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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/191

タイトル: Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information
著者: Kubo, Koji
久保, 公二
キーワード: Banking
Imperfect competition
Information production
Banks
Credit
銀行
信用
Issue Date: Nov-2004
出版者: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
引用: IDE Discussion Paper. No. 15. 2004.11
抄録: This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/191
Appears in Collections:04.IDE Discussion Paper
01.経済、産業(Economy and Industry)/特定地域なし(Non Region-specific Studies)

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