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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/137

タイトル: Trade Credits under Imperfect Enforcement: A Theory with a Test on Chinese Experience
著者: Yanagawa, Noriyuki
Ito, Seiro
Watanabe, Mariko
柳川, 範之
伊藤, 成朗
渡邉, 真理子
キーワード: Law and finance
Economic growth
Incomplete contract
Enforcement
Trade policy
Credit
China
経済成長
貿易政策
信用
中国
Issue Date: Jun-2006
出版者: Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
引用: IDE Discussion Paper. No. 58. 2006.6
抄録: It is widely recognized that trade credit is an important financial mechanism, particularly in developing economies and transition economies where institutions are weak. This paper documents theoretical analysis and empirical accounts on what facilitates an effective supply of trade credit based on original surveys conducted in P.R. of China. Our theory predicts that trade volume and trade credit are increasing function of cash held by the buyer and enforcement technology of the seller. Furthermore, if the state sector’s enforcement technology is high, it has positive external effect to expand the volumes of trade credit and trades in the whole economy. From the data, we found that government made active commitment in enforcement of trade credit contract and the government owned firms are main supplier and receivers of trade credit, which suggest that enforcement by government and state sector were effective against presumptions in the previous literatures.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2344/137
Appears in Collections:04.IDE Discussion Paper
01.経済、産業(Economy and Industry)/東アジア(East Asian Studies)

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