In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.
権利
Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア経済研究所 / Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
雑誌名
IDE Discussion Paper
雑誌名(英)
IDE Discussion Paper
巻
287
発行年
2011-03-01
出版者
Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO)
著者版フラグ
publisher
日本十進分類法
678.1
JEL分類
JEL:F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations; International Organizations
JEL:F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
JEL:L52 - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
JEL:C72 - Noncooperative Games
Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition
本文
(1.4MB)
