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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/870

タイトル: Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry
著者: Kubo, Kensuke
久保, 研介
キーワード: United States
Pharmaceutical Industry
Monopolies
Vertical Integration
Vertical Foreclosure
Entry
Generic Pharmaceuticals
Issue Date: Jan-2010
出版者: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
引用: IDE Discussion Paper. No. 221. 2010. 01
抄録: This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/870
Appears in Collections:04.IDE Discussion Paper
01.経済、産業(Economy and Industry)/その他(Developed Countries)

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