

CHAPTER II

AGRARIAN REFORM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES

by

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1. INTRODUCTION

Nobody is against genuine development where majority of the people will no longer suffer from poverty and the accompanying ills of social injustice, inequality, low productivity and agrarian unrest. The last is particularly marked by the lack of participation of agrarian reform beneficiaries and the incapability of the bureaucracy to encourage self-reliant efforts among the people. The answer to these agrarian issues is a genuine and comprehensive land reform program¹ which remedies not only the defects in the distribution and use of land but also the accompanying human relations regarding the land, as well as the economic, social and political relations.

This paper intends to examine the land reform policy in the Philippines from the aspect of rural development with special reference to the self-reliance of farmer-beneficiaries who are the main target of the program.

Section 2 gives a brief historical review of land reform in the Philippines. As discussed in Section 3, the author finds the agrarian reform program during the Marcos administration quite unique since the program was seen as a political measure to stabilize social unrest during the pre-martial law era.

The salient features of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is tackled in Section 4 while the assessment of the CARP in Section 5 is one of highlights of this chapter as it closely relates to the economic democratization policy by which the people-power-oriented social reforms are expected to be achieved.

Another highlight of this chapter is the study of the implementation of the CARP in the rural areas with close linkage to the analysis of the factors for rural develop-

¹In the Philippines, land reform or agrarian reform both mean the acquisition of land from the landholders and redistribution of it to the farmers. The latter implicitly indicates inclusion of other related reforms organized or designed to promote agricultural interests like support services. The terms may thus be used interchangeably.

ment as introduced in Section 6. For this purpose, attention was focused on two areas: the sugar-producing lands in the province of Negros Occidental and the coconut plantations in the province of Quezon. In this section, analysis was focused on the self-reliance of the farmer-beneficiaries without which the agrarian reform program would not have worked as effectively.

2. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF LAND REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES

Historical, economic and social pressures are reflected in the history of agrarian reform in the Philippines. The highly-skewed social structure spawned by the agrarian problem can be traced back to the hacienda system which involves a large estate planted to cash crops like tobacco, sugar, coffee, copra, and abaca. These cash crops were already being sold to other countries with the emergence of the haciendas.

The sharecropping system was established in the late 1700s. Most haciendas were then owned by friars who were absentee-landlords. Under the system, their lands were leased to an *inquilino* (lessee). Rather than cultivating the lands themselves, the *inquilinos* apportioned these lands to the farmers on a sharecropping arrangement. "Hired" agricultural laborers who were paid daily wages were employed by some haciendas, sugar plantations in particular.

Despite the enactment of numerous land reform laws during the American Colonial Period, redistribution of lands was never affected. At most, such laws only limited the size of properties that could be owned. American investors benefitted from a series of laws which facilitated the further accumulation of land by a few who were to become the big landholders in the country. These law were:

(a) The Philippine Bill (1902) — which not only limited private individual landholdings to 16 hectares and corporate landholding to 1,024 hectares but also gave the Americans the right to acquire agricultural lands enabling them to acquire agricultural interests to control huge tracts of land for large-scale farming.

(b) The Land Registration Act (1902, Act 496) — which required landholders to register their landholdings and acquire Torrens Titles (the Certificate of Land Title newly issued under the American colonial government) to land properties. Almost all land titles granted by the Court of Land Registrations up to 1910 were for large private landholdings because small farmers failed to register their land ownership either because they were ignorant of the law or they could not afford the documentation expenses (IBON, 1988, p. 28).

(c) The Friar Lands Act (1904, Act 1120) — which states that if the director of the land find any vacant friar lands, he is authorised to take possession or sell the land provided however that the sale should not exceed 144 hectares for an indi-

vidual and 1024 hectares for a corporation. To defuse peasant unrest as evidenced by the 1898 revolution against Spain, the act instituted the transfer of friar lands to tenants. Some of the 23 large friar estates covering 166,000 hectares were purchased for seven million dollars. Although intended for distribution to 60,000 tenants, the bulk of these estates went to American-owned firms, businessmen, and landlords (Constantino, 1975, pp. 297-298).

(d) The Public Lands Act (1906) — which provided for the homestead program whereby the American government offered Filipinos up to 16 hectares of uncultivated public land but without any financial provision to the settlers. Also, there was no clear definition of public domain as different from private property. From 1904 to 1935, only 35,721 (16.7 percent) out of 213,681 homestead applications were patented.

During the later part of the American period, social tensions between landlords and tenants heightened, and peasant uprisings were rampant, such as the Sakdalista's uprising in Laguna in 1935.

Under the past Philippine presidents, land reform laws were passed, namely:

(a) The Rice Tenancy Act (1933, Commonwealth Act 4054) was the first law which attempted to regulate landlord-tenant relationships by legalizing the 50-50 sharing contract. The tenant's share was exempted from claims for repayment of debt to landlords, and interest rates were not to exceed ten percent on loan extended to tenants. This law, however, took effect only in 1946.

(b) The Sugar Tenancy Act (1934, CA 4113) was passed to regulate tenant-landlord relationships. However, sugar workers were either unaware of the law or were dismissed if they so attempted to exercise their rights under the Act.

(c) The Agricultural Tenancy Act (1954, Republic Act 1199) under the Ramon Magsaysay administration limited rent to 30 percent, reduced the interest rate, as well as resettled the former Huk rebels.

(d) The Land Reform Act (1955, RA 1400) was another law that was passed under the Magsaysay administration which guaranteed the expropriation of all tenanted land estates and set a retention limit of 300 hectares for individuals and 600 hectares for corporate-owned estates.²

(e) The Land Reform Code (1963, RA 3844), during the administration of President Diosdado Macapagal for the first time clearly stipulated the transfer of

²"Magsaysay's Land Reform Act, similar to the Rice Tenancy Act, was watered down in Congress which yielded to the lobbying landlords. It provided that expropriation could only be started if majority of tenants in the estates petitioned for it. As tenants who did so were threatened with eviction, this act accomplished very little. After seven years (1955-66) only 41 out of a total 300 estates were purchased by the government" (IBON, op. cit., p.33).

ownership of land to its tillers. The two phases of the program are: 1) the transfer from share tenancy to leasehold system where rent was fixed at 25 percent (instead of the previous 30 percent) of a normal crop base (net); and 2) the transfer from leasehold to full ownership, the lowering of the retention limit from 300 to 75 hectares, and the setting of the amortizations at six percent interest per year for 25 years.

However, more emphasis was given to rent reduction rather than land transfer. Despite its positive contributions, the land reform measure was hardly implemented and a great deal of share tenants remained. The scope of the program was narrow as it covered only rice and corn lands like in the past land reform program.³

(f) The Land Reform Code (as amended in 1971, by RA 6389) under President Ferdinand Marcos created the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) declaring the entire country as a land reform area and rescinding share tenancy by ruling automatic conversion of all share tenants into leaseholders. Moreover, it dramatically reduced the land retention ceiling from Macapagal's 75 to 24 hectares. However, the law did not see the day of its implementation as it was aborted by the declaration of martial law in 1972.

3. LAND REFORM PROGRAM UNDER THE MARCOS ADMINISTRATION

3-1. Salient Features of PD 27

Presidential Decree No. 2, as the first of a series of enactments on land reform, was released right after President Marcos imposed martial law on September 21, 1972. PD No. 2 declared the entire country as a land reform area. This proclamation was later qualified when he issued PD 27 on October 27, 1972.

The distinctive feature of the agrarian reform (PD 27) under the Marcos administration was to declare simultaneous generation of land ownership nationwide and not through the two phases as in the 1963 Land Reform Code. Moreover, PD 27 lowered the land retention limit to seven hectares. It is in this regard that PD 27 was unique and epochal as compared to the previous land reform programs. However, there remained some shortcomings such that it targeted only the rice and corn lands and the beneficiaries were limited to the tenants excluding the agricultural workers.

The rationale of then President Marcos in carrying out the land reform program in rapid succession was to establish his power base. First, there was a strong need to stabilize the law and order situation in the regions by giving in to the demands of the farmers. Second, there was also his intention to annihilate the landlords system

³"Macapagal's Land Reform Code, which bears similarity to the previous ones, contained loopholes that conveniently afforded the landlords with the mechanisms to evade the reform law." (For details, see Adriano, 1991a, p.8).

which was the bailiwick of his political opponents. Third, it was also necessary to stabilize the political situation which could be destabilized after the declaration of martial law by setting up new organizations with barangays at the center as his political machinery in the rural areas.

The urgency with which President Marcos carried out the land reform was indicated in the style of PD 27 as it was a very simple one, containing only major principles. Besides, the original draft of the decree was handwritten by the President himself. In contrast, the agrarian reform law under the Aquino administration was composed of 78 sections written in complicated legalistic language.

At the onset of the program implementation, it drew increasing resistance from the landlords as it proceeded to cover the land over 24 hectares in November 1973, and land over 7 hectares in October 1974. Therefore, restrictions were eased allowing a fixed rent leasehold system with a 7 hectare ceiling as limit in 1975, although ownership of up to 7 hectares was prerequisite condition for PD 27.

On top of that, under the guise of agricultural diversification, the decree was again amended in 1976 (with PD 1066) explicitly exempting sugarlands converted from sugar production to that of rice, corn, feedgrains, cotton, fruits and vegetables, livestock and "such other crops as may be designated hereafter by the Department of Agriculture". Years later, another Marcos decree, PD 1942 (still unpublished), also excluded land transfer of those areas newly converted to rice and corn.

3-2. Accomplishments

During the Marcos administration, the increase of agricultural production after the imposition of PD 27 was due to the technological development in agriculture. Sadly, the institutional reforms lagged far behind. The Marcos government accomplished self-sufficiency for rice production in 1978 through the "Masagana 99 Program" which was initiated in 1973 to increase rice production to 99 cavans (1 cavan = 50 kgs) per hectare through the aid of agricultural technology and agricultural management. The program was attained through the introduction of agricultural credit and HYVs (high yielding varieties) together with the construction of irrigation systems.

Land Reform under the Marcos administration consisted of four activities, namely:

(a) Operation Land Transfer (OLT, as defined by PD 27) which involves the transfer of land from the landowners to tenant tillers. However, as mentioned earlier, it only covered tenanted rice and corn lands and allowed a seven-hectare retention limit.

(b) Operation Leasehold (LHO) as outlined under the 1963 Land Reform Code (RA 3844) covered tenants in rice and corn lands who are within the seven-hectare

retention limit. Basically it aimed to improve the share tenure of peasants by allowing share tenants to upgrade their status from sharecroppers to leaseholders. Under the LHO program, the tenant-beneficiaries shouldered all the costs of production and paid the landlord 25 percent of a normal harvest.

(c) Acquisition of landed estates or haciendas by the government for resale to tenants. The program involved the upgrading of the haciendas prior to land transfer.

(d) Resettlement Program whose beneficiaries are farmers displaced by infrastructure projects, those living in congested OLT or LHO areas, as well as rebel-returnees. Land transfer does not take place here; instead, patents are issued.

For a brief assessment of the land reform program under martial law, the OLT and the LHO shall be analyzed because they are the major components of the program which is guided by the basic principle of "land to the tillers."

As indicated in Table 1, from its inception in 1972 to June 1986, OLT reached 440,239 farmers or 102.9 percent of its target, covering 755,172 hectares of rice and corn lands or 105.4 percent of its target. However, not all Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) were issued to the farmer-beneficiaries.⁴

Only 74.6 percent of all CLTs generated as of June 1986 have been actually handed over to tenants due to many reasons, among them, the disagreement over the compensation due the landlords, defects in the land survey, and the evasive tactics of landowners.

Emancipation patents (EPs) reached 142,367 farmers or 32.3 percent of the CLTs issued, and 188,531 hectares of land or 25.0 percent of the CLTs issued. This seemingly good performance, however, masks the reality of the situation. Previously, a farmer only received an EP after full payment on the land, usually in 15 installments. However, in 1982 Marcos allowed EPs to be issued after only two payments by the amortizing tenants. Then in January 1986, during his desperate snap election bids, Marcos allowed EPs to be issued even without any payments by the farmer-beneficiary. This accounts for the seeming success of the Marcos program. However, in 1981, less than one percent of amortizing tenants gained ownership of the land they were tilling. But, by end of June 1986, the number of beneficiaries involved rose to 33.3 percent (as indicated in Table 1).

On the other hand, the LHO reached 539,758 farmers or 102.3 percent of the target, covering 567,078 hectares of lands or 100.9 percent of the target. About 255,195 farmers or 47.3 percent were issued Certificate of Agricultural Leaseholds

⁴The process of land transfer is composed of five stages: (a) Identification of the tenants, landowners, and lands, (b) Measurement of the lands, (c) Issuance of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs), (d) Evaluation of the Lands, and (e) Issuance of Emancipation Patents (EPs). The CLT serves only as a certificate to have a right to own the land in the future. However, EPs which are issued after the full payment of the land (usually in 15 installments as amortization) guarantee the right of land ownership.

Table 1
Program Accomplishment of Land Reform by Marcos Administration
(As of June 30, 1986)

	Scope	Accomplishment	Percent
1. Operation Land Transfer (OLT)			
- Certificates of land transfer (CLTs) generated			
No. of FBs involved	427,623	440,239	102.9
Hectareage covered (ha)	716,520	755,172	105.4
No. of CLTs issued	630,680	470,639	74.6
- Emancipation patents (EPs) generated			
No. of FBs involved	427,623	142,367	33.3
Hectareage covered (ha)	716,520	188,531	26.3
No. of EPs issued	630,680	22,187	3.5
2. Operation Leasehold (LHO)			
- Execution of leasehold contracts			
No. of FBs involved	527,667	539,758	102.3
Hectares covered (ha)	562,230	567,078	100.9
No. of lease contracts	872,232	727,849	83.4
- Issuance of certificates of agricultural leasehold (CAL)			
No. of FBs involved	527,667	255,195	44.9
Hectares covered (ha)	562,230	263,557	46.9
No. of CAL	872,235	336,588	38.6
3. Landed estates			
- No. of estates administered		154	
No. of beneficiaries	56,302	34,013	60.4
Area (ha)	87,682	55,221	60.4
- Deed of sale generated			
No. of beneficiaries	43,139	12,459	28.9
Area (ha)	63,555	19,807	31.4
4. Resettlement			
- No. of settlement projects		46	
- Administered area (ha)	801,042		
- No. of families resettled	78,450	59,340	75.7
- Patents issued			
No. of beneficiaries	78,450	7,068	6.7
Area covered	565,079	36,392	6.4

Source: Ministry of Agrarian Reform, "The Philippine Agrarian Reform Program: A Handbook," 1986.

(CALs); this involved 263,557 hectares or 46.9 percent of the target. The LHOs gave the beneficiaries their right to protect the leasehold agreements by waiving aside the sharecropping system.

Despite the self-serving pronouncements of Marcos, his reform program had only modest achievements due to the following reasons:

(a) Incentives for the amortizing farmers were few since they were burdened with the annual installments to pay for the land. According to a study by Mangahas

(1985, pp. 228-231) the amount of the annual installment was almost equal to 25 percent of the production (excluding payment for seed, harvesting, and threshing) as defined in the Land Reform Code of 1963. This was burdensome for the farmer-beneficiaries because they had to pay additional dues like membership fees for the "Samahang Nayon", farmers' cooperatives, compulsory savings, not to mention the rapid increase of the prices of the inputs.

(b) Support services extended to farmer-beneficiaries were insufficient. The Marcos government extended credit subsidies to rice producers through the Masagana 99 scheme. However, even this was favorable to large farmers; in some cases, some farmer-beneficiaries resorted to mortgaging their CLTs (Ibon, 1988, p. 39). Unable to repay their debts, they reverted to the status of a tenant.

(c) There was an apparent lack of will on the part of the government to promote land reform when faced with resistance from the landlords.

(d) Farmers' organizations were also inactive, a typical feature of the martial law years. Thus, the farmers' cooperatives like the Samahang Nayon was organized with the initiative of the government to control the farmers.

On the positive side, PD 27 indeed achieved more than the past reform laws. It was able to break up large haciendas in Central Luzon, thereby partially defusing peasant unrest in the area. As mentioned earlier, modern rice technology for rice production was partially credited for this achievement.

4. THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP) UNDER THE AQUINO ADMINISTRATION

4-1. Legal Foundation of the CARL

The inauguration of the Aquino administration in February 1986 raised great expectations that a genuine land reform for landless farmers covering all farmland areas would be implemented. However, since her administration started as a revolutionary government, President Corazon Aquino lost the political opportunity to initiate such a reform when she relegated the task of defining land reform to Congress.

The serious attempts of the Aquino administration in land reform prior to the formal Congressional convention were limited to the following:

(a) The legal framework for the formulation of the land reform program as provided for in the newly-ratified Constitution;

(b) The Accelerated Land Reform Program (ALRP), as the policy guideline framed by the cabinet officials in the government;

(c) Proclamation No. 31 instituting the government program of redistributive reform; and

(d) The implementing mechanics of the reform as outlined in Executive Order (EO) No. 229.

Quite different from that of the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution empowered the government to launch redistributive reform affecting both tenant-farmers and regular farmworkers in all agricultural lands and natural resources (Art. II, Sec. 21 and Art. XIII, Sec. 4).

The other salient features of the agrarian reform policy specified in the Constitution are:

(a) Congress to prescribe the retention limit (Art. XIII, Sec. 4);

(b) just compensation for the landlords (Art. III, Sec. 4)

(c) alternative measures to land distribution such as voluntary land sharing will be taken up (Art. XIII, Sec. 4);

(d) the government encouraging landowners to invest the proceeds in rural-based industries (Art. XIII, Sec. 8);

(e) the lease of as much as 1000 hectares of public agricultural lands to private corporations and no more than 500 hectares to Filipino nationals; and

(f) support services to be provided to farmer-beneficiaries by the state (Art. XII, Sec. 3-8).

These provisions invited a lot of criticisms from the farmers as they only reflected the interest of the moderate and conservative groups within the Constitutional Commission of 1986. The radical groups, including the National Democratic Front (NDF) which is the political front organization supporting the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), a radical farmers' organization headed by Jaime Tadeo, were strongly against the provisions in the draft of the Constitution and asked the president to enforce the law-making power authorized by the Freedom Constitution of 1986 prior to the start of the new Constitution. The conflict escalated to violence in January 1987 when the military fired at the farmer-rallyists in Mendiola Bridge near Malacañang.

After the Constitution was ratified in February 1987, one move of the President to defuse social unrest was to organize a Cabinet Action Committee on Agrarian Reform (CAC) which would come up with a draft program for the government.

At the time the Accelerated Land Reform Program (ALRP) was being drafted, the working group of the CAC discussed the fifteen versions of the program which saw

the gradual dilution of the reforms until the final version on June 28, 1987 due to strong opposition from the landlords.

The highlights of ALRP are as follows:

(a) implementation of the seven-hectare ceiling for all croplands within 10 years;

(b) land distribution schedule commencing with large privately-owned farms as well as rice and cornlands covered by PD 27, and ending with small farms and alienable and disposable public lands. However, exact timetables for large sugar, coconut, etc., plantations are excluded;

(c) ancestral tribal lands and land used for public services are exempted;

(d) alternative schemes to land reform such as voluntary land sharing and corporate stock sharing.

One of the institutions which persistently opposed the ALRP was the World Bank⁵ after having analyzed that the cause of failure of the land reform programs of the previous governments was the insolvency of 90 percent of the farmers who were awarded the lands. The World Bank's stand was that the deferment of the land reform program will strengthen the resistance of the landholders on one hand, and discourage the farmers to have incentives to increase productivity, on the other hand.

Consequently, a radical program was recommended by the Bank wherein (a) the Bank declined to finance the loan amounting to 500 million dollars for compensation of the landowners; (b) the government should simultaneously implement all the stages of the program; and (c) retention limit of all stages should be started simultaneously from seven hectares since January 1987.

The Aquino administration was in a dilemma as it confronted resistance coupled with strong demands from three sectors—immediate free distribution of lands to the farmers by use of the presidential lawmaking power, abdication of ALRP to Congress as demanded by the landowners, and no loan for compensation by the World Bank.

As a consequence, the Aquino administration did not adopt the ALRP but instead issued Proclamation 131, and Executive Order (EO) No. 229, both dated July 22, 1987, instituting and providing the mechanism for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). EO 229 was fundamentally different in significance and content from the ALRP. Indeed, much of EO 229 focused on the

⁵For a summary of the World Bank's recommendation, see press releases on May 25, 26, 27, 28, 1987.

administrative procedures and not on the substance of agrarian reform measures in the CARP. For instance:

(a) EO 229 did not touch on the key issues such as the retention limits and priorities of areas which were left instead for Congress to define (Sec. 2);

(b) it specified the mechanics of land registration, private land acquisition and landowner compensation. However, compensation to landowners is based on the owner's declaration of current fair market value (Sec. 6);

(c) it also focused attention especially to the composition and functions of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC), a government entity which will coordinate the implementation of the program (Sec. 18);

(d) 50 billion pesos is to be provided to cover the cost of the CARP from 1987 to 1992, and 2.7 billion pesos to cover the supplemental requirement of the CARP for 1987, sourced from the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT), sale of the ill-gotten wealth recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), and so on.

Thus, EO 229 deferred the fundamental issues, except the financial aspects of the program, for Congress and the PARC to define.

Before and after Congress opened on July 27, 1987, the pressure groups inside and outside of Congress strongly pushed for their own demands.

Outside Congress, the radical group composed of farmers' organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs), cause-oriented groups, the church, etc., organized the Congress for a Peoples' Agrarian Reform (CPAR) in May 1987 demanding for a genuine land reform. The landholders, on the other hand, were restless about their situation, and fearing for the enactment of a genuine land reform, a landholder group in Negros Island, the National Federation for Sugarcane Planters (NFSP), demanded Congress in August 1987 to exempt the sugarcane plantations from the CARP.

Inside Congress, coming to the very end, in April 1988, the Senate (composed of the moderate reformists) approved Senate Bill No. 249 which defined:

(a) a retention limit of 5 hectares, 3 hectares for farmer-beneficiaries, 7 hectares for those covered by PD 27;

(b) 30 ~50% of down payment in cash for the landholders compensation; and

(c) a 10-year term for the program.

On the other hand, the House of Representatives (composed of conservatives like the landlords) approved House Bill No. 400 which defined:

(a) a retention limit of 7 hectares, 3 hectares for an heir apparent, and 7 hectares for the PD 27 beneficiaries;

(b) exemption from the coverage of orchards, livestock projects, etc.; and

(c) a 15-30% down payment in cash for the landlords' compensation.

After the joint bicameral committee finalized the united Bill on June 6, 1988, it was approved separately by both Houses the next day.⁶

4-2. Salient Features of the CARL

On June 10, 1988, President Aquino signed into law the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, RA 6657) to give legal power to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The salient features of RA 6657 can be summarized in five points as follows:

(a) RA 6657 is a comprehensive program also involving rice and corn lands covered by PD 27.

(b) There exist a lot of loopholes in the law itself, because it is a product of the compromise between the interests of the landlords and government.

(c) RA 6657 provides for an option to keep large plantations intact by legalizing the stock sharing for the corporate plantations. However, this alternative attracted criticisms on the ground that this cannot be categorized as a land reform program.

(d) RA 6657 defines the land reform of the plantations operated by the multi-national corporations.

(e) RA 6657 defines the funding source of the Agrarian Reform Fund in order to implement the CARP.

The following is a detailed description of the salient features of RA 6657.

4-2-1. Scope, Timetable and Priorities

The 10.3-million-hectare area coverage of the program (Table 2) is projected to benefit some 3.9 million rural-based producers and rural workers (Table 3).

Land acquisition and distribution shall be accomplished in 10 years (RA 6657, Sec. 5) starting on 15 June 1988 (RA 6657, Sec. 5). It shall be implemented in three phases. A classification by land types for each of the three implementation phase and the targeted number of beneficiaries are indicated in Table 4. Under Phase I, the priority areas for land reform cover rice and corn lands (PD 27), idle and abandoned

⁶For the salient features of the Senate Bill 249 and House Bill 400, see Adriano, 1991 a, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

Table 2
Annual Projection of Beneficiaries*

PROGRAM	TOTAL (1987-1997(ACTUAL) (1988-1992)	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	TOTAL (1993-1997)	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
PHASE I	631,674	60,172	76,293	146,293	149,416	14,177	20,655	54,368	24,301	3,122	3,122	3,168
Rice and Corn Lands	522,675	60,063	70,000	140,000	140,000	112,612	15,807	41,607	18,597	2,389	2,389	2,425
Idle and Abandoned Lands	83,332		4,816	7,206	9,080	15,807	138	360	162	20	20	20
PCGG Surrendered/Sequestered	833	109	42	42	63	79	4,710	138	5,542	713	713	723
Gov't-Owned Agricultural Lands	24,834		1,435	1,435	2,147	2,706	362,062	4,710	5,542	713	713	723
PHASE II	2,742,600	320	67,479	280,212	302,942	325,367	558,062	1,408,218	340,557	308,505	291,238	105,836
Public A & D Lands and Lands under Agricultural Lease	1,721,000			187,269	205,996	224,723	243,449	859,563	224,722	205,996	185,396	
ISF Areas	626,667		51,667	60,667	61,000	61,000	61,000	331,666	65,000	65,000	68,333	68,333
Resettlements	159,500	320	112,500	25,000	25,000	25,000	25,000	46,680	21,680			
Private Agricultural Lands in excess of 50 hectares**	235,433		3,312	7,276	11,279	14,644	28,613	170,309	29,175	37,509	37,509	37,503
PHASE III	526,997		4,398	14,434	22,578	29,535	59,347	396,705	58,456	92,981	92,981	92,940
Other Private Agricultural Lands**												
5.01 - 24.00 hectares	354,526		265	8,053	12,820	17,003	35,729	280,656	33,218	70,589	70,589	70,531
24.00 - 50.00 hectares	172,471		4,133	6,381	9,758	12,532	23,618	116,049	25,238	22,392	22,392	22,409
TOTAL	3,901,271	60,492	148,170	440,939	474,936	479,379	438,064	1,859,291	423,334	404,608	387,341	201,944

* Includes both the farmer-beneficiaries and qualified heirs of affected landowners.

Estimates for FBs are computed as follows:

- For rice and corn lands under PD 27, based on average landholdings of 1.4 hectares per FB.

- For all other lands, the award calling is three hectares per FB, except for public A & D lands and lands under agriculture leasees where the average landholdings is estimated at 2.67 hectares per FB.

** whether voluntarily offered or compulsorily acquired

Source: Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC). "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the Philippines: Implementing Program and Budget," (1988-1997) Vol. II, 1989.

Table 3
Annual Land Distribution Projections*
In Hectares


PROGRAM	TOTAL (1987-1997(ACTUAL)	1987	TOTAL (1988-1992)	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	TOTAL (1993-1997)	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
PHASE I	1,054,800	80,468	811,224	116,881	214,881	224,247	193,251	61,964	163,108	61,961	72,902	9,366	9,366	9,513
Rice and Corn Lands	727,800	80,143	647,657	98,000	196,000	196,000								
Idle and Abandoned Lands	250,000	125,175	14,449	14,449	21,617	27,240	47,420	124	825	47,420	55,791	7,168	7,168	7,278
PCGC Surrendered/Sequestered	2,500	325	1,090	126	126	188	237	413	1,085	413	485	62	62	63
Gov't-Owned Agricultural Lands	74,500		37,302	4,306	4,306	6,422	8,177	14,131	37,198	14,131	16,625	2,138	2,136	2,169
PHASE II	7,659,803	958	3,717,872	202,436	778,829	840,832	901,932	993,839	3,940,973	1,005,839	947,568	857,528	812,528	317,510
Public A & D Lands and Lands under Agricultural Lease	4,595,000		2,300,000		500,000	550,000	600,000	650,000	2,295,000	650,000	600,000	550,000	495,000	
ISF Areas	1,880,000		885,000	155,000	182,000	182,000	183,000	183,000	995,000	195,000				
Resettlements	478,500	958	337,500	37,500	75,000	75,000	75,000	75,000	140,042	75,000	65,042			
Private Agricultural Lands in excess of 50 hectares**	706,303		195,372	9,936	21,829	33,836	43,932	85,939	510,931	85,939	87,526	112,528	112,528	112,510
PHASE III	1,580,997		390,878	13,195	43,302	67,734	88,604	178,043	1,190,119	178,043	175,367	278,945	278,945	278,819
Other Private Agricultural Lands**														
5.01 - 24.00 hectares	1,063,581		221,611	796	24,158	38,461	51,008	107,188	841,970	107,188	99,653	211,768	211,768	211,593
24.00 - 50.00 hectares	517,416		169,267	12,399	19,144	29,273	37,596	70,855	348,149	70,855	75,714	67,177	67,177	67,226
TOTAL	10,295,600	81,426	4,919,974	332,512	1,037,012	1,132,817	1,183,787	1,233,846	5,294,200	1,245,846	1,195,837	1,145,839	1,100,839	605,839

* Annual land distribution projections are based on agency capabilities and therefore did not consider the Program Phasing prescribed by RA 6657.

** Whether voluntarily offered or compulsorily acquired

Source: Same to a Table 2

Table 4
Priorities in the Acquisition and Distribution of Agricultural Lands for a
Period of Ten (10) Year Under ARP '88



PHASE I (Schedule of Acquisition: 1988-1992)

1. Rice and corn lands covered by PD 27
(These are governed by the procedures
provided for under DAR Adm. Order No. 2,
Series of 1987, as amended by Adm. Order
No. 12, Series of 1988.);
2. Idle and abandoned lands;
3. Lands foreclosed by private and govern-
ment financial institutions;
4. Private lands (VOS);
5. Lands acquired by the PCGG;
6. Public lands suitable for agriculture;
7. Lands operated by multinational companies;
8. Public A & D lands/resettlements.

- 727,800

- 250,000

- 150,058*

- 400,00

- 2,500

- 74,500

- 4,656,730

6,261,588 Has

PHASE II (Schedule of Acquisition: 1988-1992)
Private agricultural lands above 50 hectares
- 450,860 Has

PHASE III (Leasehold: 1988-1992)

A. Lands above 24 hectares up to 50 hectares.
(Schedule of Acquisition: 1992-1994)

- 303,100 Has

B. Lands above the retention area up to 24 hectares.
(Schedule of Acquisition: 1994-1998)

- 1,049,800 Has

Source: DAR Data Bank

lands, foreclosed and sequestered lands, and government-owned agricultural lands (Sec. 7). Phase II covers, as scheduled, three-fourths of the program's area where a large portion is alienable and disposable public lands and lands under agricultural lease as well as upland areas covered by the Integrated Social Forestry (ISF) program of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Medium-sized privately-owned agricultural lands ranging from five to fifty hectares fall under Phase III.

4-2-2. Beneficiaries

Regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands are covered by RA 6657; these include the lands planted to commercial crops like sugar, coconuts, etc. cultivated not only by tenant-farmers but also by agricultural workers.

4-2-3. Retention Limits

According to RA 6657, landowners can retain land not exceeding five hectares, with their child allowed to keep three hectares each, provided that the heir is at least 15 years of age and that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm (Sec. 6). However, as defined in PD 27 the retention limit for rice and cornlands is fixed at 7 hectares while original homestead owners and their direct heirs are allowed to own as much as 24 hectares.

For the distribution limit, agrarian reform beneficiaries can own as much as three hectares (Sec. 23), while PD 27 advocated a three-hectare retention limit, and five hectares, if not irrigated.

4-2-4. Land Valuation

RA 6657 provides a just compensation to landowners which will be determined by factoring in the land acquisition cost, its current value, its nature, the actual use and income, etc. (Sec. 17). The landowner, the Department of Agrarian Reform, and the Land Bank of the Philippines will agree on this, with the court being called in to make the final decision if there is disagreement (Sec. 18).

4-2-5. Stock Sharing Scheme

The corporate stock-sharing scheme is one of the alternative schemes provided by RA 6657 to effectively exempt agribusiness plantation owners from land reform. Under such scheme:

(a) the conversion of farm values into stocks whose shares will be distributed among its workers may exempt the farms from reform (Sec. 31);

(b) three percent of gross sales from the produce of such lands are distributed;
and

(c) an additional 10 percent of the net profit after tax shall be distributed in the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit (Sec. 32).

This provision of production and income sharing scheme will be applied to commercial farms (Sec. 11) and multinational corporations (Sec. 8).

4-2-6. Deferment of Program in Commercial Farming

Under the existing modes of land usage within the 10-year time frame of the law, private agricultural lands operated as commercial farms dedicated to livestock, poultry and swine raising, aquaculture, and production for fruits, vegetables, cutflowers, cacao, coffee, and rubber can continue their production activities (Sec. 11).

4-2-7. Multinational Corporations

Public lands in excess of the 1000-hectare area leased or owned by the multinational corporations, or those held by foreign individuals in excess of 500 hectares, will be completely acquired and distributed within three years, while that of private lands will be immediately acquired upon expiration of the lease contracts (or any other service contracts) in effect as of August 29, 1987 or after 10 years of the effectivity of the law, whichever is sooner.

4-2-8. Financing

Because previous land reform programs failed due to lack of funds for implementation, the financial sources for the Agrarian Reform Fund have been explicitly defined. The main sources of funding or appropriation include:

- (a) proceeds from the sale of the Asset Privatization Trust (Sec. 63a);
- (b) all receipts from assets recovered and from sales of ill-gotten wealth through the Presidential Commission on Good Government in foreign countries (Sec. 63b);
- (c) proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the Government in foreign countries (Sec. 63c);
- (d) official foreign aid grants and concessional financing to production credits or any other support services (Sec. 63d).

4-3. Response to the CARP

On June 25, 1988 two weeks after the enactment of RA 6657, twelve organizations under the Congress for a People's Agrarian Reform (CPAR) gathered

and adopted the People's Agrarian Reform Code (PARCODE) as their own version of the agrarian reform program apart from RA 6657.

The PARCODE set the provisions as, cited below, regarding the agricultural lands, retention limits, priority, and payment for the compensation:⁷

The lands to be covered include:

(a) agricultural lands (regardless of crops planted, existing tenurial form or farm size) including commercial farms such as piggery, poultry, livestock, etc. (PARCODE Sec. 2a);

(b) arable lands including logging areas, and thickly-populated national parks, mining, pasture area, and newly-opened and reclaimed areas (Sec. 2b); and

(c) arable lands that are idle and abandoned, foreclosed or foreclosable or sequestered, including church- and school-owned lands, plantations, haciendas, and military reservations and non-governmental lands (Sec. 2c); and

(d) all other agricultural lands which have been converted to nonagricultural uses to evade the intent and provisions of the PARCODE. (Sec. 2f).

PARCODE's retention limit is within five hectares based on the principle of owner-cultivatorship (Sec. 3). However, it varies according to factors governing a variable family size farm, such as commodity produced, and terrain as determined by the local People's Agrarian Reform Council (PARCON; Sec. 3). More importantly, the target date for the completion of the transfer of the land is within five years (Sec. 3).

The payment by the beneficiaries of the lands which were acquired and redistributed by the government is based on the acquisition cost less all land rentals and uncompensated labor, defined as the difference between actual farm wages and the government-mandated minimum wage including cost of living allowance from the start of the tenancy or the employment relationships. However, it will be paid in seventeen equal annual amortization without interest, not exceeding ten percent of the net value of production, after a two-year grace period (Sec. 11).

The proposals by the CPAR were favored by the farmers. The farmers' organization has decided to start to make PARCODE into law by people's initiatives or referendum in accordance with the provisions stated in the Constitution (Art. VI, Sec. 32).

⁷For a detailed comparison of RA 6657 and PARCODE, see Adriano, 1991a, pp. 36-48.

5. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARP

5-1. Accomplishments

As mentioned earlier, RA 6657 was criticized by both farmers and landholders. This section examines the accomplishment of the CARP as of December 1991.

Firstly, the pace of the redistribution of the private lands which form the major portion of the CARP is very slow. As mentioned earlier Operation Land Transfer (OLT) consists of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS), Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA). This program attained only 4.3 percent of its target in terms of number of beneficiaries, and 2.7 percent in terms of physical areas.

The government assesses favorably the reform of rice and corn, lands, citing figures of 65.6 and 61.4 percent in terms of the beneficiaries and areas, respectively. However, it must be noted that the land reform for rice and corn lands is just the follow-up of the reform started under the Marcos government.

Secondly, the reform of the government-owned agricultural lands obtained significant results showing 449.4 percent achievement in terms of beneficiaries, and 284.8 percent of areas. As will be mentioned later, EC 407 has exceeded the target, covering some 21, 664 hectares and 17,411 beneficiaries of distributed lands out of the 39, 576 hectares of lands leased to the multinational corporations and transferred by the National Development Company to the DAR.

However, no idle and abandoned lands nor as the PCGG-sequestered lands were acquired and distributed although these two categories are prioritized in Phase I of the CARP.

Thirdly, under the leasehold arrangement as defined by the 1963 Land Reform Code, there were 239 thousand beneficiaries on 371 thousand hectares.

5-2. Some Issues on the CARP

Many criticisms surfaced regarding the implementation process. One issue concerns the CARP law, RA 6657, itself, specifically the provisions for stock distribution and production sharing. The land valuation has also been debated upon, as will be mentioned later in this section.

The delay of the implementation of the CARP has serious repercussions for the government. Two years after the enactment of the law in June 1990, in trying to demonstrate political will to strengthen CARP and speed up its implementation, the Aquino administration issued Executive Orders (EO) 405, 406, and 407 (as amended by EO 448) (Appendix 1), details of which are explained in a later section.

5-2-1. Stock Distribution Application

As mentioned earlier, RA 6657 defined the stock distribution and profit sharing scheme as one of the options for land distribution.

Hacienda Luisita, comprising 4,915 hectares of sugarland covering ten barangays, is a case in point. In May 1989, Hacienda Luisita, Inc., signed a memorandum of agreement with the Tarlac Developmant Corporation to distribute 118 million pesos worth of shares of stocks to its 7,000 workers in compliance with the CARL.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. claims that it provides the farm workers 3 percent of gross earnings by profit-sharing. The laborers, however complained that in 1987 Hacienda Luisita reported gross sales of 220 million. Three percent of this amount is equivalent to 942.85 pesos per year, or only 2.61 pesos per day for each of the 7,000 workers. The existing daily wage in the Hacienda is 56.0 pesos. Such additional compensation will still not be enough to raise the farm worker and his family above the poverty line of 79.0 pesos a day.⁸

The test case of Hacienda Luisita has resulted in the proliferation of agro-corporations (ie, San Miguel Corp., Monterey Farms, Marsman and Gamboa-Hermanos) with pending applications for stock transfer in 1991.

According to the 1992 DAR report, out of 88 corporations covering 32,995 hectares which applied under this scheme, 74 applications have been processed, while 14 are still under evaluation. Of those processed, nine firms, covering 7,275 hectares have been approved. On the other hand, 20 applications covering 3,339 hectares have been disapproved while 15 applications covering 9,025 hectares have been withdrawn.

The situation is compounded by the Department of Justice's ruling which says that the DAR may still act on stock discription applications even beyond the deadline of June 14, 1990 (RA 6657, Sec. 31).

5-2-2. Land Valuation

In the land valuation process, corruption and the landowners' vested interests would evidently work to the disadvantage of the farmer-beneficiaries. The infamous Garchitorena land scam is an example.

The 1,880-hectare Garchitorena estate is located in the sixth class municipality of Garchitorena, Camarines Sur and was originally estimated and sold to the United Coconut Planters' Bank (UCPB) by its owners for 1.3 million pesos. The UCPB later sold the same parcel to Sharp International Marketing for 3.8 million pesos. That

⁸Refer to Congress for People's Agrarian Reform (CPAR), 1989, p. 67.

same year, the DAR, under the VOS program purchased the land at a cost of 62,725,077 pesos. Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) President Vistan's request for a review of the case led to the cancellation of the transaction.

In response to the Garchitorena land scam, President Aquino issued EO 405 which vested on the LBP the primary responsibility for land valuation. This was designed to allow DAR to focus its activities on the identification of the landholdings and beneficiaries, the distribution of the acquired lands, and the other sub-components of the program. This move will likewise lessen the perennial friction between the DAR and LBP in land valuation.

However, some argue that the land valuation should remain with DAR, because the DAR looks at the process as a developmental issue, while the LBP regards it purely as a commercial transaction. EO 405 effectively makes the DAR a mere appendage of the LBP, awaiting the latter's go-signal before land transfer can take place. Apparently, this differs from the provision of RA 6657 which states that the land valuation is subjective and should be left to the DAR, LBP, landowners and the courts to decide (Sec. 18).

5-2-3. Fast-track Implementation Strategies

EO 406 has directed implementing agencies to align their respective programs and projects with the CARP along the concept of Agro-Industrial Areas (AIDAs). Consequently, EO 406 created CARP Implementing Teams (CITs) from the national to the municipal levels including the provincial CARP Implementing Team (PCIT). At the provincial level, the same team shall serve as the implementing arm of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordination of priority areas for coverage, ironing out procedural kinks, and coordination of the delivery of support services.

EO 406 likewise identified and prioritized 24 Strategic Operation Provinces (SOPs, which numbered to 25 later) which includes Negros Occidental and Quezon, where the bulk of the CARP workload lies without prejudice to the implementation of the Program in the other provinces of the country (See Annex 2).

5-2-4. Transfer of Public Land to DAR

To speed up the implementation of CARP, Executive Order 407 was issued which directed all government instrumentalities, including Government Financing Institutions (GFIs) and Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) to immediately transfer to DAR for coverage under CARP, all their landholdings suitable for agriculture.

This directive, which has been instrumental in accelerating land distribution, was followed in February 1991 by EO 448 which directed the immediate turnover of government reservations, or portions thereof which are suitable for agriculture and no longer for the purpose for which they were established.

5-2-5. Land Conversion

The issues on land conversion and relocation were revived under the Aquino administration as it started the agrarian reform program and decentralization policy.

RA 6657, which set the framework for CARP, enumerates the following criteria for conversion of land, namely:

- (a) five years have lapsed from its award;
- (b) the land has ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purpose;
- (c) the locality has become urbanized; and
- (d) the land will have greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purpose (Sec. 65).

Many problems have arisen from what seemed to be insufficient criteria for conversion guidelines. For one, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44 in 1990 rules that the authority of DAR to approve conversion can be exercised only from the date of effectivity of RA 6657, i.e. June 15, 1988. According to this ruling, all lands classified as nonagricultural in Town Plans approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) before this date can be detrimental to DAR.

Needless to say, matters related to the socioeconomic development of the affected families are being addressed, like the distribution of industrial lots, provision of facilities and amenities, livelihood opportunity, educational and social services.

To make matters worse, despite DAR Administration Order (AO) No. 1 series of 1991 which provides another set of guidelines, the criteria for converting agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses are still vague as they are almost the same as that provided in RA 6657.

On top of the above-mentioned issues and problems, there has arisen another one, as the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect on January 1, 1992. The local government units (LGUs) are authorized by the Code to reclassify the lands (Sec. 20). On the other hand, with the empowered enlistment of people's participation in development policy, the role of NGOs is increasing. Therefore, the land conversion issues have taken on political as well as socioeconomic.

To solve the potential problems, the Task Force for Land Use Conversion was organized in September 1992 as an inter-agency committee chaired by the Director-

General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) to draft the national Physical Framework Plan and National Land Use Policy. Upon the proposal of the Task Force, the government issued in December 1992 Administrative Order (AO) No. 20 to promote interim guidelines on agricultural conversion. AO 20 clarified that agricultural lands which shall not be subject to and non-negotiable for conversion are as follow: (a) all irrigated lands where water is available, or within an area programmed for irrigation facility; and (b) irrigable lands already covered by irrigation projects.

Despite the issuance of AO 20, the definition for the area not to be converted has remained unclear especially those indicated as "programmed" areas. Therefore, the Regional Land Use Commission, a tripartite organization, was assigned to look for means and to finalize land use in the region.

5-2-6. Linkage with Privatization Policy

As mentioned earlier, funding sources for the CARP include the sale of the properties to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (GOCC). However, the privatization program is behind schedule and fraught with difficulties, evidently causing delay in the sale of non-performing assets of APT, especially the financial form assets as well as the sale of the PCGG-sequestered assets.

On the other hand, the delay in the implementation of the CARP, especially in the private land redistribution by VOS and Compulsory Acquisition is apparent.

Therefore, as of the end of 1990, despite the long delay in the privatization efforts, the low accomplishment of CARP caused 9.8 billion pesos of the outstanding balance which is almost half of the available Agrarian Reform Fund. This kind of performance is caused more by the lack of coordination among the government agencies rather than by conflicting objectives of the government policies themselves. That is, on the one hand, the government initiates the privatization efforts, which, on the other hand, threatens to sabotage the agrarian reform program (Nozawa, 1991, pp. 50-56).

6. THE CARP AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

This section discusses how the CARP is actually being carried out in the rural areas. In this regard, two provinces are selected as case studies of the implementation of the program because the social impacts of land reform are closely related with rural development.

In this regard, the focus is on the role of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as external service provider and the Peoples Organizations (POs) as the

organizations of the beneficiaries themselves, i.e., self-help groups (for the definition of NGOs and POs, see Brillantes' paper in this volume).

One area of study chosen is Negros Occidental, a major sugarcane-producing province, for the reason that 53.7 percent of total physical area planted to sugarcane have sizes exceeding 25 hectares. This proportion is way below that of the national average (11.5 percent). The other area of study is Quezon, a coconut-producing province. The land reform of coconut areas has strong implications for social development as it involves 1.5 million farms, the second biggest area, after rice. (See Table 6).

Table 6
Number and Area of Farms by Size
(1980)

	Total	0-2.99 ha	3.0-4.99 ha	5.0-9.99 ha	10.0-24.99 ha	25.0 ha and over
Palay						
Number of Farms	1,867,206 (100)	1,331,483 (71.3)	313,434 (16.8)	163,248 (8.7)	51,614 (2.8)	7,433 (0.4)
Physical Area (ha)	3,649,900 (100.0)	1,929,300 (52.9)	873,800 (23.9)	521,700 (14.3)	234,200 (6.4)	90,900 (2.5)
Corn						
Number of Farms	1,273,798 (100.0)	823,192 (64.6)	242,635 (19.0)	154,966 (12.2)	47,945 (3.8)	5,060 (0.4)
Physical Area (ha)	2,466,900 (100.0)	1,067,400 (43.3)	601,300 (24.4)	518,500 (21.0)	217,800 (8.8)	61,900 (2.5)
Sugarcane						
Number of Farms	68,859 (100.0)	38,799 (56.3)	13,668 (19.9)	8,693 (12.6)	4,881 (7.1)	2,818 (4.1)
Physical Area (ha)	298,800 (100.0)	33,400 (11.1)	28,700 (9.6)	28,600 (9.6)	47,700 (16.0)	160,400 (53.7)
Coconut						
Number of Farms	1,495,445 (100.0)	848,251 (56.7)	327,952 (21.9)	231,064 (15.4)	77,354 (5.2)	10,824 (0.8)
Physical Area (1,000 productive trees)	317,135 (100.0)	72,638 (22.9)	74,761 (23.6)	81,741 (25.8)	61,844 (19.5)	26,151 (8.2)
Banana						
Number of Farms	1,071,600 (100.0)	693,482 (64.7)	106,934 (18.4)	134,118 (12.5)	42,016 (3.9)	5,096 (0.5)
Physical Area (1,000 productive trees)	81,909 (100.0)	23,602 (28.9)	12,768 (15.6)	12,525 (15.3)	5,847 (7.1)	27,167 (33.1)
Pineapple						
Number of Farms	76,398 (100.0)	41,010 (53.7)	17,558 (23.0)	12,376 (16.2)	4,826 (6.3)	628 (0.8)
Physical Area (1,000 productive trees)	683,027 (100.0)	13,316 (1.9)	5,300 (0.8)	3,593 (0.5)	1,746 (0.3)	659,073 (96.5)
PHILIPPINES (all crops)						
Number of Farms	3,420,323 (100.0)	2,353,835 (68.8)	588,151 (17.2)	360,066 (10.5)	103,732 (3.0)	14,608 (0.5)
Physical Area (ha)	9,725,200 (100.0)	2,891,300 (29.7)	2,066,700 (21.2)	2,242,900 (23.1)	1,406,400 (14.5)	1,117,800 (11.5)

Source: National Census and Statistics Office, "1980 Census of Agriculture."

6-1. CARP in Negros Occidental

6-1-1. Cause of Crisis in Negros

As of 1980, the ratio of sugarlands owned is 77.2 percent for the whole country (Table 7) and 87.6 percent for Negros Occidental (Table 8). However, this does not necessarily mean that the land reform for sugarlands in the province has improved, because the average size of the lands owned is quite big at 23.3 hectares (Table 8). As a consequence, sugarcane production was heavily dependent on the landless farmers called *dumaans* or the permanent workers, *pangayaws* or temporary workers, and *sakadas* or the migrant seasonal workers who work on daily wage or piece-rate basis.

Table 7
Tenure of Farms by Crops
(1980)

CROP	TOTAL	Fully	OWNED Ownerlike Possession	Sub-total	RENTED OR LEASED			OTHER FARMS		
					Share Possession	Fixed Amt (Money/ Product)	Sub-total	Rent-Free	Others	Sub-total
Palay										
Number of Farms	1,610,529	901,471	268,390	1,169,861	581,905	174,199	756,104	51,744	30,307	82,051
Physical Area (ha)	3,755,700 (100.)	2,073,100	486,100	2,559,200 (68.1)	822,900	281,000	1,103,900 (29.4)	47,100	45,600	92,700 (2.5)
Corn										
Number of Farms	753,632	426,200	98,050	524,250	250,745	14,936	265,681	37,353	18,826	56,179
Physical Area (ha)	1,955,000 (100.0)	1,263,900	202,000	1,465,900 (75.0)	362,700	27,500	390,200 (20.0)	48,000	51,000	99,000 (5.0)
Sugarcane										
Number of Farms	34,634	15,488	3,095	18,583	17,386	3,497	20,883	416	447	863
Physical Area (ha)	312,800 (100.0)	203,800	37,700	241,500 (77.2)	43,400	23,700	67,100 (21.5)	1,000	3,200 (1.3)	4,200
Coconut										
Number of Farms	709,626	497,887	87,749	567,636	199,211	10,682	209,893	10,870	3,444	14,314
Physical Area	2,842,900 (100.)	1,834,400	265,300	2,099,700 (73.9)	682,000	25,800	707,800 (24.9)	18,600	16,800	35,400 (1.2)
Banana										
Number of Farms	20,570	13,655	3,086	16,741	3,229	373	3,602	1,579	532	2,111
Physical Area	79,700 (100.0)	44,500	8,600	53,100 (66.6)	5,800	17,300	23,100 (29.0)	2,000	1,400	3,400 (4.4)
Pineapple										
Number of Farms	2,331	1,265	243	1,508	673	159	832	236	46	282
Physical Area	28,100 (100.)	1,900	400	2,300 (8.2)	7,900	17,600	25,500 (90.7)	200	100	300 (1.1)
PHILIPPINES (all crops)										
Number of Farms	3,420,323	2,028,486	504,116	2,532,602	1,102,346	211,685	1,314,031	121,807	63,804	185,611
Physical Area (ha)	9,725,200 (100.0)	5,947,100	1,094,000	7,041,100 (72.4)	1,996,000	415,600	2,411,600 (24.8)	134,300	138,100 (2.8)	272,400

Source: National Census and Statistics Office, "1980 Census of Agriculture."

Table 8
Tenure of Farms (Sugarcane)
(1980)

PROVINCE	TOTAL	Fully	OWNED		RENTED OR LEASE		OTHER FARMS		Sub-total	
			Ownerlike Possession	Sub-total	Shared Possession	Fixed Amt (Money/Product)	Sub-total	Rent- Others		
(CENTRAL LUZON)										
Pampanga										
No. of Farmers	3,665	443	395	838	3,029	651	3,680	19	65	84
Physical Area (ha) (100.0)	14,812	1,529	1,150 (18.1)	2,679	10,478	1,458 (80.6)	11,936	49	148 (1.3)	197
Average Farm Size (ha)	4.0			3.2			3.2			2.3
(EASTERN VISAYAS)										
Negros Occidental										
No. of Farmers	5,466	4,332	642	4,974	183	811	994	40	35	75
Physical Area (ha) (100.0)	132,332	99,167	16,767 (87.6)	115,934	3,274	11,194 (10.9)	14,467	121	1,811 (1.5)	1,932
Average Farm Size (ha)	24.2			23.3			14.6		25.8	

Source: National Census and Statistics Office, "1980 Census of Agriculture."

Land ownership in Negros Occidental is heavily skewed with 1.9 percent of the total registered landholders of 43, 574 owning 239,919 hectares or 38.9 percent of agricultural land in parcels of 100 hectares or more in size.⁹ The inequity in the control of the basic means of production in the province has bred a socioeconomic system known for its glaring disparities in ownership of land. The landless, estimated at about 200,000 households per year, face food shortage and seasonal unemployment, while the plantation owners enjoy a lifestyle known for ostentatious consumption.

Thus, any discussion of the agrarian reform in the Philippines necessarily includes the country's Sugarlandia, the Negros Island.

Since the early 1980s, the swelling ranks of communist insurgents have thrived on the prevailing inequity. To protect their land, on the other hand, a militant faction of the landed and agricultural entrepreneurs has armed itself, effectively bringing about the polarization of the society of this province into the political extremes of right and left. The spiraling violence in the rural areas of the province is indicative of the urgent need for agrarian reform. However, the record of land reform in Negros for the past sixteen years has been dismal. Since the signing of PD 27 by President Marcos, only 3,000 hectares of rice and corn lands out of the target 17,653 hectares for distribution were transferred by 1985 into the hands of small farmers, mostly in

⁹See Lopez-Gonzaga, 1988, pp. 36-37.

the Bago Pulupandan area. As a matter of course, the Sugarlandia was excluded from PD 27.

Due to the drop in world sugar price since 1984, the situation in the province has worsened. In addition, the sugar industry has lost its status as an export industry. In terms of harvested area, there was a drop to 120-140 thousand hectares down from 180 - 190 thousand hectares. The drop of sugar price in the world market plunged the sugarcane workers to unemployment and caused food shortage resulting to the infamous "Crisis in Negros".

6-1-2. "60-30-10 Plan"

At the start of the Aquino administration in February 1986, the Officer-in-Charge Governor of the province, Daniel Lacson, submitted the outline of the "60-30-10 Plan" to President Aquino. The plan targeted to cover the sugarlands foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Republic Planters' Bank (RPB), which accounted for almost 70-75 percent of the areas cultivated by the farmers. Under the original concept of the 60-30-10 Plan, 60 percent will be used for sugarcane. Out of the remaining 40 percent, 30 percent can be utilized for agricultural diversification and 10 percent could be transferred to the farmers for their subsistence.

In December 1986, the President organized a task force to study the 60-30-10 Plan involving sugarlands in Negros Occidental. Thereafter in the same month, EO 104 was issued which authorized the release of 487 million pesos to the Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA) to liquidate the National Sugar Trading Corporations' (NASUTRA) unpaid obligations to sugar producers for the crop years 1981-85, upon recommendation of the task force. That is a prerequisite condition in order for the sugar producers to participate in the 60-30-10 Plan. This meant that the PNB would restructure the debts of the landholders with NASUTRA's loan collateral. However, as the plan faced resistance by the landholders, the loan scheme was separated from the debt restructuring. Consequently, the plan was postponed. In fact, only three individuals and corporations responded to Lacson's proposal. Thus, the plan failed due to three reasons:

(a) the Negrense landholders lost their interest to join when it was separated from the debt restructuring scheme;

(b) due to the recovery of the world sugar price, the landholders took a wait-and-see attitude towards the program;

(c) then Secretary Miriam Santiago of DAR was strongly against the program as it is not under CARP.

6-1-3. *Negros Land for a Productive Life Program*

Parallel to the 60-30-10 Plan proposed by Governor Lacson, the distribution of 10,000 hectares land foreclosed by PNB took place in May 1986. Upon approval by President Aquino, the governor initiated the implementation of the distribution of the lands under the Negros Land for a Productive Life Program (NLPLP).

As of 1986, according to the Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP), one of the implementing groups of NLPLP, 350 farms on 9,855.5 hectares were foreclosed by PNB.

Of these foreclosed lands, 7935.3 hectares or 80.5 percent was planted to sugar while 579.6 hectares or 5.9 percent were rice lands. In terms of size, almost half of the lands are more than fifty hectares. The foreclosure of 195 farms or 55.7 percent occurred between 1983 and 1985 (Table 9).

According to PBSP, the purposes of NLPLP are: (a) land distribution to landless peasants, and (b) land utilization and development through financial and technical assistance to the beneficiaries.

For the implementation of the land distribution project of the NLPLP, the Provincial Land Program Coordinating Committee (PLPCC) headed by Governor Lacson, was organized to coordinate the entire program and to decide the price of the land to be distributed.

The accomplishment record of NLPLP, as indicated in Table 10, shows that as of November 1987, 42 farms on 1,659.3 hectares have been covered by the program, the biggest portion of which consists of 12 farms and 587 hectares represented by the National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW).

However, in 1989, the PLPCC was dissolved and the CARP took over.

In accordance with EO 406, the foreclosed lands measuring 7,935.3 hectare were transferred from the PNB to DAR in 1990. At the same time, since Negros Occidental is identified as one of the 25 Strategic Operation Provinces (SOPs), the Provincial CARP Implementing Team (PCIT) was organized. The members of this team come from the Institute for Social Research and Development (ISRAD), Social Research Center of La Salle University in Bacolod which played a vital role in the study of agrarian reform in the province, as well as DAR, Department of Agriculture, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) from the local government units, and PBSP NGOs which took part in the study of agrarian reform in the provinces.

6-1-4. *Role of People's Organization for Self-Reliance*

Case of San Antonio I

This part describes how a people's organization played a key role in attaining

Table 9
PNB-Foreclosed Agricultural Lands in
Negros Occidental (1986)

A By Use of Land

Use of Land	No. of Has	(%)
Sugar	7,935.3	80.5
Palay	579.6	5.9
Corn	331.4	3.4
Rootcrops	156.7	1.6
Others	852.5	8.6
Total	9,855.5	100.0

B. By Size

Size of Land (Has)	No. of Farms	(%)	No. of Has	(%)
0 - 3	17	4.9	22.8	0.2
3 - 7	42	12.6	194.7	2.0
7 - 24	182	52.0	2,680.6	27.2
24 - 50	66	18.9	2,288.8	23.2
Above 50	43	12.3	4,668.7	47.4
Total	350	100.0	9,855.6	100.0
Average Size			28.2	

C. By Value of Bank Claim

Value of Land Claim	No. of Farms	(%)	No. of Has	(%)
Less than P100,000	71	20.3	978.9	9.9
More than P100,000	279	52.0	8,876.6	90.1
Total	350	100.0	9,855.6	100.0

D. By Average Value per Hectare

Average Value per Hectare	Pesos
Per Bank's Claim (A)	22,944.0
Per Market Value (B)	6,795.0
(B) as of % of (A)	29.6

E. By Year of Foreclosure

Year of Foreclosure	No. of Farms	(%)
1983 ~ 1985	195	55.7
1980 ~ 1982	8	2.3
1976 ~ 1979	54	15.4
1975 and earlier	93	26.6
Total	350	100.0

Source: Philippine Business for Social Progress (PBSP).
"Negros Land Transfer Program: Briefing Kit," 1986.

Table 10
Land Covered by Negros Land for Productive Life Program (NLPLP)
(as of November, 1987)

Implementing Institutions	No. of Farms	No. of Has	(%)
Churches	12	287.0	17.3
National Federation For Sugar Workers (NASW)	12	587.0	35.4
City, Municipal Sanggunians	9	443.6	26.7
Others	4	199.4	12.0
Not Identified	5	142.3	8.6
TOTAL	42	1,659.3	100.0

Sources: Institute for Social Research and Development
(ISRAD), University of La Salle, Bacolod.

land redistribution in Negros Occidental with special emphasis on the farmers' cooperative development project.

San Antonio I, in Barangay Tortosa, Manapla (north of Negros Occidental), is the site of the San Antonio I Farmer's Cooperative (SAFCO) project. The site of SA I, which was formally an hacienda, lies 44 km from Bacolod City. In February 1993, the members of the SAFCO were given their Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) — an achievement realized largely through their self-reliant efforts assisted by the NGOs.

The National Federation of Sugar Workers — Food and General Trades (NFSW-FGT, or NFSW for short) is one of the POs which served as a local implementing structure (LIS) for the farmlot project of SAFCO. Established in 1971, SAFCO began its campaign for farmlots cultivation for the benefits of hungry, underpaid workers way back in the seventies. On the other hand, NFSW as the local chapter of the union negotiated with landlords for a share of the vegetables and other food crops, for their own consumption. Thus during the period, NFSW initiated the organization of labor unions among the landless farmers.

In 1985, when the sugar industry was reeling from the severe crisis resulting in unemployment and starvation of thousands of sugar workers in Negros, NFSW intensified its campaign for farmlots. The sugar crisis also inevitably resulted in the bankruptcy of smaller sugar planters and the foreclosure of their estates as mentioned earlier. This condition created an opportunity for the local NFSW organization to till the land for their own needs.

Hacienda San Antonio I was organized as a local chapter of NFSW in 1979.¹⁰ In just six months the young union was able to negotiate a CBA with the landlord which brought about certain benefits like the implementation of the minimum wage law, SSS benefits, etc.

Beginning 1986, the union initiated a communal farmlots undertaking which was also a fruit of their CBA negotiations. After the organization evolved into the San Antonio I Workers Cooperative (SAWCO) in 1987, a series of seminars and training was undergone by leaders and members. In 1990, the local organization changed its name to San Antonio I Farmers' Cooperative (SAFCO).

The farmlots projects of SA I has a two-fold goal: to solve the problems of hunger and unemployment of sugarcane workers (which is the immediate objective) and to encourage and develop self-reliance and self-determination in the community (which is the long-term objective).

The cooperative farmlots cover a total of 58 hectares out of 84 hectares foreclosed in 1987. As of March 1993 the cooperative had 54 members representing almost the same number of households.

The land transfer program involved in the SA I project falls under CARP. When the hacienda was foreclosed it was placed under the VOS arrangement. Despite the compliance with all legal requirements for land transfer, the progress of SA I application was slow due to bureaucratic red tape in the government agencies concerned. However, NFSW was on its way to negotiations with PNB for land transfer.¹¹

Thus, the achievements of the workers and their organization can be attributed mainly to the self-reliant efforts of SAFCO as well as the conscientious organizing efforts of NFSW.

6-1-5. Accomplishment of CARP in Negros Occidental

The accomplishments of the CARP in Negros Occidental as of the end of 1990 are summarized in Table 11. About 90 percent of the rice and corn lands have been covered by the reform program, understandably because they have been targetted since the implementation of PD 27. This is followed by 52.6 percent of the lands foreclosed by the GFIs. For the private lands, only 24.3 percent were voluntarily offered for sale. Moreover, for the private lands over 50 hectares which were originally the target of the reform program, the accomplishment posted is a minimal 9.7 percent.

¹⁰For the case of San Antonio I, see, Sister Piramide, OSB, 1991.

¹¹NFSW also played an important role to lower the price of land from P 11,002.00 per hectares to P 5,000.00 per hectare; see, *ibid.* p. 3.

Table 11
Lands Covered and Accomplished by CARP in Negros Occidental
(As of the end of 1990)

	Land Covered (A)	(has) (%)	Accomplishment (B)	(%)	B/A
(Phase I)	66,723.0	17.8	31,009.2	74.7	46.5
Palay & Corn	18,092.8	4.8	16,279.5	39.2	90.0
Voluntary Offer for Sale (VOS)	28,642.5	7.7	6,656.7	16.0	24.3
Foreclosed by Government Financial Institutions (GFI)	14,719.4	4.0	7,773.0	18.7	52.6
Idle and Abandoned	108.1	0.0	-	-	-
Sequestered by PCGG	1,336.1	0.4	-	-	-
Government Land	3,752.1	1.0	-	-	-
(Phase II)	125,660.4	33.6	10,504.2	25.3	8.4
CA, Private Land (over 50 has.)	108,104.3	28.9	10,478.2	25.2	9.7
Resettlements	17,556.1	4.7	26.0	0.1	0.1
(Phase III)	182,015.6	48.6	-	-	-
CA, Private Land 24.01~50.00 has.	65,371.6	17.5	-	-	-
Private land 50.01~24.00 has.	116,644.0	31.2	-	-	-
TOTAL	374,399.0	100.0	41,513.4	100.0	11.1

Source: Institute for Social Research and Development (ISRAD), University of St. La Salle. "Fast-tracking CARP in Negros Occidental: A Situational Analysis and Process Documentation Report," 1991 (Unpublished).

6-2. CARP in Quezon Province

6-2-1. Analysis of Poverty in Bondoc Peninsula

As regards the tenure of the coconut lands, the lands owned comprised a 73.9 percent share of the national figure (Table 7), but it stood at 47.0 percent in Quezon (Table 12). On the other land, lands rented or leased had a 24.9 percent share for the country and 52.7 percent for Quezon. The farm size of the coconuts lands is relatively small with those less than five hectares comprising 46.5 percent, reflective of the national average. However, 0.8 percent of landholders share 8.2 percent of the lands measuring 25.0 hectares and over (Table 6).

Bondoc Peninsula¹², located in the southern part of Quezon province, has quite a different tenure system from the entire province of Quezon. Poverty stalks

¹²Bondoc Peninsula has a total land area of 222,254 hectares and a total population of 331,362 (1990). Around 132,000 hectares (60 percent) of the peninsula's land area are classified as agricultural lands. Population density is estimated at 1.5 person to a hectare of the total land area or 2.5 persons to a hectare of the total agricultural land.

Table 12
Tenure of Farms (Coconut)
(1980)

PROVINCE	TOTAL	Fully	OWNED		RENTED OR LEASE			OTHER FARMS	
			Ownerlike Possession	Sub-total	Shared Possession	Fixed Amt (Money/Product)	Sub-total	Rent-Free	Others Sub-total
(SOUTHERN TAGALOG)									
Quezon									
No. of Farmers	58,668	25,09	4,392	30,201	32,922	1,097	34,019	409	46
Physical Area (ha)	258,504 (100.0)	105,923	15,657	121,580 (47.0)	134,360	1,776	136,136 (52.7)	572	215
Average Farm Size (ha)	4.4			4.0			4.0		1.7
(BICOL)									
Albay									
No. of Farmers	21,583	12,042	3,280	15,322	7,457	360	7,817	1,208	125
Physical Area (ha)	81,565	39,133	12,392	51,525	27,704	816	28,520	1,437	423
Average Farm Size (ha)	3.8			3.4			3.5		1.4

Source: National Census and Statistics Office, "1980 Census of Agriculture."

across Bondoc¹³ because its economic base is virtually the domain of the few. As shown in Verona's study (1991, p.1), despite the implementation of CARP in June 1988, only 1.1 percent (608 households) of Bondoc's 331,362 population (55,227 households) control and own 44,333 hectares of transferrable lands under CARP. This land size is about 33.6 percent of Bondoc's total agricultural land of 132,000 hectares.

The concentration of land ownership in the hands of the few has caused massive landlessness and dislocation. Some 63.8 to 85.0 percent of Bondoc's entire household population remain landless. This problem of landlessness largely contributes to income inequity in the Peninsula such that Bondoc's great majority became easy prey of the landed minority. This is reflected in the pattern of the sharing system in the barangays called *kintusan* where the landlord gets 2/3 of the gross copra production value and the tenant gets only 1/3. The tenant under a *kintusan* sharing system shoulders the production cost as well.

Verona (1991) found out that the average household earned only an annual income of 4,500 to 5,500 pesos in 1991. This income level is roughly 375 to 458 pesos per month, which is almost 1.5 to 1.6 of the poverty line in the Region.

On top of the socioeconomic factors, the government had not paid attention to the development of the welfare of the people in the Bondoc Peninsula. With the support of the dissatisfied people in the Peninsula, the communist guerrilla forces increased their influence over the Bondoc people. Thus, twelve municipalities in the Peninsula are reportedly controlled by the New People's Army.

6-2-2. Bondoc Development Program

In May 1988, the Bondoc Development Program (BDP) was approved by the Regional Development Council (RDC) of Southern Tagalog Region with the support of the Federal Republic of Germany through the Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH.

The BDP was organized with the past experience of the Bondoc Peninsula Integrated Area Development (BPIAD) which started in 1982 under the Marcos administration. However the BPIAD failed because the Aquino government abol-

¹³"There are at least five constraints that hinder the economic program of the people of Bondoc in that area. These are: (a) low agricultural productivity; (b) poor infrastructure and marketing facilities; (c) low price of agricultural products; (d) limited knowledge of agricultural technologies; and (e) lack of nonfarm employment opportunities. To augment their farm income, several farmers also engaged in fishing. Aside from open-sea fishing, there are also a number of fishponds in Bondoc though most of them are owned by a few wealthy and influential families. The peninsula's fisherman, for their part, are now reeling from the results of over-exploitation of marine resources. Along the coasts, large areas of mangrove uplands lie devastated. Only blackened, burnt-out stumps of the mangrove trees remain. Fish catch has dwindled to seriously low levels and the fishermen now venture into the deeper waters far from the shore to be able to land a catch" (see, "Bondoc Development Program: Improving the Quality of Life Through People Power Empowerment", National Economic and Development Authority, 1992, p. 5.)

ished the integrated area development approach for rural development, and gave more emphasis to the decentralization policy.

To strengthen the institution-building phase of the project, EO 30 authorized the Bondoc Development Program Office in October 1992 as an ad hoc administrative agency under the Office of the President. As shown in Figure 1, the Quezon Provincial Government became the lead implementing agency for the program. The Project Governing Board, which is the highest policy-making body of the BDP, is composed of the Provincial Governor of the Quezon Province as the Chairman of the Board, with nine representatives of NGOs and POs, as well as nine of the Government Organizations (GOs) as members.

The BDP is part of the continuing attempt to alleviate the conditions of poverty which prevails in the Peninsula. Unlike other programs which sought to improve infrastructure and the delivery of basic services such as health, water system and education, the BDP aims to harness the potentials of the people in the area for self-reliant development.

Basically, its strategy is based on the strengthening of tripartite interaction between POs, NGOs and the government insofar as developing the Peninsula is concerned. Within the overall context of integrated area development, the program also seeks to foster critical awareness-building among the people, anchoring on two vital issues—agrarian reform, and peace and order.

Through community organizing processes, the BDP aims at the following conditions: people's participation in community activities and their empowerment; political pluralism; and structural change through non-violent action in a sound and stable natural environment.

To realize these conditions, the BDP has drawn up a two-phase multistage program spanning 15 years. The first is the Orientation Phase¹⁴ which began in July 1990 and is expected to end in June 1993. The Implementation Phase, which is divided into 3-4 year subphases, is tentatively set to end in the year 2005.

The Orientation Phase seeks to strengthen the self-help capacities of the target groups and the expected results are the following:

- (a) Strengthening of cooperation with and between government, NGOs and other institutions engaged in rural development on the national and regional level;
- (b) Provision of information, education and communication (IEC) support services;
- (c) Operationalization of the project organization;

¹⁴ For the details of the first phase activities of the BDP, see NEDA, *op. cit.*, 1992, p. 5.

Figure 1



(d) Updating and implementation of the community Development and Management System (CDMS);

(e) Supporting organizational development of the Quezon Partnership for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development in the Bondoc Peninsula;

(f) Supporting peace initiatives among all armed and unarmed groups in the Peninsula;

(g) Supporting women's programs and gender orientation as integrated into the BDP's activities; and

(h) Analyzing important local conditions and integrating the results into the short and long-term project development.

Out of the above mentioned eight activities, "agrarian reform and rural development" and the "peace initiative" are the two major tasks of the BDP. The participating NGOs and GOs for agrarian reform and rural development are the following: PHILDHERRA (a National level NGO), CCS and UGMA (local-level NGOs), and the DAR as GO.

6-2-3. Role of NGO for Self-Reliance

Case of San Isidro Plantation

As is true in most rural areas, passiveness among the people was prevalent in the Bondoc Peninsula. This is apparent in the feudalistic relationship between landowners and tenants.

However, this dependency on their social environment has been changing with the self-reliant efforts of the tenants greatly supported by the legal framework for reform. In effecting this change, the role of the NGOs has become significant. This is evident in the case the San Isidro Plantation¹⁵ in Barangay Tuhian, Catanauan, Quezon province, about 251 km southeast of Manila.

¹⁵The history of the land of San Isidro Plantation reveals the agrarian sentiments of the people. In 1913, before Mr. Simeon Perez came, the land was already cultivated. Unknown to the farmers he titled the land after his name. Since then, the farmers who originally cultivate the land became tenants. In 1972, the land came under the management of Armando Fajardo, grandson of Don Simeon Perez, who rejected the farmers as tenants and forced them to sign as indirect contractors. Those who disagreed were charged of squatting, theft, perjury and arson.

Complaints were subsequently filed by the ejected tenants. The court hearings stopped when the farmers could no longer financially afford to follow-up the case. With the case pending the land was contracted by Armando Fajardo to PHINMA (Philippine Investment Management Consultants) and then to Suarez Agro-Industrial Corporations in order to recover from his indebtedness to BPI. But he was not able to do so; much worse BPI foreclosed San Isidro Plantation" (Labitigan, Lydia, 1990., pp. 3-4).

For further details of the history, see, KATUPARAN, Kasaysayan ng Mga Magbubukid ng San Isidro Plantation (Brgy. Tuhian at San Isidro, Catanauan, Quezon), 1989.


After the CARP law was passed, the Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI), owner of the foreclosed 1,200-hectare San Isidro Plantation voluntarily offered it to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for land redistribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

In the bid to undertake the redistribution of the land, tremendous efforts were exerted by the farmers to counteract the constraints in the implementation of the VOS. Their activities consisted of (a) organizing and joining KATUPARAN (Kapatiran ng Mga Mangbubukid para sa Repormang Agraryo sa Catanauan), a people's organization established in 1989 as a farmer's cooperative in Tuhian with members numbering 520 families out of 567 beneficiaries, and (b) attending meetings conducted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) and other DAR officials. Furthermore, KATUPARAN conducts seminars and meetings to educate people on issues in the implementation of VOS and other related matters and exerts pressure by conducting mass unified action such as petitions, pickets and a series of dialogues with the DAR.

To enhance farmer-beneficiary unity and cooperation, UGMA (Ugnayan ng Magsasaka), the provincial alliance of coconut farmers in Quezon, actively worked for the proper and effective implementation of VOS with the help of livelihood projects and cooperative development by the Organizing for Rural Development-Center for Rural Community Services (ORD-CCS, an NGO in Quezon) and other NGOs (Figure 2).

The CCS is a social development institution providing an integrated program of services to the poor in the Philippines. Instituted separately as four offices in

Figure 2
The NGOs and the POs to Support KATUBARAN



Source: Center for Rural Community Service

1975, the Center was established in August 1978 to coordinate efforts in the implementation of various programs for industrial workers, peasants, women, students and youth. CCS assists these sectors in building genuine, self-reliant people's organizations.

Among the programs through which CCS aimed to assist the people's organization, the Education and Organizing Program plays a vital role in providing the poor sector with the necessary tools of analysis, leading to deeper awareness of their problems and of their inherent capability for change.

On the other hand, the Cooperative Development Program is aimed to facilitate economic self-sufficiency among people's organizations by setting up various community-based income generating projects that are cooperative in nature and appropriate to the resources of a developing community.

The Center has, as mentioned above, two main thrusts: Education and Organization. Out of four main units of CCS, the Organizing for Rural Development (ORD) facilitates the building of genuine peasant and fisherfolk organizations in Quezon province toward attainment of genuine agrarian reform and rural progress. As of February 1991, ORD has helped to consolidate its membership in 48 villages in 10 towns in Quezon.

6-2-4. Accomplishments of CARP in the Quezon Province

As indicated in Table 13, the accomplishment of the CARP in Quezon Province II is 17.6 percent on average as of the end of August 1992. About 90 percent of the rice and corn lands have been transferred. The VOS scheme covered 2915.2 hectares or 30.7 percent of the target. Furthermore, land transfer (Issuance of CLOA) of the private lands over 50 hectares reached 66.7 percent.

As explained by the operation officer of the DAR Quezon II, despite receiving a lot of criticisms, VOS is successful in the province with the cooperation of the government organizations (DAR and others), people's organizations (farmers' cooperatives) and non-government organizations.

7. CONCLUSION

The salient features of the land reform policy in the Philippines can be summarized as follows:

Firstly, the past land reform programs in the Philippines had been politically-motivated. Although the government started with the strong will to achieve then, it gradually backed down when faced with the strong resistance by the landholders. This was quite evident in the case of PD 27 by the Marcos administration, wherein the land reform program was tainted with political motives.

Table 13
Lands Covered and Accomplished by CARP
in Quezon Province II

(As of August 1992)

	Land Covered (has)		Accomplishment (Has)		B/A
	(A)	(%)	(B)	(%)	
(Phase I)	13,201.4	25.4	5,675.0	62.1	43.0
Palay & Corn	1,309.9	2.5	1,178.6	12.9	90.0
VOS	9,510.5	18.3	2,915.2	31.9	30.7
VLT	228.0	0.4	152.4	1.7	66.8
Idle and Abandoned	3.0	0.0			
ED 407/498	2,150.0	4.1	1,428.8	15.6	66.5
(Phase II)	13,184.4	25.4	3,464.0	37.9	26.3
Private Land					
(over 50 Has.)	2,104.9	4.0	1,404.1	15.4	66.7
Resettlements	11,079.5	21.3	2,059.9	22.5	18.6
(Phase III)	25,611.2	49.3	-	-	-
Private Land					
24.01~50.00 has.	4,647.8	8.9	-	-	-
Private land					
50.01~24.00 has.	20,963.4	40.3	-	-	-
TOTAL	51,997.0	100.0	9,139.0	100.0	17.6

Note: DAR Quezon Province II is composed of Districts III (for Bondoc Peninsula) and IV of the Province
Source: Department of Agrarian Reform Quezon II, "Provincial Agrarian Reform Development Plan, 1993-98."

Secondly, the CARP under the Aquino administration is so ambitious as it covers all the agricultural lands within the time span of ten years. However, as it was anticipated, the progress of the land reform is at a snail's pace, except the government-owned lands wherein actual coverage has exceeded the target.

Thirdly, land transfer in rice and corn subsectors, first under PD 27 and later under CARL (RA 6657), reached a substantial percent of the target.

Fourthly, the Operation Leasehold (LHO) defined in the 1963 Land Reform Code, played a significant role to protect the tenancy right of the farmers by outlawing the sharecropping system in the country.

Lastly, looking at the land reform program in the Philippines from the viewpoint of rural development, CARP shows a positive development because it is expected to work as an effective weapon for the farmers who organized the POs to help fulfill their goals. However, their goals cannot be realized without developing the capability of the farmer-beneficiaries themselves as a PO which is appropriately encouraged

with help of the NGOs. The examples in the two provinces of Negros Occidental and Quezon showed that self-reliant efforts by the POs with help of the NGOs are essential for the success of land reform for rural development.

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Appendix 1

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 405

VESTING IN THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE THE LAND VALUATION AND COMPENSATION FOR ALL LANDS COVERED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988.

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 6657, Chapter VI, provides in part that:

“SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use of income, the sworn valuation of the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16, and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land.”

WHEREAS, the Land Bank of the Philippines employs commercial banking personnel whose professional expertise includes appraisal of agricultural properties for purposes of granting loans;

WHEREAS, the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, particularly on the matter of acquisition and distribution of private agricultural lands, may be accelerated by streamlining certain administration procedures in land valuation and compensation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SEC. 1. The Land Bank of the Philippines shall be primarily responsible for the determination of the land valuation and compensation for all private lands suitable for agriculture under either the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or Compulsory Acquisition (CA) arrangement as governed by Republic Act No. 6657. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall make use of the determination of the land valuation and compensation by the Land Bank of the Philippines, in the performance of functions.

After effecting the transfer of titles from the landowner to the Republic of the Philippines, the Land Bank of the Philippines shall inform the Department of Agrarian Reform of such fact in order that the latter may proceed with the distribution of the lands to the qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries within the time specified by law.

SEC. 2. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall continue to perform its functions under Republic Act No. 6657, particularly in the identification of the priority landholdings for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

SEC. 3. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby authorized to augment its manpower resources for the purpose of implementing this Executive Order.

SEC. 4. This Executive Order shall not be construed to diminish the rights and remedies of the landowners and reform beneficiaries under Republic Act No. 6657.

SEC. 5. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 14th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary

**MALACAÑANG
MANILA**

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 406

MANDATING CERTAIN DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES TO ALIGN THEIR RESPECTIVE PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM, DIRECTING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM TO ACCELERATE THE AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE PROVISION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT, AND PROVIDING THE NECESSARY IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS FOR THE PURPOSE.

WHEREAS, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is central to the government's efforts to hasten countryside agro-industrial development:

WHEREAS, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, apart from accelerating land acquisition and distribution, equally mandates the beneficiaries development through the provision of physical, technical, social and economic support services:

WHEREAS, while the main responsibility for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program lies with the Department of Agrarian Reform, certain departments and agencies are expected to be equally involved and committed to the success of the said Program;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippine, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. The Department of Agriculture, Environment and Natural Resources, Public Works and Highways, Transportation and Communication, National Defense, Justice, Budget, and Management, and Trade and Industry, and Land Bank of the Philippines and Land Registration Authority are hereby mandated to review, evaluate and align their respective programs and projects with the end in view of integrating them into the major thrusts of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

SEC. 2. There shall be an inter-agency CARP Implementing Team (Team) composed of the representatives of the aforementioned agencies and chaired by Department of Agrarian Reform representative at the national, regional, provincial and municipal levels, which shall have the following functions:

- a. Undertake measures to promote, integrate and harmonize the working relationship between and among the participating government agencies,

- nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and the agrarian reform beneficiaries themselves;
- b. Undertake measures to hasten the generation, development and execution of CARP programs and projects;
 - c. Undertake measures to consolidate and maximize the utilization of available resources of government for the program;
 - d. Recommend measures to improve, increase and accelerate the delivery capacity of agencies for the implementation of CARP program and projects;
 - e. Submit a monthly accomplishment report to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

The Team shall convene a meeting of its members within one (1) week from the effectivity of this Executive Order and every month thereafter.

At the provincial level, the Team shall serve as the implementing arm of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM).

SEC. 3. All the aforementioned agencies shall immediately issue the implementing guidelines to all their regional, provincial, municipal and barangay officials, if any, to insure program integration and accelerate the service delivery capacity of these field implementing units.

SEC. 4. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall adopt a strategic and area-focused operations approach to accelerate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program implementation. It shall concentrate its land distribution and beneficiaries development activities in 24 identified Strategic Operation Provinces (SOPs) which account for 70 percent of the land distribution workload, i.e., Pangasinan, Kalinga Apayao, Ifugao, Isabela, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Batangas, Quezon, Mindoro Occidental, Sorsogon, Camarines Sur, Antique, Negros Occidental, Bohol, Negros Oriental, Leyte, Western Samar, Zamboanga del Sur, Bukidnon, Agusan del Sur, Lanao del Norte, South Cotabato, North Cotabato and Maguindanao, without prejudice to the implementation in the remaining provinces of the country.

SEC. 5. The Department of Agrarian Reform shall implement viable agrarian reform areas development pilot projects in the 24 SOPs particularly in the low income municipalities (LIMs) identified under the Pro-Poor Program of the government and in the aforesaid Department settlement areas. In subsequent years, replication of successful pilot projects may be undertaken in other provinces and low income municipalities. To support these pilot projects, the Bureau of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development (BARBD) of the Department of Agrarian Reform shall intensify its beneficiaries training and social infrastructure building activities particularly in the areas of organizing, value formation, cooperatives development, capability building, enterprise development, social preparation and the like.

Project preparation activities for these areas shall be accelerated and shall be supported by the Project Facilities Committee under the Office of the President.

Fifteen (15) percent of the CARP 1990 budget (P1.3 billion out of the P8.9 billion) and in the succeeding years CARP budget as approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) shall be allocated, released to and administered by Department of Agrarian Reform for the promotion, development and organization of agrarian reform beneficiaries associations and cooperatives and the implementation of the agrarian reform areas development pilot projects. The same shall be taken out of the budget allocation of CARP agencies for extension infrastructure, research and development, database and other support services which will likewise be part of the essential components of the specific development projects.

To facilitate the implementation of development activities in the identified agrarian reform pilot projects, the Department of Agrarian Reform may call on the other Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program implementing owned or controlled corporations and local government units to assist in the implementation of these projects to private organizations, private contractors, non-government organizations and the like to facilitate implementation.

SEC. 6. Heads of all other Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program implementing agencies, and government financial institutions, government owned or controlled corporations, governors, mayors, barangays chairmen and other officials of local government units in the 24 SOPs shall provide support to the implementation of the agrarian reform development pilot projects in the respective areas.

SEC. 7. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila this 14th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary

**MALACAÑANG
MANILA**

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 407

**ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL
LANDS. PASTURE LANDS, FISHPONDS, AGRO FORESTRY LANDS AND
OTHER LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SUITABLE FOR AGRICULTURE**

WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 131, S. of 1987, has instituted the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program to develop the full potential of Philippine agriculture that will result in increased productivity and better income for agrarian reform beneficiaries, and Executive Order No. 229, S. of 1987, has provided for the mechanisms for the implementation thereof;

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 6657 has declared it a policy of the State to pursue the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in order that the welfare of landless farmers and farmworkers will receive highest consideration and that the nation can move towards sound rural development and industrialization;

WHEREAS, Section 7 of Republic Act 6657 mandates, among others, that all lands foreclosed by government financial institutions, all lands acquired by the Presidential Commission on Good Government, and all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of the said Act and with implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years therefrom;

WHEREAS, the government has in its inventory lands suitably for agriculture which may be immediately placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as the titles thereof have been foreclosed and the prescriptive redemption periods have already lapsed;

WHEREAS, the Department of Agriculture, and Environment and Natural Resources are authorized by law to act on the disposition of leases covering lands of the public domain, agreements and fishpond lease agreements;

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 360, S. of 1989, enjoys all government financial institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations to grant the Department of Agrarian Reform the right of first refusal in the sale or disposition of all lands owned by them which are suitable for agriculture:

WHEREAS, the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program particularly its land acquisition and distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries must be accelerated so that its fruits could be enjoyed by its beneficiaries at the soonest possible time;

NOW, THEREFORE, I CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. All Government instrumentalities including but not limited to government agencies, government owned and controlled corporations or financial institutions such as the Development Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National Bank, Republic Planters Bank Asset Privatization Trust, Presidential Commission on Good Government, Department of Agriculture, State Colleges and Universities, Department of National Defense, shall immediately execute Deeds of Transfer in favor of the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform and surrender to the latter department all landholdings suitable for agriculture including all pertinent ownership documents in their custody, such as the owner's duplicate copy of the certificates of title, tax declarations and other documents necessary to effect the transfer of ownership. This Executive Order shall likewise apply to ownership of the following assets, as determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform in close coordination with the concerned government agency:

- a. Improvements, e.g., irrigation systems, roads and bridges;
- b. Agriculture processing machineries, e.g., post harvest facilities;
- c. Buildings and other physical structures, warehouses, administration buildings employees housing facilities;
- d. Others, such as trucks and tractors, tools and agriculture supplies.

In the case of lands suitable to agriculture with pending adjudication on their ownership in court, the respective government instrumentalities shall, when legally feasible, immediately transfer and cede the physical possessions and control of the same to the Department of Agrarian Reform for its subsequent transfer to the qualified beneficiaries.

Pending valuation of the property, the Department of Agrarian Reform shall immediately commence the necessary activities for distribution to qualified beneficiaries upon receipt of the documents aforementioned, or issue the notice of allocation to qualified beneficiaries to give them usufructuary control over the land in the event ownership can not yet be transferred to them.

Thirty (30) days from the registration of the ownership documents by the Register of Deeds in favor of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Land Bank of the Philippine, pursuant to the rules approved by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, shall pay the government instrumentality the value of the land. In the case of the lands under the Asset Privatization Trust, Presidential Commission on Good Government and other government instrumentalities which may opt for an alternative payment scheme, the Department of Agrarian Reform shall cause the issuance of the Credit Memo Advise from the Bureau of Treasury for such sale.

Thirty (30) days after effectivity of this Executive Order, the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management in consultation with the

Department of Agrarian Reform shall establish guidelines for the issuance of the Credit Memo Advise System. This System shall be applicable as a payment scheme to government instrumentalities which are mandated to turn over the proceeds from the sale of their agricultural lands to the Agrarian Reform Fund pursuant to Section 63 of Republic Act No. 6657.

Sixty (60) days after the effectivity of this Executive Order, the Land Registration Authority shall submit to the Department of Agrarian Reform certified copies of all the certificates of titles under the name of the government instrumentalities and the approved survey plans including the respective technical descriptions of each title.

SEC. 2. The Departments of Agriculture, and Environment and Natural Resources are hereby authorized and directed to cancel all lease agreements covering fishponds, pasture, agro-forestry lands and the other lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture which have remained undeveloped within three (3) years from the date of the effectivity of the lease contract and underutilized or abandoned or in cases where the terms and conditions embodied therein have been violated, taking into consideration the requirements of due process.

SEC. 3. The Departments of Agriculture and Environment and Natural Resources, in coordination with the Department of Agrarian Reform, shall redistribute and award fishponds, pasture lands and other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture subject of cancelled or amended lease agreement to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Sections 15 and 22 of Republic Act No. 6657.

SEC. 4. All concerned agencies shall issue the necessary directives and guidelines to all their national, regional, provincial and municipal officials to ensure the implementation of this Executive Order.

SEC. 5. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila this 14th day of June, in the Year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety.

(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines

By the President:
(Sgd.) CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.
Executive Secretary

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 448

AMENDING EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 407, SERIES OF 1990, ENTITLED "ACCELERATING THE ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS, PASTURE LANDS, FISHPONDS, AGRO-FORESTRY LANDS AND OTHER LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SUITABLE FOR AGRICULTURE.

WHEREAS, Executive Order No. 407, series of 1990, directs, among others, all government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations to transfer ownership of all lands suitable for agriculture to the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program;

WHEREAS, to further accelerate the acquisition and distribution of all lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture, it is necessary to include within the coverage of Executive Order No. 407, Series of 1990, all government reservations or portions thereof which are suitable for agriculture and no longer needed for the purposes for which the reservations are established;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 407 is hereby amended by adding a new section to read as follows:

"SEC. 1-A All lands or portions thereof reserved by virtue of Presidential proclamations for specific public uses by government-owned or controlled corporations suitable for agriculture and no longer actually, directly and exclusively used or necessary for the purposes for which they have been reserved, as determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform in coordination with the government agency or instrumentality concerned in whose favor the reservations and transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program."

SEC. 2. All proclamation establishing such reservations and falling within coverage of this Executive Order are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly.

SEC. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 14th day of February 1991 in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninetyone.

CORAZON C. AQUINO
President

By the President:

OSCAR M. ORBOS
Executive Secretary

APPENDIX 2

TWENTY-FIVE STRATEGIC OPERATION PROVINCES

- | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 1. Pangasinan (Region 1) | 14. Negros Oriental (Region 7) |
| 2. Isabela (Region 2) | 15. Bohol (Region 7) |
| 3. Ifugao (Region 2) | 16. Leyte (Region 8) |
| 4. Kalinga-Apayao (Region 2) | 17. Western Samar (Region 8) |
| 5. Nueva-Ecija (Region 3) | 18. Zamboanga del Sur (Region 9) |
| 6. Pampanga (Region 3) | 19. Bukidnon (Region 10) |
| 7. Quezon (Region 4) | 20. Agusan del Sur (Region 10) |
| 8. Mindoro Occidental (Region 4) | 21. Davao del Norte (Region 11) |
| 9. Batangas (Region 4) | 22. South Cotabato (Region 11) |
| 10. Camarines Sur (Region 5) | 23. North Cotabato (Region 12) |
| 11. Sorsogon (Region 5) | 24. Maguindanao (Region 12) |
| 12. Antique (Region 6) | 25. Lanao del Norte (Region 12) |
| 13. Negros Occidental (Region 6) | |