

Japan and Malaysian Economy; An Analysis of the Relations Started with Reparations after the End of World War II

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1. Objectives of this Study

In the last decade, the Japanese Government has been the largest contributor of official loans to Malaysia. These loans, i.e. Yen Credit, started with the conclusion of the so called goodwill agreement in September 1967. Since then until the end of 1991, 545 billion Japanese Yen¹ (under the present exchange rate, 11 billion Malaysian Ringgit) has been supplied to Malaysia. As these Japanese official loans have had a tremendous effect on the Malaysian economy, various review of the loans, either positive or negative, have been made by Malaysian and Japanese economists. However, how official economic relations between the two countries resumed after the end of the Second World War, has seldom been studied.

The Japanese Government's grant prescribed in the goodwill agreement was virtually regarded as the reparation for the damages caused by the Japanese occupation of Malaya. While this grant was called the 'Goodwill Grant' or 'Blood Debt' unofficially in Malaysia, it was, and still is called 'Quasi-Reparation' officially in Japan. In case of other Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar (Burma), their economic relations with Japan after the end of the war started with the payment of reparations which commenced in the mid 1950s, and therefore various analyses were made on this matter. As for Malaysia, 'Blood Debt' as a virtual reparation was considered to indicate the beginning of official economic relations with Japan. 'Blood Debt' issues emerged in 1962 when hundreds of remains massacred by the Japanese soldiers were exhumed at a construction site in Singapore. A huge number of Malayan (including Singaporean) people (The Federation of Malaya, Singapore, British North Borneo and Sarawak merged to form Malaysia in 1963), especially Malayan Chinese people demanded that the Japanese Government compensate the massacred, whose total number all over Malaya was claimed to be more than one hundred thousand, by settling the 'Blood Debt'. This firm and enthusiastic movement by Malayan people resulted in the 'Goodwill Agreement' in 1967. The Singapore Government concluded a similar type of 'Goodwill Agreement'

with Japan in September 1967, too. The 'Goodwill Grant' or 'Blood Debt' for both countries was 25 million Malaysian Ringgit and 25 million Singapore Dollars respectively (both equally corresponded to 3 billion Japanese Yen).

Many articles or works have referred to this 'Blood Debt'. If the 'Blood Debt' were truly the first involvement of the Japanese Government into Malaysian economies, we might think that we have enough analyses of the commencement of governmental economic relations between the two countries. But in actual fact, reparation issues arose immediately after the end of the war. After several years of protracted discussion, the problem was finally strangled when the British Government, the then ruler of colonial Malaya, officially relinquished claims for reparations from Japan in the San Francisco Peace Treaty that was concluded in San Francisco, The United States, in September, 1951 by the Allied Powers and Japan. While forbidding reparation payments, the Treaty gave the Allied Powers the right to retain Japanese property in territories for which they were now responsible. Thus, all former Japanese properties that had been confiscated by the British authorities in Malaya were utilized for the economic reconstruction of Malaya. To fully understand the reparation problems of Malaya, this process, which has so far been ignored, if not forgotten, by economists as well as by historians, has to be scrutinized. This is one of the objectives of this article.

Reparations paid to other Southeast Asian countries were as follows:

	(million US Dollars)
The Philippines	550
Indonesia	400
Myanmar	200
South Vietnam	39
Thailand (quasi reparation)	41.7

Quasi reparations paid to Malaysia and Singapore each were equivalent to US\$8.3 million. These were far less than those paid to five other countries shown above. Even much less than to Thailand that was, officially, not under Japanese rule. Furthermore, payments to Malaysia and Singapore were not official reparations. Because of this, criticism that the Japanese Government has never paid reparations to Malaysia and Singapore is still sometimes made. This is particularly true when Japanese militarism is mentioned in Malaysia or Singapore. No matter how appropriate this criticism may be, this situation, if left as it is, could affect future relations between Malaysia and Japan (and also between Singapore and Japan. But there is no room to refer to Singapore further in this study). Before deciding whether to accept or reject this criticism, real and objective features, in other words, historical facts, should be reviewed. This is another objective of this article.

2. Material Reparations in the Early Post-War Period

The main point relating to reparation is the War Damage Claims managed by the British Colonial Governments. But before looking at this in detail, it might be necessary to refer to the machines and warships which the British Government received from Japan as reparations by way of its share as one of the four major Allied Powers.

2.1 Factory Plant, Machinery and Industrial Equipment

In May 1947, the British Empire reparation team including a Malayan representative (A British engineer of the Electricity Department of Malaya) visited Japan to assess factory plant, machinery and industrial equipment for reparations. They carried with them the list that had been made from information given to the Malayan Union Government (The Malayan Union had been formed on the 1st April, 1946) by government departments as well as by industries and commercial firms, which had stated their requirements for rehabilitation purposes². In Japan, they negotiated with the Allied authorities for the allotment of material reparations among the eleven Allied countries. In July 1947, the Allied Headquarters announced that plants and equipment exceeding Japan's peace-time needs would be removed from Japan as reparations. Out of the total allocations, China was to get 15 per cent, and the other four Asiatic nations, the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and Malaya (inclusive of Singapore), 5 per cent each³. Shares allocated to Malaya were transported from Japan to Singapore between April 1948 and the end of 1949 by seven shipments⁴.

Meanwhile in May 1949, the United States, the virtual ultimate commander of the Allied Powers at that time, ordered an end to the preliminary transfer of machine tools in order to restore the Japanese economy⁵. Accordingly, the actual shipment may have been less than the original allocation. Two days after the order, the Economic Department of the Federation of Malaya (Federation of Malaya had taken the place of the Malayan Union on the 1st February, 1948) announced that while the Federation had asked for 809 machine tools, it had now received 416, and that all the machine tools such as generating plant, laboratory equipment and traveling cranes came from arsenals in Japan⁶. The largest shipment with a tonnage of 530 arrived in August 1949. The last one's weight was more than 300 tons, others being averaged 150 to 200 tons⁷. The bulk of these machine tools were bought by government agencies like the Singapore Harbour Board and the rest were sold to private firms by public auction⁸. Chinese factory, or factories also bought a part of them⁹.

Nonetheless, the money received from sale of machine tools that Malaya received from Japan as reparations was "like a drop in the ocean compared with the astronomical amount of reparations claimed by Singapore for damage during the occupation"¹⁰. The Situation was similar in Malaya. No matter how negligible

the amount might be, it was the British authorities that received it and used it for their colonial management. To what extent the money benefited those Malayan people who suffered most during the occupation is questionable.

2.2 Warships

At several draws from June, 1947 until late 1948, Britain, the United States, China and Soviet allotted 92 former Japanese warships, total tonnage of which was 100,000, among themselves as reparations. Each state was allotted an equal number of the fleet. All the units allotted to Britain, with the exception of two ships, were scrapped in Singapore. 20,000 tons of scrap iron from 15 ships which had been broken at the Singapore Naval Base by mid 1949 were shipped to Britain. Such material as cabin fittings, pumps and generators that had been taken out of the ships were sold in Singapore. Two exceptions were: one minelayer that was handed over to the Malayan Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve as its headquarters ship, and one 7,500 ton troopship that was towed to Britain as it was too big to be broken up in Singapore¹¹.

Since the ships were allotted to the United Kingdom, it is unlikely that the revenue generated from these proceedings were either in the Singapore budget or in the Malayan one. In July 1947, the National Shipping Congress of Malaya claimed 53,000 tonnage of ships as reparations¹². However, this claim was disregarded by the British authorities.

3. War Damage Claims

The British authorities of the Malayan Union and Singapore jointly set up the War Damage Claims Commission in late 1946 "to compile information as to all losses which might be included in Reparation Claims against the Japanese"¹³.

From early 1947 till November, 1950, the public in Malaya (inclusive of Singapore) were invited to submit claims in respect of such loss or damage as they suffered during the battle of Malaya and subsequent Occupation¹⁴.

Almost at the same time, after their re-establishment in early 1946, Chinese Consulate General in Singapore and Consulate in Kuala Lumpur appealed Malayan Chinese to register losses and damages suffered by them during the occupation¹⁵. The latter which had socio-economically much less important implications is to be examined briefly.

3.1 Registration of losses at the Chinese Consulates

As the Chinese Government at that time considered all the overseas Chinese as her nationals, her representatives abroad were charged with a mission to protect them and their interests. The Overseas Chinese, in turn, took it for granted that

the Chinese Embassy or the Consulate in residing countries protected them. Under these circumstances, human losses as well as material damages suffered by the Chinese populace in Malaya under Japanese rule were registered both at the Consulate General in Singapore and at the Consulate in Kuala Lumpur until May 1947. After completion of the registration, the Consulate General in Singapore announced on August 19, 1947 the follows:

In such areas under our direct jurisdiction as Singapore, Johor, Malacca, Trengganu, Kelantan and Sarawak, we received 2,512 copies of human loss forms and 7,315 copies of material damage forms. While the total number of casualties registered was 4,522 persons, total amount of damage on properties was 29,002,861.55 US Dollars (61.7 million Malayan Dollars...Hara). All of these forms would be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of China) and be open to the public¹⁶.

These figures were to be included in the Chinese Nationalist Government's reparation claims against Japan. However, in the course of internal and international political development, the Chinese Government dismissed the claims after all. So the claims registered in Malaya were forgotten.

3.2 War Damage Claims Commission, War Damage Commission and War Damage Compensation Scheme

When the British colonial authorities announced the formation of a department in charge of reparations (which was called reparations committee in the announcement) in early 1946, the subject of claims included (1) direct physical damage by enemy action and Allied action, (2) Industry and Commerce claims such as structures and equipment, finished goods, plantations and mines, and (3) cost of occupation including all *forced payments* and extensions of credit to Japanese military forces as well as the use of *any services not paid for* by the Japanese, e.g. *railways* (italicizing by Hara)¹⁷.

The committee, officially called the War Damage Claims Commission (WDCC), was formed in 1946. When the preliminary collection of claims was completed in September, 1947, the Governments in Malaya (ie. MU and Singapore) submitted jointly to the British Government the outlines of a Scheme for settlement of War Damage claims. Assessing the claims, which had accumulated to the "astronomical" (editorial of The Straits Times, April 8, 1948) total of 1,268 million Malayan Dollars, and the financial circumstances both of the British and the two Malayan Governments, the British Government in a public statement in April, 1948, stated that the expenditure for claims must be restricted to the sum necessary to meet essential needs on an austerity basis. Accordingly, the total expenditure was fixed at \$475 million (approximately £55 million)¹⁸.

In compliance with this statement, the Malayan War Damage Compensation Scheme was tabled in the Federal Legislative Council of Malaya (FLC) and the Singapore Legislative Council (SLC) respectively in September, 1948. Under the scheme, the War Damage Fund (WDF) of \$475 million was to be established. The fund was made up as follows: (unit; \$ million)

(1) Free gift from the British Government	85.7
(2) Drawing from <i>Japanese reparations</i>	85.7
(3) War Risks (Goods) Insurance Fund*(approximately)	12.0
(4) Assets in the hands of Malayan Custodians of Enemy Property+	52.0
(5) From the Malayan Governments	239.6
Total	475.0

*Fund derived from the War Risks (Goods) Insurance Scheme which had been introduced in Malaya in 1941 following the strong representations from the British business community in Malaya. The scheme implemented compulsory insurance of commodities against war risks. At the end of March, 1948, the total amount of claims under the scheme was \$196 million. Other war claims amounted to \$1,288 million.

+Assets here were not enemy property but assets whose ownership — beyond the fact of its being Malayan property — were not identifiable. A Custodian of Enemy Property was first appointed in 1939 to administer enemy owned properties.

If the Malayan Governments were unable to meet the liability, it was assumed to be met by interest free loans not exceeding \$300 million from Britain.

If the Japanese reparations fell short of \$85.7 million (£10 m.), further discussions with the British Government were supposed to take place¹⁹.

On the other hand, the allocation of expenditure was as below: (\$ million)

(1) Rubber Planting	85.0
(2) Tin Mining	85.0
(3) Private Chattels	50.0
(4) Other Businesses	155.0
(5) War Risks (Goods) Insurance Scheme	100.0
Total	475.0

The guiding principle was that the restoration of property and production for the good of Malaya in general must come before the personal interests of property owners²⁰.

This Scheme was not welcomed in Malaya mainly because the contribution from Britain as well as the reparations from Japan were regarded as too small. Even the President of the Association of British Malaya in London insisted on a greater contribution from Britain, pointing out that colonial Malaya contributed more than £17 million (\$149 million) to the British Government for its war effort immediately before the Pacific War²¹. In the Federal Council, not only Dato Onn

bin Ja'afar but also two of the British members, pointing out the enormous amount of revenue derived from Malaya in trade and wartime gifts, scathingly criticized Britain's £10 million "gift"²². In the SLC, unofficial members including C.C. Tan and Sardon bin Jubir contended that too heavy burden was levied on Malayan taxpayers²³. *Utusan Melayu*, Singapore's only Malay newspaper at that time, also protested at the payment of taxpayers' money where there was no legal liability made²⁴.

With regard to the Japanese reparations, the same paper insisted that Japan should be made to pay several times the £10 million war damage claims set against her²⁵. The Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce, too, stressed that the war damage compensation should be exclusively borne by the defeated country or the protector country²⁶. The Leaders of the Associated Malayan Chinese Chambers of Commerce (AMCCC), including Lee Kong Chian, as well as the influential leftist Chinese newspaper, *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* demanded an extensive increase in Japanese reparations²⁷.

Facing criticism not only from Malayan people but also from the British business community in Malaya, the British Government could not help amending the proposal. As such, after announcing the doubling of the "gift" in May, 1949²⁸, the British authorities published the new war damage compensation scheme in July, 1949. Its financial resources were as below: (\$ million)

(1) Free gift from the British Government		171.4
(2) <i>Japanese reparations</i>		60.0
(3) Non enemy assets in hands of Custodian	81.0	
less belonging to War Risks Fund	-11.6	69.4
(4) Interest free loan from the British Government*		153.6
Total		454.4

*Original figure announced in May was 162.0 m

Though some quarters still criticized the Malayan people's very heavy burden³⁰, this new scheme was, except for minor amendment in the SLC, approved in both Legislative Councils³¹, mainly because "the delay (of compensation payment Hara) had been almost vexatious as the original damage"³². Even the AMCCC decided to accept the new scheme in late June, 1949³³. On the 1st January, 1950, the scheme began to be implemented by the newly established statutory body, the War Damage Commission (WDC), which replaced the WDCC. Of the original twelve Commissioners, three were Malaysians, namely Dato Hamzah bin Abudullah, Colonel H.S. Lee and Lee Kong Chian³⁴.

It seems strange that while both Malaysians and the British community in Malaya had unanimously demanded an increase in the Japanese reparation, it was not increased at all. On the contrary, it was reduced from the original \$85.7 million to

\$60 million. Furthermore, in the event no reparations were provided for Malaya in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Instead, the War Damage Fund received the proceeds of Japanese property in Malaya up to the amount of \$60 million. The rationale for this process will be examined in detail later.

As at the end of 1952, the WDF was made up of the following items³⁵:(\$ million)

(1) Free gift from the British Government	171.4
(2) <i>Japanese property in Malaya</i>	60.0
(3) Non-enemy assets in Custodians' hands	73.3
less payment to the War Risks Fund.	-19.4
(4) Interest free loan	149.7
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 435.0

When the Custodian of Enemy Property wound up its activities and the WDC completed its task by the end of 1958, that is, when the War Damage Compensation Scheme was concluded, the total amount realized by disposal of Japanese assets in Malaya (exclusive of Singapore) was \$49 million. Of this amount, \$46.2 million was paid to the WDF, and \$1.8 million was paid to the High Commissioner of the Western Pacific Territories³⁶.

Meanwhile, of the total of \$23 millions of Japanese assets in Singapore some \$21 millions had been transferred to the Malayan WDF by the end of 1954³⁷. Out of the balance, \$0.7 million was supposed to be paid to the Western Pacific.

Thus, the total amount realized from Japanese assets all over Malaya and that utilized for the WDF were considered to be \$72 million and \$67.2 million respectively.

Another important financial resource of the WDCF was non-enemy assets in Custodians' hands. By the end of 1958, sales of these assets, that is ownerless property looted by the Japanese, accounted for \$70.5 million³⁸.

The final allocation of the compensation is not available. The total amount paid to claimants by the end of 1952 was as follows³⁹: (\$ million)

(1) Tin	56.6
(2) Rubber	41.1
(3) Seizure*	36.5
(4) Private Chattels	19.6
(5) Other Claims	38.8
(6) WRIF	19.4
<hr/> Total	<hr/> 212.0

*Compensation for goods which were insured under the WR(G) Insurance Scheme and seized by Japanese Military Administration.

With regard to Sabah and Sarawak, limited information only is available. In the middle of 1947, British colonial authorities decided that a special committee would deal with the war damage compensation for Sarawak, North Borneo (Sabah) and Brunei⁴⁰. On May 14, 1948, the editorial of *The Straits Times* stated that if the reparation claims were made in accordance with the war damages suffered by each territory, North Borneo would have a very much larger claim than Malaya. In May, 1949, it was announced that the war damage claims of these three territories amounted to \$67.25 million. As the fund for compensation, free gifts and interest free loans from the British Government were assumed to be \$7 million and \$10 million respectively⁴¹. The amount of reparation claims to Japan assumed here is not known. In conjunction with the conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Japan in September, 1951, though the British Government agreed that the greater portion of Japanese assets in Borneo should be utilized for the benefit of Borneo, some portion was transferred to the Western Pacific. This was criticized by the North Borneo Government⁴². In this connection, in 1937, agricultural holds in Sabah and Sarawak had been leased to 4 Japanese companies (45,273 acres) and 48 Japanese private farmers (3,734 acres)⁴³. The final result of the disposal of these Japanese assets in Sabah and Sarawak is unknown, too.

The Japanese Military Administration (JMA) forced the Chinese people in these three territories, as in Malaya, to "contribute" \$3 million. But nothing is known about the refund claim movement of the post war days.

Now two vital problems remain to be scrutinized. First, why were the reparation claims to Japan reduced and finally abandoned? How did the Malayan people respond to this process? What were the Japanese assets in Malaya?

Second, what did the allocation of the War Damage Compensation Scheme mean for Malayan people?

4. Locus of Reparation Claims

4.1 The British Government's Disposition of Reparation Claims and the United States

As mentioned earlier, when the British Government started to compile information on war losses in 1946, it stated that the reparation duly calculated from the information might be claimed against Japan. On August 22 of the same year, *The Straits Times* stated that compensation for the hundreds of miles of track taken by the Japanese from the East Coast Railway, in the Malay Peninsula (to construct the Thai-Burma railway), would be paid out of reparations.

In early December, 1946, the Financial Secretary, Nelson Jones, announced at the Singapore Advisory Council that he had entered \$1,547 millions in the claim for reparations against Japan on behalf of Singapore (some items of the claim were an all-Malayan figure)⁴⁴.

However, it was not Britain but the Allied Powers, actually the United States, that decided the reparations from Japan. From the very beginning of the reparation program, the US was of the opinion that any proposal to extract huge sums from Japan should be abandoned and that Japan's properties in other countries should be seized⁴⁵. This US policy derived from her global strategy to encircle Soviet Russia more efficiently by taking Japan into her block. In the process of reparation negotiation among the Allied countries, the US's stand became more negative. On May 14, 1948, *The Straits Times*, in an editorial, stated that the Malayan public had been very sceptical about the possibility that Malaya might get something out of Japan someday and that this scepticism had deepened as the US policy of a soft peace for Japan had become clearer. One year later, on 12th May, 1949, the United States called off further deliveries of reparations by Japan so as to restore the Japanese to self support and stated that it would oppose, with a veto, any proposal to revive reparations payments⁴⁶. It should be remembered that just a few days after this, the British authorities in Malaya announced the new proposal in which, as shown before, Japanese reparations were reduced from \$87.5 million to \$60.0 million.

To consolidate her stand amid the US's overwhelming international influence, Britain convened various Commonwealth conferences. The Commonwealth Conference held in Canberra in August, 1947, suggested that all Japanese rights and interests located outside Japan would be expropriated by local administration⁴⁷. It is noteworthy that though the Colonial Governments in Malaya had decided to claim reparations from inside Japan as mentioned earlier, the British Government had already shifted their position. Malayan claims were not represented here because no Malayan Government representatives, much less Malayan people's representatives, attended the conference⁴⁸. The Situation was the same for the following Commonwealth conferences.

The Commonwealth Foreign Ministers Conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in January, 1950, unable to make any concrete resolution, decided to form the Commonwealth Consultative Committee (CCC) to discuss the Japanese Peace Treaty further⁴⁹. The CCC, which met in May, 1950 in London, decided not to pursue reparation by way of industrial assets inside Japan, and instead to claim gold bullion held by Japan and Japanese assets that remained outside Japan as reparations⁵⁰. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference held in London in January, 1951 did not refer to reparations⁵¹. Depending on the Commonwealth countries' presumed support, Britain negotiated with the United States. But the latter's stand prevailed all along. In May, 1951, at the final stage of Anglo-American negotiations, Britain stuck to limited reparations by way of gold bullion held by Japan and Japanese assets abroad. But the US rejected the reparation of gold bullion. The draft peace treaty moulded by the two governments in mid-July, 1951, stated, among others, that Japan would not pay reparations, though her assets abroad might be retained by the Allied Powers.

The Allied Powers recognized, the draft stated, that payment of reparations would cripple the Japanese economy⁵². In principle, this prescription was adopted intact in the official Peace Treaty concluded in September, 1951.

Thus, as a result of the treaty, reparations from Japan were removed from the Malayan Governments' war compensation scheme, and instead a fund derived from the disposal of Japanese assets in Malaya was introduced to it.

As for reparations for the railway track taken away by the JMA to construct the Thai-Burma railway (on August 19, 1947, The Straits Times reported that total loss had amounted to \$46 million), nothing was provided for in the treaty. As such, Japan did not pay anything in this regard. But this did not mean there was no reparation from anyone at all. The Siamese Government paid £656.4 thousand (\$5.6 million) for the track at the end of 1947. This payment was used to purchase locomotives and rolling stock for the Malayan Railway though many Malayan people insisted this should be used for the victims of the Death-Railway⁵³.

4.2 Japanese Assets

It may be necessary here to enquire when the idea of Japanese property arose, and what Japanese assets were at all.

In May, 1948, just after the British Government in a public statement referred to assets held by the Custodian of Enemy Property as a resource for the compensation fund, the editorial of The Straits Times contended as follows:

The Custodian of Enemy Property ... are believed to hold cash and assets totaling ... \$50 million. ...It includes 80,000 acres of Japanese rubber, worth \$25 million or more. Those Japanese rubber estates should surely be regarded as permanent assets of the Malayan peace-time economy rather than as the spoils of war....⁵⁴

It is obvious that Japanese assets in Malaya were originally not contained in the concept of Japanese reparation. On March 5th, 1949, the Custodian of Enemy Property was reported to have stated that former Japanese estates totaling more than 90,000 acres would eventually set off Japanese reparations to Malaya⁵⁵. But, two days later, he denied this report saying that the question as to whether or not these estates would set off Japanese reparations could not be definitely stated until the terms of any peace treaty with Japan had been completed⁵⁶. On December 16, 1949, The Straits Times reported that most advisers of the custodian were strongly in favour it (ie. money collected by the custodian) going towards the WDF. As such, Britain seemed to have considered Japanese assets as an extra reserve that had not been explicitly listed in the original fund. However, by totally banning direct reparation, the final Peace Treaty pressed this obscure financial resource to the front.

Japanese assets in Malaya mainly consisted of rubber estates and iron ore mines. The Japanese began to develop and manage rubber estates in the early 1900s. According to Japanese sources, in 1911, 11 Japanese companies and 106 Japanese private farmers owned leaseholds of 57,500 acres and 26,553 acres respectively. In 1941, 11 companies (the larger ones of which were Mitsubishi, Nissan and Mitsui interests) owned 88,068 acres and private farmers (the number is not available for this year. In 1937, the figure was 73) owned 10,137 acres. The lease period was either 999 years or 99 years. Japanese estates were mainly located in Johor where the government had granted 999 years' lease⁵⁷.

The first Japanese iron ore company called Ishihara Sangyo was established in 1920. From the early 1930s till 1941, several big iron ore companies including Nihon Kogyo (one of props of the Nissan group) were operating in Malaya and exported more than 1 million tons of iron ore exclusively to Japan annually. When the war ended, all these assets were confiscated by the British Government. How these were disposed of will be analyzed later.

Now we must review the reaction of the Malayan people towards the Peace Treaty that had officially and finally denied reparations from Japan. However, before reviewing this, another important factor, that is, the prolonged and consistent reparation claims by the Malayan Chinese should be referred to.

4.3 Reparation Claims by the Chinese

The Singapore Joint Appeal Committee of Japanese-Massacred Chinese (SJACJMC) was formed on June 2, 1946. At its inauguration assembly attended by about one thousand people, the SJACJMC resolved, among others, to press for a refund of the \$50 million "contribution" which the JMA had extorted from the Chinese community and of the "Blood Debt" which Japan owed to tens of thousands of massacred Chinese in Malaya⁵⁸. Simultaneously, similar associations were organized in almost every state as well as in the main towns all over Malaya. But claims for "Blood Debt" did not stand any longer. A historian of Singapore who himself suffered the occupation recalls:

Each association surveyed material and human loss. But, all associations, except for Johor Baru, Muar, Negeri Sembilan and Singapore, reported either human loss only or nothing. It was not until the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC) convened a grand assembly in 1962 that the claim for "Blood Debt" revived⁵⁹.

As a result, only the claim to refund forced "contribution" or forced "donation" prevailed. Supported by various Chinese organizations such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Chinese Association (Zhong Hua Gong Hui) of each state, the JACJMCs, *inter alia* the SJACJMC, negotiated with the British

authorities about this. These organizations were to become agencies to register each person's "donated" amount. It was commonly insisted that the refunded money, if realized, should be used for the bereaved families or for social welfare⁶⁰.

As mentioned earlier, in 1946 the British authorities had agreed that all forced payment should be included in the claims. In February, 1947, the Political Secretary of the Colonial Government stated that his government might demand a refund of this "contribution" from the Japanese Government, and that this claim could be dealt together with other reparation claims⁶¹. When a leader of the SJACJMC, Chuang Hui Tsuan, met the Chairman of the WDCC in May of the same year, the Chairman said that though neither claims for money taken by the JMA nor for lost lives would be entertained by the WDCC, the Malayan Governments would raise the "donation" problem in the Peace Treaty negotiations⁶².

In July, 1947, the SJACJMC officially submitted a letter to the Singapore Governor-General, Malcolm MacDonald, demanding a refund of \$50 million from Japan⁶³. The Governor-General was said to have replied that this would be included in the government's reparation claims against Japan⁶⁴.

In January, 1950, the Associated Malayan Chinese Chambers of Commerce (AMCCC) asked the Malayan Governments once again to demand the refund of "contributions" from the Japanese Government, while complaining about the delay in implementation of this promise⁶⁵. This request was widely supported by various Chinese associations⁶⁶.

Why did Malayan Chinese adhere to the forced "contribution"? As on February 15, 1942, the amount of currency in circulation in Malaya was \$221.97 million⁶⁷. This means that in the three months between March and June, 1942, Chinese residents in Malaya had to collect and submit 23 per cent of the total money in circulation. It was inevitable that they would fail to fully discharge the obligation. With a desperate struggle they could manage to gather no more than \$28 million. The balance was financed by a loan from a Japanese bank. Even though this loan was written off by the British authorities after the end of the war, it can never be denied that Malayan Chinese were forced, frequently under the threat of death, to pay an extravagant amount of money to the JMA.

Japanese military currency, which had been wantonly issued during the occupation, was declared valueless by the British authorities after the war. This declaration also badly affected the Malayan people. However, as it was very difficult to show the evidence of loss caused by the nullified currency, claims for these losses were dismissed at an earlier stage.

In the comprehensive historical account of the Occupation issued in Singapore nearly a decade ago, chapters relating to the reparation claim movement barely refer to incidents between 1948 and 1962⁶⁸. However, it is obvious that the movement continued after 1947, though a little lower-toned than before. This

lower tone seems to have resulted from the ever increasingly negative attitude of the British authorities in Malaya. In these circumstances, the San Francisco Peace Conference was convened and finally, decisively rejected the Malayan people's reparation claims.

4.4 Malayan People's Response to the Peace Treaty

A little more than a month before the San Francisco Conference (which was held between September 4 and 8, 1951), *The Straits Times* reported that leading Singapore citizens wanted a representative to be sent to the treaty negotiations⁶⁹. Though leaders' names were not mentioned here, it can be considered that they represented the general view of the Malayan people at that time. This wish was not heeded by the British Government. When the conference was being convened, the editorial of the *Nanyang Siang Pau* commented that as there had been no discussion with Asian countries, these countries resented US's arbitrariness at the conference⁷⁰.

Just after the end of the conference, the *Sin Chew Jit Poh* grumbled about the abolishment of reparations⁷¹, and its editorial contended that to finance compensation expenses with Japanese assets was like "Shizhi Dongyu Shouzhi Sangyu" (a far-fetched way of taking revenge), that the Japanese assets of \$60 million was but a piece of hair of nine oxen (a drop in the ocean) when compared with losses, and that the people's voice should have been heard⁷².

One N. Carter of Singapore wrote in *The Straits Times* as below:

The failure to sound public opinion is a sad reflection on the sincerity of the two Malayan Governments' nourishment of the aspirations of the people in their desire for political and national recognition⁷³.

In short, the Malayan people's views, desires, wishes and grievances had no means of expression at the conference at all. But it is essential here to see the contemporary development from another view-point.

As mentioned above, the reparation claim movement of Malayan Chinese was focused on the forced "contribution" in this period. The *Sin Chew Jit Poh* reported on August 10, 1951, that Malayan Chinese businessmen considered that the Chinese should strive to refund the "contribution" from the Japanese Government. In early August, 1951, in spite of some members' negative view that international circumstances might abort the claims, the Canton Association of Singapore passed a resolution asking the SCCC to request the Malayan Governments to negotiate with Japan on refund of the "contribution"⁷⁴.

The Directors' conference of the SCCC convened on August 21, 1951, discussed the refund claims. Though leaders of the SJACJMC, chairman Tay Koh Yat and general affairs secretary Chuang Hui Tsuan who were also directors of the SCCC, strongly claimed the refund of the "contribution", the conference

decided not to discuss this issue any more on the ground that war damages were not restricted to the "contribution", and that possibility of success was minimal. Even if it succeeded, they considered, the expected benefit would be too little compared to the intricacy of the procedure demanded by the government⁷⁵.

The AMCCC, to which the SCCC was affiliated, held its annual congress in Kuala Lumpur just after the conclusion of the San Francisco Treaty. Among 24 resolutions adopted at the congress, none referred either to the "contribution" in particular or even to the reparation in general⁷⁶.

Chairman Tay Koh Yat stated in September, 1951, that the SJACJMC would soon demand the refund of the "contribution" by way of the said disposal of Japanese assets⁷⁷. But the SJACJMC seemingly failed to submit, or even to consolidate the demand, for nothing was reported about it afterwards.

These organizations had played the main role in demanding reparations in the early post war period and were to play the main role again after 1962. Their reluctance was so conspicuous at that time.

The "Blood Debt" movement was revived in 1962 when the remains were exhumed. But it was not the first time that massacred remains had been exhumed *en bloc*. Since 1946, in various towns of Malaya and Singapore, monuments had been erected for these newly found victims. Even immediately after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, the mass-burial places of more than 1,300 people massacred by Japanese troops were located in Siglap and Bedok, Singapore⁷⁸. In early October 1951, a memorial monument to the martyrs was erected at Jurong Road, Singapore⁷⁹. As such, exhumation might not have been the sole or decisive reason for resumption of the movement in 1962. There could have been other reasons, too.

Since 1947, trade with Japan had increased steadily. In early 1951, while the import of essential materials (especially capital goods and cloth) from Japan increased rapidly because of the Malayan Emergency, the export of iron ore and bauxite resumed⁸⁰. Though most Malayan people opposed the return of Japanese merchants, some merchants were of opinion that they should be allowed into Malaya⁸¹. Japanese commodities were generally welcomed. In September, 1951, a trade mission, which consisted of more than one hundred Chinese merchants and lead by a Penangite, visited Japan⁸².

Furthermore, there were such explicit anti-communist groups as Kuomintang whose leader in Singapore, Tan Kok Chor, supported the Peace Treaty which aimed, among others, to "guard" Japan from communism⁸³.

Judging from these facts, it cannot be denied that the lack of unity, keenness and enthusiasm among the Chinese community on the one hand and the existence of the groups that wanted restoration of economic relations with Japan on the other, affected the reparation claim movement at that time. If the movement in this period had been as vigorous as in the mid 1960s, the response of the British Government might have been slightly different. Nonetheless, it could not have changed the prevailing current climate dominated by the US at that time.

5. Allocation of the Compensation and Malayan People

Following the Peace Treaty with Japan, the War Damage Fund as well as the Compensation Scheme were finally consolidated. Then, how did the Malayan people regard the allocation of the scheme?

Generally speaking, as mentioned earlier, though the Malayan people wanted the compensation fund to be spent on social welfare or the relief of the victims and their bereaved families, the Malayan Governments stuck to their original plan to restore production, that is to subsidize the main industries, and as a result, totally ignored this request. To make matters worse, from the view point of Malayan people, "restoration of production" meant restoration of British interests in Malaya.

To begin with the allocation for the War Risks (Goods) Insurance Fund in the Compensation Scheme, the *Utusan Melayu* pointed out in 1948 that the tax-payers were to be squeezed for the benefit of the big industries, businesses and other capitalistic concerns⁸⁴. At a public meeting called by the Singapore Association, its president said that undue preference had been given to big business in the proposed settlement of WR(G)I claims⁸⁵.

With regard to preference given to main industries, in the SLC in 1948, an unofficial member, Lim Yew Hock, opposed the idea saying that many firms had more than recouped their war losses⁸⁶. And immediately after conclusion of the Peace Treaty, the *China Press* stressed in its editorial that, due to government subsidies, industries had already been fairly rehabilitated, and, *inter alia*, foundation of rubber and tin had been soundly consolidated because of the Korean War. On the other hand, the editorial continued, the Malayan people, especially the Chinese people who had been damaged most, were merely provided with a scanty sum of charity⁸⁷.

Government subsidies here means rehabilitation loans. By the end of 1949, of the \$78.5 million loans released to the tin industry, some \$60 million or 76.4 per cent went to European companies⁸⁸. To the rubber industry, \$50 million government-guaranteed bank loan was given by mid-1949⁸⁹.

Meanwhile, *The Straits Times* wrote in March, 1950, that, out of the war damage payment, the tin producers and the rubber producers were due to pay back about \$60 million and \$20 million respectively which they had received from the Federal Government in rehabilitation loans⁹⁰. It meant that most of the compensation payment for these two key industries was used to write off the loans provided to the British firms.

As to the war damage compensation *per se*, an unofficial member, C.C. Tan estimated in the SLC in May, 1949, that 70 per cent of the compensation to the tin industry and 60 per cent to the rubber industry, and a total of \$184 million, including the "big business" compensation, would go to Britain⁹¹. In the FLC in July, 1950, Tan Siew Sin suggested that 95 per cent of the rubber compensation would go to the big estates (mostly British estatesHara)⁹².

No statistics are available now to confirm or deny these statements. But it cannot be denied that a great portion of the compensation payment was given to the big British firms. This contributed to the consolidation of such large British companies as Sime Darby, Guthrie, Boustead and London Tin all of which have become Bumiputera-controlled conglomerates since the early 1970s or 1980s.

However, the most important fact here is that, since the compensation was considered to have exclusively benefited British concerns, Malayan people were certainly not satisfied with the result of the compensation scheme in general and the disposition of Japanese assets in particular.

6. Disposition of Japanese Assets

With due regard to the length of this article, and also to the limited information available, I can only refer to the largest one, i.e. former Japanese rubber estates, quite briefly here.

Until the Peace Treaty finalized how to dispose of Japanese assets, the larger rubber estates were in the charge of full-time managers appointed by the Malayan Governments, and the small holdings were leased to local residents under the direct control of the Custodian of Enemy Property⁹³.

The auction of Japanese estates lasted from June, 1951⁹⁴, till 1955⁹⁵. With regard to the auction, one anonymous planter (H.W.R.) complained in July, 1951, that the Custodian's policy was to sell the estates at the lowest price by offering them to tender in too large blocks. According to him, though the Chinese had been paying \$1,500 and over an acre for small to medium estates, at a tender for Japanese estates the price averaged only \$300. On one occasion, tenders were invited in one lot for 10 estates with an acreage of 24,282. He suggested Malaysians could not afford to participate in such costly large scale tenders and this policy would merely benefit the big British investors⁹⁶. If that were the case all the time, most of the successful tenders must have been British planters. However, there were a few exceptional Malaysians who succeeded in buying Japanese estates.

A leading Penang businessman, Heah Joo Seang, bought about 26,000 acres of rubber estates in Johor — mostly Japanese estates including Teluk Sengat (8173 acres), Nanyo (3089) and Asahi (1079) — in October, 1951, at a price of \$6 million⁹⁷. Though the names still remain, these estates came under the control of a British company, Boustead, later. Then Boustead was Malaysianized in the late 1970s. Presently, the two largest shareholders of Boustead Holdings Berhad (BHB) are the government agencies, namely Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera and the Federal Land Development Authority. The total landholdings of BHB is 39,100 acres now. This means, if we assume no further transfer of land thereafter, former Japanese estates constitute two thirds of the BHB estates.

As mentioned earlier, not only BHB, but all the British rubber companies have been Malaysianized. It can be said that the Japanese estates played some role in consolidating the British rubber companies first and then, indirectly, in forming present Malaysian semi-national companies.

In the earliest stage of Japanese participation in the rubber planting industry, there were many Japanese peasants who held small-holdings or meagre estates. But most of them didn't last long. Their lands were usually absorbed by the big Japanese estates. If this is taken into consideration, it might be said that Japanese peasants played a basic role in the process described earlier.

7. Conclusions

In response to the Malayan people's claim for reparations against Japan, the British Government compiled information on war damages. The Malayan War Damage Compensation Scheme, which was formulated in 1948, assumed reparations from Japan as its main financial resource. However, the global diplomatic strategy of the United States to encircle the Soviet Union, which dominated post-war international politics, hindered the British plan. The US considered that reparations from Japan would obstruct Japan's industrial reconstruction, and therefore, move her towards the Soviet block. As a result of this decisive opposition, the reparation claims of the Malayan Governments against Japan were reduced from the original \$85.7 million to \$60 million in 1949, and were finally abandoned in the Peace Treaty of 1951. Instead, Japanese assets left in Malaya were used to finance the WDCS.

The British Government did not allow even a single Malayan representative to participate in negotiations with other countries for reparation problems. The Peace Treaty was unilaterally and arbitrarily enforced on the Malayan people by the big powers, especially by the US. However, it cannot be denied that, in conjunction with the San Francisco Peace Conference (in which the Peace Treaty was concluded), only a small section of Malayan people were involved in the reparation claim movement. This was due to a sense of resignation towards the British policy, a lack of unity among themselves, and some businessmen's preference for reviving commercial relations with Japan. The movement did not become as extensive or influential enough to persuade the governments as in the mid 1960s. Nonetheless, the main cause of the abolishment of reparation claims was the strategy of the US. It should be remembered here that, to some extent, Japanese industries were rehabilitated at the expense of the Malayan economy.

Funds derived from the disposition of Japanese assets amounted to \$67.2 million and constituted 15 per cent of the War Damage Fund. But all of this was used for the rehabilitation, development and consolidation of the industrial companies, especially British rubber and tin companies, despite the Malayan people's

repeated request for it to be used for social welfare and relief of the war-victims and their bereaved families. The foundations for these companies which were to become huge conglomerates based on rubber or tin, and which are Malaysianized corporate companies today, were laid down in this period, at the expense of, from the contemporary Malayan point of view, Malayan people's livelihood.

Thus the Peace Treaty, which formally solved the reparation problem, didn't really help Malayan people whose lives had been severely damaged by the war. It must be because of this that reparation problem is still felt to be unsolved and is still occasionally raised by the Malaysian people.

The "goodwill agreements" concluded between Singapore, Malaysia and Japan, in which Japan agreed to offer the "Goodwill Grant" of \$25 million to each country, did not particularly refer to the forced "contribution". But it cannot be regarded as coincidental that the total amount of the "Goodwill Grants" were exactly the same as the "contribution", if the "contribution" in Sabah and Sarawak was not taken into account. It can be said that the mass movement deployed immediately after the end of the war to demand refund of the "contribution", which had not been successful in the Peace Treaty, saw its results two decades later.

I cannot judge now whether the "goodwill agreements" solved the reparation problem fully. I can only say that, in order to analyze the Japanese reparation problem, it is essential to analyze the "goodwill agreements", the War Damage Compensation Scheme and the San Francisco Peace Treaty collectively.

Notes

1. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Japan. "Keizai Kyoryoku no Genjo to Mondaiten" (*Annual Report on Economic Cooperation*; 1992), Tokyo, MITI, 1992, p. 403.
2. *The Straits Times* (ST, henceforth), 10 May, 1947. 16 May, 1949.
3. ST, 10 July, 1947.; File of the Arkib Negara Malaysia, *Custodian of Enemy Property* (CEP, henceforth), 112/1955, 'Japanese Reparations/ Accounting Procedure for Reparation Deliveries'.
4. ST, 6 March, 1948. 16 August, 1949.; *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* (NCJP, henceforth), 6 April, 1948. 1 December, 1949.
5. ST, 14 May, 1949.; NCJP, 14 May, 1949.
6. ST, 16 May, 1949.
7. ST, 16 August, 1949.; NCJP, 1 December, 1949.
8. ST, 17 May, 16 August, 1949.
9. NCJP, 15 February, 1949.
10. ST, 17 May, 1949. Comment of a spokesman of the Economic Affairs Department, Singapore.

11. *ST*, 30 June, 12 July, 15 October, 1947. 29 June, 1948. 23 February, 16 May, 1949.; *NCJP*, 22 June, 2, 5, 7, 10, 15 July, 4, 15, 16 September, 1947.
12. *NCJP*, 11 July, 1947.
13. Graham, Richard, *War Damage Commission, Federation of Malaya and Singapore; Report in which is included in the Annual Report for 1952* (WDC, henceforth), Kuala Lumpur, Government Press, 1953, pp. 7, 33.
14. *ibid.* p. 10.
15. *NCJP*, 27 February, 8 March, 1 May, 8, 20 June, 21 August, 1947.
16. *Nanyang Siang Pau* (NYSP, henceforth), 21 August, 1947.; *Sin Chew Jit Poh* (SCJP, henceforth), do.
17. *ST*, 18 April, 1946.
18. WDC, pp. 8, 9.; *ST*, 8 April, 1948.
19. WDC, pp. 12, 13.; *ST*, 28 April, 3 September, 1948.
20. *ST*, 3 September, 1948.
21. *ST*, 19 September, 1947.
22. *ST*, 3 September, 1948.
23. *ST*, 15 September, 1948.
24. *ST*, 9 September, 1948.
25. *ST*, 30 November, 1948.
26. *NCJP*, 21 January, 1949.
27. *NCJP*, 18, 21 February, 26 March, 1949.
28. *ST*, 18, 19, 20 May, 1949. In both Legislative Councils of Federation of Malaya and Singapore, Malayan and Singaporean unofficial members like Dato Onn bin Ja'afar and C.C. Tan resented the British Government's intrusive directives on how to manage the scheme. Some members still demanded that Britain should pay the full cost of Malaya's war damage.
29. *ST*, 29 July, 1949.; WDC, pp. 18, 19.
30. *ST*, 18 May, 1949.
31. The Singapore Legislative Council rejected the Profit Set-off proposal which meant that any profits made by various firms (except for rubber plantations and tin mines) during the year 1946-48 in excess of the prescribed limit should be set-off. The Malayan Council approved it. WDC, pp. 20-22.; *ST*, 20, 29 July, 3 August, 8, 30 September, 1949.
32. *ST*, 1 August, 1949. (editorial)
33. *NCJP*, 28 June, 1949.
34. WDC, pp. 32, 33.; *ST*, 24 January, 1950.
35. WDC, p. 19.
36. *CEP*, 1/1958, Annual Report for 1957.; *CEP*, 1/1959, Annual Report for 1958. In 1956, the British authorities in Malaya decided that from Japanese assets in Malaya \$2.5 million should be transferred to the Western Pacific which had no Japanese assets to be confiscated. Of this amount, Malaya was apportioned $\frac{11}{15}$ and Singapore $\frac{4}{15}$.
37. *Colony of Singapore, Annual Report 1955*, Singapore, Government Printing Office, 1956, p. 155.
Subsequent Annual Reports referred neither to the Custodian nor to enemy property.
38. *CEP*, Annual Report for 1958.

39. *WDC*, p. 122.
40. *NCJP*, 12 July, 1947.
41. *NCJP*, 5 May, 1949.
42. *ST, NYSP, SCJP*, 7 September, 1951.
43. Hara Fujio, "Eiryō Malaya no Nihonjin" (*Japanese Immigrants in British Malaya*), Tokyo, Institute of Developing Economies, 1986, p. 226.
44. *ST, NCJP*, 6 December, 1946.
45. *ST*, 29 December, 1945.
46. *ST*, 14 May, 1949. This unilateral announcement of the United States annoyed the Philippine Government that had also demanded reparations from Japan. See Watanabe Akio, Miyazato Seigen eds., "San Francisco Kōwa" (*San Francisco Peace Conference*). Tokyo University Press, 1986, p. 267.
47. *ST*, 30 August, 1947.
At the Singapore Legislative Council in 1949, C.C. Tan criticized the government as follows: "We (Malayan people... Hara) have absolutely no control or say in securing the payment of reparation". *ST*, 8 September, 1949.
48. *ST*, 21 August, 1947.
49. Kibata Yoichi, 'The Japanese Peace Treaty and Britain's Asian Policy', p. 169. Contained in Watanabe, op. cit.
50. *ibid.*, p. 170.; *ST*, 18 May, 1950.
51. Kibata, *ibid.*, p. 174.; *ST*, 11 January, 1951.
52. *ST*, 13 July, 1951.
53. *NCJP*, 24 November, 3, 4 December, 1947.
54. *ST*, 14 May, 1948.
55. *ST*, 5 March, 1949.
56. *ST*, 7 March, 1949.
57. Hara, op. cit., p. 224.
58. *NYSP*, 3 June, 1946.; Khoo Sin Min ed., "Zhaonan Sidai Shihua" (*Historical Account of the Shonan Period*), Singapore, Youth Book Co., 1992, pp. 156, 157.; Shu Yun-Tsiao, Chua Ser-Koon eds., *Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan 1937 - 1945 — Selected Source Materials*, Singapore, Cultural & Historical Publishing House, 1984, pp. 917-924.
59. Khoo Sin Min, op., pp. 156, 157.
60. *NCJP*, 16, 30 June, 9, 16, 22 July, 1 August, 11 September, 1947.
61. *NCJP*, 3 February, 1947.
62. Shu Yun-Tsiao, op. cit., p. 923.
63. *ST*, 11 August, 1947.
64. *NCJP*, 29 August, 1947.
65. *ST*, 19 December, 1949.; *NCJP*, 19 December, 1949, 13 January, 1950.
66. *NCJP*, 19, 21 January, 1950.
67. *NCJP*, 1 September, 1947.
68. Shu Yun-Tsiao, op. cit., pp. 924-967.
69. *ST*, 24 July, 1951.
70. *NYSP*, 7 September, 1951.
71. *SCJP*, 9 September, 1951.

72. *SCJP*, 11 September, 1951.
73. *ST*, 20 September, 1951.
74. *NYSP*, 8 August, 1951.; *SCJP*, 9 August, 1951.
75. *NYSP*, *SCJP*, 23 August, 1951.
76. *China Press (CP, henceforth)*, 15, 16 September, 1951.
77. *SCJP*, 9 September, 1951.; *CP*, 10 September, 1951.
 The Chairman of the Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Lau Pak Khuan, also demanded that revenue from the auction of Japanese assets be allocated to relieve Chinese victims. *CP*, 9 September, 1951.
78. *ST*, 13, 14 September, 1951.; *SCJP*, 12, 13 September, 1951.
79. *NYSP*, 14 September, 5 October, 1951.
80. *ST*, 1, 24 February, 13 April, 7, 29 May, 1951.
81. *ST*, 11, 12, 13 September, 5 October, 1951.; *NYSP*, 14, 27 September, 1951.; *SCJP*, 10 August, 14 September, 1951.
82. *SCJP*, 15, 20, 21 August, 1951; *Kwong Wah Yit Poh*, 18 September, 1951.
83. *ST*, 13 July, 1951.
84. *ST*, 9 September, 1948.
85. *ST*, 22 September, 1948.
86. *ST*, 15 September, 1948.
87. *CP*, 11 September, 1951.
88. Loh Kok Wah, Francis, *Beyond the Tin Mines*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 68.
89. *ST*, 27 July, 1949.
90. *ST*, 21 March, 1950.
91. *ST*, 18 September, 1949.
92. *ST*, 27 July, 1950. Though the acting financial Secretary, who replied to Tan Siew Sin, denied Tan's estimation, he did not give an accurate counter figure.
93. *ST*, 5 March, 1949.
94. *ST*, 27 June, 1951.
95. *CEP*, 123/1955, 'Enemy Estates in Malaya — Final Accounts'.
96. *ST*, 27 July, 1951.
97. *ST*, 6 October, 1951. It means that, in this case, the price was \$231 per acre.