英文要旨

| 権利 | 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア経済研究所 © 2012 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア経済研究所
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>原出所</td>
<td>アジア経済</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>冊数</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>号数</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>出版年</td>
<td>2012-05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>定価</td>
<td>127-129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>出版者</td>
<td>日本貿易振興機構アジア経済研究所</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00006995
Abstract

Globalization under a “Low-Organized” System: A Case Study on Iran’s Apparel Industry

Yoko Iwasaki

Medium and small-sized firms with less than 10 workers make up the majority of Iran’s garment-producing industry. This shows the extremely small-scale nature of the industry as a whole. Cooperation among the firms has always been weak. In particular, they have had a strong tendency toward not developing vertical relationships between producers and distributors. These “low-organized” apparel firms, owing to the change in government trade policy after 2000, were confronted with an inflow of a massive amount of foreign-made (mainly Chinese) garments. It was occasionally reported that Iran’s apparel market was being overwhelmed by Chinese products and totally destroyed, but the reality is somewhat different. The fact is that some of the small independent firms that have engaged in garment-production so far have jumped the barrier between production and distribution and have started new careers as buyers. They bring a huge quantity of apparel goods into the Iranian market from China’s “Specialized Markets,” which are growing at a remarkable rate at the moment. Small Iranian firms that are clearly inclined toward diversification in order to avoid risk are keen on this “market-styled” production and distribution system, which they can enter and leave quite flexibly. China’s “Specialized Markets” respond to their needs. Consequently, a type of globalization is in progress here that is different from the one led by the advanced countries.
Abstract

Taiwan’s Aid: Consistent Purpose and Evolving Approaches

Kondoh Hisahiro

This article covers two primary issues about Taiwan’s aid: (1) whether Taiwan’s aid was and is different from the DAC aid model, and (2) what factors have formed and transformed Taiwanese aid.

Taiwan started to provide aid in the 1950s, and it allocated aid for Africa in the 1960s and Latin America in the 1970s. Taiwan’s aid in the 1980s established funding for technical cooperation and loans, which reinforced the aid system. Despite some originality in its aid model (the “Taiwan experience”) and some opaque examples of “dollar diplomacy,” Taiwanese aid has recently moved closer to the DAC aid model.

Taiwan has consistently pursued objectives that will help to bolster its claim to statehood, but their approach has changed from ideological and economic competition with China to compliance with trends in international aid. Thus, Taiwan’s aid model has been formulated and transformed by aid strategies that are defined by Taiwan’s comparative advantages over China.

Therefore, to secure its statehood, Taiwan seems at present to have shifted from competition with China to cooperation/compliance with international trends. It has moved from the world of realpolitik to an approach described by President Ma Ying-jeou in the first published White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy when he stated that Taiwan would adopt a “realistic idealist” approach to achieve consistent aid policies in an idealistic manner.
This paper examines the establishment and housing operations of Manchuria Estate Co. Ltd., a government-controlled housing supply organization that was engaged in housing construction and mortgage financing in Manchuria.

The revision of the Five Year Plan for Manchuria Industrial Development was predicted to substantially increase the number of laborers in Manchuria, including non-Japanese laborers and employees of special companies. The state, therefore, had to be in direct charge of the housing supply for these laborers, because the construction of company housing for employees of special companies alone could not meet the demand.

Manchuria Estate Co. Ltd. integrated all housing functions, including the provision of company housing for employees of special companies, in order to promote policies that reduced rents. Then the company engaged in the rationalization of construction work and the setting of housing standards. However, the burden of the high-interest rates charged by the Industrial Bank of Manchuria and fund controls due to the fact that the Five Year Plan for Manchuria Industrial Development changed its priorities led to continuous delays in housing construction. This aroused criticism about a system of housing supply that used a joint-stock method. The lessons of Manchuria Estate Co. Ltd. were commonly acknowledged by those in charge of housing policy and were referred to during the establishment of the Japan National Estate Organization.