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IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 231

A Critical Review of Opinion Polls relating to Iranian Voting Intentions: Problems of Research Methodology as applied to Complex Societies

Hitoshi SUZUKI

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Abstract

After the 10th Iranian Presidential election on June 12, 2009, several public opinion polls taken in Iran attracted the attention of policy-makers and journalists around the world because of the political crisis that followed. In this paper I first review critically the polls conducted by the WPO (WorldPublicOpinion.org), PIPA (Program on International Policy Attitudes) at the University of Maryland. I also review an essay by Steven Kull, which is based on the aforementioned poll results and which in my opinion leads to false conclusions concerning Iran's political prospects. I also discuss “An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public,” published by WPO-PIPA on February 3 2010.

The present paper arrives at the overall conclusion that it is impossible to obtain an accurate image of political opinions in societies as complicated as that of Iran by concentrating on only one technique of research and analysis, especially when the political and social situation in the society concerned is in a state of constant flux.

Keywords: Iran, Presidential election, opinion polls, political crisis
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Introduction

After the unforeseen Iranian political crisis that followed the 10th Presidential election held on June 12, 2009, the results of several opinion polls for gauging the political attitudes of the Iranian public attracted the attention of policy makers and journalists around the world. A typical example of the polls that observers turned to was the one conducted by an organization known as WorldPublicOpinion.org (hereafter WPO), which is managed by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (hereafter PIPA) at the University of Maryland, United States.

The WPO poll was expected to be the most reliable overview of Iranian public opinions immediately after the election, and it received much attention because its results seemed to correspond to the actual voting results of the election.

So far as the actual outcome of the election was concerned, the official results were as follows. Mahmud Ahmadinejad received 62.6% of all the votes cast and was declared the winner in the first round. As regards the other candidates, Mir Hosein Mousavi received 33.8% of the vote, Mohsen Rezai 1.7% and Mehdi Karrubi only 0.9%. In the WPO poll of September 19, 2009 (hereafter WPO-Sep09), the 20th question (hereafter Q20) asked “who did you vote for in that election?” and the answers were: Ahmadinejad 55%, Mousavi 14%, Rezai 3%, and Karrubi 1%.

At first sight, it is difficult not to be impressed by the congruence of the opinion poll results and the election results. But for reasons that will become clear below, it is also difficult to accept the general picture of the opinions given in the poll as representing the actual political views of the Iranian people. As a sociologist with a special interest in the society of Iran, I will here critically review and analyze the WPO poll results, and will discuss why I consider this and other polls to be mostly misleading concerning their representations of the opinions held by Iranian voters.

It is important to clarify why such a huge gap in the general images of Iranian society and of the results of the opinion polls tends to occur, and to determine what is wrong with this type of opinion-poll data. In this paper I first review the results of WPO-Sep09 critically, and then I proceed to review an essay by Steven Kull, whose argument, being based on the WPO-Sep09 poll results, leads to false conclusions concerning Iran’s political prospects.

I also discuss related discussions included in “An Analysis of Multiple Polls of the Iranian Public,” published by WPO-PIPA in February 3, 2010 (hereafter WPO-An10). There I critically evaluate another opinion poll, conducted by the Tehran University
study group (hereafter TU-Jun09). In the conclusion, I will discuss why opinion polls of this kind mostly produce misleading results in societies such as that of Iran, and to what extent we can accept the poll findings as an accurate reflection of social reality.

1. Does WPO-Sep09 give us a true image of Iranian public opinion?

Following the 10th Presidential election, held on June 12, 2009, huge demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of people occurred every day from 13th to 18th June in Tehran and several big cities of Iran. On June 19, the Supreme Leader (the highest political authority in Iran), Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, confirmed Ahmadinejad’s election as President, and from the following day onwards, suppression of the demonstrators became more violent and more undisguised.

The killing of Neda Aqa-Soltan (a 26 year-old woman), thought to be by a member of the military in plain clothes, happened on 20 June, and its video coverage immediately spread around the world via the Internet, causing widespread dismay.

On 29 June, the Guardians’ Council officially accepted Ahmadinejad as the President elect, but on 9 July more huge demonstrations were held, again of hundreds of thousands of people, in Tehran and several other cities. This clearly showed that the Iranian people’s dissatisfaction with the election result was not a temporary or fleeting affair, but a consistent and well-established trend.

Popular demonstrations continued from the next day on, and on 17 July Hashemi Rafsanjani (the most effective Iranian politician and a powerful supporter of reformist group) urged the government to listen to the voice of the people, and expressed his concern about the escalation of violence directed against ordinary people by the security forces.

On 1st August, the mass trial of 100 opposition figures began, and having been endorsed by the Supreme Leader on 3rd August, on 5 August Ahmadinejad was officially sworn in as President. From the 22nd, the holy month of Ramazan began, and no large demonstrations were reported during August and the first half of September, unrest being limited to several protests in the universities.

The opinion poll for WPO-Sep09 was conducted between August 27 and September 10, 2010, and this timing coincided with Ramazan. As had been expected, there were no significant political developments during the period in question, and more importantly, the opposition movements had triggered violent suppression and harsh treatment from the government.

Even when considering this background and the timing of the poll, it seems that the WPO-Sep09 shows a disproportionately large number of conservatives who
supported the Presidency of Ahmadinejad. Those must have included the Basijis, who were originally volunteer soldiers during the Iran-Iraq War, but now the character of the Basij organization changed and the members belong to a larger network of young supporters of the Islamic government. They are generally used to receiving privileges from the government.

The influence of these conservative groups can be seen especially in the answers to questions Q1d, Q2a-f, Q18, Q21, Q22, Q24, Q25, Q26, Q27, Q28, Q29, Q32 and Q33 (See the Appendix I for the details). It is noted that these groups consist of relatively older people, and belong to the middle and lower classes of Iranian society (see D1-D10 of the original report). All these groups seem to have affected the poll results to a considerable degree.

According to the polling organization’s description of its methodology, the survey was carried out by means of computer-assisted landline telephone interviews made from neighboring countries, with 2,886 respondents in all over Iran. This information may give us confidence in the neutrality and randomness of the sampling of the recipients, but as we shall see, such seems not to have been the case.

Here we must stress again that the Iranian government and the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) have taken control of all of Iran’s communication facilities and telephone lines, while the Internet in Iran is subject to the most severe censorship in the world. It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that during the two weeks of the opinion poll, the calls were secretly monitored by the authorities, who may even have clandestinely intervened to change the results of the survey, and hence of the research.

For example, since these telephone calls were not intended for a specific person, it was impossible to tell whether or not the calls had been intercepted, and the Iranian government and authorities had very many supporters, such as the Basijis, to intercept calls secretly and then, at some profit to themselves, supply the interviewers with pro-government respondents and answers. Government manipulation of the survey results is by no means impossible: after all, the government of Ahmadinejad and its leader Ayatollah Khamenei are quite openly suppressing the academic activities of social science departments in Iran’s universities.

With all of these shortcomings and unintended failures, WPO-Sep09 has been generally accepted as best means of gauging Iranian political opinion at that crucial time. As was mentioned above, the main reason for this is that the result of Q20 asking “who did you vote for in the election?”, whether accidentally or otherwise, yielded answers that corresponded quite closely to the official voting results of the Presidential election. That said, there is no convincing evidence to suggest that the overall result of
this WPO-Sep09 opinion poll accurately reflects the actual Iranian political opinion in detail.

2. Steven Kull’s views based on the WPO-Sep09 data

On 23 November 2009, Steven Kull, the Director of PIPA, gave his opinions on the poll in a short essay entitled “Is Iran pre-revolutionary?” on the website called openDemocracy.com. In this essay Kull discussed the opinion poll using part of the data set gathered in WPO-Sep09 – data that are not fully accessible on the Internet.

Dr Kull is careful enough in his discussion to consider the criticism that WPO-Sep09 did not reflect accurately the real political opinions of Iranians and he based his main discussion only on data relating to poll participants who in response to Q20 of WPO-Sep09 of the poll, said that they had voted for Mousavi.

But by restricting his remarks to data gathered only from the Mousavi supporters, he inadvertently touched on another serious shortcoming of the poll, namely the very small size of the sample. In WPO-Sep09 there were only 140 respondents who clearly said that they had voted for Mousavi, a number far too small to allow us to arrive at firm and detailed conclusions on political opinion in Iran. It is true that by limiting his comments to the data derived from Mousavi supporters, Kull may have avoided the possible skewing of the poll’s results through covert government manipulation. Nevertheless, the fundamental limitations of the telephone interview methodology become apparent in respect of the sincerity and seriousness of the respondents, when only the minority who supported the Mousavi supporters is referred to.

Another serious shortcoming of this essay is Dr Kull’s lack of information about Iran and his limited understanding of Iranian society. In the introduction to his essay, he introduces an imaginary analogy between Iran in 2009 and Vietnam in 1968. He argues that Kremlin observers, viewing only the street demonstrations in America against the Vietnam War, might have wrongly concluded in 1968 that America was on the brink of disintegration. Similarly, Kull goes on to say, an American observer of the Tehran street demonstrations of 2009 might erroneously have concluded that Iran was about to collapse from within.

Of course this point of view in itself is not problematic, but it does rather suggest that Kull has no deep understanding of the Iranian society, which is one of the longest-lived of the world’s societies, and one characterized by great religious and cultural complexity and by the existence of rich and delicately nuanced political expression. This being the case, it is hardly surprising that Dr Kull’s remarks failed to capture the important nuances of political opinion in Iranian society. For example Dr.
Kull emphasizes that in the poll, most of the Mousavi supporters expressed support for the Islamic system of revolutionary Iran.

But for most academic specialists on Iranian politics and society, this was evident from the outset. Mousavi and his supporters have always called the Ahmadinejad government a “coup d’etat government,” the implication being that the Mousavi is the “legal” winner and that his government would be truly Islamic and thus legitimate.

Dr. Kull, citing another finding of the poll, states that “only 43% (of Mousavi supporters) say they would be ready to give up enriching uranium in exchange for removing sanctions,” but here he seems to ignore the fact that among most Iranians, the issue of nuclear energy has long been a matter of national sovereignty, not a matter of the potential production of nuclear weapons.

On February 3, 2010, WPO again published its report and summary, under the title “Analysis of Multiple Polls Finds Little Evidence that the Iranian Public Sees Government as Illegitimate.” It is not clear in itself if the “government” referred to here is Ahmadinejad’s specific government or the Islamic/Revolutionary government in general, but anyway the article concludes that the Iranian people most probably elected Ahmadinejad as their President and now the majority accept him as legitimate.

Even more surprisingly, on the website of ConsortiumNews Robert Parry briskly told his readers that “Ahmadinejad won, get over it.” Parry’s somewhat tendentious discussion was based on the new report of the WPO published on 3 February 2010 (WPO-An10). What makes the report noteworthy is WPO’s reference to the opinion poll conducted by a study group affiliated with Tehran University (TU-Jun09). We will now examine the TU-Jun09 opinion poll as portrayed in WPO-An10.

3. On the reliabilities of opinion poll conducted by Tehran University’s survey unit

Most recently WPO-An10 compares the results of three opinion polls, namely WPO-Sep09, the telephone surveys conducted by the University of Tehran’s survey unit immediately before and after the Presidential election (TU-Jun09), and the telephone survey conducted by GlobeScan.

Here we will focus our attention on TU-Jun09, and especially on the eight polls carried out before the voting, and we will try to refute some of the conclusions that the survey claims to have arrived at. It is important to do this because it seems that WPO-An10’s comparison and discussion mainly depends on reference to the findings of TU-Jun09.

WPO-An10 provides a summary of the eight polls carried out by TU-Jun09 between 19 May and 11 June and claims that in these polls, Ahmadinejad always
emerged as the front runner. “At the beginning of the month he had majority support, but (his lead) then dropped to below half as Mousavi moved (to) within striking distance. After the debate he recovered majority support and went into the election with a solid majority.” This, the main story of the election, is what WPO-An10 draws from the opinion poll of TU-Jun09.

It seems that up until the point at which the number of Ahmadinejad supporters began to drop, on June 1, the poll results were almost in line with with other observations and reports. But the unexpectedly rapid recovery of Ahmadinejad’s support must give grounds for suspicion. WPO-An10, which may have shared the same doubt, attempted to tackle the problem in their Appendix I, entitled “Analysis of Trendline Data, May-June 2009.”

Those responsible for WPO-An10 explain this surprising recovery in the following terms. “Overall the tracking polls show that Mousavi, during the middle of the campaign, came close to forcing Ahmadinejad into a second round (of the election). Ahmadinejad saved himself from this fate only by making better use of the televised debates (something utterly new in Iran) than Mousavi did. Ahmadinejad then recovered support, but did not return all the way to the high levels he had at the start of the campaign.”

WPO-An10 then goes on to seek the reason for Ahmadinejad’s success in the televised debates on the night of June 3, and concludes that the rhetoric that linked Mousavi with the former President Hashemi Rafsanjani appealed to the deep resentment felt by ordinary people all over Iran toward Rafsanjani and led to Ahmadinejad’s “landslide majority”, to borrow the phrase used by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei after the election.

But here several questions arise. The polls of TU-Jun09 clearly show that the support for Ahmadinejad, as expressed in respondents’ declared voting intentions, increased steadily from June 4 to June 11 (the latter being the day before the vote was held). If the sharp upturn in Ahmadinejad’s fortunes had been the result of his populist rhetoric during the televised debates, the increase would have been a sudden and temporary one, not a steady trend.

And if Ahmadinejad had so cleverly succeeded in associating Mousavi with Rafsanjani, why is it that the support for Mousavi supporters did not decline immediately after the debate, but instead remained fairly steady (See Appendix II)?

All of these irregularities seem to need a completely different explanation, and my own hypothesis is that once again there may have been some clandestine intervention from the governmental side that distorted the findings of the TU-Jun09 poll.
According to the methodology outlined by WPO-An10, TU-Jun09 was conducted by means of domestic landline telephone interviews using random digit sampling. The point is that the interviewers seem to have used the ordinary telephone lines quite frequently over a relatively short period, making it very easy to identify which line was being used to conduct the opinion survey.

As was the case with WPO-Sep09, there would have been no need to for the authorities to become involved from the start, and all that would be needed to trigger government intervention would be for the interviewers to inadvertently hit upon one confident Basiji respondent, who would immediately realize what was going on, and would instantly report the call to his colleagues or to his superior. After that, the security services of the government would inevitably take prompt action.

In this way, it is natural to imagine that in the course of these telephone interviews, covert intervention, especially when it is conducted for a relatively long period, may have gradually distorted the results of the poll. In any case, it was reported that as voting day drew near, general censorship became ever more stringent in Tehran. It is also worth noting that the national telecommunication company of Iran is known to be under the strong influence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

But we must also consider the fact that the sample size for each of the TU-Jun09 polls was not big enough to allow sufficiently sensitive analysis of the political opinions of a nation with a population size of well over 70 million (See Appendix II).

For example the opinion poll just before voting day must be regarded as the most important, but according to WPO-An10, the sample size for the poll of June 11 was only 450, the smallest of this series of surveys. This means that if only 9 of the recipients had changed their answer, the proportion of those intending to vote for Ahmadinejad might have declined to 55% while those intending to support Mousavi might have reached 30% of the sample.

The reason for the limited number especially for the last round of polling was not explained, but if there happened to be any difficulties in communicating by telephone, these may possibly indicate the presence of some background hindrances that prevented accurate assessment of the political opinions of Iranians as revealed in TU-Jun09.

Concluding remarks

In this paper, it has never been my intention to deny the usefulness of all the findings of WPO-An10 or any of the other opinion polls that I have mentioned. In fact as a sociologist specializing on the formation of rusta-shahr or the newly-shaped Iranian rural cities which appeared numerously after the 1979 revolution and the following war,
I agree with many of the conclusions arrived by the pollsters – conclusions that show the relatively conservative nature of Iranian society, especially in the countryside. Thus on the legitimacy of the regime, most of the points made by WPO-An10 are not all that new, and considering the historical context of political processes, each answer obtained by the poll seems to be a natural response to the present political situation. Candidate Mousavi was not supported because of his radical denial of the present regime. Rather, he was chosen as a candidate because he himself was a member of this regime and he is thoroughly aware of the limits of political reform in Iran.

I agree that in their day-to-day level of political consciousness, the ordinary Iranians in the countryside are more conservative than we would expect to be the case among Iranian city-dwellers, to say nothing of the inhabitants of Tehran. But it is obvious that the authors of WPO-An10 were in serious need of basic information which would have allowed accurate evaluation of Iranian rural society and its changing relationships with the urban areas (See my essay “The Shaping of Rusta-shahrs...,” 2009). The resulting report failed to shed light on the new political consciousness, rural and urban, emerging in Iranian society. So we must conclude that WPO-An10 and relating opinion polls have fallen far short of giving accurate and useful materials for decision-making by the United States government or by the governments of other countries as regards their confrontation with the new Iranian government led by Ahmadinejad.

I stress again that I agreed with several points of argument presented in WPO-An10, especially concerning the general tendency towards conservatism that can be seen in Iranian rural society. I would even go so far as to say that on the morning of 13 June, immediately after it became clear that Ahmadinejad would win with an absolute majority, my first impression was that the media reports just before the voting were too strongly influenced by the superficial coverage of events in Tehran and other big cities, and that the reports neglected the huge number of the voters living in the rural areas of Iran.

But at the same time, I am well aware that after the 1979 revolution and the war with Iraq in 1980's, there appears to be a huge trend of penetration of urban culture towards deepest rural areas all over Iran. For example the Internet communication is now accessible in every small city in the remote areas, and the information gap according to regions is rapidly ceasing to exist in Iran.

It is not proper to see the Iranian society as a clearly divided one between urban and rural. It appears that the Ahmadinejad government seeks to make use of the divided interests of urban and rural societies in Iran, but this way of policy making will
not work well soon in a situation where people share almost the same quality and quantity of information for their political decision-makings and behaviors.

So after observing the mounting political tension that has been provoked by the government's harsh and unyielding hostility to those opposed to it, I now feel more strongly than ever before that the Iranian political turmoil and crisis is still continuing and penetrating ever more deeply into Iranian society.

In conclusion we must say that it is impossible to obtain an accurate image of political opinions in complicated societies such as that of Iran by employing only one narrow technique of investigation, especially when the analysis is done at a time of fluctuating circumstances. We are seriously in need of deep insights into the society and political culture of Iran, and we also need the widest possible range of information before we can properly understand any kind of change in the Iranian power structure.

If Iranian government and society overcome the present serious obstacles, and if sophisticated research and reliable opinion polls can lead to an accumulation of dependable know-how as regards Iranian society, we might expect a far more precise and fruitful level of scholarship on Iranian political opinion in the years ahead.

But if the Iranian government continues with its secretive militant dictatorship, and if it refuses to change its skeptical and hostile attitude towards the academic activities of social scientists, today's regrettable absence of a detailed and accurate image of Iranian society will not be easily made good, at least not in the foreseeable future.

Appendix I. Some Findings of the the opinion polls from WPO-Sep09

The following results clearly show that the majority of recipients were supporters of the Islamic government, and especially of President Ahmadinejad. This is not in concordance with the general impressions we usually get from direct contacts and conversations with various classes in Iran, both urban and rural.

- Q1 asks whether the recipients think that each of the stated aspects have in general gotten better, worse, or are about the same as compared with the situation four years ago, meaning the first year of the first term of the Ahmadinejad Presidency. Q1-d asks about Iran's ability to resist foreign pressures, meaning mainly pressures from the United States, and the answers are: better (57%), worse (14%), about the same (13%), don't know (15%), and refused to answer (2%).
- Q2 asks how much confidence the recipients have in the following governmental
institutions. Q2-a, about confidence in the Majlis (National Congress): a lot (40%), some (39%), not much (7%), not at all (8%), don't know (5%), refused to answer (2%). Q2-b asks about confidence in the Ministry of Interior (which supervises elections, security forces, etc.): a lot (38%), some (34%), not much (6%), not at all (6%), don't know (14%), refused to answer (3%). Q2-c, about confidence in the President, at this time Ahmadinejad: a lot (64%), some (21%), not much (5%), not at all (6%), don't know (2%), refused to answer (2%). Q2-d asks about confidence in the Judiciary Branch (which has been dominated by religious conservatives for many years): a lot (43%), some (30%), not much (7%), not at all (7%), don't know (11%), refused to answer (2%). Q2-e asks about confidence in the Guardians' Council (which consists of six clergymen and six members of the judiciary and which supervises the Presidential activities and all the national elections, and also checks if the parliamentary bills are religiously correct. At present the Council is led by a very conservative member of the clergy, Ayatollah Jannati): a lot (42%), some (29%), not much (6%), not at all (6%), don't know (15%), refused to answer (2%). Q2-f asks about the police (who took part in a series of violent crackdowns on demonstrators following the election): a lot (52%), some (31%), not much (6%), not at all (7%), don't know (3%), refused to answer (1%).

- Q18 asks how much the respondents are in general satisfied with the process by which the authorities are elected. The answers are: very much (40%), somewhat (41%), not very much (10%), not at all (6%), don't know (2%), refused to answer (1%).
- Q21 asks how free and fair the recipients think the Presidential election was. The answers are: completely (66%), somewhat (17%), not very much (5%), not at all (5%), don't know (5%), refused to answer (2%).
- Q22 asks how much confidence the recipients have in the declared election results (the election won by Ahmadinejad). The answers are: a lot (62%), some (21%), not much (6%), not at all (7%), don't know (3%), refused to answer (2%).
- Q24 asks if the recipients consider Ahmadinejad to be the legitimate President: The answers are: yes (81%), no (10%), don't know (3%), refused to answer (5%).
- Q25 asks how honest the recipients think Ahmadinejad is when he speaks to the people. The answers are: very much (48%), somewhat (33%), not very (6%), not at all (5%), don't know (5%), refused to answer (3%).
- Q26 asks if the recipients think the Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Khamenei) should have given his support to Ahmadinejad after the election. The answers are: should have (76%), should not have (13%), don't know (6%), refused to answer (5%).
Q27 asks about the relationships between the press and the government. 36% chose the answer that the press should have the right to publish news and ideas without any government control and 58% chose the opposite answer. Some 4% of the answers were “don’t knows” and 2% refused to answer.

Q28 asks the extent of people’s freedom to express controversial political views without fear of being harassed or punished. The answers are: completely free (27%), somewhat free (44%), not very much (12%), not at all (11%), don’t know (4%), refused to answer (2%).

Q29 asks whether or not respondents trust the government to do the right thing. The answers are: most of the time (54%), some of the time (31%), rarely (9%), never (2%), don’t know (2%), refused to answer (1%). In respect of this question, positive answers increased from the Feb. 2008 poll (48% – 54%) conducted by WPO notwithstanding the fact that just before the 2009 poll there was a series of violent suppression of popular protests in the form of street demonstrations in Tehran and in several other cities.

Q32 asks how much the respondents are satisfied with Iran’s system of government. The answers are: very much (41%), somewhat (46%), not very (7%), not at all (3%), don’t know (1%), refused to answer (1%).

Q33 asks if the respondents think the way the Supreme Leader is selected is consistent with the principles of democracy. The answers are: yes (55%), no (14%), depends (5%), don’t know (19%), refused to answer (7%).

Appendix II. Trendline Data of Pre-Election Voting Intentions in TU-Jun09

Below is an overview summary of the eight opinion polls conducted by the University of Tehran survey group from 19 May to 11 June, the day before voting.

In the first three polls conducted in May, Ahmadinejad kept ahead of the other candidates for the presidency, but his support declined continuously from 63% to 56% and then sank as low as 48%. In this same period, Mousavi’s support started from 19%, and contrary to the level of support given to to Ahmadinejad, increased steadily to 26%, finally reaching 30%.

In the fourth opinion poll conducted on 1 June, Ahmadinejad’s support reached a low point of 39%, but was still higher than Mousavi’s, which remained steady at about 30%.

In the fifth poll conducted on 4 June, Ahmadinejad’s support recovered dramatically to 48%, and this continued to increase, reaching 52% in the period 6-8 J une, 54% in the period 9-10 J une, and finally hit a 57% high on 11 June. In this
same period Mousavi’s support decreased slightly but consistently to 29% on 4 June, 28% in the period 6-8 June, and 27% on 11 June. The only exception to the trend was a sharp dip to 23% in the period 9-10 June.

- During the period in which the opinion polls were carried out, support for the Presidential candidates Mohsen Rezai and Mehdi Karrubi remained very low throughout, at between 7% and 1%.
- As to the sample size of the number of respondents interviewed by telephone, according to the pollsters’ records, in the first poll (May 18-21) 1,166 were interviewed, in the second (May 22-23) 3,657, in the third (May 25-28) 1,091, in the fourth (June 1) 625, in the fifth (June 4) 543, in the sixth (June 6-8) 2,084, in the seventh (June 9-10) 1,009, and in the eighth (June 11) 450.

List of References