In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzes a country's decisions concerning antidumping (AD) action against two foreign countries and the relationship between those decisions and regional trade agreements (RTAs). An RTA intensifies product-market competition in the markets of member countries and lowers product prices, while it raises export prices of goods subject to tariff reductions. This effect widens the dumping margin of the non-member firm and narrows the dumping margin of the member firm. If the government is more concerned with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may invoke the member's AD action against the nonmember. If the governments attach a sufficiently high value on social welfare, however, the RTA may promote the AD action against the member. If the governments' weight on the domestic firm's profit is neither high nor low, an RTA may block the AD actions against both countries.
権利
Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア経済研究所 / Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
雑誌名
IDE Discussion Paper
雑誌名(英)
IDE Discussion Paper
巻
611
発行年
2016-07-01
出版者
Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-JETRO)
著者版フラグ
publisher
日本十進分類法
678
JEL分類
JEL:F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
JEL:F13 - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
JEL:F15 - Economic Integration
JEL:L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
地域/国名
世界、その他
キーワード(LSH)
International trade
International agreements
Preferential trade liberalization
Antidumping
International oligopoly
Preferential trade agreements and antidumping actions against members and nonmembers
本文
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