to as *les pays jumeaux* (the twin countries), share a number of characteristics makes comparative methods quite relevant (Durkheim, 1960). This chapter examines the role played by ethnicity in politics in the two countries, offering a comparison of the two countries' ethnic relations and political institutions in order to draw out some more general implications for conflict prevention.

Ethnic relations will be analysed through the lens of horizontal inequalities (HIs), which is a useful method for understanding the causal relationships between ethnicity in politics and conflict

(Stewart, 2008). In the case of Rwanda and Burundi, who have very similar ethnic compositions, the conclusions that can be drawn from a comparison made using this method is particularly relevant. Moreover, disaggregating their historical processes into the political and socioeconomic dimensions of HIs will make any such comparisons much clearer.

In addition to historical analyses of HIs, this chapter will examine the political institutions introduced after the recent armed conflicts. In this context institutions can be understood to mean the rules of the game, incentives, and/or norms. The term refers to ‘the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990: 3), including both formal rules and informal constraints. In the context of recent post-conflict state-building, particular attention should be paid to the gaps and interactions of two sorts of institutions. On the one hand, the international community has tried to enhance a set of institutions based on the idea of ‘liberal democracy’ – that is, those that enhance such norms as multi-party democracy, free markets, and human rights, in peace-building processes (Paris, 2004). These efforts have been reflected in the formal institutions of these countries. On the other hand, state-building is nothing more than a process of coercive power accumulation (Tilly, 1992); actors seizing state power thus try to make use of institutions for their own purposes. The dynamics of post-conflict politics will therefore be determined through the interactions of these different motivations.

In comparing the historical processes behind the formation of HIs and political institutions in Rwanda and Burundi, this chapter aims to clarify the implications for a general approach to conflict prevention.<sup>2</sup> Analyses of ethnic relations and institutions shed light on the nature of post-conflict political regimes and the prospects for conflict prevention. In Rwanda, where revolutionary political change has been a recurrent feature of the state’s history, authoritarian post-conflict rule led by the ethnic minority casts a shadow over its peace-building, as the members of the ethnic majority are likely to resent both political and socioeconomic HIs. While the introduction of the power-sharing system has drastically reduced the importance of ethnic politics among the Burundian elites, there is still an imminent danger of armed conflict breaking out in that country, as the institutionalisation of the power struggle remains unresolved.

Our analysis elucidates various historical interactions that have culminated in the contrasting post-conflict political institutions in the two countries. These institutions are undoubtedly attributable to the way in which their wars ended; complete military victory by the former rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) enabled it to impose favourable institutions for its own rule, whereas a negotiated peace agreement forced a power-sharing system on the warring parties in Burundi. However, the way in which the war ended is not the only factor determining post-conflict political institutions; experiences since the pre-colonial period have also influenced recent post-conflict institutional choice in each country. The contrasting institutions in the ‘twin countries’ have their own historical grounds.

This chapter is structured as follows. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 focus on the analyses of HIs. While the former clarifies the formation (and essentialisation) process of identity groups in Rwanda and Burundi, historical changes in the HIs will be analysed in a disaggregated manner in the latter. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 deal with the post-conflict political institutions; following an analysis of their formal rules in the former, their functions in real politics will be explored in the latter. An examination of the popular perception of HIs is given in section 3.6, and, finally, section 3.7 concludes with an assessment of political stability in each country. This chapter is based on the previous literature and the author’s field research in the two countries.<sup>3</sup>

### 3.2 Configuration of identity groups

In both Rwanda and Burundi, the dominant identity groups in politics are the Tutsi and Hutu, as shown in the repeated outbreaks of ethnically influenced violent conflicts. In the analysis of these groups, two caveats should be borne in mind. First, the politicisation of the two groups has taken place largely since the colonial period;<sup>4</sup> ethnic antagonism arose between Tutsis and Hutus as a result of colonial policies in both countries. This means that the social constructivist vantage point is particularly relevant in this instance.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, the focus should be on the similarities and differences between the two countries as reflected in their historical experiences. Although the social characteristics of the Tutsi and Hutu have a number of similarities, for instance, they share the same language and religions, ethnic relations in terms of state power have been quite distinct in the two countries. The necessity and importance of a historical analysis of their group formation are therefore quite evident.

Pre-colonial Rwanda was the most centralised state in the Great Lakes Region, a part of the African continent characterised by the presence of a number of states with stratified societies.<sup>6</sup> The centre of Rwandan state formation, the kingdom of Nyiginya, is thought to have been founded in the latter half of the seventeenth century. At the end of the nineteenth century, King Rwabugiri exercised control over almost the same territory as present-day Rwanda. The king could mobilise strong military power through his control of influential pastoral chiefs. In this context, a relatively unitary Tutsi group identity had developed among the ruling elites.<sup>7</sup> The political dominance of the Tutsi had been strengthened in particular in the central area of the kingdom, to such an extent that there are records of several revolts by Hutu agriculturalists at the end of the nineteenth century (Vansina, 2001: 177). Although there is no doubt that the group identities of the Tutsi and Hutu were clearly shaped during the colonial period, it is clear from the evidence that Rwanda's social cleavage between these groups can be traced back to the pre-colonial era.

By contrast, political power in pre-colonial Burundi was more decentralised. Influenced by delays in state formation, Burundian dynastic history before the nineteenth century is quite obscure, although its regional autonomy was very marked even before that period (D. Newbury, 2001). What characterised pre-colonial Burundi were the diversity of the social category 'Tutsi' and the existence of serious cleavage among ruling elites. Three points deserve to be mentioned in this regard. First, the central actors in Burundian state formation, the dynastic family, had a unique identity as Ganwa. While the Ganwa are ethnically a part of the Tutsis, it was only they who had access to the political power of the pre-colonial state, and thus they had a clearly distinct identity from Tutsis in general. Secondly, the Ganwa elites were always in conflict internally, due to the rivalry between different lines of descent, thus hindering the consolidation of central rule. Especially important in this context was the opposition between the Bezi and Batare,<sup>8</sup> which remained a source of conflict in Burundian politics until the 1960s. Thirdly, dichotomous relationships between Tutsis and Hutus did not exist in pre-colonial Burundi, partly because the Tutsis had never been a monolithic group,<sup>9</sup> and partly because the Burundian Hutus had played more important roles than their Rwandan counterparts in the pre-colonial kingdom.<sup>10</sup>

In the period from 1899 to 1962, Rwanda and Burundi were administered at first by Germany, as a part of German East Africa, then after the First World War by Belgium, as a mandated territory on

behalf of the League of Nations, and subsequently as a trust territory on behalf of the United Nations. Under European rule, ethnic tensions were heightened, because the colonial authorities<sup>11</sup> systematically prioritised the Tutsis, and discriminated against the Hutus in the political system. This policy was based on a Eurocentric ideology, the so-called Hamitic hypothesis, which argued that the Tutsi were a superior race, with a European origin, whereas the Hutu were an inferior race of African origin (Sanders, 1969; Chrétien, 2000). Discriminatory policies were justified under the pretext of stabilising 'traditional society'; in public schools priority was given to Tutsi children; and Hutu chiefs were eliminated from the administration.<sup>12</sup> As a result of this policy, the Hutus generally lagged behind the Tutsis in terms of education as well as their level of employment in the modern sectors of the economy. The notion of the Tutsi as ethnically European, based on the Hamitic hypothesis, had an enormous impact under the unequal power relations of the colonial period, creating widespread discontent among Hutu elites.

Hutu grievances were more intense and organised in Rwanda, where the dichotomy between Tutsi and Hutu was much clearer than in Burundi. In consequence, the political turbulence and ethnic strife, which was euphemistically termed the 'social revolution',<sup>13</sup> broke out at the end of the colonial era. This was Rwanda's first experience of nationwide ethnic strife, and resulted in the collapse of the Tutsi-led political system, a massive outflow of Tutsi refugees,<sup>14</sup> and the Hutu elites gaining a monopoly on political power after independence. In 1965 their party, the Parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu (PARMEHUTU), won all seats in the national parliament (Reyntjens, 1985: 445), systematically eliminated Tutsis from political power, and prohibited Tutsi refugees from returning to the country.

The 'social revolution' also had a tremendous impact on Burundi, where people tended to regard it as their possible future, which was desirable for Hutus but a potential nightmare for Tutsis. The ethnicisation of politics obviously accelerated after the assassination of the nationalist leader, Prince Louis Rwagasore, in October 1961. In spite of King Mwambutsa's efforts to appease ethnic tensions, distrust of the king's political machinations finally resulted in a coup attempt in October 1965 by a Hutu group in the army and gendarmerie. The attempt was severely suppressed by Tutsi groups in the army, enabling them to seize political power and, subsequently, to overthrow the monarchy in November 1966. This process of dethroning the king and establishing the republic resulted in considerable changes in power relations; the Ganwa elites, who had hitherto occupied the centre of Burundian politics, were largely replaced by non-Ganwa Tutsi officers in the army, who came largely from the Province of Bururi. In contrast to the Rwandan Tutsis, the Burundian (non-Ganwa) Tutsis had not been positioned at the centre of the traditional kingdom.<sup>15</sup>

In comparison with Rwanda, where the sudden power shift took place during the short period of the 'social revolution', the post-independence consolidation of Tutsi hegemony in Burundi advanced only gradually. Their hegemony, however, was established through bloodshed and mass killing; a huge number of Hutus were slaughtered following the two aborted coups in 1965 and 1969, and finally in the genocide of 1972.<sup>16</sup> It was, in fact, following the genocide in 1972 that the Bururi Tutsi monopoly of political power was confirmed, because the Hutu elites were almost completely eliminated in the genocide. In 1987, only two seats out of 65 in the Central Committee of the sole legal party, the Parti de l'union et du progrès national (UPRONA), were held by Hutus (Lemarchand, 1994: 108).<sup>17</sup>

### 3.3 Horizontal inequalities

#### 3.3.1 The political dimension

HIs have various dimensions (Stewart, 2008). In the case of Rwanda and Burundi, it is easier to grasp the socioeconomic than the political dimension, as their political changes have often accompanied a shift in ethnic relations. The shift has been clearer in Rwanda; as a result of discriminatory colonial policies, political power was dominated by Tutsi elites until the outbreak of the ‘social revolution’ in 1959, which altered the power structure completely; Hutu elites in the PARMEHUTU then succeeded in seizing all political power at the time of independence. Although the composition of the elite had been considerably transformed following Juvénal Habyarimana’s coup in 1973,<sup>18</sup> Hutu dominance of Rwandan politics continued until 1994. In that year the military victory of the RPF resulted in a complete change in the political power structure. Since then, members of the former rebel group, namely, former Tutsi refugees, have occupied the centre of state power.<sup>19</sup>

In Rwandan history there have been few attempts to achieve ethnic power-sharing. In fact, the first republic, led by Grégoire Kayibanda, attempted to drive Tutsis out of the political scene completely; the Tutsi community therefore welcomed Habyarimana’s coup, which overthrew Kayibanda (Munyarugerero, 2003: 161–3). However, the marginalisation of Tutsis was largely unchanged under the Habyarimana regime, leading to the creation of the Tutsi-led rebel force, the RPF, in Uganda, and its subsequent invasion of Rwanda in 1990. As a consequence of the civil war, the former rebels seized power, sweeping away the political elites of the previous regime (Prunier, 1995). Rwanda’s history has therefore been characterised by repeated revolutionary power shifts.

In Burundi, changes in the political dimension of the HIs have been more gradual and ambiguous in nature. In addition to the fact that Burundian pre-colonial political power was more decentralised than was the case in Rwanda, and that Burundian non-Ganwa Tutsis had not occupied a central position in the pre-colonial kingdom, leaders had often tried to strike an ethnic balance in politics. While the Burundian Tutsis, like their Rwandan counterparts, had been privileged during colonial times, the nationalist leader Rwagasore adopted the principle of ethnic equivalence in his party, UPRONA.<sup>20</sup> When Rwagasore was assassinated, King Mwambutsa made an effort to attenuate ethnic antagonism, by appointing equal numbers of ministers in terms of the two ethnic groups.<sup>21</sup> It was only following the abortive coup attempt in 1965 that new Burundi Tutsi elites took control of the security organisations and began to systematically expunge Hutus from the national political scene. Their dominance in politics was further strengthened through bloodshed in 1969 and 1972.

Although the principle of ethnic power-sharing was agreed among Burundians in the 2000 peace agreement, its precursor had already appeared at the end of the 1980s. Following the ethnic killing that occurred in the north of the country in August 1988, the then President Pierre Buyoya launched several initiatives for power-sharing with Hutus, including the establishment of a cabinet containing equal numbers of Tutsis and Hutus, in October 1988. However, there were ample grounds for questioning his motives,<sup>22</sup> because the power-sharing principle was never carried over into security organisations such as the army, gendarmerie, and police, which had always been dominated by Tutsis (Reyntjens, 1994: 68–76). Although Buyoya subsequently accepted the introduction of multi-party elections, which resulted in the victory of a Hutu candidate, Melchior Ndadaye, in June 1993, the ethnic imbalance in the security organisations led to the latter’s assassination by the army just four

months later. Hutu politicians participated in governments even during the civil war caused by the assassination of Ndadaye, although the security organisations were always controlled by Tutsi officers.<sup>23</sup>

The conclusion of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000 did not produce an immediate change in the ethnic balance. It was only after the signing of a power-sharing agreement in 2003 between the government and the largest rebel group, the Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie–Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), and the subsequent integration and reform of the security organisations, that Hutu officers began to be appointed as core members of these organisations.<sup>24</sup> Following the adoption of the constitution in 2005, the principle of ethnic parity was fully applied and this has been observed to date.

In sum, the political dimension of the HIs in the two countries has moved in very different ways. Developments in Rwanda have been characterised by the two abrupt and complete changes: the ‘social revolution’ just before independence, and the RPF’s military victory in 1994. While the Tutsi elites had dominated all of the important political posts before 1959, the situation shifted suddenly to the dominance of Hutu elites as a result of the ‘social revolution’. However, the RPF victory in 1994 once again gave political supremacy to the Tutsi elites. Each of these radical shifts was accompanied by a total replacement of political elites, including members of both the government and also the security organisations.

In Burundi, Tutsi–Hutu power relations have been more ambiguous. Broadly speaking, Tutsi elites had ensured their own political dominance from pre-colonial times to the recent introduction of the ethnic power-sharing system. Nevertheless, despite the power shift from the Ganwa to the Bururi Tutsis, Hutus continued to exercise influence on the political scene, apart from a period of nearly two decades following the genocide in 1972. The Burundian ethnic power-sharing mechanism should be understood in this historical context.

### **3.3.2 The socioeconomic dimension**

It is not straightforward to demonstrate scientific evidence about socioeconomic HIs between Tutsis and Hutus: there are no statistics based on each group; and geographical comparisons are generally irrelevant, as the regional concentrations of each group are not obvious. The socioeconomic dimension of HIs, however, tends to depend on the political dimension; when a Tutsi (or Hutu) elite group gains power, a relatively small number of people from the same ethnic group are likely to have opportunities for accumulation, although the overwhelming majority of the group may obtain no such chances. Neither of the two groups is homogenous, but as far as the socioeconomic dimension of HIs among political elites is concerned, its characteristics can be estimated from the nature of the political dimension.

Additional information exists for understanding the socioeconomic dimension in Rwanda. First, its nature in formal education as well as formal job markets can be traced roughly. In these sectors, Tutsis were generally in a favourable position during the colonial period; the colonial authorities privileged the sons of Tutsi chiefs for modern education; as a corollary, this policy gave them a greater chance of securing jobs in the developing sectors of the economy. The situation was basically the same in Burundi. The ‘social revolution’, however, resulted in a fundamental change in the Rwandan political power structure. Following independence, the Kaybanda and Habyarimana regimes adopted a quota policy, according to which the number of Tutsi students as well as teaching

staff was to be limited to 9 per cent in secondary schools and universities. Although enforcement of the policy was generally loose, for Tutsis the threat of expulsion was always genuine; they were, in fact, systematically expelled from schools, universities, and administrative positions in 1973.<sup>25</sup>

Following the advent of the RPF-led government, the situation changed completely. Policy changes, such as the abolition of the quota system and the political environment, were generally advantageous to Tutsis, enabling many Tutsi returnees to enter schools and universities. The language policy, for example, has undoubtedly contributed to the further enrolment of Tutsis. Before the civil war, Rwanda had two official languages: Kinyarwanda and French. Soon after its victory in the civil war, the RPF added a third official language, English. This assisted those Tutsi returnees from Uganda, where the core members of the RPF were educated, to advance in education. In late 2008, the government adopted an important policy change, selecting English as the sole medium of instruction, with children beginning to study it from the first grade. This change in the language of education not only caused serious problems for teachers, who were obliged to learn the new foreign language, but also had a significant social and political impact on the present Rwandan context, where language is a proxy for identity (Hintjens, 2008; Samuelson and Freedman 2010), precisely because English is considered to be the language of former Tutsi refugees. This policy change clearly demonstrated the stance of the RPF-led government in mainstreaming the ‘culture’ of former Tutsi refugees, who in fact tend to “feel” themselves to belong to the inner circles of power’ (Ingelaere, 2010: 286).

Secondly, the rural–urban divide has a special meaning in the case of socioeconomic HIs in Rwanda. Before the civil wars in the 1990s, the urbanisation rate was very low in both countries; subsequently, however, the Rwandan urban population has grown rapidly whereas that in Burundi remains relatively low.<sup>26</sup> This growth in urban population has been mainly due to a massive influx of Tutsis returning to their homeland following the victory of the RPF.<sup>27</sup> In the same period, Rwanda has achieved rapid economic growth, but there has also been a considerable widening of the level of economic inequality.<sup>28</sup> In a recent report UNDP has pointed out that the nature of the inequality is also changing: ‘it is becoming increasingly rural and increasingly detrimental to the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society’ (UNDP, 2007b: 18).<sup>29</sup> These facts demonstrate strongly that the main beneficiaries of postwar Rwandan economic growth have been Tutsi returnees, who often have connections with RPF members.

Regarding the socioeconomic dimension of the HIs in Burundi, the previous literature has highlighted two major problems. First, there is serious educational inequality between the ethnic groups. This situation has deep roots going back to the colonial period, because the colonial authorities adopted discriminatory measures in education, as we have already mentioned. Although this discrimination was gradually rectified in the late colonial period and the first half of the 1960s, the seizure of power by the new Tutsi elite had a serious effect on the ethnic balance in education. In particular, Hutu students in higher education, along with educated Hutus in modern sectors such as the civil service, were systematically killed during the 1972 genocide (Gaffney, 2000: 143). The lack of higher education has naturally led to limited opportunities for employment in modern sectors, thus aggravating the socioeconomic position of the Hutus.

Secondly, regional imbalances appeared, as a consequence of public investment policies during the 1970s and the 1980s that privileged Bururi province, which was the home province of three consecutive presidents (Micombero, Bagaza and Buyoya).<sup>30</sup> Calculations from data collected around 2000 showed that the social infrastructure in Bururi was much better equipped than in other

provinces.<sup>31</sup> Such advantages for Bururi, however, seem to be lessening as a result of the political changes in the 2000s; according to recent statistics, the figures for Bururi province were not substantially higher than other provinces, although its figures were still better than the national averages.<sup>32</sup>

### **3.4 Post-conflict institutional choices and their backgrounds**

In this section, we compare the characteristics of the basic political institutions of the two countries through an analysis of the recent constitutions they have adopted after the serious armed conflicts, and explore the backgrounds of their institutional choices.

#### **3.4.1 Rwanda**

Adopted in 2003, nine years after the end of the civil war, the Rwandan constitution provides political institutions based on a system of multi-party democracy (Republic of Rwanda, 2003). It can be classified as a semi-presidential system, in which a president (the head of the state) and a prime minister (the head of the cabinet) are both active participants in the administration of the state. As a multi-party democracy, political organisations are permitted to be formed and to operate freely. However, they are required not to destabilise national unity (Article 52), and are prohibited from basing themselves on 'divisions' such as race, ethnic group, and region (Article 54).

In essence, the Rwandan constitution is shaped by the shadow of the 1994 genocide. Determination not to repeat the genocide and to promote national unity is expressed repeatedly in its preamble and the text, thereby emphasising the importance of 'unity' and the danger of 'division'. In fact, commitments to 'fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations' as well as 'eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity' are stipulated as two of the six fundamental principles of the state (Article 9). These principles are based on the idea that the genocide was derived from ethnic discrimination and division among nationals. The prevention of genocide is pursued further by abolishing a period of limitation for the crime of genocide, and by stipulating that its 'revisionism, negationism and trivialisation' are punishable (Article 13). In addition, the constitution states not only that 'discrimination of whatever kind' is 'prohibited and punished by law' (Article 11), but also that any form of 'division', such as on ethnic, regional, and racial lines, is also punishable (Article 33).

In this context, ethnic power-sharing is unthinkable, because the very existence of ethnic diversity is formally denied in the constitution. Moreover, as shown in its fundamental principles, the constitution considers ethnic difference as something to be eradicated; those who emphasise difference will be regarded as wrongdoers promoting 'division'. Under the rule of the RPF, terms such as 'division', 'divisionism', and 'genocide ideology' are often utilised when the government criticises its opponents. For instance, before the first post-conflict election, in 2003, the biggest Hutu opposition party (Mouvement démocratique républicain: MDR) was ordered to dissolve itself because of its 'divisive ideology'.<sup>33</sup> In 2010 April, a Hutu woman, who had declared her intention to be a candidate in the presidential election, was arrested and charged with 'propagating the Genocide Ideology, Revisionism and Ethnic Division' (*The New Times*, April 23, 2010).

While detailed analysis of the Rwandan constitution has already revealed a number of problems

(Reyntjens, 2003), two points deserve to be mentioned here. First, some of its articles constitute institutional arrangements that operate to the advantage of RPF rule. One example is the composition of the legislature, because a limit is placed on the proportion of members to be elected by universal suffrage (Article 76). In the case of the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house), 53 of its 80 members are elected by universal suffrage with a secret ballot. The remaining 27 seats are reserved for representatives of women (24 seats),<sup>34</sup> youth (2 seats), and the disabled (1 seat). These representatives are selected by members of local administrations and/or related official councils, on which the RPF-led government can exert a dominant influence (Reyntjens, 2003: 77).<sup>35</sup> Considering the fact that the RPF's core supporters are an ethnic minority, these measures limiting universal suffrage were likely devised in order to maintain its rule. Secondly, important civil rights such as freedom of thought, opinion, and religion (Article 33), as well as freedom of the press and information (Article 34), are defined as being 'guaranteed by the State in accordance with conditions determined by law'. The text indicates the over-presence of the state, because these fundamental human rights should include freedom *from* the state. These clauses demonstrate the intention of the Rwandan state to control the societal sphere for its own purposes.

The 2003 Rwandan constitution was based on the RPF's political ideology; against the backdrop of the victory in the civil war, it attempted, through the constitution, to legitimise the revolutionary change and to institutionalise its gains, for example, by emphasising national unity, denying 'division', and promoting state control over politics and civil society. Since the RPF's victory, its elites have virtually monopolised important political posts, while condemning the 'bad governance' of previous regimes as having been responsible for the genocide, and have adopted a series of radical reforms in such fields as local administration, agriculture, education, and health care. In some of these reforms, a tendency toward elitism as well as radical social engineering has been observable (Ansoms, 2008, 2009). While it is clear that these political behaviours derive directly from the RPF's complete victory in the civil war, they have other roots, such as its members' origins as guerrilla fighters, their ethnic affiliation as minority Tutsis, and the influence of other 'African new leaders' (Ottaway, 1999).<sup>36</sup> In addition, the revolutionary ideology has its roots in Rwandan history itself. Monopolies of power and revolutionary changes in power relations have occurred repeatedly in Rwandan history. In this sense the RPF's victory in 1994 was very similar to the 'social revolution' that had occurred thirty years before.

### **3.4.2 Burundi**

Following the conclusion of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 2000 and the subsequent transition period, Burundians approved their constitution in a referendum held in 2005 (République du Burundi, 2005). Like Rwanda, multi-party democracy was chosen as a political system (Article 75). A president is the head of state, but Burundi does not have a prime minister, and instead established two vice-presidents, which is clearly a power-sharing device.

In fact, Burundi's political institutions as stipulated in the 2005 constitution are characterised by a rigorous system of power-sharing between ethnic groups. Unlike in Rwanda, the Burundian Constitution recognises ethnic diversity, in its first Article, and defines a series of regulations for power-sharing. As shown in detail in Table 3.1, there are strict definitions of the compositions of the two main ethnic groups (Tutsi and Hutu) in organisations related to state power. The system, designed along consociational lines,<sup>37</sup> is based on the idea of sharing state power among political

elites. In this power-sharing system, ethnic quotas are calculated on an individual basis; that is, Tutsi members from Tutsi-led parties (like UPRONA) but also from Hutu-led parties (like CNDD-FDD) are counted as Tutsis.<sup>38</sup> This arrangement, together with the effect of the electoral rule obliging parties to put candidates from different ethnic groups on their lists (Article 168), has shaped the pattern of power struggle in Burundian politics.

The reasons for the particular institutional choice in Burundi deserve some consideration. There is no doubt that the immediate cause of the power-sharing agreement was the military stalemate in the civil war. Although Tutsi-dominated government forces (Forces armées burundaises: FAB) controlled the capital with overwhelming forces and equipment during the civil war, they could not impose security on rural areas, where the Hutu rebels, the CNDD-FDD and FNL-Palipehutu, prevailed. The importance of mediating efforts offered by Julius Nyerere and Nelson Mandela (naturally with the cooperation of their governments) should be recognised, but the fact that neither side could win the war by military means was the most fundamental reason for the local parties to accept a power-sharing arrangement. In addition to this immediate reason, however, Burundian historical experience should be considered as another non-negligible factor affecting the choice of institutions. Looking back on Burundi's modern history, power-sharing arrangements were often adopted to appease political tensions; to deal with political difficulties Burundian political leaders, from Rwagasore to Buyoya, have resorted to such arrangements. The idea of ethnic equality in political institutions was a familiar element of the Burundian experience.

*Table 3.1* The ethnic power-sharing mechanisms defined in the Burundian 2005 Constitution

Function	Rules of power-sharing
Vice-President	The two Vice-Presidents shall belong to different ethnic groups and different political parties. (Article 124)
Cabinet	The cabinet must include a maximum of 60% Hutu Ministers and Vice-Ministers, and a maximum of 40% Tutsi Ministers and Vice-Ministers. (Article 129)
Security organisations	The Minister in charge of the National Defence Force should not belong to the same ethnic group as the Minister in charge of the National Police. (Article 130) Members of the same ethnic group should not account for more than 50% of the members of the Defence and Security organisations. (Article 257)
Public enterprises	Ethnic representation in public enterprises is assigned as a maximum of 60% for Hutus and a maximum of 40% for Tutsis. (Article 143)
National Assembly	The National Assembly is composed of at least 100 members, with 60% being Hutu and 40% Tutsi. (Article 164)  The election of members of parliament is carried out through a proportional representation system with closed lists. Party lists must have a multi-ethnic character, and take gender equality into account. From every three candidates in order on a list, only two can belong to the same ethnic group, and at least one of every four must be female. (Article 168)

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Senate	The Senate is composed of: (1) two delegates of each Province, belonging to different ethnic groups; (2) three persons from the Twa ethnic group; and (3) the former Heads of the State. (Article 180)
Judiciary	The composition of members of the Magistrate Upper Council should take ethnic, regional, and gender balance into account. (Article 217)
Commune	Neither of the principal ethnic groups should be represented beyond 67 per cent of the national total of Commune Administrators. (Article 266)

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*Source:* République du Burundi (2005).

### **3.5 Institutions and political power: How do the institutions work?**

#### **3.5.1 Formality and reality of the institutions**

In Chapter 2, the political institutions of African countries are examined in terms of whether they are PD (power-dispersing) or PC (power-concentrating) institutions, for the purpose of classifying a typology of political power. According to that analysis, the positions of Rwanda and Burundi are not considerably different in the diagram indicating the relationship between ‘centralised/decentralised and majoritarian/power-sharing’ (Figure 2.1). This result appears counter-intuitive, as it is clear that the political institutions of the two countries are quite contrasting. This reminds us of the need to consider both formal institutions and their management in practice in order to understand the exercise of political power.

Among eight comparison variables, two elements need additional explanation. The first concerns the party system rating (B), in which Rwanda is classified as a bipolar and Burundi as a unipolar system, according to the effective party numbers.<sup>39</sup> However, it is highly debatable whether the opposition parties in the parliament are really ‘oppositional’ in Rwanda, because these parties voted for the incumbent Paul Kagame, the former rebel commander, in the past presidential elections. Although parties other than the RPF exist in the Rwandan parliament, their behaviour is fairly similar to that of the ruling party. In the case of Burundi, the effective party number tends to reflect the reality of political power in a parliament. Its unipolar nature was a result of the particular conditions involved: the boycott by the main opposition parties in the 2010 election. In fact, a calculation based on the results of the 2005 election shows a much higher score (2.42).

The second concerns the rating for the recognition of group culture (H); although Rwanda and Burundi have no significant differences in respect of the cultural dimension of minority rights, they diverge in terms of their political dimension. The two countries do not admit the existence of traditional authorities; both derive from pre-colonial kingdoms, which had been transformed into republics in the 1960s following the dethronement of their kings. Moreover, both countries recognise special political rights for certain minority groups; the Burundian constitution clearly ensures political posts for the ethnic minorities, the Tutsi and Twa, because of its system of ethnic

power-sharing; in Rwanda, women and the disabled have quotas for representation (24 seats and 1 seat respectively) in the Lower House (Article 76), while ‘historically marginalised communities’ are provided with eight seats in the Senate.<sup>40</sup> However, Rwanda does not recognise any political right in terms of ethnic groups; indeed their very existence is denied. Ethnic diversity is concealed in Rwanda precisely because it is the minority group that controls power; defining who the majority and the minority are is dangerous for the power-holders under a system of multi-party democracy.<sup>41</sup> The critical difference between the two countries regarding the position of ethnic minorities in politics should be emphasised.

### **3.5.2 Political power and its performance**

In the post-civil war period, Rwandan politics has been virtually controlled by the RPF, whose basis of power has been nothing more than military might. While the victory in the civil war in 1994 enabled it to dominate the overarching political system, the military operation in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) since 1996 (Reyntjens, 2009), as well as the counter-insurgency operations in western Rwanda in 1997 and 1998,<sup>42</sup> contributed to the establishment of an RPF-led political order in the area, including the eastern DRC. Despite the reduction in the numbers of military staff, as well as the integration of former civil war combatants into the national army (Rwandan Defence Forces: RDF) under the auspices of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), the power structure in the Rwandan military did not change; the core members of the military have been always former Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)<sup>43</sup> officers; that is, former guerrilla fighters.<sup>44</sup> Although the RPF has not changed its Tutsi-centred nature, the RPF’s power, based on the military as well as the self-advantageous institutional arrangements, has enabled it to dominate politics under the multi-party democratic formalities (Dorsey, 2000; Reyntjens, 2004, 2011; Beswick 2010).

Under the RPF-centred political system, post-conflict Rwanda has achieved steady economic growth. The average annual GDP growth rate was as high as 4.39 per cent between 2000 and 2010 (World Development Indicators). One of the crucial factors contributing to the high level of economic growth is the export of mineral resources,<sup>45</sup> the overwhelming majority of which come from the eastern part of the DRC. The increase in exports of mineral resources was clearly attributable to Rwandan military intervention in the eastern DRC and its subsequent dominance of that region.<sup>46</sup> On this point, the former editor of the UNDP National Human Development Report (UNDP, 2007b) argued that economic growth based on military intervention led to high economic disparity (Silva-Leander, 2012).

While Burundian ethnic policy contrasts with that in Rwanda, the features of its political power have been rather similar. Since its victory in the 2005 elections, the former rebel-cum-ruling party, the CNDD-FDD, has concentrated its power in politics to the detriment of other parties (Vandeginste, 2011). The boycott strategy of the main opposition parties in the 2010 elections resulted in extending the political domination of the ruling party. At present, political antagonism has emerged not in the appearance of an ethnic problem, but in terms of sheer power struggle.

The Burundian ethnic power-sharing system has been well observed to date, with a broad consensus among stakeholders. Because of the institutional constraints, political parties tend to be multi-ethnic. As shown in Table 3.2, in the past two legislative elections, more than 30 per cent of CNDD-FDD members in the National Assembly were Tutsi, despite the party’s origins in the Hutu

rebel movement. This phenomenon was the result of the abovementioned institutional arrangements. Although the core members of the CNDD-FDD remain Hutu males, the party has the appearance of being multi-ethnic and multi-sex because of this rule.

*Table 3.2* Ethnic profile in Burundi's National Assembly

		Hutu	Tutsi	Twa	Total
2005	CNDD-FDD	43	21	0	64
	Frodebu	23	7	0	30
	Uprona	0	15	0	15
	CNDD	3	1	0	4
	MRC	0	2	0	2
	Twa	0	0	3	3
	Total	69	46	3	118
2010	CNDD-FDD	54	27	0	81
	Frodebu-Nyakuri	3	2	0	5
	Uprona	5	12	0	17
	Twa	0	0	3	3
	Total	62	41	3	106

*Source:* Election in 2005: Reyntjens (2006). Election in 2010: CENI (2010a).

*Note:* Results of the elections in 2005 and 2010.

The ethnically and sexually mixed appearance of the ruling party, however, does not necessarily result in a dispersed power structure. On the contrary, just like the RPF, the CNDD-FDD has often been accused of concentrating too much power, of intimidating opponents, and of manipulating political institutions (ICG, 2006, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2010). Following the ceasefire and power-sharing agreement in 2003, the CNDD-FDD has exerted a strong influence over the security organisations (the National Defence Force and the National Police and National Intelligence Service) in occupying key posts in these organisations. The intimidation of opposition supporters and journalists has therefore been carried out via the security organisations, especially the National

Police and National Intelligence Service.<sup>47</sup> Although the strategy of boycotting the elections has often been criticised not only by the Burundian government but also by external actors such as donor countries, its background, in which the ruling party had relied on authoritarian measures, should be taken into account (ICG, 2010, 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2010).

While the dominance of the CNDD-FDD has been becoming increasingly established in Burundi, its economic performance has been rather disappointing. The average annual GDP growth rate between 2000 and 2010 was only 1.35 per cent – less than the annual population growth rate during the same period. The following points are important as factors explaining this poor macroeconomic performance. First, Burundi's economic governance has remained fragile in comparison with Rwanda's, as is shown by several indicators.<sup>48</sup> Secondly, Burundi does not have an engine of growth comparable to Rwanda's exports of its mineral resources. The reason why Burundi does not export mineral resources is undoubtedly attributable to the extent of military intervention in the eastern DRC; Burundi could not organise a network for mineral exports, as it has not been as deeply and systematically involved in the Congo War as Rwanda.<sup>49</sup>

### **3.6 Popular perceptions<sup>50</sup>**

In spite of its official negation, ethnicity has been popularly perceived as playing a critical role in post-conflict Rwanda (Ingelaere, 2010). Ironically, the more the RPF negates ethnicity, the more it tends to be regarded through the lens of ethnicity; its emphasis on national unity as well as its refusal to recognise ethnicity have been interpreted, from an ethnicity-centred logic, as the RPF's agenda for maintaining political power. This logic asserts that the RPF does not want ethnicity to enter into politics, because it is supported by the ethnic minority: the Tutsi.

With regard to post-conflict Rwanda, the dangers of social exclusion have often been pointed out. There are, in fact, three related problems. The first concerns state patronage; in the circumstances in which the political arena has been dominated by the RPF, the Tutsis have had greater chances to be the beneficiaries of state service provision, including opportunities for education and employment in the sector, because of their patronage network with political leaders. Since its seizure of power, the RPF has exerted its influence not only on the central bureaucracy, but also on local administrations. Today, leaders of local administrations are, almost without exception, ardent supporters of the RPF.<sup>51</sup> While the state patronage network also includes the Hutus, as both Tutsi and Hutu are far from monolithic groups, it is nevertheless beyond doubt that the overwhelming majority of those who have been excluded from the network are Hutus.

The second problem relates to economic disparities. As we have already mentioned, rapid economic growth in Rwanda has widened economic disparities, in a setting in which Tutsi returnees have tended to be the winners. The third danger is related to Gacaca: a popular, participatory transitional justice process for punishing genocide perpetrators. Its social impact has been enormous, as the number of delivered judgements has reached around 1.4 million.<sup>52</sup> The previous literature disagrees in its assessment of Gacaca, but researchers who have recently observed the realities on the ground tend to be critical of the practice;<sup>53</sup> one of these studies has argued that, as a consequence of the trials, Rwandan society has suffered from 'a tension worsening social cohesion and attitudes towards the "other group"' (Ingelaere, 2009). The reasons for this were mainly twofold; on the one hand, in the huge number of Gacaca trials, the relationship between accusers and accused has always been ethnically fixed – the accusers were Tutsi and the accused were Hutu; on the other hand,

although RPF soldiers also committed atrocities during the civil war, they have rarely been judged or punished (Human Rights Watch, 2008). In spite of the Gacaca's stated objectives of reconciliation and national unity, it may in fact have rather widened the ethnic divide.

It is highly possible that these three layers of exclusion have resulted in the marginalisation of the Hutus. In addition to the fact that Hutus are in the majority in the rural population, which makes it generally difficult for them to benefit from macro-level economic growth, they have a smaller chance of being included in the patronage network of political leaders. Moreover, it is rare for a Hutu to have no family members who stood accused in Gacaca trials. In short, the Hutus are quite likely to perceive themselves as suffering from HIs with regard to both the political as well as the socioeconomic dimensions.<sup>54</sup>

In the case of examining perceived HIs in Burundi, it is better to separate the perception among political elites from that among ordinary people, because the ethnic power-sharing system has drastically transformed patterns of political antagonism. The institutional change prohibited politicians from relying on ethnic logic in organising a political party. As a result, Tutsi elites chose to enter into Hutu-led parties in pursuing chances to become MPs, and vice versa. Political elites ceased to use ethnicity as a tool for mobilising the population in power struggles.

Although the Burundian power-sharing system to date has succeeded in containing ethnic mobilisation, it fails to institutionalise power struggles. Since 2010 the country has once again been faced with a rebel movement, because after the election boycott the FNL rearmed and launched sporadic attacks. Although they once accepted the ceasefire and the integration, they defected from the security organisations and returned to the bush to fight.<sup>55</sup> Political antagonism between two Hutu-led parties is a new development, but the outlaw features of the power struggle, such as political violence, oppression, and terrorism, have often been witnessed in modern Burundian history.

Among ordinary Burundians, CNDD-FDD has remained relatively popular since its election victory in 2005. The results of the Communal election in 2010, in which CNDD-FDD gained 64 per cent of the members of the Communal Council, were an indication of its popularity, especially in rural areas.<sup>56</sup> The main reasons for this popularity seemed to be the improvements in living standards; in addition to the mere fact of the end of war, policies ensuring free-of-charge access to primary school and health care have particularly served to garner popular support.<sup>57</sup> It is safe to say that the actual popularity of the CNDD-FDD is not based solely on ethnic preferences.

Nevertheless, the ethnic problem has remained unsolved among the population. The most visible evidence for this is the camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) that are located throughout the country.<sup>58</sup> Burundian IDPs are mainly Tutsis, who were chased out by their Hutu neighbours during the civil war in the 1990s. Although the fighting has now ended, the IDPs prefer to stay in the camps for fear of persecution. In everyday life, the legacies of the civil war always remain a reality;<sup>59</sup> ordinary people continue to hold memories of fear in terms of ethnicity. It may be possible that such fear could be manipulated for another mobilisation.<sup>60</sup>

### **3.7 Conclusion: Implications for conflict prevention**

Despite their socioeconomic and geographical similarities and their common experiences of repeated ethnic conflicts, Rwanda and Burundi adopted contrasting policies, in terms of ethnicity and

power-sharing, after their devastating recent civil wars. From the analyses of HIs, political institutions, and recent political developments, some conclusions on the nature of political power as well as conflict prevention can be drawn.

In post-conflict Rwanda, political power has been dominated by the Tutsi-led RPF: the victor in the civil war. Although some appearances of power-sharing can be found in formal institutions, a number of formal as well as informal devices serve to maintain the political dominance of the RPF. Under the power-concentrating system, the RPF has so far succeeded in guaranteeing security and in promoting rapid economic growth. This success, however, has been accompanied by social exclusion, in a way that many Hutus are likely to resent in terms of both political and socioeconomic HIs. Overlap in two dimensions of HIs is a dangerous signal for the outbreak of conflict (Stewart, 2010). Despite the appearance of stability, a third revolutionary political change in Rwanda's history would not be unimaginable, if the power concentration in the hands of the RPF were to deepen the grudge held by the ethnic majority.

Following the introduction of the ethnic power-sharing system, post-conflict Burundi has seen a clear change in the nature of its power struggle. Ethnicity is no longer the determinant of antagonism among political elites, which is a remarkable and positive change. Nevertheless, during the same period, Burundi has also seen a concentration of power in the former Hutu-led rebels, the CNDD-FDD, as well as economic stagnation with rampant corruption, and the rearmament of the FNL. Although the HIs are tending to diminish with the new institutional arrangement, especially among elites, Burundi is always faced with a real threat of political violence; the power struggle has not yet been institutionalised.

The case of Burundi highlights the possibilities and limitations of international intervention in conflict prevention. The introduction of ethnic power-sharing has reduced the danger of ethnic mobilisation. Even if an institution is introduced on the initiative of external actors, it could play a decisive role in changing the rules of the game in national politics in a positive fashion. Nevertheless, it has not yet been able to transform the essential nature of the politics; the institutionalisation of the power struggle remains unsolved in Burundi.

Analyses of the two countries show that their institutions reflect long-term historical experiences. Although the way in which recent wars end is undoubtedly an important factor for the determination of post-conflict political institutions, it is not the only factor. In neither country were the post-conflict political institutions merely the results of the preceding civil wars. The sustainability and resilience of the institutions depend on the extent to which they can resonate with endogenous initiatives. It was possible to introduce the ethnic power-sharing system in Burundi, which is a country with a long history of implementing similar mechanisms. In a similar vein, the RPF's mode of governance reflects not only its total victory in the war, but also Rwanda's modern history, in which revolutionary political change has taken place repeatedly. Institutions for conflict prevention should therefore be designed taking the historical background into account.

## Notes

1. Although no census on the ethnic groups has been carried out in either country, the approximate proportions of the

three groups among their total populations are said to be almost the same: the Tutsi account for around 15 per cent and the Hutu 85 per cent, while the proportion of the Twa is less than 1 per cent.

2. As comparative studies between Rwanda and Burundi, Lemarchand's works (1970, 2006, 2009) are the most notable. Uvin (2010) is also worth mentioning in terms of research on conflict prevention.
3. The author has continuously conducted field studies since 1999 in Rwanda, and visited Burundi for research during two months in total in 2010, 2011, and 2012.
4. The origins of the Tutsi and Hutu have been one of the hottest issues in the history of the two countries. Although we do not have enough space to follow the debates, it should be stressed that the thesis attributing the origin of the traditional kingdoms to the migration of and conquest by the Tutsi is seriously questioned today. Recent studies have clarified that the group identities of Tutsi and Hutu were ambiguous, and their border was blurred in the pre-colonial period. As representative studies, see C. Newbury (1988), Schoenbrun (1993, 1998), Chrétien (2000) and D. Newbury (2001).
5. For the importance of the social constructivist view in the analysis of HIs, see Stewart (2008: 9–12).
6. The Great Lakes region, including south-western Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, north-western Tanzania, and part of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, was the site of a number of pre-colonial kingdoms, among which only Rwanda and Burundi became modern sovereign states. These kingdoms shared a stratified social composition, particularly between pastoralists and agriculturalists (d'Hertefeldt *et al.*, 1962; Maquet 1971); in the case of Rwanda and Burundi, pastoralist Tutsis took the dominant position over the agriculturalist Hutus, although it should be noted that the distinction between the two groups has been ambiguous.
7. The concept was characterised by elitism (Vansina, 2001), connected with state power, as well as pastoralism, their main socioeconomic activity (Nkurikiyimfura, 1994).
8. Batare refers to family members who were descendants of King Ntare Rugamba (reigned from 1795 to 1852), while Bezi were descended from Mwezi Gisabo (1852–1908). The Burundian state expanded considerably during the reign of Ntare, who, in order to consolidate his territorial gains, appointed his sons to administer newly acquired provinces. As a consequence of this practice, connecting dynastic families systematically with politically important positions, the Ganwa as a group began to play a decisive role in politics. King Mwezi, on the other hand, tried to remove his predecessor's influence and appoint his own sons to politically important positions, thus exacerbating the rivalry between the two groups (Lemarchand, 1970: 311).
9. In addition to the Ganwa, the ethnic identity of the Hima seemed to be much more strongly perceived in Burundi than in Rwanda. While the Hima is a group related to the Tutsis, living in Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, its uniqueness and independence as a group have been different depending on the political as well as regional context. Comparing the description of 'Hima' in Dorsey (1994) and that in Eggers (1997), the latter clearly emphasises its uniqueness. For the Hima in Burundi, see also Lemarchand (1994: 81–2).
10. A good example on this point is the role of the Bashingantahe, elders who are in charge of justice in local communities (Laely, 1992; Naniwe-Kaburahe, 2008). 'Although commonly (though not exclusively) Hutu, they were fully recognised within the Burundi political system in a way unknown – even adamantly opposed – in Rwanda under the Nyiginya dynasty' (D. Newbury, 2001: 275).
11. Strictly speaking, the Belgian administration on behalf of the League of Nations and the United Nations is different from colonial rule. In this chapter, however, the term 'colonial' will be used because of the similarity of power relations between foreigners and natives.
12. The elimination of Hutus from the administration proceeded following the 1920s in the process of administration reform, which considerably reduced the number of chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms under the name of administrative rationalisation. In Burundi, all 27 posts for Hutu chiefs were struck off between 1929 and 1945, as a result of rationalising chiefdoms from 133 to 35 (Gahama, 2001: 104). No chiefdom among the 45 that existed in Rwanda as of November 1, 1959, was headed by a Hutu chief; only 10 sub-chiefdoms among 559 had Hutu sub-chiefs (Reyntjens, 1985: 269).
13. The term 'social revolution' implies a connotation of social progress, moving from feudalism (rule by the Tutsi minority) to democracy (rule by the Hutu majority). This terminology has therefore been preferred by Hutu elites, who took power after independence. In contrast, Tutsi elites tend to avoid the term. The present Tutsi-led government calls the incident 'the first massacres of Batutsi' (Website of Government of Rwanda. [http://www.gov.rw/page.php?id\\_article=56](http://www.gov.rw/page.php?id_article=56) last accessed January 13, 2011). In this chapter, the term is used within quotation marks.
14. For detailed studies of the 'social revolution', see Lemarchand (1970) and Reynjens (1985).
15. Michel Micombero, the first president after the overthrow of the monarchy, was of mixed Tutsi–Hima origin and from a family that did not rank high in traditional prestige (Eggers, 1997: 84). See also Lemarchand (1970).
16. For the Burundian genocide in 1972, see Chrétien and Dupaquier (2007), Lemarchand (1994).
17. Examples of the extreme ethnic disparity in this period were shown in Nkurunziza and Ngaruko (2008: 76); the Tutsi monopolised almost all posts in the public sector, such as ministers, provincial governors, ambassadors, army members (from officers to the rank and file), policemen, state-owned company directors, and magistrates.
18. Elites from central Rwanda monopolised the core of political power under the first president (G. Kaybanda), who was originally from Gitarama (Reyntjens, 1985). Following the coup, Rwandan politics tended to be dominated by political elites from the north-western part of the country, which was where Habyarimana and his wife had come

from (Prunier, 1995).

19. Data on Rwandan and Burundian political elites are available in series of annuals 'L'afrique des grands lacs' issued by the Centre d'étude de la région des grands lacs d'afrique. Every annual lists the names of members of the political elite such as cabinet members, governors, top officers in the army, and ambassadors, with their political party, ethnic affiliation, and regions of origin. The data clearly show that the Tutsis who had been refugees have occupied important posts in the government. For instance, top officer positions in the Rwandan armed forces have always been monopolised by the former Tutsi refugees of the RPF, namely, the former guerrilla fighters.
20. Despite the deepening Tutsi–Hutu divide during the colonial period, Rwagasore succeeded in including Tutsis as well as the Hutu population in the UPRONA, thus making it a nationalistic mass party. In addition to his charismatic leadership, the principle of incorporating equivalent numbers of Hutu and Tutsi members at every level of the party organisation was crucial to gaining support from ordinary Hutus (Lemarchand, 1970: 330).
21. Each of the five governments between 1963 and 1965 comprised an almost even proportion of Hutu and Tutsi ministers (Lemarchand, 1970: 368).
22. Unlike the case of the mass killing in 1972, the international community fiercely reacted against the incident in 1988 and demanded that the Buyoya government improve ethnic relations. The government was thus obliged to show some results of 'reconciliation' for outsiders (Lemarchand, 1994: 128–30).
23. For example, among 48 high-ranking members (ministers and cabinet directors) in the Buyoya cabinet in 1998, 19 were Hutu, 19 were Tutsi, and 10 others were of ethnically unknown origin. In the same year, all top officers in the Burundian armed forces and the gendarmerie were Tutsi (Marysse and Reyntjens dir. 1999: 385-9).
24. According to the data from the 'L'afrique des grands lacs' annuals, ethnic equivalence in the army seemed to have been achieved around the period of the general elections in 2005.
25. Before the systematic expulsion, nearly half the students in secondary schools and universities were Tutsi (Munyarugerero, 2003: 134). For the Tutsi expulsion in 1973, see also Reyntjens (1985: 501–4).
26. At the beginning of the 1990s, both Rwanda and Burundi were among the least urbanised countries in sub-Saharan Africa. AQ – should this be sub-Saharan Africa as in earlier chapters? ---yes Burundi was in the same position in 2008, with almost 90 per cent of its total population living in rural areas. However, rapid urbanisation was seen in Rwanda in the same period, as its urban population rate increased from 5.4 per cent in 1990 to 18.34 per cent in 2008 (World Development Indicators).
27. A tremendous number of Tutsi former refugees returned after the end of the civil war. Although there have been various estimates of the number of returnees, it is safe to say that 600,000 to 700,000 former refugees returned (Huggins, 2009: 69; Bruce, 2009: 112). Ansoms (2009) and Silva-Leander (2012) pointed out the concentration of Tutsi returnees in urban areas. The RPF-led government, which is eager to involve the Rwandan Diaspora in the development of the national economy, has adopted several measures to promote this, such as permission for dual citizenship (Plaza and Ratha eds, 2011). It is highly probable that the part of the Rwandan Diaspora that has returned to the homeland since 1994 is overwhelmingly Tutsi.
28. This fact is clearly shown in the evolution of the percentage share of GDP per quintile of population. While the share of the top 20 per cent quintile has sharply enlarged, reaching 51.4 per cent in 2000 from 39.1 per cent in 1985, the bottom 20 per cent shrank from 9.7 per cent to 5.4 per cent in the same period. This means that 'almost all the growth generated in the last few years has gone to the top quintile' (UNDP, 2007b: 19), leaving the average income of the other four quintiles virtually unchanged since 2003. Rwanda's Gini coefficient in 2000 was 0.468, considerably aggravated from 0.289 in the mid 1980s (UNDP, 2006, 2007a); it further increased to 0.510 in 2006 (Republic of Rwanda, 2007: 13).
29. According to data from the census held in Rwanda in 2000–2001, the proportion of the population whose annual income or expenditure for consumption was under the national poverty line (64,000 Rwanda Francs, corresponding to roughly 150 US dollars) was over five times higher in rural areas than that in the capital, Kigali (République rwandaïse, 2002: 33).
30. In the Burundian army, members from Bururi had outnumbered those from other regions since the 1960s. After the coup in 1966, the army established the Conseil national de la révolution (CNR) as a supreme decision-making body. In 1968, among 17 officers included in the CNR, eight were from the Bururi (five Tutsi, two Hutu, and one Hima), and seven were non-Tutsi (three Hutu, two Hima, one Ganwa, and one so-called 'Swahili') (Lemarchand, 1994: 79).
31. Compared with the national average, the school enrolment ratio in Bururi was 1.5 times higher, its number of teachers per classroom was twice as large, and its population per hospital was only 107,000 in comparison with the national average of 266,000 (Nkurundiza and Ngaruko, 2008: 73).
32. Bururi's privileged position in public health was no more obvious in recent statistics; the population per hospital in Bururi province was 129,663 in 2007 (ISTEEBU, 2009: 132); this figure was the fifth-highest rank among 17 provinces. However, Bururi seemed to maintain its prominence in secondary schools; its enrolment rate (21.6 per cent) – the second-highest figure, after only Bujumbura city (37.7 per cent) – was remarkably higher than other rural provinces, among which the highest (Makamba) was only 13.1 per cent (République du Burundi, 2006: 62–4).
33. IRIN, May 23, 2003. 'Rwanda, Government to Start Legal Proceedings against Banned Party'.
34. For the position of women in post-conflict Rwandan politics, see Burnet (2008).
35. In the case of the Senate, all 26 members are either elected from among or appointed by the Executive

Committees of local administrations, the President of the Republic, the Forum of Political Organisations, and academia.

36. In Ottaway's analysis, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda are typical countries under the rule of the 'African New Leaders', and Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are their possible followers. Tendencies toward authoritarian rule and social engineering can be commonly observed among these countries. In addition, the ideological influence of Museveni's Uganda on Kagame's Rwanda has been well known (Prunier 1998).
37. Lijphart (1977). For analyses of the Burundian power-sharing system from the viewpoint of consociationalism, see Sullivan (2005), Lemarchand (2006), and Vandeginste (2006, 2008, 2009).
38. This arrangement was in accordance with the argument of Hutu parties during the negotiations, whereas Tutsi parties had insisted on counting through the party base, i.e., that only members from Tutsi parties should be considered as representatives of the Tutsi ethnic group.
39. The effective party numbers calculated from the results of the latest elections are 1.53 for Rwanda and 1.49 for Burundi. As a consequence of Rwanda's legislative election in 2008, the RPF gained 47 of the 53 seats in the Lower House, PSD (Parti social-démocratique) seven, and PL (Parti libéral) four. As mentioned earlier, in addition to these seats elected through universal suffrage, 27 members were selected through various administrative organizations. Burundi's legislative election in 2010 resulted in a landslide victory for the CNDD-FDD, accounting for 81 of 104 seats, because the main oppositional parties had boycotted it (see *infra*). For the method of calculating the effective party numbers, see Lijphart (1999: 68).
40. Article 82. Although no mention is made in ethnic terms, the 'historically marginalised communities' clearly include the Twa people.
41. The policy of the ethnic ban was not the RPF's invention. Burundians had also seen the same policy under the Bagaza regime (1976-87). See Lemarchand (1994: 108).
42. In 1997-98, government forces attacked Hutu militias who had returned to Rwanda from the DRC in the guise of civilian returnees. During this operation, a number of Hutu civilians were allegedly slaughtered. An international NGO estimates that at least 6,000 civilians were killed between January and August 1997 (Amnesty International, 1997).
43. During the civil war, the RPA constituted the military wing of the RPF.
44. On the one hand, the RDRC program, especially its second phase which started in December 2001, has been generally appreciated by the international community; the number of members of the Rwandan military was reduced from 80,000 in 2002 to 35,000 in 2008; the assistance for former combatants was equally distributed without respect to their former affiliation. On the other hand, the power structure of the Rwandan military has not changed since the end of the civil war; its core high officer positions have been virtually monopolised by former guerrilla force (RPA) members. See Takeuchi (2011) for details.
45. Whereas Rwandan traditional export items were almost entirely limited to coffee and tea, the export of mineral resources such as niobium, tantalum, and vanadium has rapidly increased recently. In 2006, they made up 18.2 per cent of total exports, thus constituting the second-largest export item after coffee (World Bank, 2009: 85). The dependency of Rwandan economy on mineral exports is deepening, as tin became the largest export item in 2011, accounting for 24.4 per cent of total exports (Republic of Rwanda, 2012: 32).
46. Regarding Rwanda's military interference in the DRC and its illegal exploitation of mineral resources, see, for example, UNSC (2001, 2002). Marysse and André (2001) estimated that the benefit that had been acquired by Rwanda through illegal exports of minerals (coltan, diamond and gold) was equivalent to 7 per cent and 8 per cent of its GDP in 1999 and 2000, respectively. For recent developments, see Global Witness (2011).
47. Key posts in the security organisations, such as the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of the National Intelligence Service, and the Vice-Director of the National Police, are held by former CNDD-FDD officers. During the author's field research in October and November 2010, members of local NGOs all pointed out that the National Police and the National Intelligence Service were virtually controlled by the CNDD-FDD. See also Human Rights Watch (2010), Vandeginste (2011), Africa Confidential (2011).
48. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Burundi's 'Control of Corruption' indicator remained low during 1998 (-1.24) and 2009 (-1.12), while Rwanda markedly improved from -0.84 to 0.126 in the same period. Another NGO survey positioned Burundi as the most corrupt of five East African countries (Transparency International 2010). In the Doing Business ranking in 2010, which ranked Rwanda 58th in the world (the fourth-highest position among African countries), Burundi was in the 181st position among 183 countries, better than only the Central African Republic and Chad. In addition, during the author's field research, a number of interviewees from the civil society pointed out corruption has intensified under the rule of the CNDD-FDD, and attributed the fact to the behaviour of new elites, who were busy profiting from their opportunities for 'eating'.
49. Marysse *et al.* (2006) contrasts Rwanda's 'aid darling' status with the DRC's and Burundi's 'aid orphan' status. Although the contrast between Rwanda and the DRC is convincing, that between Rwanda and Burundi is not. Comparing the average net ODA received per capita from 2000 to 2009, Burundi received US\$ 44.0, which counted for 72 per cent of Rwanda's US\$ 60.7 (data from WDI). Both of these figures are not far from the average for sub-Saharan countries during the same period (US\$ 58.5).
50. Due to the sensitiveness of questions concerning ethnicity, large-scale social inquiries were not carried out in Rwanda and Burundi in the research project. Therefore, unlike other chapters, the perceptions of HIs will be

estimated in this chapter on the basis of analyses made thus far on the history, institutions, and recent political processes in each country.

51. See Ingelaere (2010). The voting system through queues has confirmed this tendency. In local elections in Rwanda, voters are requested to stand in a queue behind their preferred candidates.
52. 'Open Justice: Q&A with Minister of Justice, Tharcisse Karugarama' (Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda) <http://www.gov.rw/OPEN-JUSTICE-Q-A-with-Minister-of-Justice-Tharcisse-Karugarama> (last accessed May 23, 2011).
53. See, for example, Waldorf (2006), Drumbl (2007), Ingelaere (2009), Rettig (2008), Thomson (2011).
54. Ingelaere (2010) supports this point. According to his survey, subjective political representation rankings are contrasting between Tutsis and Hutus. Tutsis generally feel that they were more politically represented after the civil war of the 1990s than before, but Hutus tend to consider themselves to be in the opposite position.
55. A UN expert panel revealed that FNL had entered the DRC for remobilisation. See UNSC (2010: par. 113-119).
56. Although the main opposition groups such as FNL and Sahwanya-Frodebu accused the ruling party of carrying out massive fraud and withdrew from subsequent elections, the general popularity of the CNDD-FDD seemed to be undeniable except in several provinces, such as Bujumbura Rural, Bururi, and Bujumbura Marie. The popularity of FNL was particularly strong in the Province of Bujumbura Rural (CENI, 2010b).
57. Considering that the execution of these policies will result in overloading governmental finance, it is uncertain how long these policies and therefore the popularity of the ruling party will be sustainable. During the author's field visit in 2010, the diplomatic corps, international agencies, and the civil society were all worried about the danger to the national finances that the free-of-charge policies would create.
58. As of 2009, Burundi had 137 IDP camps, with camps in all 17 provinces; the total number of IDPs amounted to 157,167 (Rwabahungu and Nintunze, 2009: 9).
59. A civil society activist pointed out that, as a result of the civil war, contacts with different ethnic groups have considerably diminished, even on ceremonial occasions such as weddings and funerals (Author's interview, November 2010, Bujumbura).
60. Land problems are among the most dangerous issues that can heighten ethnic tensions. In addition to the land problems of the IDPs, land conflicts caused by the return of Hutu refugees are also serious. The end of the civil war encouraged a huge number of Burundian refugees, who escaped the country in the 1960s and 1970s, to return to their homeland. Many of them, however, found that their land had been occupied (ICG, 2003). It is said that there would be considerable numbers of Tutsi migrants among the occupiers, who had been sent there under the one-party regime in the 1970s and 1980s. There is a danger that the land conflicts between Hutu returnees and Tutsi occupiers have the potential to be ethnically manipulated.