

Minority type matters : ethnic diversity and tolerance in 29 European democracies

著者	Hazama Yasushi
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journal or publication title	IDE Discussion Paper
volume	442
year	2014-02
URL	http://hdl.handle.net/2344/1587

IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and critical comments

IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No.442

Minority Type Matters: Ethnic Diversity and Tolerance in 29 European Democracies

Yasushi HAZAMA *

February 2014

Abstract

Past research has shown that having a large population of ethnic minorities beyond the neighborhood level arouses intolerance in the majority. However, this paper presents the argument that the effect of minority size on tolerance depends on minority type: the less subject the minority is to negative stereotyping, the more favorable the effect that minority size has on tolerance. In this study, a hierarchical linear model was applied to a dataset on advanced and emerging democracies in Europe. The analysis shows that when the duration and level of democracy are controlled for, ethnic tolerance was associated positively with native minority size and negatively with foreign population size.

Keywords: political tolerance, ethnic minorities, Europe

* Director, Middle Eastern Studies Group, Area Studies Center, IDE (hazama@ide.go.jp)

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INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN

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INTRODUCTION

Past research on political tolerance toward ethnic minorities (hereafter referred to as “ethnic tolerance”) has focused on advanced democracies in which ethnic minorities are typically immigrants or foreigners (Weldon, 2006; Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Cote and Erickson, 2009). In accordance with Gibson (2006; 2007), ethnic tolerance is here defined as a willingness to permit varying degrees of civil rights to ethnic outgroups. The literature reveals that having a large share of foreigners in Western democracies, or of blacks in the United States, at the community (neighborhood) level encourages positive attitudes toward these minorities among the majority; however, having a large population of these minorities in the overall population beyond the community level arouses antipathy (Taylor, 1998; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Oliver and Meldelberg, 2000; Semyonov et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2006; Stein et al., 2000; Dixon, 2006). The different effects of ethnic diversity between the two geographic levels emerge because a significant presence of these minority groups (above the level at which personal contact is possible) gives rise among the majority group to the perception of a societal threat.

This paper argues, however, that the effect of minority size on tolerance above the community level is not uniform, instead it depends on the minority type. For minorities not subject to stereotyping as criminals, group size has a more favorable impact on tolerance than for those groups stereotypically associated with crime. The literature reviewed here will reveal that ethnic diversity above the community level exerts a negative effect when the minority group is stereotypically associated with crimes (foreigners in Europe and blacks in the United States); for minorities who are less

subject to such stereotypes, there is either no significant effect (Hispanics in the United States) or even a positive effect (native ethnic minorities in the former Yugoslavia). In the European context, native ethnic minorities are much less subject to criminal stereotyping than foreigners and immigrants, and so the effect of their population size on tolerance deserves scrutiny. Native ethnic minorities in Europe should not be neglected in tolerance studies that include emerging democracies, in which the foreign population accounts for only a small proportion of the ethnic minority population, as Table 1 indicates.

[Insert Table 1 here]

This paper shows by analyzing data from 29 European democracies that an increase in the native ethnic minority size increases the majority's political tolerance of minorities, but an increase in the foreign population size reduces the majority's political tolerance toward minorities, even after controlling for other country- and individual-level variables.

CONCEPTUALIZING ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE

Ethnic diversity beyond the community level encourages intolerance

The impact of ethnic diversity on ethnic tolerance is complex because it involves dual

effects. On the one hand, ethnic diversity is conducive to frequent contact between the majority group and minority groups, which enhances tolerance (hereafter referred to as the “contact effect”). On the other hand, the presence of a sizable minority can foster sociotropic threat perception in the majority, which fuels intolerance (hereafter referred to as the “threat effect”). Pettigrew and Tropp (2011: 196–200) used a structural equation model to demonstrate that larger foreign population ratios at the district level had indirect effects through increases in both the contact and threat effects, whereas the same ratios did not have a direct effect on attitudes toward foreigners.

Although ethnic diversity is expected to increase both contact and perceived threats, the net impact on tolerance is not uniform. Instead, the net impact depends on which effect is more prominent in a given context. A growing body of literature indicates that ethnic diversity at the community level enhances the contact effect more than it strengthens the threat effect. At higher levels of aggregation, however, ethnic diversity induces the threat effect to a greater extent than it does the contact effect. Thus, ethnic diversity at the community level is associated with greater tolerance levels, but ethnic diversity at the municipal level or larger leads to lower tolerance levels (Taylor, 1998; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Oliver and Meldelberg, 2000; Semyonov et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2006; Stein et al., 2000; Dixon, 2006). This discrepancy arises because tolerance in ethnically heterogeneous contexts is negatively affected by sociotropic threat (rather than individual threat), which often emanates from political discourse at the national level (Wagner et al., 2006: 387).

Anomalies: group and country differences

Even above the community level, the threat effect does not always outweigh the contact effect. In the U.S. context, the threat effect (measured at the municipality or county level with reference to the size of the outgroup as a percentage of the total population) was observed in the attitudes of whites toward blacks, but not in the attitudes toward Hispanics or Asians (Taylor, 1998; Dixon, 2006).¹ In the European context, Hodson et al. (1994) attest that the size of the native ethnic minority population has a positive effect on tolerance in each republic of the former Yugoslavia. These atypical cases indicate that the threat effect does not outweigh the contact effect when the minority group is not perceived as particularly threatening to the majority.

In the literature generally, the majority group is said to perceive a threat when its members attribute crime, cultural dissonance, or job competition to outgroups (Green, 2009: 43-44). With regard to the effect of minority size on ethnic tolerance in particular, stereotyping of outgroups as criminal seems to be the most decisive factor. There is evidence that in the United States whites associate crime (Quillian and Pager, 2001; Quillian and Pager, 2010; Oliver, 2010: 42-45; Drakulich, 2012) and other negative behaviors (Sears et al., 1999) more strongly with blacks than with Latinos or Asians. In Europe, a German panel study found that concerns about crime were a stronger predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes than economic concerns (Fitzgerald et al., 2012). Native ethnic minorities in Europe are usually not subject to stereotyping as criminals. Additionally, the enlargement of the European Union and its expanded cooperation with the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

brought about new treaties and laws intended to protect ethnic minority rights (Tesser, 2003; Agarín and Brosig, 2009), which should give support to the argument that political tolerance is practiced toward native ethnic minorities in Europe.

In addition to examining minority type, it is also necessary to control for cross-country differences in institutions and social discourses. McLaren (2003) found that the foreign population size affected threat perception (see also Schneider (2008) for the effect of foreign-born population size) but not anti-immigration attitudes in Western Europe, which reveals important variations among countries in how the threat effect is socially mediated into intolerance. Semyonov et al. (2006) introduced more extensive country-level controls by using two-level data pooled across four times and thus showed that a large foreign population increased antipathy toward foreigners in Western Europe. Although several studies of up to 17 countries point to a positive effect (either directly or indirectly) from democratic experience and institutions on political tolerance generally (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007; Hinckley, 2010; but see Viegas, 2007), the influence of democratic experience and institutions on ethnic tolerance has yet to be fully examined for a large sample of countries. Country-level control variables are more extensively discussed in the Research Design section.

To summarize the above, previous research has demonstrated that whereas ethnic diversity at the community level positively affects tolerance regardless of the type of minority, ethnic diversity above the community level appears to exert a negative effect when a minority group is stereotypically associated with crimes and cultural deviance;

for less feared and more familiar minorities, there is no significant effect or even a positive effect from population size. In the European context, the negatively stereotyped group is foreigners and the relatively unstereotyped groups are native ethnic minorities. Although it is difficult to precisely predict the effect of ethnic diversity above the community level for each type of ethnic minority, the preceding discussion makes it reasonable to hypothesize that the effect of the size of a native ethnic minority on ethnic tolerance in Europe is more favorable than the effect of foreign population size after controlling for individual- and country-level variables. In reality, the extent to which native ethnic minorities are less subject than foreigners to negative stereotyping may vary among countries and even among ethnic minorities within one country. This paper presents a preliminary attempt to test how well the differential effects of native ethnic minority population size and foreign population size generalize.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The dataset and the sample

Individual-level data were chosen from the dataset of the Eurobarometer 71.2 survey ($N = 29\,768$, May–June 2009; European Commission 2010) of 27 EU member states and three candidate states (Croatia, Turkey, and Macedonia), which addressed multiple topics. In particular, questions on general trends (QA), discrimination (QE), and demographics (D) were used in the present study. Respondents who indicated that they were a member of an ethnic minority group (4.6% of the 29 768 interviewees) or an unspecified minority group (0.6%) and those who selected “Do not know” (4.6%) were

excluded from our dataset; however, respondents who reported being a member of a religious minority (4.0%), sexual minority (0.7%), or minority in terms of disability (2.1%) were retained.

Data on Cyprus were dropped from the sample because of a current conflict that is causing strong antipathy among its ethnic majority (Greek Cypriots) toward its largest ethnic minority (Turkish Cypriots). The country has been divided into Greek and Turkish sides by a ceasefire since the Turkish invasion in 1974, which invasion followed a Greece-inspired coup aimed at unifying Cyprus with Greece. For Germany and the United Kingdom, data from the former East Germany and Northern Ireland, respectively, were excluded from the sample to ensure consistency with country-level data. The number of interviewees from the unexcluded 29 countries was 25 677. Due to deletion of observations with missing values, the final sample consists of 20 076 observations (interviewees).

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is a response (ranging from 1 “most uncomfortable” to 10 “most comfortable”) to a question on having the highest elected political position of the state be held by a member of an ethnic minority (QE6: “And using a scale from 1 to 10, please tell me how you would feel about having someone from each of the following categories in the highest elected political position in (OUR COUNTRY): A person from a different ethnic origin than the majority of the population”). This measurement captures an interviewee’s political tolerance because it shows the extent to which that

individual tolerates political rights being conferred to ethnic outgroups.² The 10-point response scale was treated as a continuous variable according to the convention that “[w]hen the dependent measure is a ratio, interval, or ordinal scale with five or more points, social scientists generally regard the outcome as continuous and ANOVA or regression-based statistics are employed” (Newsom 2012, 144).

Measuring ethnic tolerance on only a single indicator is a major weakness of this study.³ However, the drawback of a one-dimensional measurement is outweighed by the advantage of comparability across 29 countries, which have various durations and levels of democracy. Previous studies have used ethnic tolerance metrics based on multiple indicators, but these metrics were mostly applied to advanced democracies. The validity of the dependent variable is assessed in the RESULTS section by examining whether the dependent variable is correctly predicted by major individual-level independent variables that are widely known to determine tolerance.

Individual-level independent variables

Contact. The argument that links contact to tolerance largely draws on Allport's contention that various forms of contact, ranging from casual to intense, reduce prejudice against ethnic groups (Allport, 1954: 261-282). The effect of contact has been widely evidenced in the context of residential proximity (Wilner et al., 1955), integrated (or segregated) housing projects (Deutsch and Collins, 1951), intercommunity socialization (Persell, Green, and Gurevich, 2001), friendship with foreigners (McLaren, 2003), and interracial contact (Gibson, 2006). Although intolerant attitudes may result

in little contact with outgroups, representing reverse causality, a meta-analysis of the literature (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) indicates a stronger effect from contact on attitudes than the reverse relation.

In the present study, the level of contact was measured by whether the respondent has any friends or acquaintances who are either members of an ethnic minority (QE16.1: “Do you have friends or acquaintances who are people whose ethnic origin is different from yours?”) or any friends or acquaintances who are Roma (QE16.2: “Do you have friends or acquaintances who are Roma?”).⁴ A value of 1 was assigned to a dummy variable if the answer to either QE16.1 or QE16.2 was “yes,” and a value of 0 was assigned if the answers to QE16.1 and QE16.2 were both “do not know,” “no,” or a mix of these. A binary dummy was adopted because, logically, the “do not know” respondents ($n = 182$, or 0.7% of the total, for QE16.1 and $n = 287$, or 1.1% of the total, for QE16.2) could not have perceived being friends with any individuals of ethnic minority origin.

Threat. Perceived threat, not to the individual but to society (Gibson and Gouws, 2003; Huddy et al., 2005), is a strong exogenous determinant of tolerance. Perceived threat from ethnic minority groups was measured by a composite index, calculated as the mean of three interviewee evaluations: the (1) current and (2) future (within the next twelve months) situation and (3) the change (in the last five years) in relations between people of various cultural, religious, and national backgrounds (QA2.6: “How would you judge the current situation in each of the following: Relations in (OUR COUNTRY) between people from different cultural or religious backgrounds or nationalities?”).

Slightly different wordings were used for the future and past situations. See QA3.7 and QA4.7 for the changes to questions about the future and past, respectively). Although this measurement only partially captures the respondents' perception of threat from ethnic minorities, this measure was the closest to the target concept within the Eurobarometer dataset.

For QA2.6, values of 1, 2, 2.5, 3, and 4 were given to the responses "very good," "rather good," "do not know," "rather bad," and "very bad", respectively. For QA3.7 and QA4.7, values of 1, 2.5, and 4 were given to the responses "better," "same," (and "do not know"), and "worse," respectively. The "do not know" answers were included in the analysis because they indicate a moderate position rather than an outlier or nonresponse. Additionally, due to the relatively large number of "do not know" answers, their wholesale deletion would have compromised the representativeness of the dataset.⁵ For reasons similar to but more specific than perceived threat, competition over employment and scarce resources between the majority and emerging minorities results in greater intolerance (Olzak, 1992), but no appropriate data were found in the dataset.

Education. Educated individuals are more tolerant than less educated individuals (Stouffer, 1955). Education has been reported to reduce ethnic prejudice by instilling knowledge and information, growing cognitive capacity, and introducing universal values and norms (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003: 317; Hagendoorn, 1999). The positive effect of education on attitudes toward immigrants was found to be robust even after controlling for the high skill levels associated with education (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). This study used the age at which the respondent ended full-time

education, which was then coded into four categories (1 = no education, 2 = age 15 or lower, 3 = ages 16 to 19, and 4 = age 20 or higher).

Religion. Although the effect of religion on ethnic tolerance has not been widely explored, there is some evidence that religious affiliation (Moore and Ovadia, 2006), and religiosity (Eisenstein, 2006; Moore and Ovadia, 2006) have a negative effect (either direct or indirect) on political tolerance (but see Karpov, 1999). The results of a large sample study ($N = 16\,512$) by Moore and Ovadia (2006) showed that Evangelical protestants are more intolerant than non-Evangelicals and also that absence of religious affiliation is associated with political tolerance. There is also indirect evidence from Gallup Poll surveys supporting a relationship between religion and intolerance. These surveys were conducted in various countries to show that people who regard religion as important in their daily lives tend to think that ethnic minorities have a hard time living in their communities (Crabtree and Pelham, 2013). The religion variable was coded as 1 for affiliation with any religion or denomination and as 0 for no affiliation (atheists, non-believers, and agnostics). The “do not know” answers were treated as missing values.

Political ideology, gender, age, urban residence, occupation, income, and socioeconomic status. Other individual-level independent variables have shown less consistent effects in tolerance studies but were included in this analysis as control variables. These sociodemographic variables are usually found in Eurobarometer surveys. The (recoded) political ideology variable has five values, ranging from 1 for the most left ideology to 5 for the most right ideology. “Refusal” responses were treated

as missing values, but responses of “do not know” were recoded to 3. Compared to the other variables, the ideology variable was more likely to be a refusal (2 326, or 8.7%) or “do not know” (3 124, or 11.6%) response in Eastern European countries. When “do not know” responses were recoded to avoid deleting them, it was considered most appropriate to assign the median value of the scale. However, because the median fell between 5 and 6 in the original 10-point scale, the scale was collapsed into a five-point scale, and a value of 3 was assigned to “do not know” responses. A calculation of the mean of the dependent variable grouped by point of the five-point left-right scale, revealed that the mean dependent variable for “do not know” responses (5.866) was closest to the mean dependent variable for the third point (5.864). In other words, the level of ethnic tolerance among the ideologically indifferent (“do not know”) respondents was very similar to that of ideologically centrist respondents.

For the gender variable, women were coded as 1 and men were coded as 0. The age variable was coded as the respondent’s actual age. The urban residence variable was coded as 1, 2, or 3 for a rural area or village, a small or mid-sized town, or a large town, respectively. Occupations were divided into five types (self-employed; managers; other white collar employees; manual workers; and non-income earners, comprising homemakers, unemployed persons, retired persons, and students), with a dummy variable created for each category except for non-income earners, who act as the default category. Income was approximated by difficulty in paying bills (D60: “During the last twelve months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month...?”) in accordance with various Eurobarometer reports that use this question item as a sociodemographic indicator of income and affluence. Values of 1, 2, and 3

were given to the responses “most of the time,” “from time to time,” and “almost never,” respectively, while refusal responses were treated as missing values. The perceived socioeconomic status was measured by the respondent’s assessment of his or her own position in society (D61: “On the following scale, step '1' corresponds to ‘the lowest level in the society’, and step '10' corresponds to ‘the highest level in the society.’ Could you tell me on which step you would place yourself?”). For this question, refusal responses were treated as missing values.

Country-level independent variables

Ethnic minority and foreign population sizes. Ethnic minority size was calculated by subtracting from 100% the percentage of the population belonging to the largest ethnic majority. Ethnicity data for 21 countries were collected from the *CIA World Factbook* (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012), which relied on the most recent national census results for 16 of these countries. For the eight included countries on which ethnicity data were not reported in the *CIA World Factbook*, the author searched for national census results on the internet and found 2001 census data for Greece and 2006 census data for France from Ethnologue (Lewis et al., 2013).⁶ For both countries, linguistic group data were used because the available data on ethnic minorities in Greece pertains to foreigners only and the French census does not ask respondents about ethnicity.

For the remaining six countries (Denmark, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden) about which the author failed to find national census data, the dataset by Alesina et al. (2010) was used.⁷ Alesina et al. (2010) give a breakdown of national populations by

ethnic, religious, and linguistic group membership. The original data sources that correspond to the country sample in that study include Encyclopaedia Britannica (2001) and Levinson (1998). From Alesina et al. (2010), the author used ethnic group data for Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain and linguistic group data for Malta and Sweden. This procedure was utilized because the largest ethnic groups included in the dataset by Alesina et al. (2010) were very broadly defined as “Europeans” (97.9%) in Malta and “Western Europeans” (96.9%) in Sweden, with no distinctive elements to characterize the ethnic majority of the country.⁸ For both countries, the largest linguistic group categories, such as Maltese (95.3% in Malta) and Swedish (89.5% in Sweden) are more salient than the above ethnic group categories for distinguishing between the ethnic majority and minorities within “Europeans.”⁹ Table 1 presents the primary and secondary sources of the ethnic minority data. The ethnic minority population size reflects the probability of an individual from the majority ethnic group encountering an individual from any ethnic minority group. The data include both native and non-native minorities, but the impact of the latter group can be controlled by including the foreign population size in the analysis.

The foreign population size was modeled as the logarithm of the percentage of foreign residents in the 2009 total population (but 2008 for Croatia) (European Commission, 2012), except that Macedonia was handled as described below. The logarithm of the raw value was used to normalize the distribution of the foreign population percentage, which was highly skewed to the right. The logarithmic transformation also ameliorated high collinearity between the ethnic minority and foreign population sizes.¹⁰ For Macedonia, statistics were not available on the size of the foreign population, but the United Nations

(2006) reported data on the foreign-born population of Macedonia. Macedonia's foreign population percentage as of 2005 (0.2%) was estimated by assuming that Macedonia's foreign-born population (6% of the total population) had the same proportion of foreigners as Croatia's: as of 2005, 14.5% of Croatia's population was foreign-born, and 0.6% was foreign, measured as the mean of the foreign population sizes in 2001 (Republic of Croatia, 2011) and 2008 (European Commission, 2012).¹¹ As former Yugoslavian republics, both Macedonia and Croatia have large populations of individuals who were born in other former Yugoslavian republics (United Nations, 2006).

Democracy. Democratic political institutions are expected to encourage general political tolerance because they implement laws and education policies that promote equality in political rights among social groups. The effect of democracy was measured by its duration and level. The data regarding the duration of democracy were obtained from the 2009 POLITY IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2011b), for which the duration of a democracy was defined as “the number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three-point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score)” (Marshall et al., 2011a, 17).

A country's level of democracy was gauged by the Freedom House Score for 2009 (Freedom House, 2011), which was reversed such that 1 represents least free and 7 represents most free. Not only the duration but also the level of democracy was used because the duration of democracy offers little information on the current level of

minority rights ensured by law and practice. The Freedom House uses minority rights as one of the criteria for calculating its Freedom House Score.¹² The question on its checklist that is most relevant to minority rights asks, “Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?”¹³

Per capita real GDP. The majority of studies on political tolerance toward the least-liked group (and on generalized political tolerance) did not report a significant effect of economic development on political tolerance. If, however, the duration or level of democracy is strongly related to the level of economic development, spurious relationships will emerge. To control for such potential confounds, the per capita real GDP of 2009 (in thousands of 2005 Euros) was included in the model when the democracy variables were included.

Estimation model

The hypothesis is tested using a hierarchical linear model. When different levels of aggregation exist in the dataset, cluster-induced association between variables at two levels leads to artifacts in standard errors. The hierarchical linear model adjusts for this intraclass correlation and calculates the correct standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002: 100). The final estimation model, which corresponds to Model 7 in Table 2, takes the following form:

$$TOL_{ij} = \alpha + \beta_1 * (CONTACT_{ij}) + \beta_2 * (CONTACT_{ij} * FOREIGN_j) + \beta_3 * (THREAT_{ij}) + \beta_4 * (EDU_{ij}) + \beta_5 * (REL_{ij}) + \beta_6 * (LR_{ij}) + \beta_7 * (GENDER_{ij}) + \beta_8 * (AGE_{ij}) + \beta_9 *$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& (URBAN_{ij}) + \beta_{10} * (OCCUP_SLF_{ij}) + \beta_{11} * (OCCUP_MNG_{ij}) + \beta_{12} * (OCCUP_OWH_{ij}) \\
& + \beta_{13} * (OCCUP_MNL_{ij}) + \beta_{14} * (INCOME_{ij}) + \beta_{15} * (SES_{ij}) + \beta_{16} * (MINORITY_j) + \\
& \beta_{17} * (FOREIGN_j) + \beta_{18} * (DEMOCD_j) + \beta_{19} * (DEMOCL_j) + v_j + \varepsilon_{ij}
\end{aligned}$$

(Equation 1)

for $i = 1, \dots, m$ first-level groups (individuals), $j = 1, \dots, n$ second-level groups (countries) comprising members of group i . The following variables (meanings) are all at the individual level: TOL_{ij} (ethnic tolerance), $CONTACT_{ij}$ (contact), $THREAT_{ij}$ (threat), EDU_{ij} (education), LR_{ij} (political ideology), $GENDER_{ij}$ (gender), AGE_{ij} (age), $URBAN_{ij}$ (urban residence), $OCCUP_SLF_{ij}$ (occupation: self-employed), $OCCUP_MNG_{ij}$ (occupation: manager), $OCCUP_OWH_{ij}$ (manager: other white collar), $OCCUP_MNL_{ij}$ (occupation: manual labor), $INCOME_{ij}$ (income), and SES_{ij} (socioeconomic status). The country-level variables are $MINORITY_j$ (ethnic minorities percentage), $FOREIGN_j$ (logarithm of foreign population percentage), $DEMOCD_j$ (duration of democracy), and $DEMOCL_j$ (level of democracy). α is the intercept; β_k are the k coefficients to be estimated; v_j is the error term at the second (country) level; and ε_{ij} is the error term at the first (individual) level.

RESULTS

The results of the hierarchical linear model analysis are shown in Table 2. The software used was HLM 6.02. Model 1 is the base model that consists of only individual-level variables. Because variance at the country level represents unexplained variance, Model 1's variance provides the basis on which change in the explanatory power can be

calculated to construct a new model that supplements Model 1 with country-level variables. The explanatory power of the newly obtained model is regarded as the proportion of the variance that is explained. The country-level variables are added to the base model one at a time, beginning with the variables of concern, which are followed by the more relevant control variables, and finally by the less relevant control variables.

Individual level

In all models, homogeneity testing of the level-1 (i.e., individual-level) variance indicated heteroscedasticity. When the error term is heteroscedastic, the coefficient estimators are unbiased but inefficient. Typically, robust standard errors are then used to calculate the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. Yet, subsequent estimation returned robust standard errors that were smaller than conventional standard errors. Under such circumstances, Angrist and Pischke (2009: 293-308) recommend adopting conventional standard errors rather than robust standard errors to avoid overestimating the precision. Accordingly, precision in this analysis is based on conventional standard errors.

[Insert Table 2 here]

For all models, the four major individual-level determinants of tolerance were statistically significant at the 0.01 level in their expected effects. Among the individual-level control variables, leftwing ideology, gender, youth, managerial occupation, income, and socioeconomic status positively affect ethnic tolerance. These

results indicate that although the dependent variable is represented by a single measurement, it captures the level of ethnic tolerance to a reasonable extent.

Country level

Model 2 added the ethnic minority population size variable, which included both native and non-native ethnic minorities, to Model 1. The coefficient for the ethnic minority population size variable had a positive sign but was not statistically significant. Model 3 added the foreign population size variable to Model 2. Neither the ethnic minority population size variable nor the foreign population size variable had a significant effect, although both variables were correctly signed. Model 4 added the duration of democracy variable to Model 3. The duration of democracy had a positive effect ($p = 0.002$) and foreign population size had a negative effect ($p = 0.073$); ethnic minority population size remained insignificant. Model 5 added the level of democracy variable to Model 4, which made both the ethnic minority variable ($p = 0.016$) and the foreigner variable ($p = 0.004$) statistically significant. In addition, the duration ($p = 0.001$) and level ($p = 0.006$) of democracy were significant.¹⁴ Model 6 added the per capita real GDP variable to Model 5 and demonstrated that the impacts of the duration and level of democracy on ethnic tolerance were substantive, rather than spurious, because both variables remained statistically significant. Additionally, the per capita real GDP had no significant effect on tolerance. These results from Models 2 to 6 indicate that if two countries have the same duration and level of democracy, the country with the larger native ethnic minority population has a higher level of ethnic tolerance.

All of the cross-level interactions were also examined in Model 5, which best fits the data. As a result, Model 7 turned out to be the best-fit cross-level interaction model. Model 7 shows that the effect of contact on tolerance is buttressed when the foreign population percentage is large. In other words, having no ethnic minority friends in countries with large foreign population sizes generates greater intolerance compared with the same situation in countries with smaller foreign population sizes. Such an interaction effect was absent for the native ethnic minority population size. In summary, the results support the working hypothesis: the size of a native ethnic minority population has a more favorable effect on ethnic tolerance than the size of the foreign population after controlling for individual- and country-level differences.

CONCLUSIONS

By analyzing data on 29 democracies in Europe, the present paper demonstrated that when the duration and level of democracy are controlled for, the size of the native ethnic minority population enhances the majority's political tolerance toward minorities, but an increase in the size of the foreign population reduces the majority's political tolerance toward minorities. It was also found that the larger the size of the foreign population, the stronger the negative effects on tolerance from limited personal contact; however, such conditional effects were not observed for the size of native ethnic minority populations. This difference implies that if the population to be tolerated is relatively unknown (e.g., foreigners), then negative stereotyping that exaggerates threats from the outgroup is more persuasive for larger outgroups. Negative stereotyping of better-known ethnic minorities, however, will be of limited effect. Other evidence

demonstrated that conventional determinants of political tolerance at the individual and national levels apply without modification to ethnic tolerance.

The conclusions of the present study are subject to certain conditions and limitations; thus, they require further scrutiny. The present findings were only shown to hold when the model was controlled for the duration and level of democracy, which reveals a sobering truth: democracy is the primary determinant of political tolerance, including tolerance toward ethnic minorities. The positive result, however, is that in emerging democracies, a greater presence of native ethnic minorities can partly offset limited democracy. Another limitation of the present results is that the sample covered only European countries. The inclusion of democracies in other regions of the world would allow for control of a potential European bias that may stem from attitudinal or institutional legacies of the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. In addition, the present study did not distinguish between different native ethnic minorities and regarded them as invoking less threat perception than foreigners. The extent to which a given ethnic minority might arouse threat perception could be measured by the presence and strength of regional political parties (Brancati, 2008). Because it was not possible to identify regional parties for 12 of the 29 countries included in the present study, regional party variables were not used. Future research could introduce new approaches or perspectives to address these issues.

Endnotes

¹ The contact effect was found for all types of ethnic outgroups, according to Dixon (2006).

² This measurement also captures attitudes toward non-native ethnic minorities because even if new immigrants are not eligible to be elected to the highest political position of the state, their children are eligible in many countries.

³ A possible alternative indicator of ethnic tolerance was a response to the question regarding job opportunity measures for ethnic minorities: QE7.1 “Would you be in favour of or opposed to specific measures being adopted to provide equal opportunities for everyone in the field of employment? Measures such as, for example, special training schemes or adapted selection and recruitment processes, for people depending on their ethnic origin.” However, responses to the above question seems to indicate views on labor market intervention more strongly than views on outgroup tolerance. The Spearman rank-sum correlation coefficient between the responses to QE7.1 and to QE6.1 was only 0.23 ($p < 0.001$, $n = 22\ 184$), but the same correlation coefficients between the response to QE7.1 and QE7.2 to QE7.6 (gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, and disability) were all above 0.60 ($p < 0.001$). It was thus considered inappropriate to use QE7.1 as a measure of ethnic tolerance.

⁴ Using only QE16.1 to measure the contact variable did not modify its effect on tolerance.

⁵ Gibson (1992: 563, fn6), a leading theorist of political tolerance, also included “do not know” answers in his dataset and scored them as a 3 on the 5-point tolerance scale. Oesterreich (2005) also gave a value of 3 to “difficult to say” answers on the 5-point scale of authoritarian personality.

⁶ The ethnic majority population percentage was obtained by dividing the number of people in the largest linguistic group in the census year reported in Ethnologue (Lewis et al., 2013) by the total population (as of the same year) reported in Eurostat data (European Commission, 2012).

⁷ For compiling their dataset, Alesina et al. (2003) mostly used secondary sources and

looked for census data when there were no secondary sources.

⁸ These categories are chosen to accord with the data source (Levinson, 1998).

⁹ Regarding data on Portugal in Alesina et al. (2012), the term “Europeans” is more appropriate than the term “Portuguese-speaking” to identify the actual ethnic majority because Europeans are distinct from the people of Portugal’s former colonies:

Portuguese is used as the first language of almost the entire population, including people from former colonies.

¹⁰ For using a logarithmic transformation to handle collinearity between demographic variables, see White et al. (2008).

¹¹ A Macedonian diplomat, who the author interviewed by telephone in November 2011, also estimated the foreign population to be around 0.1% of the total population.

¹² The POLITY score, on the basis of which the duration of democracy was measured, does not explicitly include any elements of minority rights.

¹³ See the fourth question under the category of political pluralism and participation in the Checklist Questions and Guidelines (Freedom House, 2011).

¹⁴ When a variable for level of democracy was added to Model 3, none of the variables had any significant effect.

Table 1. Ethnic-Minority and Foreign Populations in 29 European Democracies (%)

Country	Ethnic minority pop. (A)	Foreign pop. (B)	Sources of (A) data ^a		
			Secondary	Primary	Date
Advanced democracy					
Denmark	4.2	5.8	Alesina et al. (2010)	EB (2001)	1996
Italy	5.9	6.5	Alesina et al. (2010)	EB (2001)	1983
Finland	6.6	2.7	CIA (2012)	n.s.	2006
Germany	8.5	8.8	CIA (2012)	n.s.	n.s.
Austria	8.9	10.3	CIA (2012)	Census	2001
France	8.9	5.8	Lewis et al. (2013)	Census	2006
Sweden	10.5	5.9	Alesina et al. (2010)	EB (2001)	n.s.
Ireland	12.6	9.9	CIA (2012)	Census	2006
Britain	16.4	6.8	CIA (2012)	Census	2001
Netherlands	19.3	3.9	CIA (2012)	Estimate	2008
Luxemburg	36.9	43.5	CIA (2012)	Census	2000
Belgium	42.0	9.4	CIA (2012)	n.s.	n.s.
Mean	15.1	9.9			
Emerging democracy					
Portugal	2.4	4.2	Alesina et al. (2010)	Levinson (1998)	n.s.
Greece	2.5	8.3	Lewis et al. (2013)	Census	2001
Poland	3.3	0.1	CIA (2012)	Census	2002
Malta ^b	4.7	4.4	Alesina et al. (2010)	EB (2001)	n.s.
Hungary	7.7	1.9	CIA (2012)	Census	2001
Czech Republic	9.6	3.9	CIA (2012)	Census	2001
Croatia	10.4	0.4	CIA (2012)	Census	2001
Romania	10.5	0.1	CIA (2012)	Census	2002
Slovakia	14.2	1.0	CIA (2012)	Census	2001
Lithuania	16.0	1.2	CIA (2012)	Census	2009
Bulgaria	16.1	0.3	CIA (2012)	Census	2001
Slovenia	16.9	3.5	CIA (2012)	Census	2002
Spain	25.6	12.3	Alesina et al. (2010)	EB (2001)	1991
Turkey	27.5	0.1	CIA (2012)	Estimate	2008
Estonia	31.3	16.0	CIA (2012)	Census	2008
Macedonia	35.8	0.2	CIA (2012)	Census	2002
Latvia	40.7	17.9	CIA (2012)	Census	2009

Mean	16.2	4.5
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Sources: See the Research Design section.

Notes:

^a Secondary sources cited the corresponding primary sources. EB=*Encyclopaedia Britannica*. n.s.= not specified.

^b Malta was included in the list of emerging democracies because its first democratic election, which was held in 1966, took place closer to the Third Wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) than to the Second Wave that followed the end of the Second World War.

Table 2. Hierarchical Linear Model for Ethnic Tolerance in 29 Countries, 2009 ($N = 20\,076$)

	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model	Model
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Intercept	5.87 ^{***}	5.83 ^{***}	5.85 ^{***}	5.15 ^{***}	-1.74	-1.51	-1.72
Individual-level variable							
Contact	0.85 ^{***}	0.85 ^{***}	0.85 ^{***}	0.85 ^{***}	0.85 ^{***}	0.86 ^{***}	0.64 ^{***}
× Foreign pop. %, logged							0.20 ^{***}
Threat	-0.35 ^{***}	-0.35 ^{***}	-0.35 ^{***}	-0.35 ^{***}	-0.36 ^{***}	-0.36 ^{***}	-0.36 ^{***}
Education	0.20 ^{***}	0.20 ^{***}	0.20 ^{***}	0.20 ^{***}	0.20 ^{***}	0.20 ^{***}	0.20 ^{***}
Religion	-0.26 ^{***}	-0.26 ^{***}	-0.26 ^{***}	-0.26 ^{***}	-0.26 ^{***}	-0.26 ^{***}	-0.26 ^{***}
Left-right	-0.22 ^{***}	-0.22 ^{***}	-0.22 ^{***}	-0.22 ^{***}	-0.22 ^{***}	-0.22 ^{***}	-0.22 ^{***}
Gender	0.30 ^{***}	0.30 ^{***}	0.30 ^{***}	0.30 ^{***}	0.30 ^{***}	0.30 ^{***}	0.30 ^{***}
Age	-0.01 ^{**}	-0.01 ^{**}	-0.01 ^{**}	-0.01 ^{**}	-0.01 ^{**}	-0.01 ^{**}	-0.01 ^{**}
Urban	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
Occupation: self-employed	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Occupation: manager	0.50 ^{***}	0.50 ^{***}	0.50 ^{***}	0.50 ^{***}	0.50 ^{***}	0.50 ^{***}	0.50 ^{***}
Occupation: other white collar	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Occupation: manual worker	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05
Income	0.10 [*]	0.10 [*]	0.10 [*]	0.10 [*]	0.10 [*]	0.10 [*]	0.09 [*]
Socioeconomic status	0.04 [*]	0.04 [*]	0.04 [*]	0.04 [*]	0.04 [*]	0.04 [*]	0.04 [*]
Country-level variable							
Minority pop. %		0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03 ^{**}	0.03 ^{**}	0.03 ^{**}
Foreign pop. %, logged			-0.06	-0.19 [*]	-0.42 ^{***}	-0.45 ^{***}	-0.31 ^{**}
Democracy, duration				0.02 ^{***}	0.02 ^{***}	0.02 ^{**}	0.02 ^{***}
Democracy, level					1.00 ^{***}	0.95 ^{***}	0.98 ^{***}
Per capita real GDP						0.01	
Variance component (v_j)	0.92 ^{***}	0.94 ^{***}	0.98 ^{***}	0.89 ^{***}	0.87 ^{***}	0.86 ^{***}	0.90 ^{***}
Percentage explained		-2.09	-5.86	3.78	6.23	6.85	2.15

Source: Compiled by the author from the two-level dataset.

Notes: Entries are empirical Bayes estimates of the individual-level coefficients, generalized least squares estimates of the country-level coefficients, and maximum-likelihood estimates of the variance and covariance components.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$.

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