

## Chapter 2 Transfer of Power from Jiang to Hu: the CPC's Transformation

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# Chapter 2

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### *Introduction*

One of the major issues at the CPC 16th National Congress was whether Jiang Zemin would maintain his influence upon the Party after he resigned as General Secretary. Two factors would decide the matter. One was the designation of new members of the Party's officers and the other was how to handle the important thought of the "Three Represents".

Regarding the designation of new officers, people were concerned about whether Jiang Zemin would remain as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission, and how many confidants he would be able to designate as members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. On the other hand, people were also concerned about how the important thought of the Three Represents would be integrated into the report on behalf of the CPC Central Committee (Jiang Zemin report) and the Party's amended constitution<sup>1</sup>.

The National Congress anticipated the imminent transformation of the CPC, which reflected the changing aspects of the Party through the reform and the open policy since 1978 and the development of a market economy since 1992.

This paper analyzes the designation of the CPC officers, the Jiang Zemin report, and the Party's amended constitution, and discusses the transformation of the CPC.

### **2.1 Designation of Officers: Limited Transfer of Powers from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao**

#### **2.1.1 General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission**

In accordance with the stipulation on

the mandatory retirement age of 75 in the CPC's internal statutes, Jiang Zemin resigned as General Secretary and was replaced by Hu Jintao. This was a consequence of Deng Xiaoping's decision to designate him at 49 years of age as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee in order to train young leaders. Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Liu Xiaoqi, Lin Biao, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who were major successors to Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, lost their positions during political struggles. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the inauguration of Hu Jintao is the only case where a General Secretary peacefully transferred his supreme power to his successor. This suggests that the era of Jiang Zemin had been politically stable.

At the 16th National Congress, Jiang Zemin remained as chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. In order to keep political influence in the CPC after the end of the 16th Congress, he made efforts to develop his powers during the five years following the previous congress<sup>2</sup>. This merely reflected the desire for power of a man who has once reached the top. Because of the impossibility of continuing as General Secretary, it was a personal imperative for Jiang Zemin to retain the position of chairman of the Central Military Commission at all costs. Retirement from this office would have constituted a total retirement from the political stage. In fact, this maneuver had already been used by Deng Xiaoping who had succeeded in remaining in the same position for the preceding term. The position of chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission had become a de facto supreme position of the CPC. Fortunately for those concerned, this position is not governed by any stipulation regarding mandatory retirement age or conflict of positions. Thus,

Table 1 Line-up of Political Bureau of CPC

position	15th		16th		age	other post (as of Mar. 17, 2003.)
	name	age	name	age		
General Secretary	Jiang Zeming	71	Hu Jintao	59	President, Chairman of Central Military Commission	
Standing Committee Members	Jiang Zeming	71	Hu Jintao	59		
(9)	Li Peng	68	Wu Bangguo	61	Chairman of Standing Committee of National People's Congress	
	Zhu Rongji	68	Wen Jiabao	60	Premier	
	Li Ruihuan	63	Jia Qinglin	62	Chairman of National Committee of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	
	Hu Jintao	54	Zeng Qinghong	63	Vice President, Member of Secretariat, President of Central Party School	
	Wei Jianxing	66	Huang Ju	64	Vice Premier	
	Li Lanqing	65	Wu Guanzheng	64	Secretary of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection	
			Li Changchun	59		
			Luo Gan	67		
Members	Ding Guangen	68	Wang Lequan	57	Secretary of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Committee	
(15)	Tian Jiyun	68	Wang Zhaoguo	61	Vice Chairman of Standing Committee of National People's Congress, Chairman of All-China Federation of Trade Unions	
	LiChangchun	53	Hui Liangyu	58	Vice Premier	
	Li Tieying	61	Liu Qi	59	Secretary of Beijing Municipal Committee	
	Wu Bangguo	56	Liu Yunshan	55	Member of Secretariat, Head of Publicity Department	
	Wu Guanzheng	58	Wu Yi	63	Vice Premier	
	Chi Haotian	68	Zhang Lichang	63	Secretary of Tianjin Municipal Committee	
	Zhang Wannian	69	Zhang Dejiang	55	Secretary of Guangdong Provincial Committee	
	Luo Gan	62	Chen Liangyu	56	Secretary of Shanghai Municipal Committee	
	Jiang Chunyun	67	Zhou Yongkang	59	Member of Secretariat, State Councillor, Ministry of Public Security	
	Jia Qinglin	57	Yu Zhengsheng	57	Secretary of Hubei Provincial Committee	
	Qian Qichen	69	He Guoqiang	59	Member of Secretariat, Head of Organization Department	
	Huang Ju	59	Guo Boxiong	60	Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission	
	Wei Jiabao	55	Cao Gangchuan	66	Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission, State Councillor	
	Xie Fei	64	Zeng Beiyuan	63	Vice Premier	
Alternate Member	Zeng Qinghong	58	Wang Gang	60	Member of Secretariat, Director of General Office	
(1)	Wu Yi	58				

Notes: 1. Figure indicate age in elected on each Party Congress

2. DMembers are listed in the order of the number of strokes in their surnames

Source: Prepared by the author

Jiang Zemin had only to retain this position as a source of power for exercising his political influence during the reign of Hu Jintao.

### **2.1.2 Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee**

Nine persons were elected as members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, the supreme decision-making organ of the Party: Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, and Luo Gan (Table 1).

Three facts should be pointed out regarding the election for the Standing Committee. One is that the new Standing Committee includes a group of five persons associated with Jiang Zemin: Wu Bangguo, Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, and Li Changchun ("Jiang faction"). This group constitutes a majority of the committee and is able to exercise Jiang Zemin's influence.

#### ***Hu Jintao in the first rank***

This rank is reserved for General Secretary.

#### ***Wu Bangguo in the second rank***

He was promoted from his previous position of a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Jiang Zemin wished to reserve the second rank for one of his confidants. The leader behind the curtain would have lost face if the first two superior ranks had been given to a non-Jiang faction in spite of gaining a majority. The designation of Wu Bangguo in the second rank may also be a logical consequence since Wu Bangguo is serving as vice-premier. He succeeded to Li Peng as chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee in March 2003.

#### ***Wen Jiabao in the third rank***

He is close to Zhu Rongji. He assumed the office of premier as successor to Zhu Rongji in March 2003. He deserves this third rank.

#### ***Jia Qinglin in the fourth rank***

Jia Qinglin was unexpectedly elected as a member of the Standing Committee. During his office of secretary of CPC Fujian Province Committee, he could be accused for neglecting his duties regarding smuggling in Fujian Province. It was regarded as the worst case of corruption in the history of the People's Republic of China. People criticized his wife, too. In the long run, spouses were not accused, so Jiang Zemin was criticized<sup>3</sup>. This designation, despite the gray background, is a positive result of Jiang Zemin's efforts. Jia Qinglin became the chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March 2003.

#### ***Zeng Qinghong in the fifth rank***

He is a member of Jiang Zemin's principal staff. When promoted from secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipality Committee to CPC General Secretary, Jiang Zemin was accompanied by Zeng Qinghong from Shanghai. Zeng's two-stage promotion from alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee is exceptional. Besides, her position of fifth rank is not regarded as modest, and this too is an effect of Jiang Zemin's political influence. He is a member of the CPC Central Committee Secretariat, and has assumed the president of the Central Party School.

#### ***Huang Ju in the sixth rank***

He was promoted from a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and became the vice-premier in March 2003.

#### ***Wu Guanzheng in the seventh rank***

He was promoted from a member of

the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. The faction to which he belongs is not known. Because he is thought to be close to Zeng Qinghong, Wu Guanzheng is certainly a member of the Jiang Zemin faction. He is regarded as principled, so he has reasonably assumed the secretariat of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.

### ***Li Changchun in the eighth rank***

This time, he was promoted from a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

The second fact is that the number of members of the Standing Committee was raised from 7 to 9. This increase was decided probably for Luo Gan.

### ***Luo Gan in the ninth rank***

He also was promoted from a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. He is regarded as close to Li Peng. Before the designation of members, he had been expected to be ranked higher but ended up at ninth, the lowest rank. The promotion may reflect Li Peng's reduced influence in the CPC. The total number of members was increased by two probably because Li Peng insisted that Luo Gan should be designated as member of the Standing Committee. And the number was increased by two rather than one, presumably in order to guarantee that decisions can be made by majority.

The third fact in the newly organized Standing Committee is that all the previous members but Hu Jintao was replaced by new members. It is considered that the members of the Standing Committee must follow a clause on mandatory retirement age in the Party's internal statutes. Li Ruihuan could have remained in the previous position because he is 68 years old. Probably, all the members of the third generation retired from their office in order to make it easier for Hu Jintao to work in the new era. It thus con-

stitutes a renewal of personnel. However, Li Ruihuan was in the fourth rank in the 15th Standing Committee and might have coveted supreme power like Jiang Zemin. Therefore, the previous No. 4 member of the Standing Committee surely accepted a proposal for retirement with reluctance. Li Ruihuan was probably expelled from the position by Jiang Zemin so that the Jiang faction might have a majority in the Standing Committee.

### ***2.1.3 Members / Alternate Member of the Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee***

The Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee is composed of 24 members (9 are members of the Standing Committee) and an alternate member of the Political Bureau. It is not possible to classify them by faction (Jiang faction, non-Jiang faction, or Hu Jintao faction). This section analyzes the other 16 members.

At the end of the 16th National Congress, eight secretaries of CPC local committees were designated as members of the Committee of the Political Bureau. Some people attributed this decision to the importance placed on local societies. One should not be too rash in reaching a conclusion, and should appreciate the fact that the cadre (personnel) exchange system between central and local organizations is functioning properly.

After the 16th National Congress, it was announced that Zhang Dejiang (1), secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee, was transferred to the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee to serve as secretary; Zhou Yongkang (2), secretary of the CPC Sichuan Provincial Committee, was transferred to the CPC Central Committee Secretariat to serve as secretary and minister of Public Security; Hui Liangyu (3), secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee, was transferred to the vice-premier. Liu Qi (4), secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipality Committee, Chen

Liangyu (5), secretary of the CPC Shanghai Municipality Committee, and the secretary of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee reasonably reached their reserved positions as members of the Committee of the Political Bureau.

Wang Lequan (6), secretary of the CPC Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region Committee, and Zhang Lichang (7), secretary of the CPC Tianjin Municipality Committee, have worked as secretary for more than five years and are expected to leave their current office for the central organization soon.

Yu Zhengsheng (8), secretary of the CPC Hubei Provincial Committee, was elected not because of their current position but because of their knowledge and skills. The achievements of Yu, "successor" to his father's heritage as politician, in his office of secretary of the CPC Qingdao City Committee were highly appreciated by many.

Lu Yunshan (9), head of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, and He Guoqiang (10), head of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, were elected as members of the Committee of the Political Bureau as expected.

The soldiers Guo Boxiong (11) and Cao Gangchuan (12), vice-chairmen of the CPC Central Military Commission, have only taken their reserved seats.

Wang Zhaoguo (13), who had already registered in the Chinese Communist Youth League when Hu Jintao joined it in his youth, was probably nominated for this reason. Wu Yi (14), State Councilor, was once minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and recorded excellent achievements in trade negotiations with foreign government officials such as those for affiliation to GATT. Foreigners refer to her as "China's Thatcher." She is expected to become a vice-premier in charge of diplomatic relations in international trade, an increasingly important field. Zeng Peiyan (15), minister of the State Development Planning Commission, is one of the rare experts in economics in the Political Bureau of the

CPC Central Committee. He was designated as vice-premier in charge of macroeconomics as assistant to Wen Jiabao in this field.

## ***2.2 How the Important Thought of the "Three Represents" are Treated***

### ***2.2.1 What are the Important Thought of the "Three Represents"?***

According to Jiang Zemin report, the Chinese Communist Party (1) has evolved from a party that led the people in fighting for state power to a party that has led the people in exercising the power and has long remained in power, (2) has developed from a party that is leading national reconstruction under external blockade and a planned economy to a party that is leading national development while the country is opening to the outside world and developing the socialist market economy. Along with these changes, there emerged the proposition of what kind of Party to build and how to build it. The "Three Represents" were presented by Jiang Zemin in February 2000 in answer to this proposition.

The "Three Represents" means that the Chinese Communist Party represents and embodies three things as the head of the people: (1) the development trend of China's advanced productive forces; (2) the orientation of China's advanced culture; and (3) the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The author interprets these three abstract matters as follows: (1) is to develop the productive forces required for economic progress; (2) is to absorb a culture of knowledge required for developing productive power such as scientific technology and human resources development, while retaining the direction of Communism to which such culture of knowledge is conducive, and (3) are benefits that are not shared by some of the people but those that give sat-

isfaction to the greatest number of people.

Since these details are widely different from traditional Marxist theory, there was a controversy in the Party<sup>4</sup>. However, this controversy was tentatively brought to an end by the speech of Jiang Zemin on the occasion of the Congress held on July 1, 2001 to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. In his speech (on July 1, 2001 speech), Jiang Zemin recognized the "Three Represents" as "the foundation for building our Party, the cornerstone for its governance and the source of its strength" and judged that it does not deviate from traditional Marxist theory or what has developed from it. Thus, the "Three Represents" gained consensus among the Party members as the guide to action for the Chinese Communist Party.

### **2.2.2 The Important Thought of the "Three Represents" in the CPC 16th National Congress**

In the Party's amended constitution in the CPC 16th National Congress, the important thought of the "Three Represents" was deemed to be the guide to action to be taken by the Communist Party, the same as Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong thought and Deng Xiaoping theory. Further, in addition to the words "Since the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Party Central Committee.....the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Jiang Zemin as their chief representative.....have formed the important thought of the 'Three Represents'", the name Jiang Zemin was included in the Party constitution as a founder of the important thought of the "Three Represents". Thus, the authority of Jiang Zemin in the Party was explicitly established.

### **2.2.3 Complete Victory of Jiang Zemin**

To summarize sections 2 and 3, Jiang Zemin has succeeded in (1) getting person-

al guarantees and (2) securing authority in the CPC 16th National Congress in order to secure his own political power under the Hu Jintao era. Thus, matters turned out as he had expected, and the CPC 16th National Congress ended in complete victory for Jiang Zemin.

## **2.3 Start of Change of the Chinese Communist Party: Growing Away from the "Workers' and Farmers' Party"**

The CPC 16th National Congress not only secured Jiang Zemin's political influence over the Party but it was also a landmark in the Party's history, indicating the future direction of the Communist Party. This is reflected in Jiang Zemin report and the Party's amended constitution, which suggests that the change of the Communist Party has started. This section examines where the Chinese Communist is headed.

### **2.3.1 The Focal Part of the Party Constitution has been Amended**

In the Party's amended constitution, The Chinese Communist Party, to the existing words, "The Chinese Communist Party, 'is the vanguard of the Chinese working class' " , were added "and (is vanguard) of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation." This signified the great change that a range of interests of the Chinese Communist Party will be expanded from specific classes to what is universal. This revision of the focal point of the Party constitution as well as the inclusion of the "Three Represents" as "the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people" reflects the growth of the Chinese Communist Party from "a class party" into "a catch-all party."

According to Liu, the percentage of industrial workers and farming workers, which accounted for 87.2% of all social strata in Chi-

na in 1978, had declined to 66.6% in 2000 (Liu [2002]). In other words, more than 20 years on since the reforms and opening up, people other than the working class, which includes blue collar workers, farmers, intellectuals, cadres and soldiers, now account for a major share of society. Now that the working class has ceased to represent the whole of China due to the diminishing percentage of workers and farmers, amendment of the focal point of the Party constitution is a practical approach.

### **2.3.2 Evaluation of "New Social Strata"**

Jiang Zemin designated (1) entrepreneurs and technical personnel employed by non-public scientific and technological enterprises, (2) managerial and technical staff employed by overseas-funded enterprises, (3) the self-employed, (4) private entrepreneurs, (5) employees in intermediaries, and (6) freelance professionals, all belonging to non-working classes, as "a new social stratum" that has been born through reform and opening up, and recognized them as "all builders of socialism with Chinese characteristics."

Furthermore, Jiang Zemin went so far as to state that CPC should "admit into the Party advanced elements of other social strata (i.e., other than workers, farmers, intellectuals, servicemen and cadres) who accept the Party's program and Constitution, work for the realization of the Party's line and program consciously and meet the qualifications of Party membership following a long period of test." He thus vowed that participation of "a new social stratum" in the Party would be granted on condition that they met certain requirements, and this has been newly incorporated in the Party constitution.

This meant that the Communist Party has accepted "a new social stratum" as an "advanced productive force" for economic development and as entity that plays a role in an "advanced culture", that is, a role in develop-

ing scientific technology and human resources. Both of these concepts are included in the important thought of the "Three Represents." In other words, the Communist Party has formally acknowledged as an ally this stratum that has been so far in an unstable position with no guaranteed position as an ally.

### **2.3.3 Aiming to Expand the Support Base by Co-opting Entrepreneurs**

The recognition of a new social stratum by the Chinese Communist Party is part of its attempt to expand its support base. On the face of it, such recognition indicates its intention to become a catch-all party. However, from a different perspective, it also reflects the importance the Party places on specific strata.

What is attracting much public attention among the new social stratum is the entrepreneurs in private business. This is because entrepreneurs in private business have long been viewed as exploiting the classes and so were treated as enemies in traditional Marxist theory, but the tide has turned and they are now considered as allies. At least six entrepreneurs from the private sector participated in the CPC 16th National Congress as representatives.

According to the State Economic and Trade Commission, the amount of taxes paid by private enterprises and proprietorships accounts for 9.3% of the total industrial and commercial tax. Their share in GDP amounts to 30%, and to 60% in the East Coastal Region alone. They accept 70% of the workers who are laid off (*xiagang laodongzhe* in Chinese) through restructuring of national enterprises, etc. (*People's Dairy*, December 2, 2002). The presence of private enterprises and proprietorships are thus indispensable to the progress of the Chinese economy.

There were no names of private entrepreneurs among the 198 members of the CPC Central Committee and 158 alternate mem-



bers of the CPC Central Committee elected at the CPC 16th National Congress. Private entrepreneurs are indispensable for economic development and the Communist Party wishes to absorb them to expand their own support base. For this reason, Jiang Zemin report referred to improving the legal system concerning the protection of private property, which is an improvement desired by many private entrepreneurs, but their political rise is not welcome.

The above-mentioned requirements for joining the Party cannot be easily fulfilled and the ratio of private entrepreneurs allowed to join the Party was no more than 19.8% in 2000 (Dai [2001, p75]). Private entrepreneurs who are members of the Party at present are in many cases so-called "xia hai - leaving public office for private enterprise" where a cadre of a local division of the Party or local government changes jobs and moves into the business world<sup>5</sup>. In other words, the private entrepreneurs who are members of the Party are in a special position that is close to political power from the start. Further, as symbolized by the private entrepreneurs who were elected at the CPC 16th National Congress, those that the Communist Party really wishes to absorb as its support base are limited to managers of large private enterprises with economic power. While there are hopes for their economic contribution, there is also the intention of preventively enclosing them for fear that they may engage in anti-Communist activities against the backdrop of their economic power (Zhong [2000, p23]).

Sixteen managers of enterprises have been elected as members or alternate members of the CPC Central Committee and they are mainly managers of manufacturers in industries where the state enjoys a monopoly, key industries and growth industries. It is these managers of large state-owned enterprises that the Communist Party wishes to protect as a political power.

The Jiang Zemin report states "Development is our Party's top priority in govern-

ing and rejuvenating the country..... progress should be focused on construction of the economy." Further, in revising the Party constitution, the following parts of the constitution have been deleted: the part that says (1) "(Marxism-Leninism) points out that it analyzes contradictions inherent in the capitalist system that it cannot overcome, socialist society replaces capitalism and it develops into the Communist society without fail. As the history of more than one hundred years since the publicizing of the Declaration of the Communist Party attests, the theory of scientific socialism is right and socialism has strong vitality. The essence of socialism is to liberate productive powers, develop them, extinguish exploitation and achieve common prosperity in the end," and the part that says (2) "Although socialism has its turns and twists and its repetition, it is a general non-retrogressive trend of historical development of society that Communism never fails to take the place of capitalism." This means that traditional Marxist theory's claim that the exploitation of the classes will be extinguished, and that history will develop such that socialism takes the place of capitalism and Communism will be realized in the end, which is perhaps the *raison d'etre* of the Communist Party, has been totally deleted. There is thus a wish to avoid branding capitalism as an evil to be replaced. These measures have been taken to ensure consistency between Marxist theory and the current practice of economic development based on the market economy system.

### **2.3.4 Choice of the Chinese Communist Party**

Lastly, I would like to present a hypothesis and prospects for metamorphosis of the Chinese Communist Party.

Based on the outcome of CPC 16th National Congress, that is, recognition of a new social stratum, inclusion of private entrepreneurs elected as representatives as well as managers of state enterprises as members or

alternate members of the CPC Central Committee, it would appear that the Chinese Communist Party is willing to accept capitalism and capitalists for the sake of economic progress. This suggests that the Chinese Communist has grown away from being a "workers' and farmers' party", and is shifting toward being a "Capitalist's Party" rather than "a catch-all Party."

The Chinese Communist Party still has the dual faces of a catch-all Party and a Capitalist's Party. This corresponds to the political alternatives of giving priority to eliminating economic discrepancies and providing relief for the socially vulnerable such as reemployment of the unemployed or laid-off workers, which are imminent issues, and giving priority to preferential treatment for the strong such as managerial support for capitalists where wealth is concentrated. The Communist Party will be forced to choose one of the two alternatives in the course of time. This is perhaps also a new ideological conflict that remains to be resolved.

### **Conclusion: Expectations for Hu Jintao**

When government leaders are reshuffled, people tend to have great expectations in them, but they often prove disappointing. The greater the expectations, the greater the disappointment. Hu Jintao may be fortunate in that respect, as many people know that Jiang Zemin still maintains great influence and Jiang Zemin assigned only partial authority to Hu Jintao. The people therefore have fewer expectations for Hu Jintao.

In his inaugural address as General Secretary of CPC, Hu Jintao declared that he would follow the line of Jiang Zemin (*People's Dairy*, November 15, 2002), perhaps reflecting the political influence still held by Jiang Zemin. But it is not for a passive reason that he should follow the line of Jiang Zemin. For the Chinese Communist Party to remain as a ruling party, its only option is for Hu Jintao to

maintain the system of one-party dominance by the Communist Party in political terms and to push forward with development of the market economy in economic terms. Hu Jintao cannot be expected to set his own policy after the complete retirement of Jiang Zemin.

If Hu Jintao is driven by a desire to steer a course independent of others, his trump card is to introduce political pluralism for political reform. But Hu Jintao is not a man who has ascended to his present position as General Secretary like previous number twos who have climbed the ladder of political strife to win supremacy. He was appointed as successor in the current political system, which is a system of one-party dominance by the Communist Party and has followed the path of the supreme leader. For him, the current political system is the most useful and Hu Jintao is unlikely to push forward with reforms that would destroy the present political system unless a most disordered political situation such as an intense struggle for power should present itself. The political reform carried out by Hu Jintao will be limited to reforms within the framework of the current political system.

(Norihiko SASAKI)

#### **Notes:**

1. The author discussed several major stakes at the 16th National Congress before it was held [Sasaki (2002b)].
2. The campaigns such as the "Three Stresses" education since 1998, great development of Western China since 1999 and "Three Represents" study have been conducted mainly as political movements for establishing the authority of Jiang Zemin.
3. For the smuggling case, see Sasaki & Imai [2001] and Sasaki & Ohara [2002].
4. For this controversy, see Sasaki [2002a].
5. For instance, Shen Wenrong, who participated in the CPC 16th National Congress as representatives, is a typical "xia hai" - leaving public office for private enterprise," who became a private entrepreneur from an elite cadre of a local division of the Party. Before becoming of the chief executive of Shagang Steel, Jiangsu, he had been deputy secretary of the CPC Municipality Committee of Zhangjiagang, Jiangsu Province and chairman of Municipality Political Consultative Conference Committee of the same Municipality.

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