DSpace
 

Academic Research Repository at the Institute of Developing Economies,Japan(ARRIDE) >
02.アジア研究(Asian Studies) >
01.経済、産業(Economy and Industry)/アジア(Asian Studies)  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/876

タイトル: Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights of State Owned Listed Enterprises: Channels of Expropriation after the Discriminated Share Reform in China
著者: Watanabe, Mariko
渡邉, 真理子
キーワード: China
Government Enterprises
Corporate Governance
Concentrated Owner
Expropriation
State Owned enterprises
Issue Date: Jun-2010
出版者: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
引用: IDE Discussion Paper. No. 224. 2010. 06
抄録: Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the "one share, one vote" principle were to be realized, asset inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.
記述: First published in Feb-2010, revised in Jun-2010.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/876
Appears in Collections:04.IDE Discussion Paper
01.経済、産業(Economy and Industry)/アジア(Asian Studies)

Files in This Item:

File Description SizeFormat
224.pdf197.36 kBAdobe PDFView/Open

Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

 

Privacy PolicyTerms of Use Copyright (C) JETRO. All rights reserved.